Hitler's fireman nickname. Field Marshal Walter model. Beginning of a military career

03.04.2015

As part of the project dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the Victory, we continue the series of publications under the heading “Commanders: a double portrait against the background of the battle.” Studying the biographies and personalities of the commanders who opposed each other, you inevitably come across unexpected parallels that encourage you to take a fresh look at those tragic but great events.

MIKHAIL EFREMOV AND WALTER MODEL: THE RED COMMANDER VERSUS “FIREMAN FURER”

During the counteroffensive of Soviet troops near Moscow in December 1941 - January 1942, the troops of Nazi Germany were forced to retreat from the capital. But the enemy was not thrown back as far as the military-political leadership of the USSR would have liked. The Wehrmacht forces managed to create a powerful - up to 160 km in depth and up to 200 km along the front - Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge, which was considered by the German command as a springboard for a new offensive on the Soviet capital.

The presence of a large German group on the approaches to Moscow forced the troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts to carry out operation after operation for 15 months in order to eliminate the serious danger. Suffice it to say that in a fierce battle in the Vyazma-Gzhatsk-Rzhev-Bely space, up to two-thirds of the troops of Army Group Center were concentrated against the Red Army.

At the beginning of January 1942, the Soviet command decided to conduct the Rzhev-Vyazma offensive operation. In fact, this was the first large-scale attempt by the Red Army to encircle the enemy group in the Moscow direction. Unfortunately, it ended in failure, including because the 33rd Army of Lieutenant General Mikhail Efremov itself ended up in a cauldron and did not emerge from it. The opponent of the Soviet commander here was the commander of the 9th Field Army, General of the Tank Forces Walter Model, a recognized master in conducting defensive battles. Efremov and Model were equally brave, persistent and active commanders. They were to a certain extent similar - loyal soldiers of their leaders, firm bearers of the dominant ideologies, specialists in military affairs. They even accepted death in the same way...

Mikhail Grigorievich Efremov was born on February 27, 1897 in the city of Tarusa, Kaluga province, into a family of poor townspeople. From childhood, he helped his father on the farm until he was noticed by the merchant Ryabov, who received the consent of his parents to take the boy to his manufacturing factory in Moscow. The factory was located in Bolshoy Voskresensky Lane, where Mikhail initially worked as an apprentice. Soon he entered the engraving workshop to study. He really liked this job, the income was reliable, which allowed the teenager to move from a rooming house to an apartment. After some time, the boy entered the six-year Prechistensky work courses, which he successfully completed.

After the outbreak of World War I, Mikhail was drafted into the army. In September 1915 he joined the 55th reserve regiment. Since he had a six-year education, he was sent to Georgia, to the city of Telavi, to the school of warrant officers. In the spring of 1916, having replaced the cadet shoulder straps with the shoulder straps of a junior officer, Efremov was sent to the Southwestern Front. Here he was enlisted in a heavy artillery division and, as part of it, took part in the famous Brusilov breakthrough in Galicia.

Efremov liked military service. Ordinary soldiers loved him because he was always nearby in battle, and did not shy away from replacing even the gunner, even the castle commander, even the carrier of shells, when one of the gun servants dropped out.

COMMANDER OF THE 33rd ARMY LIEUTENANT GENERAL M.G. EFREMOV

In 1917, unrest arose at the front. In the army, the plebeian-soldier masses hanged, shot, drowned their officers, and fraternized with the enemy. Committing treason, the soldiers - under the influence of enemy propaganda - left their positions and deserted to the rear. Efremov resisted these unrest up to a certain point, but soon the elements of chaos captured him too. He returned to Moscow, where in November 1917 he took part in the suppression of the cadet uprising.

During the Civil War, Efremov fought on the Southern and Caucasian fronts, going from company commander to corps commander. He successfully commanded a detachment of four armored trains of the 11th Army in the Baku operation, for which he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and the Order of the Red Banner of the Azerbaijan SSR No. 1. In 1920, Mikhail Grigorievich graduated from the Higher Military Academic Courses, commanded the 33rd separate rifle regiment division that contributed to the Bolshevik uprising in Georgia.

In 1921, Efremov’s formation under the leadership of M. Tukhachevsky suppressed the Tambov uprising, which the Bolsheviks dubbed the Antonov rebellion. Units of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) used all means, including chemical weapons, against the rebellious people. There is still debate in historical circles about what Efremov’s role was in these tragic events. According to one version, he did not share the position of Tukhachevsky, who demanded brutal reprisals against the rebels. Nevertheless, the further military career of M. G. Efremov was very successful, and this gives grounds to assert that the future commander of the 33rd Army was involved in the crimes committed in 1921 in the Tambov region.

After the Civil War, Efremov served in command positions. In 1927 he was in China as a military adviser. A year later, he commanded the 18th Yaroslavl Rifle Division, and then entered the Courses for the High Command of the Red Army. In 1929, Efremov studied at the faculty of single commanders at the Military-Political Academy named after. N. G. Tolmacheva in Leningrad. In 1930 he entered the Special Group of the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze. In 1933, Mikhail Grigorievich completed his training and received the following certification: “Healthy, energetic, hardy combat commander...

In 1937-1940. Efremov commanded the troops of the Transbaikal, Oryol, North Caucasus and Transcaucasian military districts. The most difficult year for Mikhail Grigorievich turned out to be 1938, when a large-scale purge of the Red Army command cadres unfolded in the USSR. Efremov was summoned to Moscow, placed in the Moscow Hotel and placed under house arrest. The NKVD suspected him of having connections with the “enemy of the people” Tukhachevsky. The interrogations lasted two and a half months. Efremov sent several letters to old friends - K. E. Voroshilov and A. I. Mikoyan - asking for help. As a result, the matter ended with interrogation in the presence of Stalin, after which the military leader was released.

Efremov faced the war with the rank of lieutenant general and as commander of the 21st Army. The army fought as part of the Western Front and fought in the Mogilev direction. On August 7, 1941, Mikhail Grigorievich was appointed commander of the troops of the Central Front. Subsequently, he became deputy commander of the Bryansk Front and commanded the 10th Army. In October 1941, he was confirmed as commander of the 33rd Army, with which the last stage of his military career and life was associated.

MODERNIZATION FANATIC

Walter Model was born in the village of Gentheim near Magdeburg on January 24, 1891 (Saxony-Anhalt). His parents were Lutherans and at baptism they gave the baby the name Otto Moritz Walter.

Like Efremov, Model came from an environment in which officer service seemed not only undesirable, but also unlikely. His father, Otto, was a pastor, senior seminary teacher, and later a church choir conductor. Mother Model came from an ordinary peasant family; her family included horse traders and innkeepers. However, Walter’s uncle, Martin, was listed as a reserve officer in the 52nd regiment.

According to some European researchers, the future Hitlerite general was distantly related to the leader of the world proletariat, Vladimir Ulyanov-Lenin, who, despite the multinationality of his family tree, as is known, did not belong to any Russian or European aristocratic family. These historians (though it is still unclear on what sources) believe that Lenin was a relative of Model on his mother’s side. Whether the field marshal himself suspected such a relationship - history is silent. This curious fact of his biography still raises many questions in serious scientific circles today.

Model received his education at the Erfurt gymnasium, and his schoolmate was Hans-Valentin Hube, who later became a famous Colonel General of the Wehrmacht and a holder of the Knight's Cross, the Iron Cross with oak leaves, swords and diamonds. As for Walter, at that time he was a sickly boy who, from an early age, surprised teachers with his unconventional thinking. He loved Greek and Latin and had a keen interest in history.

COMMANDER OF THE 9TH FIELD ARMY COLONEL GENERAL WALTER MODEL

In 1906, young Model saw the training of the Jaeger battalion stationed near Naumburg. From that time on, Walter began to dream of an army. Two years later, Model begged his uncle, an officer, to use his influence so that his nephew was accepted into the military school in the city of Neisse as a candidate officer of the 52nd Brandenburg Infantry Regiment. Hube's faithful friend also followed suit.

Despite the health problems that periodically arose with Model during training, on August 22, 1910, he was still awarded the rank of lieutenant and sent as a junior officer to the 11th company of the 52nd regiment.

When World War I began, Model was sent to the Western Front. He fought in the infantry, was wounded several times and was awarded the Iron Cross, 1st class, for his bravery. He was also awarded a very rare and honorable award - the Knight's Cross of the Royal Household Order of Hohenzollern with Swords. At the end of the war, the promising officer was transferred to the General Staff in Berlin, without undergoing the necessary training at the military academy. Model soon gained fame thanks to his book about Field Marshal von Gneisenau (1760-1831).

During the period between the two world wars, Model became a military specialist in technical matters. He went on a six-week tour of secret Reichswehr training camps in the Soviet Union. The model arrived in the USSR together with a group of officers, which included Walter von Brauchitsch (in 1938-1941, commander-in-chief of the Reich Land Forces), Wilhelm Keitel (in 1939-1945, chief of staff of the OKW) and Erich Köstring (from 1944, chief volunteer units). The delegation visited several units of the Red Army. As a result of this visit, the young major of the General Staff prepared a technical review of the state of the Red Army's weapons. In addition, according to Model’s acquaintances, his visit to the Land of the Soviets gave him “a persistent hostility to everything connected with communism.”

In 1930, Model took the position of head of the 4th department of the Reichswehr Personnel Directorate, and then became head of the technical department of the army. With Hitler's rise to power, Model turned into a Nazi supporter and fanatical follower. He met Goebbels, on whom he made a very favorable impression, and he, in turn, introduced him to the Fuhrer, whose opinion turned out to be no less favorable.

The model was personally involved in a detailed study of the experience of using tanks and aircraft in Spain. In the winter of 1937-1938. he toured the border with Czechoslovakia to test the prospects of using siege weapons against the line of Czech fortifications. Model's enthusiasm for military innovation earned him the nickname "modernization fanatic." In March 1938 he was promoted to major general, and 8 months later he was appointed chief of staff of the IV Army Corps in Dresden.

During the capture of Poland in September 1939, Model proved himself to be a talented chief of staff. Soon, however, not only operational tasks fell on his shoulders, but also the functions of maintaining security in the rear of his association. He was forced to organize transport convoys and guard prisoners. He had to use “anti-partisan measures,” which often amounted to the destruction of disloyal populations. The IV Corps combat journal for this period preserved reports of punitive raids, burned villages and executions. A number of such documents bear the signature of the Model. It is no coincidence that after the war he was declared a war criminal.

Model performed well in the French campaign, leading the headquarters of the 16th Army. But Model’s talent truly revealed itself during the war against the Soviet Union. Commanding the 3rd Panzer Division, which was part of Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group, he crossed the Bug, then the Berezina and the Dnieper, took Bobruisk, took part in the battles of Bialystok, Minsk and Smolensk. It was Model who was at the forefront of Guderian’s tank armadas, which closed the notorious cauldron near Kiev. In October 1941, he took part in the attack on Moscow, during which he was promoted to general of tank forces. Finally, on January 12, 1942, Model was appointed commander of the 9th Army. Hitler believed that Model would carry out any of his orders and stabilize the situation near Rzhev and Vyazma.

WESTERN FRONT. HEROES OF THE RZHEV FOREST. LEFT TO RIGHT: MAJOR I.T. SELENKOVICH AND BATTALION COMMISSIONER I.V. LEBEDEV. NOVEMBER 1942 PUBLISHED FOR THE FIRST TIME

Photo by A. Garanin/archive of the Voeninform Agency of the Russian Defense Ministry

RZHEVSK-VYAZMSKAYA Slaughterhouse

The Soviet command made an attempt to eliminate the German group of troops in the central strategic direction as soon as the Wehrmacht was driven back from Moscow. It was decided to carry out the Rzhev-Vyazma offensive operation at the beginning of 1942. The purpose of the operation was to complete the defeat of Army Group Center. The directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of January 7, 1942 planned to “encircle and then capture or destroy the entire Mozhaisk-Gzhatsk-Vyazma group of the enemy.”

The offensive was carried out by troops of the Western (Army General G.K. Zhukov) and Kalinin (Colonel General I.S. Konev) fronts. As part of two fronts, troops from 14 armies, three cavalry and one airborne corps, and front-line air forces with the involvement of additional air forces took part in the operation.

Army Group Center (Field Marshal G. Kluge) at that time included two field and two tank armies. In quantitative terms, Soviet troops on this section of the front numbered more than 688,000 people, 10,900 guns and mortars, 474 tanks, the Wehrmacht - about 625,000 people, about 11,000 guns and mortars, 354 tanks.

The troops of the Western Front entered the operation on January 9-10. The main blow was delivered in the Vyazma direction by the armies of the left wing of the front. During fierce battles, the Yukhnov group of Germans was covered from three sides. Units of the 50th Army (Lieutenant General I.V. Boldin) and the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps (Major General P.A. Belov) bypassed Yukhnov from the south and southeast, and bypassed it from the north and northeast troops of the 43rd (Major General K.D. Golubev) and 49th Army (Lieutenant General I.G. Zakharkin). Belov's strike group was supposed to, interacting with the Rzhev group, play a major role in the encirclement of the 4th and 9th armies of the Wehrmacht. In mid-January, Belov’s formations began fighting in the Warsaw Highway area. On January 27, five cavalry divisions broke through it behind enemy lines.

On January 19, the advancing units of the 33rd Army of General Efremov captured the city of Vereya and broke through the enemy’s defenses. On January 30, by order of the front commander, the army’s strike group was instructed to “cover a distance from 25 to 90 km within 1-1.5 days and then, in cooperation with the group of the general. Belov to take possession of Vyazma." The order was carried out, and on February 1, the divisions of the 33rd Army began fighting 7-8 km south and southeast of Vyazma. According to various estimates, there were up to 16 thousand people in the broken formations and other units.

It was impossible to surrender Vyaz to the Germans, since it was a key point of defense, where, among other things, the headquarters of three armies were located: the 9th field - Walter Model, the 4th field - Lieutenant General Gotthard Heinrici and the 4th tank - Lieutenant General Richard Ruoff.

Model quickly realized that there was a threat of death not only to his army, but also to the entire Army Group Center. He repeatedly went to the front line to personally familiarize himself with the situation. Model saved the 9th Army as a result of a counterattack from Rzhev and Olenin. Thanks to this blow, he surrounded the formations of the 39th and 29th armies. True, at the end of February 1942, units of the two armies, suffering heavy losses, nevertheless broke out of the encirclement.

Of course, the front was still far from completely stabilized. Model's significantly weakened forces were subject to constant attacks from the 22nd, 31st, 30th and 1st Shock Armies. When attacking German positions, Soviet military leaders did not bother themselves with tactical delights, but simply exhausted both themselves and the enemy with large-scale frontal attacks, wave after wave, in terrible frosts.

The western group of the 33rd Army operated at the junction of the 4th and 9th field armies. Efremov's units besieged Vyazma, cut the Vyazma-Bryansk railway and in early February 1942 carried out continuous attacks. But they were never able to capture the city. After February 3, the troops of Model and Heinrici managed to eliminate the breakthroughs north and south of Yukhnov. As a result, Efremov's division, parts of Belov's 1st Guards Cavalry Corps and the 8th Airborne Brigade of the Western Front found themselves surrounded.

Zhukov tried to help his cut off troops. The front commander first demanded that the command of the 43rd Army restore the situation near Yukhnov. Then the troops of the 49th and 50th armies were involved. The encircled divisions conducted active battles. Zhukov promised Efremov and Belov that help would come to them. But the command of Army Group Center strengthened the defense of its troops near Yukhnov, and all attempts to break through it from the outside failed.

For the encircled Western group of the 33rd Army, a period of survival began. The attacks on Vyazma were stopped. Both because of futility, and because there was no one and nothing to attack. For almost the entire month of February, Efremov kept his divisions at their previous lines. During this period, strict and brief orders were sent to division headquarters, the essence of which boiled down to one thing: to hold out until the last.

Meanwhile, the Eastern Group of the 33rd Army continued to attempt a breakthrough. On February 19, in a stubborn battle, during which both sides suffered heavy losses, including tanks, battalions of the 266th and 129th regiments of the 93rd Infantry Division broke into the outskirts of Pinashino. But they couldn’t stay there.

At the beginning of March, another attempt was made by the encircled units of the 33rd Army from the inside and the strike group of the 43rd Army from the outside to break through the pocket. The German command transferred additional forces here. The distance between the Soviet troops was reduced to 2 km, but they could not be overcome. From that time on, the position of the 33rd Army began to deteriorate every day. On March 11, there were 12,789 people in the encircled units and formations of Efremov’s army. By the end of March, Belov’s group had approximately 17 thousand people (primarily thanks to local partisan detachments that joined his corps).

A special message from the head of the special department of the NKVD of the Western Front dated April 8, 1942 spoke about the difficult situation with the supply of ammunition and food in the 33rd Army: “A significant part of the artillery has been mothballed due to the lack of fuel and ammunition... Losses from 1.02 to 13.03.1942 .are killed - 1290 people, wounded - 2531 people... Replenishment of personnel is not carried out... Food consists of a small amount of boiled rye and horse meat. There is absolutely no salt, fat or sugar. Due to malnutrition, cases of illness among fighters have become more frequent... On the night of March 15, two fighters died of exhaustion.”

Model and Heinrici sent units of seven divisions against the divisions of General Efremov. The encirclement ring narrowed to dimensions of 10 by 25 km. In April, Efremov and Belov were given permission to leave the boiler. The command of the 33rd Army, in particular, was ordered to go out through the forests through the partisan areas in the direction of Kirov, where the 10th Army was preparing to break through the enemy’s defenses. But half-starved people, among whom there were many wounded and sick, would hardly have been able to overcome 150-180 km in conditions of spring thaw. Efremov had to look for another route and at the same time fight heavy battles.

On April 3, 1942, Luftwaffe planes scattered leaflets over the cauldron with an ultimatum, which also stated: “The German soldier and the German leadership have respect for the courage of the encircled 33rd Red Army and the 113th, 160th and 338th subordinates. th rifle divisions. This army fights bravely. It had been surrounded since the beginning of February due to the Soviet government's failure to appreciate the importance of German military power. All attempts by your army to break through the ring formed around it were unsuccessful. They only caused huge casualties. Also in the future, these three brave divisions will not be able to break through the German lines.”

But even in a difficult situation, Efremov did not lose heart and set up his commanders and personnel for a breakthrough. On April 7, a plane landed in the encircled area to pick up the commander of the 33rd Army. The army commander refused to fly. He ordered the units’ banners to be loaded and told the pilot, when he once again reminded Efremov of Stalin’s order: “I came here with the soldiers, and I will go out with the soldiers.”

In mid-April, the last attempt was made by the remnants of the 33rd Army to leave the pocket. But she was not successful either. Together with Efremov, a group of about 2 thousand people broke through. In one of the battles, the army commander was seriously wounded and could no longer physically lead the fighting. He was carried on a stretcher as machine gunners, the last soldiers from his headquarters, fought off attacks by German infantry. Efremov understood that this was the end. He was afraid that he would be in a state of weakness and would no longer be able to control himself. On April 18, 1942, Mikhail Grigorievich, who was with a small group near the village of Zhary, took out a pistol and shot himself in the temple...

Meanwhile, fierce fighting continued. The soldiers and commanders accompanying the army commander were mostly killed, and those who were wounded were finished off by the search teams of the 4th Field Army who were combing the area. Few managed to escape from the cauldron. Approximately 230 people crossed the front line and reached the location of the 43rd Army. Another 670 people remained in the occupied territory and joined the partisan detachments. But most of the 33rd Army - about 10,600 people - was destroyed.

The body of Lieutenant General Efremov fell into the hands of the enemy. However, the Germans buried him with full military honors. According to one version, the order for the solemn funeral was given by Model himself. He allegedly was present at the burial of Efremov in the village of Slobodka and made a short speech addressed to the German soldiers: “You must fight for Germany as bravely and courageously as this general did for his Russia!”

SERVANTS OF LEADERS, FATHERS OF SOLDIERS

The Rzhev-Vyazemsk operation of 1942 is considered one of the bloodiest operations of the Great Patriotic War. Officially, the Western and Kalinin fronts lost 776,889 people, according to independent researchers - more than 950 thousand soldiers and officers. Some experts believe that the culprit for the death of the 33rd Army was personally the commander of the Western Front (later - the commander-in-chief of the Western direction) G. K. Zhukov. It was his mistakes, in their opinion, that led to the tragic ending. It should be added that, in addition to the 33rd Army, the 1st Guards and 11th Cavalry Corps, the 39th and 29th armies of the Kalinin Front were thrown into the enemy’s deep rear. In the absence of second and subsequent echelons, this could easily lead to the encirclement of the forces that broke through, which is what happened.

The reasons for the failure in the battles of Rzhev and Vyazma are underestimation of the Western direction, the forces of possible resistance of the enemy and his ability to quickly maneuver reserves. Responsibility for the tragedy automatically falls not only on Zhukov, but also on the top military leadership, which set impossible tasks for the troops of the Western direction.

Of course, during the Rzhev-Vyazemsk operation, Soviet troops completely liberated the Moscow, Tula, and part of the Kalinin (now Tver) region, but its main goal - the destruction of Army Group Center - was not achieved.

Undoubtedly, the fact that the Rzhev-Vyazemsk operation failed was a huge credit to Model. It was he who saved Army Group Center from defeat. For his victory, Model received the rank of colonel general. Hitler personally presented him with oak leaves for the Knight's Cross (the general was awarded the Knight's Cross back in July 1941 for the capture of Bobruisk). German troops gained a foothold in the Rzhev-Vyazma bridgehead, which created a constant threat of a new offensive on Moscow.

Like Mikhail Efremov, Walter Model was devoted to the leader of his state, Adolf Hitler. By order of the Fuhrer, he went to where the situation was critical for the Wehrmacht. And it is no coincidence that the general received the nicknames “Hitler’s fireman” and “lion of defense.” It was he who held the Rzhev ledge throughout 1942, arranging a real bloodbath for the Red Army, so even today researchers provide different data about the dead soldiers and commanders of the Red Army. According to Marshal V. G. Kulikov, the total losses of Soviet troops in the Rzhev-Vyazma direction in 1942-1943. amounted to about 2.5 million people.

The model is rightfully considered a “master of retreats.” In addition to the fact that the German general defeated G.K. Zhukov for the second time - whose operation codenamed "Mars" failed - he managed, as part of Operation Buffalo, to withdraw German troops to new frontiers in March 1943. For the successful completion of this operation, Model was awarded swords to the Knight's Cross.

However, the withdrawal of German troops was accompanied by numerous war crimes. Model personally ordered the evacuation of the entire male population of military age, the confiscation of all food supplies, the poisoning of wells and the burning of many villages to the ground. It was these orders, as well as the brutal nature of the anti-partisan actions, that led the Soviet Union to declare Walter Model a war criminal.

Like Efremov, Model paid great attention to the training and provision of soldiers. He was known as a tough and demanding commander who was not used to sitting at headquarters, but preferred to personally control the situation in the combat formations entrusted to him, often appearing on the front line. “His hard face with a large monocle and short manner of speaking,” recalled one officer, “had an unpleasant effect on those who did not know him. He seemed ungracious. His visits were always very short.” Even Guderian, under whose command Model entered the war against the Soviet Union, noted that the “brave and tireless” Model was “no good for lazy and incapable subordinates, because he resolutely got his way.”

However, Model knew how to win over both commanders and soldiers, so people who knew him well spoke very kindly of him. In particular, the commander of the 6th Infantry Division of the 9th Army, General Horst Grossman, noted in his memoirs: “He gave the impression of a small but strong man. His head was framed by thick black and gray hair. By his clear, despite the thick glass of the monocle, open and kind gray-blue eyes, one could judge the kindness of his heart.”

The model was not always lucky. During the Battle of Kursk, the 9th Army did not show itself in the best way. The offensive on the front sector, which was led by the “lion of defense,” started poorly and developed even worse. As a result, the goals set by the Citadel plan were never achieved. However, Hitler's faith in Model was practically not shaken by the defeat at Kursk.

At the end of January 1944, Model became commander of Army Group North. He had to not so much resist the advancing Soviet troops as, if possible, delay their advance and withdraw his forces. The model managed to move away from the Panther line, occupying a line from Narva along the western shore of Lake Peipsi and the Velikaya River to the location of Reinhardt’s 3rd Tank Army, and held there, stopping the Soviet offensive. For this withdrawal of troops, he received the rank of Field Marshal on March 1, 1944. Hitler soon sent him to Ukraine, where he replaced Manstein as commander of Army Group Northern Ukraine.

During the Soviet offensive Operation Bagration, Army Group Center found itself in a desperate situation. The model was urgently sent to Belarus, retaining his previous position. In fact, he commanded most of the German troops on the Eastern Front. When the Red Army stopped on the outskirts of Warsaw in August 1944, Hitler proclaimed Model the “savior of the Eastern Front” and awarded him diamonds to the Knight’s Cross.

In August 1944, Model became commander-in-chief in the West. At first, he managed to hold back the onslaught of Anglo-American troops, but then his formations were defeated by Allied forces in the Ardennes (December 1944 - January 1945) and during the Meuse-Rhine operation (February-March 1945).

At the beginning of April 1945, Model was surrounded during the Ruhr operation. He looked for a gap in the American lines to slip through, but it was all in vain. The field marshal had no intention of surrendering. He told his staff officers: “The Russians have declared me a war criminal, and the Americans will certainly hand me over to them to hang. My time has come." On April 21, 1945, near the village of Vedau, Walter Model took his service pistol out of its holster and, like Efremov, shot himself.

Saxony-Anhalt in the family of a seminary teacher. Graduated from a military school. In the army since 1909, he served as a fanen cadet in the 52nd Infantry Regiment. In 1910 he was promoted to the officer rank of lieutenant. Participant of the First World War on the Western Front. For his services he received the Iron Cross, 1st degree (1917) and a number of other orders, and was promoted to the rank of captain in November 1917). He was wounded several times.

Between world wars

Since 1919, he served in the General Staff, was the head of the personnel training department of the War Ministry, and the head of the technical department of the War Ministry. Lieutenant Colonel (1932). In 1934 he was promoted to colonel, and in 1938 to major general. Since October 1938 - Chief of Staff of the 4th Army Corps.

Beginning of World War II

As chief of staff of the 4th Army Corps, he entered World War II and participated in the invasion of Poland. In October 1939, he was appointed chief of staff of the 16th Army and in this position participated in the French campaign. Since November 1940 - commander of the 3rd Tank Division. This division was transferred to Poland and included in General Heinz Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group.

In battles on the Eastern Front (1941-1944)

On June 22, 1941, he entered the war on the Eastern Front, crossing the state border of the USSR. As part of Army Group Center, he participated in the Border Battle in Belarus, the Battle of Vitebsk, and the Battle of Smolensk. One of the executors of the grandiose encirclement of Soviet troops in the Kyiv operation. In maneuver battles in the summer of 1941, he achieved outstanding successes against the Red Army and became one of the most famous generals of the Wehrmacht. From October 1941, he commanded the 41st Tank Corps of the 3rd Tank Group and participated in the Battle of Moscow. When Hitler, after the defeat near Moscow, removed several dozen of his generals from their posts, Model in January 1942 was appointed to the vacant post of commander of the 9th Army.

In this post, for over a year he led the actions of German troops in the Battle of Rzhev, where he again managed to inflict significant losses on Soviet troops (according to various estimates from 1 to 2 million people) and repel several major offensives of the Red Army: the Rzhev-Vyazemsk operation in January - April 1942, The first Rzhev-Sychev operation, Operation Mars. For more than a year, Model’s army held a bridgehead near Rzhev and in numerous battles repelled the Red Army’s attempts to capture the city. But in the spring of 1943, due to the general deterioration of the situation on the Soviet-German front, Model withdrew his troops from the Rzhev salient, repelling the attempts of the Soviet command to defeat the retreating 9th Army. Colonel General (02/1/1942).

Model's 9th Army, withdrawn from Rzhev, dealt the main blow to the northern front of the Kursk Bulge in the summer campaign of 1943. However, in the Battle of Kursk, which began on July 5, its troops were only able to move forward slightly with heavy losses, and then were thrown back to the starting line by the Soviet Central Front under the command of K.K. Rokossovsky. This battle was Model's first defeat. Then, at the head of the army, he acted in the Oryol operation and in the battle for the Dnieper. For the second time he suffered a serious defeat in the Bryansk operation.

On January 31, 1944, Model was appointed commander of Army Group North, which at that time was suffering a severe defeat in the Leningrad-Novgorod operation. During February, Model managed to turn a disorderly retreat into a systematic withdrawal and by the beginning of March finally stop the Soviet offensive near Narva and Pskov, thwarting the plans of the Soviet command for a deep breakthrough into the Baltic states. For this success, on March 1, 1944, Model was awarded the rank of Field Marshal. On the same day, he was transferred to the south and appointed commander of Army Group South, which in April was renamed Army Group Northern Ukraine. The model is often credited with success in stopping the Soviet offensive near Tarnopol in April 1944, but it must be taken into account that by that time Soviet troops had been continuously advancing for over three months during the Dnieper-Carpathian operation, had fought almost a thousand kilometers and no longer had the opportunity to continue continuous offensive.

This publication provides historical portraits of the most famous military leaders of the West who fought against Russia in the Patriotic War of 1812 and the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. In general historical works there are references to all these figures, but nothing more. Therefore, both specialist historians and a wide range of readers will undoubtedly be interested in learning more about the life and activities of Napoleon’s marshals and military leaders of the Third Reich. The final part presents the commanders of the Great French Revolution, who fought for new ideals and brought liberation from feudal oppression to the people.

First of all, each character is shown as a military leader with all his advantages and disadvantages, his role and place in history are determined, and the qualities of the commander as a person are revealed.

Walther model

Walther model

German military leader Model Walter (01/24/1891, Gentin, near Magdeburg, - 04/21/1945, Lintorf, near Duisburg), Field Marshal (1944). Son of a music teacher.

He spent his childhood in poverty. In military service since 1909. As a candidate for officer rank (Fanen-Junker) he served in the 52nd Infantry Regiment. In 1910 he was promoted to officer, receiving the rank of junior lieutenant. Promotion in the Kaiser's army was very slow, not only for officers from the common people, such as Model, but even for those from the nobility. Therefore, until the outbreak of the First World War, Model remained in his previous rank. Participant of the First World War on the Western Front. He spent almost the entire war at the front, in combat units, commanding a company. At that time these people were called “trenchmen.” He was wounded several times and was awarded a number of awards for military distinctions, including the Iron Cross of the 2nd and 1st degrees. At the end of the war he was transferred to the General Staff (an exceptional case for an officer who did not have a Military Academy behind him).

He finished the war as a chief lieutenant. After the liquidation of the Kaiser's army, he was left to serve in the Reichswehr - the army of the Weimar Republic (1919). He served in the 2nd Infantry Regiment, stationed in East Prussia.

At the end of the 1920s, he was transferred to the War Ministry, where he held the position of head of the personnel training department, then of the technical department. The author, who gained great fame, wrote a book about one of the heroes of the Liberation War of the German people from the Napoleonic yoke in 1813, Field Marshal A. Gneisenau. Promotion in the Reichswehr was also quite slow. Only at the end of 1932 Model received the rank of lieutenant colonel. As a technical specialist as part of the Reichswehr military delegation, he visited.

In January 1933, he supported the Nazis' rise to power in Germany and immediately became their active supporter, and later a fanatical adherent. This line of behavior of Model greatly contributed to his military career. He met Goebbels, who introduced him to A. Hitler. Model made a favorable impression on the Fuhrer and gained his favor. In 1934 he received the rank of colonel, and in 1938 he was promoted to major general.

During the Czechoslovak crisis of 1938, on Hitler's instructions, it was planned to appoint Model as chief of staff of a group of troops intended to invade Czechoslovakia. But after the Munich Agreement, the need to create such a group disappeared. In October 1938, Model was appointed chief of staff of the 4th Army Corps - 4th Military District (headquarters Dresden), commanded by General W. von Schwedler. In this position, he participated in the Polish campaign of 1939, during which the 4th Army Corps was part of the 10th Army (General W. von Reichenau), operating in the main direction. During the French campaign of 1940, he was chief of staff of the 16th Army (General E. Bush).

In November 1940, Model was appointed commander of the 3rd Panzer Division and promoted to lieutenant general. At the head of this division, which was part of the 2nd Panzer Group of General G. Guderian, Model entered the war against the Soviet Union (June 1941). Units of the 3rd Tank Division successfully fought near Bialystok, Minsk and Smolensk, crossed the Western Bug, Berezina and Dnieper rivers, and took Bobruisk. Being at the forefront of the attack by Guderian's tank group, Model's division played an important role in the encirclement and defeat of large groups of Soviet troops south and southwest of Smolensk (July-August 1941). Then, when the 2nd Panzer Group turned south, Model was still operating in the direction of its main attack. On September 15, 1941, his division linked up with the 9th Panzer Division of Kleist's 1st Panzer Group, which was advancing from the south, from the Dnieper, towards the 2nd Panzer Group. As a result, the encirclement operation of the Kyiv group of Soviet troops was completed - the largest encirclement operation in the entire Second World War. In October 1941, he was appointed commander of the 41st Tank Corps, which was part of the 3rd Tank Group (General G. Reinhardt), and at the same time received the rank of general of tank forces. For military services in the summer-autumn campaign of 1941 he was awarded the Knight's Cross.

In the fall of 1941, he took part in the attack on Moscow, which ended in failure for the Nazi troops. Here, near Moscow, the Wehrmacht suffered its first major defeat since the beginning of World War II. On the snowy fields of the Moscow region, the Red Army, having dealt a crushing blow to the Nazi troops, dispelled the myth of their invincibility. On January 16, 1942, Model was appointed commander of the 9th Army. His appointment to this high position took place, one might say, out of turn. Despite the objections of some senior military leaders who believed that the 51-year-old General Model, who only 3 months earlier had commanded only a division, was still young and not experienced enough to hold such a position, Hitler still insisted on his candidacy. This time the Fuhrer was not mistaken in his choice. During the fierce battle that unfolded in the winter of 1941-1942 in the Rzhev region, Model not only saved his army from the threat of encirclement hanging over it and prevented the defeat of the entire left wing of Army Group Center by Soviet troops, but also managed to encircle the Soviet 39th army, the defeat of which was completed by the end of February 1942. For successful actions in the Rzhev region, Hitler promoted Model to colonel general and awarded oak leaves to the Knight's Cross.

Until October 1942, the 9th Army, led by Model, fought successful defensive battles, repelling all attempts by the Soviet troops to eliminate the Rzhev salient of the front it occupied. Model left this ledge only after the disaster that befell the Nazi Wehrmacht at Stalingrad, when it became clear that the offensive from the Rzhev bridgehead to Moscow would not take place in the foreseeable future and there was no point in holding it any longer. In March 1943, Model carried out a rather skillful withdrawal of his troops (17 divisions) from the Rzhev ledge to a new defensive line, located 100-140 km to the west. He carried out the evacuation of the Rzhev bridgehead masterfully, despite the powerful onslaught of the Soviet troops who went on the offensive and had great superiority in forces. After this, the 9th Army was transferred from the northern flank of Army Group Center to the southern, where it was to take part in the offensive Operation Citadel. The commander of the troops of Army Group Center, Field Marshal G. von Kluge, who did not believe in the success of this operation, evaded direct leadership of it by a cunning maneuver, shifting all responsibility to his subordinate, Model.

Thus, Model was entrusted with leadership of the left (northern) wing of the group of Nazi troops that launched an offensive on the Kursk Bulge in the summer of 1943.

It must be said that Model also doubted the successful outcome of the upcoming operation and opposed its implementation. At his insistence, Hitler several times postponed the start of the offensive. The Battle of Kursk, as Model foresaw, ended in another crushing defeat for the Nazi Wehrmacht. His 9th Army also suffered a heavy defeat, unable, despite all the power of the initial blow it inflicted, to overcome the defense in depth of the Soviet troops. Showing the greatest courage, perseverance and heroism, Soviet soldiers repelled a powerful blow from the enemy, against which, it would seem, nothing could withstand. And they not only repulsed, but also inflicted losses on the enemy strike group such that its offensive capabilities were hopelessly undermined. Bleeded in unsuccessful attempts to break through the defenses of the Soviet troops of the Central Front (General K.K. Rokossovsky), the divisions of the 9th Army could not resist the powerful onslaught of the Red Army, which went on a counteroffensive, and began to retreat. We must give Model his due - after a heavy defeat in the Battle of Kursk, he very skillfully organized the withdrawal of his troops and managed to save the main forces of the 9th Army from complete defeat. During the retreat to the Dnieper, following Hitler’s orders, he used the “scorched earth tactics” with particular zeal, showed extreme cruelty towards the civilian population, and actively collaborated with the punitive organs of the SS. On his orders, over 250 thousand civilians were deported to Germany. Retreating to the west, Model’s troops left behind only the smoking ruins of villages and cities burned and razed to the ground. Such actions are defined by all international laws as war crimes, and military leaders who adhere to such methods of warfare are considered war criminals. Model managed to stop the advance of the Soviet troops only in October 1943 at the turn of the Dnieper. He commanded the 9th Army until November 1943. On January 31, 1944, he was appointed commander of Army Group North, replacing Field Marshal G. von Küchler in this post. This group of armies, having been defeated by the Red Army near Novgorod and Leningrad, was in a very difficult situation. In order to force Hitler to at least partially abandon his extravagant idea of ​​defending his occupied lines at all costs, Model proposed a new method of warfare, called “shield and sword.” Its essence was that temporary retreat was allowed if it was necessary to prepare a counterattack. Oddly enough, Model managed to convince Hitler of the feasibility of his proposed method and obtain consent to use it.

However, despite all efforts, Model was still forced to retreat to the Panther line by the beginning of March 1944. Only here, on the approaches to the Baltic states, did he manage to gain a foothold and stabilize the front, which the Nazi troops then held until mid-July. On March 1, 1944, Model was promoted to field marshal general and awarded swords to the Knight's Cross.

But after stabilizing the front in the Army Group North zone, he was transferred by Hitler to another section of the Eastern Front. On March 30, 1944, Model was appointed commander of Army Group South (from April 5, 1944, Army Group Northern Ukraine), replacing Field Marshal General E. von Manstein in this post. Here he also had to restore the defense front of the Nazi troops defeated by the Red Army in Right Bank Ukraine. Model successfully completed this task. The Soviet offensive was stopped and the front in Western Ukraine stabilized until July 1944. After the defeat of Army Group Center in Belarus by the Red Army, Hitler, in order to save the situation in the central sector of the Eastern Front, appointed Model as commander of its remnants (July 28, 1944). Having replaced his former chief, Field Marshal E. Bush, as commander of Army Group Center, Model is making vigorous efforts to save the remnants of this army group that suffered a crushing defeat. He managed to stop the advance of the Soviet troops only at the turn of the Vistula and Narev rivers. Having received reinforcements, Model launched a counterattack, as a result of which he inflicted a serious defeat on the Soviet 2nd Tank Army on the outskirts of Warsaw. In the early autumn of 1944, the strategic breakthrough of the Red Army in the center of the Eastern Front was localized and the front here stabilized until mid-January 1945. Hitler called Model "the savior of the Eastern Front" and awarded him diamonds for the Knight's Cross (August 17, 1944). This was the highest military award in the Third Reich. During the entire Second World War, only 27 people were awarded the Knight's Cross with oak leaves, swords and diamonds, including 4 field marshals. Model was the third of them.

In mid-August 1944, when the defense front in Poland had not yet been completely stabilized, the Fuhrer set a new task for Model - to save the situation on the Western Front, whose troops suffered a heavy defeat from the allied Anglo-American troops in Normandy.

On August 18, 1944, Model replaced his former boss, Field Marshal G. von Kluge, as commander of the Western Front. At the same time, he also headed the command of the troops of Army Group B (7th A, 15th A, 5th TA), which was part of this front, whose commander, Field Marshal General E. Rommel, was out of action due to injury. Having taken command, Model immediately gave the order to withdraw the troops of Army Group B (a total of 14 divisions) from the so-called Falaise pocket. As a result, before the Allies completely closed the encirclement, he managed to withdraw up to half of the troops located there from the “cauldron”. This was a decisive step on the part of the new commander, since his predecessor had failed to obtain permission from Hitler for this.

However, despite all the efforts he made, Model failed to change the unfavorable development of events in the West for the Nazi troops. The tank divisions, the main striking force of the Wehrmacht, suffered especially heavy losses in the battles in Normandy. The enemy completely dominated the air. The combat effectiveness of the troops was inexorably declining.

In this situation, despite Hitler’s categorical order, Model refused to defend Paris, which was surrendered to the Allies on August 25, 1944. And soon almost all of France was abandoned by Nazi troops. Realizing that Model did not live up to the hopes placed on him, Hitler replaced him as commander of the Western Front with Field Marshal G. von Rundstedt (September 5, 1944). Model remained only as the commander of the troops of Army Group B. In September 1944, he won the battle of Arnhem, where the Allied airborne troops were defeated. At the end of 1944, he opposed the counter-offensive in the Ardennes, believing that given the existing balance of forces and means it had no chance of success. The commander (from November 17, 1944, commander-in-chief) of the troops of the Western Front, Rundstedt, shared the same opinion. When Hitler nevertheless insisted on carrying out a counteroffensive, Rundstedt avoided direct leadership of it, entrusting this matter to Model. Presented with a fait accompli, the latter was forced to submit and did everything in his power to ensure success. On December 16, 1944, the troops led by Model went on the offensive, which at first developed successfully. The Allies suffered a serious defeat, because the troops of the 1st American Army, which was the main target, were taken by surprise and were unable to provide adequate resistance and, having suffered heavy losses, retreated.

By December 25, German troops, having broken through the Allied front, moved to a depth of more than 90 km and reached the river. Maas. But here their advance was stopped. All attempts to resume it came to nothing. Already by January 8, 1945, it became clear to the fascist German command that the counteroffensive in the Ardennes had failed. The transition on January 12 to the offensive on the Eastern Front of the Red Army (the Vistula-Oder operation) finally dispelled all the illusions of Hitler’s headquarters about the successful outcome of the counteroffensive undertaken in the West. Since the defense front on the Vistula collapsed in the very first days of the Soviet offensive, an urgent transfer of German troops from West to East began. Under Allied attacks, the remaining troops at Model’s disposal (12 divisions, including 1 tank division) were forced to begin a retreat and by the end of January retreated to their original position. The losses of fascist German troops in the Ardennes operation amounted to about 82 thousand people.

By mid-March 1945, the Allies pushed the Germans back across the Rhine and began the Ruhr offensive operation (March 23 - April 18, 1945). Army Group B, led by Model, by this time included a little more than 30 divisions, most of which were short-staffed by up to 50%. Having crossed the Rhine in the very first days of the offensive, the 1st and 9th American armies began to develop their success in depth, covering the main forces of Army Group B on both flanks. On April 1 they united in the Lipstadt area. Model's main forces were surrounded - about 325 thousand people and he himself with his headquarters. With the encirclement of the Ruhr group of fascist German troops, their Western Front actually disintegrated. The Allies, leaving only part of their forces to eliminate the encircled group, concentrated their main efforts on the outer front of the encirclement. Meeting almost no resistance, they launched a rapid offensive to the east, towards the Elbe River. By April 18, the organized resistance of the Nazi troops in the Ruhr pocket had practically ceased. The headquarters of Army Group B lost control of the troops, and they began to spontaneously and en masse surrender. On April 17, Model disbanded the remnants of his troops, giving every soldier and officer the opportunity to escape as best he could.

In recent months, the field marshal has been in an extremely depressed state of mind. Having long been disillusioned with the favorable outcome of the war for Germany, he fought his last battle in the Ruhr Pocket without the same energy and determination. The stamp of complete apathy and hopelessness lay on almost all of his actions. He no longer tried, as usual, to strictly demand from his subordinate troops the strict fulfillment of the Fuhrer’s order to “hold on at all costs”; he ignored Hitler’s order to destroy all industrial enterprises in the Ruhr Basin.

The model learned that the Russians had added him to the list of war criminals. Therefore, he had no illusions about the fate awaiting him, being firmly convinced that if he surrendered to the Allies, he would immediately be handed over to the Soviet Union. This prospect did not suit him at all. And Model decided not to surrender under any circumstances. In the last days of the struggle, the field marshal and his headquarters were not much different from the many thousands of refugees wandering among the ruins of the cities and villages of the Ruhr destroyed by Allied aviation. “The field marshal cannot be captured,” Model repeatedly stated these days to his officers. “Such a thing is impossible!” He was clearly looking for death. At the final stage of the battle, Model, apparently hoping to die like a soldier on the battlefield, repeatedly moved to the forefront, consciously trying to come under enemy fire. On the morning of April 21, he found himself in a small forest near Duisburg. The Americans were nearby, 2-3 km away. “My hour has come,” declared the field marshal and asked his adjutant to shoot him as a last favor. When the major categorically refused to do this, Model said thoughtfully: “There is nothing worse than falling into the hands of the Russians.” Then, taking out his pistol, he asked the confused adjutant: “I hope you will bury me?” - and, without waiting for an answer, he shot himself in the temple. For many years, the field marshal's body lay in a secret, unmarked grave, on the very spot where he committed suicide. Subsequently, his son Major G. Model reburied the remains of his father in the soldiers' cemetery in the Hürtgen forest. Since then, the ashes of this Nazi field marshal have rested among those soldiers whom he commanded in his last, ingloriously lost battle.

Like Hitler's other field marshals, Model was a career officer in the Kaiser's army who began military service shortly before the First World War. He fought bravely on its fronts as a combat officer, was awarded military awards, and gained experience working in the General Staff. After Germany's defeat in the war and the dissolution of the Kaiser's army, he continued to serve in the Reichswehr among the few of its officers. Promotion in the 100,000-strong Reichswehr for the vast majority of officers was very slow. However, for Model, who was distinguished by a particularly zealous attitude towards fulfilling his official duties, everything turned out relatively well. Over almost 15 years of service in the army of the Weimar Republic, he managed to move up the career ladder from chief lieutenant to lieutenant colonel, going from an unknown company commander to the head of one of the leading departments of the War Ministry. Very few people managed to make such a leap in the Reichswehr.

With the coming to power in Germany of the Nazis, who set a course for the militarization of the country, the situation changed radically. The accelerated promotion of pro-Nazi officers, and Model in a short time established himself as such, was given what is called the “green light.” In just 5 years, the Model becomes a general from lieutenant colonels, and after another 5 years - a field marshal general.

Unlike most career Reichswehr officers, Model joined the Nazis immediately after they came to power and soon became their ardent supporter. He took this step quite consciously, so to speak, for ideological reasons, despite the fact that the military leadership of that time did not really favor officers who violated the old army principle of “the army is beyond politics.” The further course of events showed that the Nazi ideology adopted by Model largely ensured his successful career in the ranks of the Nazi Wehrmacht. Unlike many of his fellow generals, he was a convinced Nazi, enjoyed great confidence from Hitler, stood out for his personal loyalty to the Fuhrer and was ready to carry out any of his orders without hesitation. It was precisely such military leaders of the new, National Socialist formation, like Model and others like him, that suited Hitler, especially at the final stage of the war, when the initiative finally passed to the enemy, and the German army only had to repel his blows one after another, unquestioningly carrying out the Fuhrer’s orders “stand to the end,” even contrary to common sense, and even more so, regardless of any losses. Gradually, encouraged and supported by Hitler, military leaders like Model came to the fore, occupying a dominant position in the Wehrmacht. The military leaders of the old formation, who were critical of the Nazis, bearers of “Prussian traditions”, heroes of the victorious campaigns of 1939-1941, were mostly either expelled from the army, or relegated to secondary roles, or were used in secondary theaters of military operations.

A distinctive feature of Model as a military leader was cruelty, which was especially clearly manifested during the war in the East. He was a supporter of waging war using the most barbaric methods, regardless of any restrictions imposed by generally accepted laws and customs of war. As a rule, a brutal occupation regime was established on temporarily occupied Soviet territory. Unlike many other military leaders of the Third Reich, Model’s cooperation with the punitive authorities of the SS, SD and Gestapo was always the closest, and mutual understanding was complete.

As a high-ranking military leader, Model undoubtedly had extraordinary military abilities. He spent the Polish 1939 and French 1940 campaigns as chief of staff of the corps and army, proving himself to be a capable staff worker. His career as a combat commander began relatively late - only with the outbreak of the war against the Soviet Union in 1941. As the commander of a tank division, Model particularly distinguished himself in the summer-autumn campaign of 1941 on the Eastern Front. As commander of a tank corps in the fall of 1941 and the winter of 1941-1942, he did not win any special laurels. The 3rd Tank Group, which included Model’s corps, was advancing on Moscow and suffered a heavy defeat in battles on the outskirts of the Soviet capital. Nevertheless, against the backdrop of the general defeat of the Nazi troops on the near approaches to Moscow, Model’s actions as commander of a tank corps were considered impeccable, and he was promoted, while a number of his fellow generals lost their posts. At the same time, Model’s nomination to a higher position was carried out out of turn, bypassing many applicants who had a significant advantage over him in seniority and had extensive team experience.

As commander of the 9th Army at the final stage of the Battle of Moscow and in the subsequent battles of 1942 and 1943, Model showed high combat skill. Even the defeat he suffered at the Battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943 did not shake Hitler's faith in his military abilities.

Subsequently, Model proved himself to be an outstanding specialist in defensive operations, receiving the nickname “Fuhrer’s fireman” in army circles. And indeed, where the defense front of the Nazi troops collapsed, Hitler immediately sent Model to save the situation. In this role, Model especially distinguished himself in the summer of 1944, when he managed to stop the powerful offensive of Soviet troops in the central direction after the disaster of Army Group Center in Belarus, localize the strategic breakthrough of the Red Army to the Vistula and create a new defense front in Poland. However, some clarification should be made here. The fact is that in the northwestern, southwestern, and central directions of the Soviet-German front, Model’s successes were largely relative, since in most cases the Red Army troops, having decided on one direction or another their main task, having defeated the opposing enemy group in fierce battles, having advanced during the offensive to great depths, measured in many hundreds of kilometers, and having largely exhausted their offensive capabilities, they themselves were forced to go on the defensive at the achieved lines. On none of the three occasions in 1944 on the Eastern Front did Model confront Soviet forces at the beginning of their offensive operations, but appeared only in their final stages. This was the case in the North-West, and in Western Ukraine, and in Poland.

As commander of an army and then an army group, Model enjoyed great authority with Hitler. At the same time, he was not, like some of his colleagues, a weak-willed puppet in the hands of a fascist dictator. On the contrary, this field marshal knew how to defend his point of view before the Fuhrer and was not afraid, if necessary, to enter into an argument with him. At one time (from January to September 1944) his influence on Hitler was quite significant.

The Model's appearance was very unprepossessing - he was below average height, densely built, with an ugly face and a white crew-cut of short-cropped hair, as well as a permanent monocle. In terms of mentality and mode of action, he was a typical Prussian. The model had great courage, personal bravery and enviable energy. He often appeared in the most critical and most dangerous sectors of the front, and sometimes he could personally lead the attack of a regiment or even a battalion. He was distinguished by clarity in defining goals and assigning tasks to his subordinates. In the German army he was considered an excellent tactician. At the same time, many were irritated by Model’s tendency to thoroughly delve into all the details of the combat situation and the condition of the troops, which as a commander might simply not have interested him. He had a valuable gift for inspiring and captivating troops to solve assigned problems. He showed great concern for his subordinates and was quite popular among the troops. This was largely due to his simplicity and ease in communicating with soldiers and junior officers, as well as his subtle understanding of their psychology. At the same time, with officers, especially senior ones, and generals, he was often strict and sometimes harsh. The end of the career of this Hitlerite field marshal, who put his knowledge and far from ordinary military abilities at the service of the Nazis and their criminal goals, was tragic and at the same time natural.

The mark of a good commander is the ability to adapt with lightning speed to an unstable situation on the battlefield. Walter Model was one of these commanders. A master of defense whom Hitler could rely on in the most difficult circumstances. “The Fuhrer's Fireman”, who saved hopeless situations for the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front. Thanks to his military merits, Model enjoyed the enormous confidence of Hitler. Guderian remembered him as “a brave and tireless soldier... the most suitable general for the enormously difficult task of rebuilding the central part of the Eastern Front.”

At 53, Model became the youngest field marshal of the Wehrmacht. Coming from a civilian family, he took his place among the Prussian military aristocracy. But even as head of the Supreme Command of the Western Front, Model was equally far from both staff work and the politics of the Third Reich, which was heading towards its decline. His element was the battlefield: on the front line, among shots and explosions, shoulder to shoulder with his soldiers. This is the reason for his brilliant successes... and disappointing defeats.

Beginning of a military career

Model's origins did not foretell a bright military career. Otto Moritz Walter Model was born on January 24, 1891 in Gentin, near Magdeburg, into a family of Lutheran teachers. His father taught at a local girls' school, his mother came from a peasant family.

At the end of World War II, Model ordered all his personal records to be burned, so little is known about his childhood. The future field marshal had a weak physique, loved Latin and history, and was a member of a literary circle. Young Walter received his first impression of the art of war in 1906, when he transferred to a church gymnasium in Naumburg (Saale). At that time there was the Kaiser's Jaeger Battalion. Apparently, the 15-year-old boy was so impressed by military training that he decided to connect his life with the army. Two years later, Model entered the military school in Neuss as an officer candidate in the 52nd Infantry Regiment of the 6th Brandenburg Division. This was not easy for a man of low birth, but Walter was helped by his uncle, who served there as a reserve officer. According to the recollections of other graduates, brutal order reigned in the school. As in any closed society, there was an internal hierarchy that allowed those above them to humiliate and beat those below them; Despite the lack of clear service instructions, any cadet could be severely punished for any offense. However, Model withstood two years of testing and on August 22, 1910, left the school with the rank of lieutenant in the Prussian army.

Walter Model in 1918
http://www.diary.ru

The model immediately established himself as a conscientious and ambitious officer. He was not afraid to openly state his position, made caustic remarks, and could argue with his superiors. Model carried these qualities throughout his entire career. Like his contemporaries, Model participated in the battles of the First World War. There he earned a reputation as a capable and hardworking officer and received several combat wounds and awards. Walter Model met the surrender of Germany with the rank of captain, after which he continued his military career within the walls of the General Staff. In 1920, General von Rantau described him as "having all the makings and qualities required for senior command positions." As time has shown, the general was not mistaken.

Friend of soldiers, foe of staff officers

In 1932, Model was awarded the rank of lieutenant colonel. Two years later, already with the rank of colonel, he took command of the 2nd Infantry Regiment. For Germany, this was a special period associated with Hitler’s rise to power, the rapid build-up of weapons, and the expansion and modernization of the army. In 1935, Chief of the General Staff Ludwig Beck organized the 8th department in his department to analyze technical innovations. He appointed Model as the head of this department. The colonel, accustomed to infantry troops, had difficulty understanding the technical details of innovative projects. However, this did not stop him from immediately assessing the potential of tanks and aircraft and defending innovations.

In 1938, Model, with the rank of major general, was transferred to the headquarters of the 4th Army Corps, with which he took part in the Polish campaign of 1939. The following year, at the head of the 16th Army, he participated in the invasion of France, after which he took command of the 3rd Panzer Division. By this moment, an ambivalent attitude towards the Model was already manifesting itself. The soldiers under his direct leadership respected their commander and appreciated his willingness to act quickly and mercilessly. The general loved to be on the front line and give orders in the heat of battle. For the same reason, staff officers did not like him: in an emergency situation, he acted at his own discretion and did not strive to coordinate every order with his superiors.

On the Eastern Front of World War II

Model entered the war with Russia on the Eastern Front. His division was in the vanguard of the 2nd Panzer Group of General Heinz Guderian, breaking through the Soviet defenses at Brest-Litovsk, Rogachev, Baranovichi. On July 9, 1941, Model received the Knight's Cross as a reward for his services. After the rapid capture of Smolensk and Kyiv, he was appointed commander of the 41st Motorized Corps. The model took part in Operation Typhoon, during which German troops almost reached Moscow.

The commander of the German 3rd Panzer Division as part of the 2nd Panzer Group, Major General Walter Model (left), and the commander of the 2nd Panzer Group, Colonel General Heinz Guderian. 1941
http://waralbum.ru

When winter frosts began, the Soviet army managed to push the enemy back to the west. Angered by such a failure, Hitler removed several dozen of his generals from their posts. At the beginning of 1942, Walter Model was appointed to the vacant post of commander of the 9th Army. The reasons why the Fuhrer was attracted to his personality can be considered in two ways. On the one hand, his pro-Hitler views could have played a role. A number of biographers speculate on this as the main reason that allowed Model to jump through three levels of the army hierarchy and surpass many of his colleagues in the career ladder: less than six months later, he became a colonel general. But no less important are his competent actions during the retreat near Moscow, which could not help but attract Hitler’s attention.

Model (center) on the Eastern Front, July 1941.
https://en.wikipedia.org

On February 1, Model received the Oak Leaves for the Knight's Cross as a reward. Just a couple of weeks earlier, he had had a heated argument with Hitler regarding strategy and tactics. The model was able to prove that the field commander imagines the situation on the battlefield much better than the generals bent over maps in Berlin. Hitler agreed. The general was allowed to regroup on the battlefield, and he received the requested reinforcements. In the battles of Rzhev, Model was able to realize the trust placed in him. Reflecting the advances of Soviet troops, the 9th Army held a bridgehead near the city for over a year, inflicting significant losses on the enemy: about a million people, including prisoners and wounded. Model's army retreated only in the spring of 1943, when the general situation of German troops on the Eastern Front noticeably deteriorated.

"Lion of Defense"

The “Lion of Defense” walked across Soviet soil with a heavy tread, leaving behind scorched earth and destroyed destinies. The Nuremberg Tribunal established a lot of evidence of the atrocities of his 9th Army on Soviet soil. Do not forget that Model not only has brilliant tactical maneuvers and impressive victories, but also thousands of killed civilians. In captured Rzhev, several dozen people were hanged in the central square, thousands were shot, about 100 Jews were brutally killed in Sychevka, 200 people were burned alive in Drachevo, another 79 in Kharino... People were driven out of their homes, livestock was taken away, food was destroyed. Many fell into the hands of SS punitive detachments. This was the price of the victories of the Third Reich.

Walter Model speaks to members of the Hitler Youth, October 1944.
http://ww2db.com

After the retreat, Model took an active part in the offensive near Kursk - the famous Operation Citadel. There was no agreement among the German army high command about the plan of operation. General Manstein and Model's immediate superior, General von Kluge, hoped to attack the Kursk Bulge before Soviet troops could strengthen their defenses. However, Model himself urged caution and refused to lead his 9th Army into an attack until it received sufficient reinforcements. He was supported by Guderian, who warned Hitler that the offensive could be “futile” and only bring heavy casualties. This is how it happened - but largely because of Model’s advice to delay the attack. This was his first major defeat, revealing the weaknesses of his commanding abilities. Being an excellent tactician on the battlefield and skillfully plugging defense gaps with reserves, Model was unable to become an equally competent “broad-profile” strategist: competently assess the options for the development of the situation, and most importantly, plan an offensive. Nevertheless, his art of building a defense was extremely useful to Hitler in the last years of the war.

Model, Rundstedt and Krebs studying a map of the Western Front, November 1944.
http://ww2db.com

In January 1944, Model was entrusted with command of Army Group North, which was experiencing serious problems due to the Soviet offensive in the Leningrad area. Finding himself in the elements familiar to 1942, he was able to stop the enemy troops, rapidly advancing towards the Baltic states. Hitler appreciated Model's merits: on March 1, he became the youngest Field Marshal of the Wehrmacht. Over the next six months, Model was deployed throughout the Eastern Front to plug gaps in the defenses and ensure the retreat of demoralized German units. For these services, on August 17, Model received the Diamonds for the Knight's Cross and the order to take control of the situation on the Western Front.

The Allied landings in Normandy brought Germany to the brink of defeat. Once in France, Model faced the same problems as on the Eastern Front. In August, he withdrew the encircled troops from the Falaise “pocket”, and in September he organized the defense of Oosterbeek after the Allied landing on the Armensky Bridge. The Ardennes became a second Kursk for the field marshal. After the successful offensive in December 1944, Model never wanted to go over to strategic defense. Despite the superior artillery power of the American army, he led the tanks into the attack. The field marshal again failed to assess the development of the situation - and paid dearly for this, losing not only thousands of soldiers, but also his authority with Hitler.

Disappointed Model (center) on the Western Front near Aachen, on a Volkswagen Kübelwagen, October 1944.
http://ww2db.com

Defeats followed one after another, the war was coming to a predictable end. Realizing this, Model did not wait for the inevitable captivity and possible execution. Moreover, he could hardly imagine a suitable occupation for himself outside the army, to which he devoted his entire life. On April 21, 1945, Field Marshal Walter Model shot himself in the forest near the village of Wedau. Hitler's Germany capitulated two weeks later.

Literature:

1. Stephen Newton. Hitler's "firefighter" is Field Marshal Model. M., 2007.
2. Correlli Barnett. Hitler's Generals. NY, 1989.
3. Liddell, Garth, Basil Henry. Battles of the Third Reich. Memoirs of the highest ranks of the generals of Nazi Germany. M., 2004