The structure of dialectical logic: principles, categories, laws. Dialectical logic Dialectical logic originated in which country

the science of the most general laws of development of nature, society and human thinking. These laws are reflected in the form of special concepts - logical. categories. Therefore, L. D. can also be defined as the science of dialectic. categories. Representing a system of dialectic. categories, it explores their interconnection, sequence and transitions from one category to another. The subject and tasks of L. D. Dialectical logic proceeds from the materialistic. solving the basic question of philosophy, considering thinking as a reflection of objective reality. This understanding was opposed and opposed by idealistic. the concept of L. d., proceeding from the idea of ​​\u200b\u200bthinking as an independent sphere, independent of the world surrounding a person. The struggle between these two mutually exclusive interpretations of thought characterizes the entire history of philosophy and logic. There is an objective logic, which reigns in all reality, and a subjective logic, which is a reflection in the thinking of the movement that dominates all reality by way of opposites. In this sense, linear logic is subjective logic. In addition, linear dynamics can also be defined as the science of the most general laws governing the connections and development of phenomena in the objective world. L. D. "... there is a doctrine not about external forms of thinking, but about the laws of development of "all material, natural and spiritual things", i.e. the development of all the specific content of the world and its knowledge, i.e. the result, the sum , conclusion and history and knowledge of the world" (Lenin V.I., Soch., vol. 38, pp. 80–81). L. D., as a science, coincides with dialectics and with the theory of knowledge: "... three words are not needed: they are one and the same" (ibid., p. 315). L. D. is usually contrasted with formal logic (see also Art. Logic). This opposition is due to the fact that formal logic studies the forms of thinking, abstracting both from their content and from the development of thinking, while L. d. explores the logical. forms in connection with the content and in their historical. development. Noting the difference between formal and dialectical, meaningful logic, one cannot exaggerate their opposition. They are closely related to each other in the real process of thinking, as well as in its study. L. d. under the definition. from the point of view considers what is the subject of consideration of formal logic, namely, the doctrine of the concept, judgment, inference, scientific method; she includes in the subject of her research her philosophy., methodological. fundamentals and problems. The task of L. d. is to, based on generalizations from the history of science, philosophy, technology, and creativity in general, to explore the logical. forms and laws of scientific knowledge, methods of construction and patterns of development of scientific theory, reveal its practical, in particular experimental, foundations, identify ways of correlating knowledge with its object, etc. An important task of L. d. is the analysis of historically established methods of scientific. knowledge and identification of heuristic. the possibilities of a particular method, the limits of its application and the possibility of the emergence of new methods (see Methodology). Developing on the basis of the generalization of societies. practice and achievements of sciences, L. D., in turn, plays a huge role in relation to specific sciences, acting as their general theoretical. and methodological. bases (see Science). The history of philosophy as a science plays a special role in relation to LD. The latter, in fact, is the same L. D. with the difference that in L. D. we have a consistent development of abstract logic. concepts, and in the history of philosophy - the consistent development of the same concepts, but only in a concrete form that succeeded each other philosophies. systems. The history of philosophy suggests to L. D. the sequence of development of its categories. The sequence of development is logical. categories in the composition of L. D. is dictated primarily by the objective sequence of development theoretical. knowledge, to-rye, in turn, reflect the objective sequence of development of real historical processes, cleared of violating their accidents and having no creatures, the meaning of zigzags (see Logical and historical). L. d. is an integral, but by no means complete system: it develops and enriches itself along with the development of the phenomena of the objective world and along with the progress of man. knowledge. History of L. D. Dialectical thinking has an ancient origin. Already primitive thinking was imbued with a consciousness of development, dialectics. Ancient Eastern, as well as antique. philosophy created enduring examples of dialectic. theories. Antich. dialectics based on living feelings. perception of the material cosmos, starting from the first representatives of the Greek. Philosophy firmly formulated all reality as becoming, as combining opposites in itself, as eternally mobile and independent. Decidedly all the philosophers of the early Greek. the classics taught about universal and perpetual motion, at the same time imagining the cosmos as a complete and beautiful whole, as something eternal and at rest. It was a universal dialectic of movement and rest. Philosophers of early Greek the classics taught, further, about the universal variability of things as a result of the transformation of any one basic element (earth, water, air, fire and ether) into any other. It was a universal dialectic of identity and difference. Further, all early Greek. the classics taught about being as a sensually perceived matter, seeing certain regularities in it. The numbers of the Pythagoreans, at least in the early epoch, are completely inseparable from the bodies. The Logos of Heraclitus is the world fire, flaring up in measured and dying out in measured. Thinking in Diogenes of Apollonia is air. Atoms in Leucippus and Democritus are geometric. bodies, eternal and indestructible, not subject to any changes, but of which sensible matter is composed. All early Greek the classics taught about identity, eternity and time: everything eternal flows in time, and everything temporal contains an eternal basis, hence the theory of the eternal circulation of matter. Everything is created by the gods; but the gods themselves are nothing more than a generalization of the material elements, so that in the end the cosmos was not created by anyone or anything, but arose by itself and constantly arises in its eternal existence. So, the early Greek the classics (6th–5th centuries BC) thought through the main categories of L.D., although, being in the grip of elemental materialism, they were far from the system of these categories and from separating L.D. into a separate science. Heraclitus and other Greek. natural philosophers gave formulas for eternal becoming as a unity of opposites. Aristotle considered Zeno to be the first Eleatic dialectician (A 1.9.10, Diels9). It was the Eleatics who for the first time sharply contrasted unity and plurality, or the mental and sensual world. On the basis of the philosophy of Heraclitus and the Eleatics, in the conditions of growing subjectivism, in Greece, naturally, a purely negative dialectic arose among the sophists, who saw the relativity of man in the incessant change of contradictory things, as well as concepts. knowledge and brought L. D. to complete nihilism, not excluding morality. However, Zeno also made life and everyday conclusions from dialectics (A 9. 13). In this environment, Xenophon portrays his Socrates, striving to teach about pure concepts, but without sophistry. relativism, looking for the most common elements in them, dividing them into genera and types, necessarily drawing moral conclusions from this and using the method of interview: separate objects by gender..." (Memor. IV 5, 12). In no case should the role of the sophists and Socrates in the history of L. d. be reduced. It is they who, moving away from too ontological. L. D. of the early classics, led to a violent movement of people. thought with its eternal contradictions, with its tireless search for truth in an atmosphere of fierce disputes and the pursuit of more and more subtle and precise mental categories. This spirit of eristics (disputes) and the question-answer, colloquial theory of dialectics from now on began to permeate the entire antich. philosophy and all its inherent L. d. the logic of the Stoics and even the Neoplatonists, to-rye, for all their mysticism. moods were endlessly immersed in eristics, in the dialectics of the finest categories, in the interpretation of old and simple mythology, in the sophisticated systematics of all logical. categories. Without the sophists and Socrates, the ancient L. d. is inconceivable, and even where it has nothing in common with them in its content. The Greek is a constant talker, a debater, a verbal equilibrist. The same is true of his L. D., which arose on the foundations of sophistry and the Socratic method of dialectical conversation. Continuing the thought of his teacher and interpreting the world of concepts, or ideas, as a special independent reality, Plato understood by dialectics not only the division of concepts into clearly distinct genera (Soph. 253 D. ff.) and not only the search for truth with the help of questions and answers (Crat 390 C), but also "knowledge concerning beings and true beings" (Phileb. 58 A). He considered it possible to achieve this only by bringing contradictory particulars into a whole and general (R. R. VII 537 C). Remarkable examples of this kind of ancient idealistic literature are contained in Plato's dialogues The Sophist and Parmenides. In the "Sophist" (254 V-260 A) is given just the dialectic of the five main dialectic. categories - movement, rest, difference, identity and being, as a result of which being is interpreted here by Plato as an actively self-contradictory coordinated separateness. Every thing turns out to be identical with itself and with everything else, different with itself and with everything else, as well as resting and moving in itself and in relation to everything else. In Plato's Parmenides, this L. d. is brought to an extreme degree of detail, subtlety, and systematics. Here, first, the dialectic of the one is given, as an absolute and indistinguishable individuality, and then the dialectic of a single-separate whole, both in relation to itself and in relation to everything else that depends on it (Rarm. 137 C - 166 C). Plato's reasoning about the different categories of L. d. are scattered throughout all his works, from which one can point at least to the dialectic of pure becoming (Tim. 47? - 53 C) or the dialectic of cosmic. a unity that stands above the unity of separate things and their sum, as well as above the very opposition of subject and object (R. R. VI, 505 A - 511 A). No wonder Diogenes Laertius (III, 56) considered Plato to be the inventor of dialectics. Aristotle, who placed the Platonic ideas within the confines of matter itself and thereby turned them into the forms of things and, in addition, added here the doctrine of potency and energy (as well as a number of other similar doctrines), raised L. D. to the highest level, although he calls this whole area of ​​philosophy not L. d., but "the first philosophy." He retains the term "logic" for formal logic, and by "dialectics" he understands the doctrine of probable judgments and inferences, or of appearances (Anal. prior. 11, 24a 22 and other places). The significance of Aristotle in the history of L. d. is enormous. His doctrine of four causes - material, formal (or rather, semantic, eidetic), driving and target - is interpreted in such a way that all these four causes exist in every thing, completely indistinguishable and identical with the thing itself. From modern t. sp. this, undoubtedly, is the doctrine of the unity of opposites, no matter how Aristotle himself puts forward the law of contradiction (or rather, the law of non-contradiction) both in being and in cognition. Aristotle's doctrine of the prime mover, which thinks itself, i.e. is both a subject and an object for itself, is nothing but a fragment of the same L. d. True, the famous 10 categories of Aristotle are considered separately and quite descriptively. But in his "first philosophy" all these categories are interpreted quite dialectically. Finally, one should not place low on what he himself calls dialectics, namely, the system of inferences in the field of probable assumptions. Here, in any case, Aristotle gives the dialectic of becoming, since probability itself is only possible in the field of becoming. Lenin says: "The logic of Aristotle is a request, a search, an approach to the logic of Hegel, and from it, from the logic of Aristotle (who everywhere, at every step, ) made a dead scholasticism, throwing out all searches, hesitations, methods of posing questions" (Soch., vol. 38, p. 366). The Stoics "only the wise are dialectician" (SVF II fr. 124; III fr. 717 Arnim.), and they defined dialectics as "the science of speaking correctly about judgments in questions and answers" and as "the science of true, false and neutral" (II fr. 48). Judging by the fact that the Stoics divided logic into dialectics and rhetoric (ibid., cf. I fr. 75; II fr. 294), the Stoics' understanding of LD was not at all ontological. In contrast, the Epicureans understood L. d. as "canonical", i.e. ontologically and materialistically (Diog. L. X 30). However, if we take into account not the terminology of the Stoics, but their factual. the doctrine of being, then basically we find Heraclitean cosmology among them, i.e. the doctrine of eternal becoming and the mutual transformation of elements, the doctrine of fire-logos, of the material hierarchy of the cosmos, and Ch. unlike Heraclitus in the form of persistently pursued teleology. Thus, in the doctrine of being, the Stoics also turn out to be not only materialists, but also supporters of L. D. The line of Democritus - Epicurus - Lucretius, too, can in no case be understood mechanistically. The appearance in them of every thing made of atoms is also dialectical. a leap, since each thing carries with it a completely new quality in comparison with the atoms from which it arises. It is also known antique. assimilation of atoms to letters (67 A 9, see also in: "Ancient Greek atomists" by A. Makovelsky, p. 584): a whole thing appears from atoms in the same way as tragedy and comedy from letters. Clearly, the atomists are thinking through the L. D. of the whole and of the parts. In the last centuries of ancient philosophy, Plato's dialectic was especially developed. Plotinus has a special treatise on dialectics (Ennead. 1 3); and the further neoplatonism developed to the end of antich. of the world, the more refined, scrupulous and scholastic here became L. d. The basic Neoplatonic hierarchy of being is completely dialectical: the one, which is the absolute singularity of all that exists, merging in itself all subjects and objects and therefore indistinguishable in itself; the numerical separation of this one; the qualitative content of these primary numbers, or Nus-mind, which is the identity of the universal subject and the universal object (borrowed from Aristotle) ​​or the world of ideas; the transition of these ideas into becoming, which is the driving force of the cosmos, or the world soul; the product and result of this mobile essence of the world soul, or cosmos; and finally, gradually decreasing in their semantic content, cosmic. spheres from heaven to earth. Dialectical in Neoplatonism is also this very doctrine of the gradual and continuous outpouring and self-division of the original unity, i.e. what is usually called in antich. and Wed-century. philosophy of emanationism (Plotinus, Porfiry, Iamblichus, Proclus and many other philosophers of the late antiquity of the 3rd-6th centuries). Here - the mass of productive dialectic. concepts, but all of them, in view of the specific. The features of a given era are often given in the form of a mystic. reasoning and scrupulously scholastic. systematics. Dialectically important, for example. , the concept of bifurcation of a single, mutual reflection of the subject and object in cognition, the doctrine of the eternal mobility of the cosmos, of pure becoming, etc. As a result of the review of antich. L. D. it must be said that almost all Ch. categories of this science on the basis of a conscious attitude to the elements of becoming. But not antique. idealism, nor antich. materialism could not cope with this task due to its contemplative nature, the fusion of ideas and matter in some cases and their rupture in other cases, due to the primacy of religious mythology in some cases and educational relativism in other cases, due to the weak awareness of categories as a reflection of reality, and due to constant inability to understand creativity. the impact of thinking on reality. To a large extent, this also applies to the Middle Ages. philosophy, in which the place of the former mythology was occupied by other mythology, but L. d. Monotheistic dominance. religions in cf. centuries moved L. D. to the field of theology, using Aristotle and Neoplatonism to create scholastically developed doctrines of the personal absolute. In terms of the development of L. d., this was a step forward, because. philosophy consciousness was gradually accustomed to feeling its own power, albeit arising from the personalistically understood absolute. The Christian doctrine of the trinity (for example, among the Cappadocians - Basil the Great, Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa - and in general among many fathers and teachers of the church, at least, for example, in Augustine) and the Arab-Jewish doctrine of the social absolute (for example, Ibn Roshd or Kabbalah) were built mainly by the methods of L. D. The creed approved at the first two ecumenical councils (325 and 381) taught about the divine substance expressed in three persons, with the full identity of this substance and these their differences, as well as the self-identical development of the individuals themselves: the original womb of the eternal movement (father), the dismembered regularity of this movement (son or god-word) and the eternal creative. the formation of this motionless regularity (holy spirit). In science, the connection between this concept and the Platonic-Aristotelian, Stoic concept has long been clarified. and neoplatonic. L. d. This L. d. is most deeply expressed in Proclus's treatise "Elements of Theology" and in the so-called. "Areopagitics", which is a Christian reception of proclism. Both were of great importance throughout the Middle Ages. L. D. (see A. I. Brilliantova, The Influence of Eastern Theology on Western Theology in the Works of John Scotus Eriugena, 1898). This L. d., based on the religious-mystical. thinking, reached Nicholas of Cusa, who built his L. d. just on the Proclus and the Areopagitics. Such are the teachings of Nicholas of Cusa on the identity of knowledge and ignorance, on the coincidence of maximum and minimum, on perpetual motion, on the trinity structure of eternity, on the identity of the triangle, circle and ball in the theory of deity, on the coincidence of opposites, on any in any, on the folding and unfolding of the absolute zero, etc. In addition, Nicholas of Cusa has an antique-mid-century. Neoplatonism merges with the ideas of the emerging mathematical. analysis, so that the idea of ​​eternal becoming is introduced into the concept of the absolute itself, and the absolute itself begins to be understood as a peculiar and all-encompassing integral or, depending on the t. sp., differential; such notions as being-possibility (posse-fieri) figure in him. This is the concept of eternity, which is eternal becoming, the eternal possibility of everything new and new, which is its true being. Thus, the infinitesimal principle, i.e. the principle of the infinitely small determines the existential characteristic of the absolute itself. Such, for example, is his concept of possest, i.e. posse est, or the concept, again, of eternal potency, which gives birth to everything new and new, so that this potency is the last being. Here L. d. with infinitesimal coloring becomes a very clear concept. In this regard, it is necessary to mention Giordano Bruno, a Heraclitean-minded pantheist and pre-Spinozist materialist, who also taught about the unity of opposites, and about the identity of the minimum and maximum (understanding this minimum is also close to the then growing doctrine of the infinitely small), and about the infinity of the Universe. (quite dialectically interpreting that its center is everywhere, at any point of it), etc., etc. Philosophers such as Nicholas of Cusa and Giordano Bruno still continued to teach about deity and about the divine unity of opposites, but these concepts they have already receive infinitesimal coloring; and a century or a half later, the very real infinitesimal calculus appeared, which represented a new stage in the development of the world linear d. In modern times, in connection with the ascending capitalist. formation and dependent on it individualistich. philosophy, during the period of rationalistic domination. metaphysics mathematical. analysis (Descartes, Leibniz, Newton, Euler) operating on variables i.e. infinitely-becoming functions and quantities, was not always conscious, but in fact a steadily maturing area of ​​L. d. t. sp. becoming a value; and as a result of this becoming certain limiting quantities arise, which in the full sense of the word turn out to be a unity of opposites, just as, for example, a derivative is a unity of opposites of an argument and a function, not to mention the very formation of quantities and their passage to the limit. It must be borne in mind that, excluding Neoplatonism, the very term "L. d." or not used at all in those philosophies. systems cf. centuries and modern times, which were essentially dialectical, or used in a sense close to formal logic. Such, for example, are the treatises of the ninth century. John of Damascus "Dialectics" in Byzantine theology and "On the Division of Nature" by John Scotus Eriugena in Western theology. The teachings of Descartes on heterogeneous space, Spinoza on thought and matter, or on freedom and necessity, or Leibniz on the presence of each monad in any other monad undoubtedly contain very deep dialectical constructions, but these philosophers themselves do not call them dialectical logic. Likewise, the entire philosophy of modern times was also a step forward towards the realization of what L. D. The empiricists of modern times (F. Bacon, Locke, Hume), for all their metaphysics and dualism, gradually taught in one way or another to see reflections of reality in categories. . Rationalists, for all their subjectivism and formalistic. metaphysics, nevertheless, they were taught to find some kind of independent movement in the categories. There were even attempts at a certain synthesis of both, but these attempts. could not be crowned with success in view of the too great individualism, dualism and formalism of the bourgeois philosophy of the new time, which arose on the basis of private enterprise and too sharp opposition of "I" and "non-I", moreover, the primacy and the team always remained for. "I" as opposed to the passively understood "not-I". The achievements and failures of such a synthesis in pre-Kantian philosophy can be demonstrated, for example, in Spinoza. The first definitions in his Ethics are quite dialectical. If essence and existence coincide in the cause of oneself, then this is the unity of opposites. Substance is that which exists by itself and is represented by itself through itself. This is also the unity of opposites - being and the idea of ​​it determined by itself. The attribute of a substance is that which the mind represents in it as its essence. It is the coincidence in essence of what it is the essence of and its mental reflection. The two attributes of substance, thought and extension, are one and the same. There are an infinite number of attributes, but in each of them the whole substance is reflected. Undoubtedly, here we are dealing with nothing other than L. D. And yet even Spinozism is too blindly ontological, teaches too vaguely about reflection, and understands too little the reverse reflection of being in being itself. And without this it is impossible to build a correct and systematically conscious L. D. The classical form for the new time was created by L. D. idealism, which began with its negative and subjectivistic interpretations by Kant and passed through Fichte and Schelling to the objective idealism of Hegel. In Kant, L. d. is nothing more than an exposure of human illusions. a mind desirous of necessarily attaining whole and absolute knowledge. because scientific knowledge, according to Kant, is only such knowledge, which is based on the senses. experience and is substantiated by the activity of the mind, and the highest concept of reason (God, the world, the soul, freedom) does not possess these properties, then L. D., according to Kant, reveals those inevitable contradictions in which the mind becomes entangled, wishing to achieve absolute integrity . However, this purely negative interpretation of L. D. by Kant had an enormous historical significance. the value that I discovered in human. reason of its necessary inconsistency. And this subsequently led to the search for overcoming these contradictions of reason, which formed the basis of L. D. already in a positive sense. It should also be noted that Kant is the first to use the very term "L.D." But the most interesting thing is that even Kant, like all world philosophy, nevertheless unconsciously succumbed to the impression of the enormous role that L. D. plays in thinking. In spite of his dualism, in spite of his metaphysics, in spite of his formalism, he, imperceptibly to himself, still very often used the principle of the unity of opposites. Thus, in the chapter "On the Schematism of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding" in his main work, "The Critique of Pure Reason," he suddenly asks himself the question: how are these sensible phenomena brought under the understanding and its categories? For it is clear that there must be something in common between the one and the other. This general, which he calls here a schema, is time. Time connects the sensually flowing phenomenon with the categories of reason, since it is both empirical and a priori (see Critique of Pure Reason, P., 1915, p. 119). Here Kant, of course, is confused, because according to his basic teaching, time is not at all something sensible, but a priori, so that this scheme does not at all give Ph.D. unification of sensibility and reason. However, it is also undoubted that, unconsciously for himself, Kant understands here by time becoming in general; and in becoming, of course, each category arises at every moment and at the same moment is sublated. Thus, the cause of a given phenomenon, characterizing its origin, necessarily at each moment of this latter manifests itself differently and differently, i.e. constantly arises and disappears. Thus, dialectic. the synthesis of sensibility and reason, and, moreover, precisely in the sense of L. d., was actually built by Kant himself, but metaphysically dualistic. prejudices prevented him from giving a clear and simple concept. Of the four groups of categories, quality and quantity undoubtedly merge dialectically into a group of categories of relation; and the group of categories of modality is only a refinement of the relation group obtained. Even within the groups of categories are given by Kant according to the principle of the dialectical triad: unity and plurality merge into that unity of these opposites, which Kant himself calls wholeness; as for reality and negation, then, undoubtedly, their dialectic. synthesis is limitation, since for this latter something must be fixed and something beyond this reality must be in order to delineate the boundary between what is affirmed and what is not affirmed, i.e. limit assertion. Finally, even Kant's famous antinomies (such as: the world is limited and unlimited in space and time) are eventually removed by Kant himself with the help of the method of becoming: in fact, the observable world is finite; however, we cannot find this end in time and space; therefore, the world is neither finite nor infinite, but there is only a search for this end according to the regulatory requirement of the mind (see ibid., pp. 310-15). "Criticism of the power of judgment" is also an unconscious dialectic. synthesis of the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason. Fichte immediately facilitated the possibility of a systematic L. D. by his understanding of things in themselves as also subjective categories, devoid of any objective existence. The result was absolute subjectivism and thus no longer dualism, but monism, which only contributed to a harmonious systematic. the allocation of some categories from others and brought L. D. closer to antimetaphysical. monism. It was only necessary to introduce into this absolute spirit of Fichte also nature, which we find in Schelling, as well as history, which we find in Hegel, as Hegel’s system of objective idealism arose, which, within the limits of this absolute spirit, gave an impeccable in its monism L . etc., covering the entire field of reality, starting from purely logical. categories, passing through nature and spirit and ending with the categorical dialectics of all historical. process. Hegelian L. D., if not to talk about all other areas of knowledge, although, according to Hegel, they also represent the movement of certain categories created by the same world spirit, is a systematically developed science, in which an exhaustive and a meaningful picture of the general forms of the movement of dialectics (see K. Marx, Kapital, 1955, vol. 1, p. 19). Hegel is absolutely right in his own perspective when he divides L. D. into being, essence, and concept. Being is the very first and most abstract definition of thought. It is concretized in the categories of quality, quantity and measure (and by the latter he understands just a qualitatively determined quantity and a quantitatively limited quality). Hegel understands his quality in the form of original being, which, after its exhaustion, passes into non-being and becoming as a dialectic. the synthesis of being and non-being (since in every becoming, being always arises, but at the same moment it is destroyed). Having exhausted the category of being, Hegel considers the same being, but with the opposition of this being to itself. Naturally, from here, the category of the essence of being is born, and in this essence Hegel, again in full agreement with his principles, finds the essence in itself, its appearance and dialectic. synthesis of the original essence and phenomenon in the category of reality. This is the end of his essence. But essence cannot be separated from being. Hegel also explores that stage of L. D., where there are categories that equally contain both being and essence. This is a concept. Hegel is an absolute idealist, and therefore it is precisely in the concept that he finds the highest flowering of both being and essence. Hegel considers his concept as a subject, as an object, and as an absolute idea; the category of his L. d. is both an idea and an absolute. In addition, the Hegelian concept can be interpreted materialistically, as Engels did, as the general nature of things or, as Marx did, as the general law of a process, or, as Lenin did, as knowledge. And then this section of Hegelian logic loses its mysticism. character and acquires a rational meaning. In general, all these self-moving categories are thought out by Hegel so deeply and comprehensively that, for example, Lenin, concluding his notes on Hegel's Science of Logic, says: the alistic work of Hegel has the least idealism, and the most materialism. “Contradictory,” but true!” (Soch., vol. 38, p. 227). With Hegel, we have the highest achievement of all Western philosophy in the sense of creating precisely the logic of becoming, when all logical categories are invariably taken in their dynamics and in their creative mutual generation and when the categories, although they turn out to be the product of only the spirit, however, as such an objective principle, nature, society and the whole of history are represented in it. , Herzen, Chernyshevsky and Dobrolyubov, whose revolutionary theory and practice not only made it possible to move from idealism to materialism, but also led them to the dialectic of formation, which helped them create the most advanced concepts in various areas of the history of culture.Lenin writes that Hegel's dialectic was for Herzen "the algebra of revolution" (see Soch., vol. 18, p. 10). How deeply Herzen understood L. D., for example, in relation to the physical world, can be seen from the following words: ov: "The life of nature is an uninterrupted development, the development of an abstract simple, incomplete, spontaneous into a concrete Complete, complex, development of the embryo by dismembering everything contained in its concept, and the constant harassment to lead this development to the fullest possible correspondence of form to content - this is the dialectics of the physical world" (Coll. soch., vol. 3, 1954, p. 127). Chernyshevsky also expressed deep judgments about L. D. (see, for example, Poln. sobr. soch., vol. 5, 1950, p. 391; vol. 3, 1947, pp. 207–09; vol. 2, 1949, p. 165; v. 4, 1948, p. 70). Under the conditions of the time of the revolution. democrats could only approach the materialistic. dialectics. L. D. in bourgeois philosophy of the 2nd floor. 1 9 - 2 0 in c. Bourgeois philosophy renounces those achievements in the field of dialectic. logics, to-rye were available in the former philosophy. L. D. Hegel is rejected as "sophistry", "logical error" and even "morbid perversion of the spirit" (R. Haym, Hegel and his time - R. Haym, Hegel und seine Zeit 1857; A. Trendelenburg, Logical Investigations - A Trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen, 1840; E. Hartmann, On the Dialectical Method - E. Hartmann, ?ber die dialektische Methode, 1868). The attempts of the right Hegelians (Mikhelet, Rosenkranz) to defend L. D. were unsuccessful, both because of their dogmatic attitude towards it, and because of the metaphysical. the limitations of their own views. On the other hand, the development of mathematical logic and its great success in substantiating mathematics lead to its absolutization as the only possible scientific logic. Preserved in modern bourgeois Philosophy elements of L. D. are associated primarily with criticism of the limitations of formal logic. understanding of the process of cognition and reproduction of Hegel's teachings about the "concreteness of the concept". In neo-Kantianism, in place of the abstract concept, built on the basis of the law of the inverse relationship between the volume and content of the concept and therefore leading to ever more empty abstractions, is put a "concrete concept", understood by analogy with mathematical. function, i.e. general law, to-ry covers all otd. cases by applying a variable that takes any consecutive values. Having taken this idea from the logic of M. Drobisch (New presentation of logic ... - M. Drobisch, Neue Darstellung der Logik ..., 1836), the neo-Kantianism of the Marburg school (Cohen, Cassirer, Natorp) generally replaces the logic of "abstract concepts" with "logic mathematical concept of function". This leads, in the absence of understanding of the fact that the function is a way of reproducing reality by the mind, and not itself, to the denial of the concept of substance and "physical. idealism." However, neo-Kantian logic retains a number of idealistic elements. L. d. - understanding of cognition as a process of "creating" an object (an object as an "endless task"); the principle of "first beginning" (Ursprung), which consists in "preservation of association in isolation and isolation in association"; "heterology of synthesis", i.e. subordinating it not to the formal law "?-A", but to the meaningful "A-B" (see G. Cohen, Logic of pure knowledge - N. Cohen, Logik der reinen Erkenntnis, 1902; P. Natorp, Logical foundations of the exact sciences - R Natorp, Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften, 1910). In neo-Hegelianism, the problem of L. d. is also raised in connection with the criticism of traditions. theory of abstractions: if the only function of thought is distraction, then "the more we think, the less we will know" (T. X. Green). Therefore, a new logic is needed, subject to the principle of "integrity of consciousness": the mind, which carries the unconscious idea of ​​the whole, brings its frequent ideas into line with it by "complementing" the particular to the whole. Having replaced the Hegelian principle of "negativity" with the principle of "complementation", neo-Hegelianism comes to "negative dialectics": the contradictions found in concepts testify to the unreality, "appearance" of their objects (see F. Bradley, Principles of Logic - F. Bradley, The principles of logic, 1928; his own, Phenomenon and reality - Appearance and reality, 1893). Complementing this concept with the "theory of internal relations", which, by absolutizing the universal interconnection of phenomena, excludes the possibility of true statements about isolated fragments of reality, neo-Hegelianism slides into irrationalism, denies the legitimacy

Landmarks of rational thinking, ensuring the development of knowledge, its movement towards the truth, are provided by dialectical logic. Dialectical logic is dialectics in action, in its application to thinking, cognition, and practice. Dialectical logic studies ways of thinking that ensure the coincidence of the content of knowledge with the object, i.e. achievement of objective truth.

The origins of dialectical logic go back to the intellectual searches of the great thinkers of antiquity: Heraclitus, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Lao Tzu and others. The largest systematizer and, in fact, the founder of dialectical logic is G. Hegel (1770-1831). However, the unique version of dialectical logic developed by Hegel in the fundamental work "The Science of Logic" and a number of other works, unfortunately, has a "dark depth" and is beyond the reach of most even professional philosophers. Enormous work to clarify the rational meaning of dialectics and dialectical logic, to reveal their methodological potential was done by the followers of Hegel - K. Marx (1818-1883) and F. Engels (1820-1895). However, even these thinkers, who found themselves in the “gravity field” of the grandiose Hegelian system, did not manage to completely overcome its “dark depth”.

The merit of deep rethinking and processing of Hegel's dialectical logic, its development and presentation in modern, clear, constructive forms belongs to the Russian thinker and revolutionary, the founder of the world's first socialist state V.I. Lenin (1870-1924).

The main principles of dialectical logic are:

• 1. Comprehensive consideration of the object.
• 2. Historical approach to the object, its consideration in development.
• 3. Identification of the main (decisive) link that determines the nature of the object.
• 4. Identification of the essential foundations of the object through the disclosure of its fundamental contradictions.
• 5. The concreteness of truth.
• 6. Achievement of the developed integrity of the object on the basis of dialectical synthesis.
• 1. Comprehensive consideration of the object.“In order to really know a subject, one must embrace, study all its aspects, all connections and “mediations”. We will never achieve this completely, but the demand for comprehensiveness will warn us against mistakes ... ". The meaning of this formula lies in the fact that without a comprehensive consideration of the essential aspects of the object and its relations with other objects, it is impossible to form an objective, true idea of ​​this object, it is impossible to scientifically explain its state, methods of action and development trends. For example, when solving the problems of technical re-equipment of production, acquiring new equipment, it is important to comprehensively evaluate the possible options for the required equipment (technology). In this case, one should take into account not only the actual technical characteristics of this equipment (productivity, reliability, product quality), but also economic ones (cost, payback period, effect / cost ratio, etc.).
• 2. Historical approach to the object. The principle of historicism involves consideration of the object "... in its development," self-movement "... change ...". “... The most important thing to approach ... a question from a scientific point of view is not to forget the main historical connection, to look at each question from the point of view of how a well-known phenomenon in history arose, what main stages in its development this phenomenon went through, and from the point of view of this development of it, look at what this thing has now become.

The need for a historical approach to the object is due to the fact that the causes, roots of many phenomena, structures, processes of the present are rooted in the past. Therefore, without knowledge of the history of the object, it is impossible to explain its current state, methods of action and development trends with sufficient depth and completeness.

• 3. Isolation of the main (decisive) link in a complex phenomenon. “We must be able to find at every special moment that special link in the chain, which we must grasp with all our might in order to hold the whole chain.” The principle of identifying the decisive link follows from the unequal value of their elements and relationships, which is natural for complex objects, and the varying degree of their influence on the final result. Decisive links are those points of the object where the priority application of efforts can give the greatest effect. The role of this principle is the more significant, the more complex, the more extreme the problem being solved, and the more acutely there is a shortage of resources.
• 4. Identification of the essential basis of the object through the opening and analysis of its fundamental contradictions."In its proper sense, dialectics is the study of contradiction in the very essence of objects." The idea of ​​a breakthrough to the deep foundations and connections of an object through the disclosure of its fundamental contradictions is based on the fact that these contradictions draw all aspects, connections, processes of the object into the orbit of their intense interaction, determine its state and development trends. Therefore, their opening and analysis create a kind of research "window" into the deep world of the object, allow us to understand its essential basis and specificity.
• 5. The specificity of truth."Dialectical logic teaches that there is no abstract truth, truth is always concrete...". The concreteness of truth means that the depth and accuracy of knowledge are possible only when the abstract is combined with the concrete, theory with practice, when theoretical conclusions are applied, taking into account the specific specifics of the subject. According to this principle, knowledge can be considered true only if it takes into account the specific conditions for the existence of an object.
• 6. Achievement of the developed integrity of the object on the basis of dialectical synthesis. The mechanism of dialectical synthesis is described by the logical formula: "thesis

The relevance of this formula is due to the fact that it allows you to overcome the "blockages" of ossified one-sidedness, in which science and practice often get stuck, to find ways out of the confrontational dead ends of theoretical thought, to predict the contours of qualitatively new, more developed and integral forms of the future. In any sphere of human activity, one has to face an unproductive confrontation between one-sided approaches that stubbornly insist on their truth and self-worth and at the same time reject the values ​​of the opposite side. The uncompromising struggle of extremes opposing each other leads the development of the object to a dead end, blocks the movement forward to new forms and meanings.

Examples of one-sided extremes, limited by the assertion of their imaginary "self-sufficiency" and the denial of the values ​​of the opposite side, are the antitheses: "materialism - idealism", "liberalism - communism", "capitalism - socialism", "market - planning mechanism", etc. Similar bastions of stagnant confrontations generated by the fruitless confrontation of ossified, mutually negating approaches are common in all areas of science and practice and are the strongest brake on development.

The formula of dialectical synthesis indicates a way to unblock stagnant impasses through a mutually limiting synthesis of opposing extremes. The dialectical nature of the synthesis means that it takes place not according to the formula of an eclectic mixing of the parties, but using the potential of their confrontation to process these parties into a qualitatively new, more developed integrity. In the dialectical synthesis, the potential of confrontation between the parties is subordinated to achieving their adequate mutual limitation, cutting off unproductive extremes, connecting the viable parts of these opposites into a new integrity.

In recent years, several monographs have been published on questions of the dialectics and logic of Marx's Capital. This indicates that Soviet philosophers follow the instructions of Lenin, who attached great importance to the study of the logical content of the great work of scientific communism.

Unlike already published works, the work under review is devoted to the study of the logical structure of "Capital", the problem of logical categories and their role in cognition (on the example of the analysis of goods and money). Tracing the course of Marx's analysis of economic categories and their transitions into each other, the author seeks to reveal the logical basis, the "logical fabric" of this analysis, to identify the place and role of various logical categories. And it should be noted that the author manages to clearly highlight the logical content of "Capital". The guiding idea in the development of these problems in the reviewed work is V.I. Lenin about the nature of logic as a science, that it coincides with dialectics and the theory of knowledge.

To reveal the depth and power of Marxist dialectical logic - this is the main goal set by the author. L.A. Mankovsky prefaces his research with an exposition of general philosophical and logical principles that determine the combination of logical categories into a system. The logical categories are understood in the monograph as “universal concepts that express the versatility of reality taken in its general form (space, time, quality, measure, form, content, reason, etc.), in the discovery of a logical regular connection between which consists one of the most important tasks of dialectical logic. Universal categories in "Capital" are organically linked with the categories of concrete science, political economy. This connection is manifested, on the one hand, in the fact that each economic category is analyzed through a number of logical categories; on the other hand, in the connections of economic categories, there is also a mutual transition of logical categories, a certain logical framework.

The concept of a system of categories implies a certain ordering, sequence. The logical order of the system of economic categories was determined by Marx on the basis of the principle of historicism, the coincidence of the logical and the historical. The logical, that is, theoretically consistent form of reflecting the historical process in the system of categories, is based on an objective historical sequence, but traceable in a “pure form”, that is, not on a simple derivation of the present from the past, but on one that is repelled from the self-movement of the existing system in the present. and allows us to understand its genesis. The "beginning", the first category of the theory, should, therefore, reflect such a universal side, a link in the system, which is a condition and prerequisite for the existence of all other aspects of the whole, their genetic basis, "cell", "embryo". This aspect of capitalist production is the commodity, the exchange of commodities. The germ acts as an opportunity for the deployment of the entire system, its abstract foundation.

Everyone thinks that there is one dialectic, but in fact (ie, in the historical and philosophical sense) there are two of them: the original, Fichte-Hegelian and Soviet (not counting the intermediate stage). Their main difference is that the Fichte-Hegelian dialectic was absurdist and, unlike the Soviet one, also included dialectical logic. The concept of dialectical "logic" in the Soviet period was used not in a literal sense, but in a figurative one and meant the theory of knowledge in general + the dialectical method of knowledge. In the Fichte-Hegelian dialectic, dialectical logic was present and, moreover, in the direct, literal sense of the word, and was also formalized, like traditional logic! For some reason, this is firmly forgotten or unwilling to recognize this fact. Hegelian dialectical LOGIC is an inverted traditional (Aristotelian) logic.

The original (absurdist) Fichte-Hegelian dialectic.

Dialectics is such a doctrine about the world (a description of reality) that contains an absurd contradiction in its basic principles and judgments. Dialectic is subdivided into:

a) dialectical logic,

b) Dialectical ontology,

c) The dialectical theory of knowledge.

1) A not = A. The object is not equal to itself.

2) A = not A. Identity of opposites. The subject and its direct opposite are one and the same.

3) The principle of the permitted third.

(((See Grachev and Borchikov, I'm pointing my finger at the demarcation line between dialectical logic and how you put it "formal": 1) A = A, 2) A not = not A, 3) The principle of the forbidden third. The casket just opens, and you have been looking all your life!)))

Dialectical logic is ordinary logic, only turned upside down. This is normal logic, but standing on its head.

In accordance with it, it is built and dialectical ontology. Objects move and do not move, are in this place and at the same time in another; the object is equal to itself and unequal, it is he and not he, and in general the object exists and it does not exist. Opposites coincide and (or) pass into each other: subject and object are one and the same, + and -, the way to the west and the way to the east, black and white, heaven and earth, the object and the thought about it, everything is one and too (or in each other). Three laws of dialectics.

a) The criterion of the truth of dialectics is the presence of a logical contradiction. A judgment that does not contain contradictions is false.

c) The path of knowledge goes from one opposite to another, from the abstract (concept) to the concrete (subject), that is, from logic to nature, from the general to the particular, from thought to being.

d) The method of analyzing objects and phenomena through the discovery of opposites in them.

Such is the original (absurdist) Fichte-Hegelian dialectic. The main design flaws of this concept:

1. The inability to build as a complete system.

2. The impossibility of creating any science at all on such a logical basis.

3. If the subject and object coincide, then the theory of knowledge is unnecessary at all, because the subject then must know everything about everything in advance.

Yu.A. Rotenfeld noted that Aristotle's concepts of contradiction and opposition are divorced as different, and in dialectics these concepts are merged, indistinguishable, which leads to a colossal confusion that has lasted for two centuries.

In Soviet dialectics, real dialectical logic was thrown out, dialectical ontology was erased. What remained was the dialectical theory of knowledge slightly altered to materialism.

For several decades this topic has been discussed, but no one can dot all the e, because few people want to leaf through the puzzling texts of the Science of Science and the Science of Logic in search of understandable phrases. Already Fichte actually creates this dialectical logic (which will be called Hegelian), and Hegel echoes him, filling up the logic of Aristotle in the Science of Logic. In the literal sense, dialectical logic is simply obliged to have the status of logic. To use this term in a figurative sense is to confuse the very essence of the matter.

Comments

Assault on dialectical logic

- "Content of dialectical logic:
1) A not = A. The object is not equal to itself.
2) A = not A. Identity of opposites. The subject and its direct opposite are one and the same.
3) The principle of the permitted third.
(((See Grachev and Borchikov, I'm pointing my finger at the demarcation line between dialectical logic and how you put it "formal": 1) A = A, 2) A not = not A, 3) The principle of the forbidden third. The casket just opens, and you've been looking all your life!"

Your principle of the permitted third is nothing else than the forbidden fourth, which is well known in non-classical formal logic.
And not=A - the principle of forbidden identity.
A = not A - the principle of allowed (allowed) contradiction.

Everything for the assault recklessly good. Only clarifications are required: if you claim that "The object is unequal to itself", then it has nothing to do with dialectical logic. Since the subject of dialectical logic includes statements about the subjects not the objects themselves. . It is you who formalize the ontology.

Dialectical logic is not an exalted teenager who contradicts his parents in everything. Dialectical logic must (and can) reconcile seemingly paradoxical statements with the time-tested requirements of traditional formal logic. And as soon as a real contradiction is revealed, then remove it by dialectical means of synthesis.

--
M. Grachev

Dialectical logic must (and can) reconcile seemingly paradoxical statements with the time-tested requirements of traditional formal logic.

In principle, it is impossible to reconcile these two logics; one must choose one thing. Although Engels believes that dialectics is a superstructure over traditional logic, like walls over a foundation, I still think that if we take precisely dialectical logic in the exact sense of the word, then it is an unconditional negation of traditional logic, which is obvious from the formulas.
It is impossible to oppose formal logic to dialectical logic, because dialectical logic is also formalized.

And as soon as a real contradiction is revealed, then remove it by dialectical means of synthesis.

I consider dialectical logic to be false. There are no contradictions in objective reality, but there is only opposition of opposites. There are no contradictions even in logic, they exist only in speech, and even then, when this speech is illogical. All this talk about the emergence and instant "removal" of contradictions is nothing more than a metaphorical play on words.

"It's basically impossible to reconcile these two logics, you need to choose one thing."

The reconciliation of the two logics can begin with the establishment of a common subject. Both logics will have a common subject - "reasoning".
--
M. Grachev

On the relationship between elementary DL and formal logic

1. Formal and dialectical logic in the proper sense of the word are two theoretical models of natural logical thinking (rational).

2. Both disciplines (formal logic and elementary dialectical logic) have a common subject: reasoning.

3. Dialectical logic is a broader model, since it expands the composition of thought forms without going beyond logic. Questions, evaluations, imperatives and dialogue are added to concepts, judgments and inferences as a form of connection between statements in reasoning (in addition to inference).

4. Dialectical and formal logic build their body based on a common logical cell "judgment" . Judgment structure:

A: (s - p), (1)
where
A - judgment
s- logical subject
p - predicate
[-] - link.

5. If formal logic is abstracted from the subject of reasoning (doer of statements or Actor *), then dialectical logic takes into account the actor (subject of reasoning) in the structure of the statement:

A: S (s - p), (2)
where
A - judgment
S - actor (subject of reasoning)
s- logical subject
p - predicate

6. A contradiction in formal logic and dialectical logic is the relation of two mutually exclusive judgments.

7. Formal logic prohibits the contradiction of judgments (statements), and dialectical logic allows (permits).

8. The conflict of two logics is removed by introducing an actor into the structure of the statement. Which allows you to consistently describe the logical contradiction A & ~ A, since this formula can describe the collision of statements coming from different people:

A i & ~A j , (3)
where
And i is a judgment made by the actor S i
A j - the judgment expressed by the actor S j

9. Dialogue formula:
S i , j > (s - p), (4)
where
S i - actor (subject of reasoning at position i)
S j - actor (subject of reasoning at position j)
s- logical subject
p - predicate
[-] - link.
[>] - quota sign (actor statement operator)

So, formal logic and dialectical logic are two independent models of natural thinking. Their subject: reasoning. Both cover the main forms of thought (concepts, judgments, inferences). An indicator of the independence of dialectical logic is the presence in the structure of logic of forms from which traditional formal logic is abstracted (questions, assessments, imperatives, dialogue, the subject of reasoning is the actor). The specificity of dialectical logic is that it allows the contradiction of statements, unlike formal logic, however, the conflict of two logics on the basis of the interaction of mutually exclusive principles ("forbidden contradiction" and "allowed contradiction") is correctly resolved by introducing the subject of reasoning. Two subjects of reasoning (actors) can indeed contradict each other, which formal logic does not prohibit, although the conditions for detecting a contradiction required by formal logic are preserved. The peculiarity is that in formal logic the contradiction is excluded, while in dialectical logic the contradiction is resolved in an argumentative dialogue.

___________
*) In order to meet the wishes of Sergei Borchikov, in order to distinguish between two subjects in the structure of a judgment, I introduce an additional term "actor" , which means the same as the subject of reasoning (statement).
--
M. Grachev

The specificity of dialectical logic is that it allows the contradiction of statements, unlike formal logic, however, the conflict of two logics on the basis of the interaction of mutually exclusive principles ("forbidden contradiction" and "allowed contradiction") is correctly resolved by introducing the subject of reasoning.

The introduction of the subject of reasoning, the "actor" absolutely does not solve anything and does not remove the contradictions between statements !!! There is no difference for logic - two people express conflicting opinions or one. That's what logic is for, to abstract from the speaker(s).

Two subjects of reasoning (actors) can indeed contradict each other, which formal logic does not prohibit, although the conditions for detecting a contradiction required by formal logic are preserved.

If "the conditions for detecting a contradiction are preserved", that is, a contradiction is present, then it must be a logic forbidden.
Your phrase is equivalent in meaning - I have plenty of money, although there is not a penny. Very funny.

The peculiarity is that in formal logic the contradiction is excluded, while in dialectical logic the contradiction is resolved in an argumentative dialogue.

Give an example. I believe that "the contradiction is resolved in an argumentative dialogue" only if one of the arguing either shuts up or admits he was wrong!

Elementary dialectical logic - logical system

Kiva: "The introduction of the subject of reasoning, the "actor" absolutely does not solve anything and does not remove contradictions between statements !!! There is no difference for logic - two people express contradictory judgments or one. That's what logic is for, to abstract from the speaker (s) ".

You're right! Only everything that was said refers to traditional formal logic. In it, indeed, the "subject of reasoning" (the actor) does not remove the contradiction. And precisely because there is no difference "two people express conflicting opinions or one."

Taking into account the fact that consistent traditional formal logic operates with only one truth form "judgment", the entire dialogue of contradictory actors will be reduced to meaningless: "yes-no", "no-yes" (repeatedly repeated). As it sometimes happens in real life.

Elementary dialectical logic is a logical system aimed at solving the original problem. The elements of this system are not only "actor". In addition to truth judgments, it contains non-truth forms of thought: questions, assessments, imperatives (" n not true" in the sense that statements do not take on the truth values ​​"true" or "false").

What does it give? In the course of joint argumentative reasoning, between contradictory statements from both sides, a chain of intermediate members is built, consisting of questions, assessments, imperatives, affirmations and denials. Depending on the attitude towards cooperation of actors or obstruction (because each subject of reasoning has free will and its own base of argumentation independent of the interlocutor), as a result, the initial contradiction will be resolved or everyone will remain with their own opinion (in a mild version). This is what the transcript of the actual dialogue deployed in time will fix.

--
M. Grachev

Consistent display of contradiction

Two subjects of reasoning (actors) can indeed contradict each other, which formal logic does not prohibit, although the conditions for detecting a contradiction required by formal logic are preserved.

If "the conditions for detecting a contradiction are preserved", that is, a contradiction is present, then it should be prohibited by the logic.

What are the conditions? These are - contradictory statements should be about the same thing; at the same time and place; in the same sense and meaning. If at least one of the conditions is violated, then formal logic does not recognize such statements as a contradiction.

Due to the subjectlessness of formal logic (as it was rightly noted here: for formal logic "there is no difference for logic - two people express contradictory judgments or one") or its indifference to the reasoning actor, the contradiction of indexed statements takes the form:

From the formal-logical point of view, the contradiction remains and, at the same time, the prohibition of formal logic you mentioned does not apply to it, because these are statements from different subjects of reasoning.

The peculiarity is that in formal logic the contradiction is excluded, while in dialectical logic the contradiction is resolved in an argumentative dialogue.

Give an example. I believe that "the contradiction is resolved in an argumentative dialogue" only if one of the arguing either shuts up or admits he was wrong!

The judge freely retains in his mind the contradiction between the plaintiff and the defendant, together with their mutually exclusive arguments. But this does not form a semantic mess in his head or, as Popper would say, an arbitrary judgment. Litigation is an example of the actualization of a dialectical-logical contradiction.

The second example is productive scientific discussions.
--
M. Grachev

What is dialectic?

1. The traditional definition of dialectics in a broad sense (I proceed from it): "dialectics is the science of the most general laws of the development of nature, society and thinking." Here are listed three areas of action of dialectics that make up the universe. In order to move from dialectics to dialectical logic, one must turn to the realm of thought.

Thinking is the subject of interest of many disciplines, in particular, psychology, epistemology, neurophysiology, pedagogy and logic. Therefore, it is necessary to single out that aspect of thinking that interests precisely logic. This aspect is reasoning. Reasoning refers both to the subject of formal logic and to the subject of dialectical logic.

2. In a narrow sense, since antiquity, dialectics has been interpreted as a method of argumentation: the art of arguing, reasoning.

3. In turn, dialectical logic is considered in a broad and narrow sense. In a narrow sense, as logic in the proper sense of the word, this is the science of reasoning - elementary dialectical logic (EDL).

This shows that dialectics intersects with elementary dialectical logic in relation to the subject of "reasoning". As regards the structural structure of dialectics as the science of the most general laws, elementary dialectical logic in relation to dialectics will be a particular discipline.

Dialectic is subdivided into:
a) dialectical logic,
b) Dialectical ontology,
c) The dialectical theory of knowledge.

It is quite acceptable division of the discipline "Dialectics". Dialectics is a general theory of development. The seal of dialectics lies not only on the three listed, but also on other areas of knowledge. You can add to the list:

Usually just an adjective "dialectical" they omit, just as they omit the reasoning actor in formal logic, since it is commonly believed that formal logic is of a universal nature and that all people think according to the same laws of traditional formal logic. That is, formal logic reduces the original dialogism to a monologism of reasoning, ignoring the widespread fact that people in their statements more often than not contradict each other.

--
M. Grachev

dialectical logic - like any logic - is primarily logic; 0) it differs from all other logics in the following:

1. by its basis (the law of sufficient reason). the basis of dialectical logic is 0 or the Absolute. in contrast to formal logics, where the base is one or another 1 or unit. According to its foundation, the law of "identity" in dialectical logic looks like: A-A=0. That is, for dialectical logic, it was necessary to "discover" a special element - 0, which for a long time remained unknown to people. ;0) So since the discovery of zero, mathematics has been using formalized dialectical logic. read about this, by the way, Losev's Dialectical Foundations of Mathematics.

2. Dialectical logic, as I have already said here, does not deal with predicates, but with names. the difference between a name and a predicate is reflected in the formula: the name of a thing is the thing itself, although the thing itself is not its own name.

and the main point: everything that is needed has already been written and found before us. know how to read carefully. careful reading - that's the philosophy for today; 0))))

and the main point: everything that is needed has already been written and found before us. know how to read carefully. careful reading - that's the philosophy for today

Stability and variability: "everything that is needed has already been written and found before us" - this is our stable golden fund. And what about the second side of the dialectical pair - "variability" ? Does it have a place in philosophy today?
--
M. Grachev

all possible "smart" variability here has already entered the golden = smart stability = sufficiency of already accumulated written knowledge. the synthesis of immutable variability has already taken place in the fullness of knowledge about how to acquire knowledge. knowledge about knowledge is the sublated infinity of knowledge.

What are the philosophical categories? With its limit. They cannot be subsumed under a more general concept. Therefore, every limiting category is included in every other. In particular, variability into immutability and stability. Synthesis has nothing to do with it.
--
M. Grachev

d) dialectical methodology;
e) dialectical axiology;
f) dialectical psychology;
g) dialectical epistemology.

What is dialectical axiology, dialectical psychology? This is the first time I see such phrases. Show their structure, expand their content. Maybe you're just playing word-combination like a kid with blocks? Methodology and theory of knowledge are one and the same.

“I [Mikhail Mikhailovich] consider dialectical logic to be false.
... Dialectics is subdivided into: a) Dialectical logic,
... In the literal sense, dialectical logic is simply obliged to have the status of logic.
...Are you just playing word-combination like a block kid?"

One of the three: either you include dialectical logic in the composition of dialectics, or you do not include it, or you simply play with the words "dialectics" and "dialectical logic".

You have been presented with the structure of elementary dialectical logic in the status of logic in itself. However, they behaved like a well-known heroine of the famous fairy tale about the fisherman and the fish. The structure of elementary dialectical logic seemed not enough - give a new dialectical structure!?

Dear Mikhail Mikhailovich, more consistency! Decide for yourself first the general question of the existence of dialectical logic (is it false or true; does it have the status of logic or not). Discuss what is real. And after that, take it for a particular, hypothetical.

--
Mikhail Petrovich.

"What is dialectical axiology, dialectical psychology? This is the first time I see such phrases."

"Dialectical axiology focuses on the establishment of gradations in the sphere of values: what is the goal in one case, in another can act as a means. ... Values, whatever their nature, are also what the subject is guided by in his cognitive and practical activities, and what is achieved in the course of such activities "(Alekseev P.V., Panin A.V. Philosophy: Textbook for universities. - 3rd ed., revised and added. - M .: Prospekt, 2004. - P. 409).

Dialectical axiology is a theory of human value development of reality, along with the knowledge of the world. As can be seen from the above quotation, the phrase "dialectical axiology" can be found in a popular philosophy textbook.
--
M. Grachev

"Methodology and theory of knowledge are one and the same."

Moreover, dialectics, logic and theory of knowledge are one and the same. However, they correspond to different disciplines.

absurdity is whose "skeleton in the closet": DL or formal logic?

- "Their main difference is that the Fichte-Hegelian dialectic was absurdist and, unlike the Soviet one, also included dialectical logic."

In fact, since antiquity, formal logic has been absurd. This was very well shown by Zeno (the aporias "Dichotomy", "Arrow", "Achilles"), the sophists ("Evatl"), the megarics ("Horned", "Covered", "Heap", "Bald", "Liar").

As for dialectical logic, by making a clear distinction between the forms of thought "judgment" and "evaluation", it allows you to reveal the sophistical content of, say, the "Liar" paradox. It is obviously absurd to ask: "Is "false" true?"

Indeed, since case-based reasoning actually manipulates the substitution of forms of thought: "judgment" (has the truth values ​​"true" and "false") and "assessment" ("false" is the evaluation "false" itself, which does not have the value "true"). The substitution of concepts in reasoning is a violation of the law of identity.

P.S. Neither Fichte nor Hegel used the expression "dialektische logik" in their writings, therefore, in fact, they have no thoughts and reasoning about dialectical logic. Why then attribute your ideas about dialectical logic to Fichte-Hegelian dialectics?
--
M. Grachev

Truth Criterion of Elementary Dialectical Logic

Dialectical theory of knowledge, one of the parts of dialectics. To be consistent, it would be logical to talk about the content of the dialectical theory of knowledge about its own criterion of truth, and not about something that goes beyond its limits.

So, what is the criterion for the truth of a theory of knowledge? Let's say it's a contradiction. But contradictions are different: formal-logical, dialectical-logical, epistemological. Which of the three contradictions is relevant for epistemology? Probably epistemological. And certainly not formally logical.

A logical contradiction is a contradiction between two statements. There are three ways to deal with a logical contradiction: freeze forever; discard, exclude one of two contradictory statements; remove the contradiction in the argumentative dialogue.

The criterion of truth in elementary dialectical logic is put forward - "criticism". If a theory in depth withstands equally thorough criticism, then it is true (of course, not absolutely). But what is criticism? It is nothing but a contradiction. Of course, if someone wants to declare the dialectical theory of knowledge absurd, then the best way to achieve this goal would be to resort to the substitution of a theoretical-cognitive contradiction by a formal-logical contradiction.

--
M. Grachev

On the law of included contradiction

- "A judgment that does not contain a contradiction is false.
...Dialectical logic is ordinary logic, only turned upside down. This is normal logic, but standing on its head."

According to the hypothesis of the author of the quote, the transition from ordinary logic (traditional formal logic) to dialectical logic is extremely simple: we take ordinary logic, put it on our heads (turn it upside down); ready. For example, in ordinary logic, a proposition that does not contain contradictions is true. Flip true to false. Now, they say, we got dialectical logic: "a judgment that does not contain a contradiction is false".

And what is a judgment that contains a contradiction? This is a judgment in which what is said before the comma contradicts what is said after the comma. For example: "ordinary logic" and logic "turned upside down". According to traditional logic, such a statement is false. But if it is presented as true, then we are dealing with dialectical logic.

In this situation, Mikhail Mikhailovich, demonstrates himself as an authentic dialectical logician in the sense that he (dialectical logician) imagines. Namely, his sentence "Dialectical logic is ordinary logic, only turned upside down", is just an example "normal logic, but standing on its head"(what is before the comma in the sentence contradicts what is after the comma). For if dialectical logic is ordinary logic, then at the same time it is normal logic.

But if this is normal logic, then what is its dialectical specificity? And is it true that dialectical logic changes the law of excluded contradiction into the law of included contradiction?

Let me put it this way: elementary dialectical logic would not be dialectical if it did not preserve in its composition the law of excluded contradiction. It may be objected that in this case the two laws (of excluded contradiction and included contradiction) are, in turn, incompatible in one logic.

So this is precisely the whole non-triviality of elementary dialectical logic - in the productive reconciliation of these two opposites. The solution lies in the transition from a non-subjective logic to a logic that takes into account the subject of reasoning. Two subjects of reasoning may contradict each other, but each has no right to contradict himself.

--
M. Grachev

The method "thesis antithesis - synthesis", although it is an essential procedure of dialectics, but not the only one. And to reduce all the diversity of human thinking to one particular procedure - Hegel would not have dreamed of such a thing.

Mistake #2.

Thus, it can be said that interpretation in terms of trial and error is somewhat more flexible than interpretation in terms of dialectics.

The trial and error method is also a private procedure. And it also has its pros and cons. And in no way does it replace all thinking.

Mistake #3.

From the Cartesian point of view, we can build explanatory scientific theories without any recourse to experience, simply by the power of our own reason, since every reasonable (reasonable) statement (that is, speaking for itself due to its transparency) must be a true description of the facts.

"Non-reference to experience" - to attribute this to one of the world's greatest scientists - is absurd. It is not about not turning to experience in general, but about the relative, pre-experimental, pre-experimental postulation of hypotheses with subsequent appeal to experience. Which is enough in all science. Yes, and the trial and error method itself suggests this: an error is a judgment formulated before experience and not confirmed in experience.

Popper is almost right that dialectic has nothing to do with the status of logic. Indeed, apart from the 3 listed principles (Ane=A, etc.) there is no actual logical content in dialectical logic., April 6, 2011 - 07:11,

Please indicate what? Where exactly does he (Popper) have an error?

An error in the interpretation of the Law of contradiction. Popper erroneously believed that the Law of Contradiction could be interpreted in only one way: only as the prohibition of contradiction.

Whereas in practice people contradict each other at every step and this does not bother anyone. The contradiction is perceived as a norm, i.e. permission (permission) to contradict.

You are a pedophile...

Understand correctly, I just showed the absurdity of your approach, If you were on the dock and argued that during the murder of which you are accused, you were in the country and that there were other fingerprints on the murder weapon, and the judge would be guided by your logic - you would evaluate it completely differently.

dialectical logic

the science of the most general laws of development of nature, society and thought. These laws are reflected in the form of general concepts - categories (See Categories). Therefore, D. l. can also be defined as the science of dialectical categories. Representing a system of dialectical categories, it explores their mutual connection, sequence and transitions from one category to another. In the system of Marxist-Leninist philosophy D. l. coincides with dialectics and the theory of knowledge, with dialectical materialism. In this sense, D. l. “... there is a doctrine not about external forms of thinking, but about the laws of development of “all material, natural and spiritual things”, i.e. ... the result, the sum, the conclusion of the history of knowledge of the world” (Lenin V.I., Polnoe sobr. soch., 5th ed., v. 29, p. 84). Inherent D. l. consideration of all objects and phenomena in their interdependence, comprehensive connections and mediations, in their development, history characterizes the approach of D. l. to the study of human thought and its categories. D. l. is the result of a generalization of the entire history of human knowledge.

D. l. proceeds from a materialistic solution to the basic question of philosophy (See The Basic Question of Philosophy), considering thinking as a reflection of objective reality. This understanding has been and is opposed by the idealistic conceptions of DL, which proceed from the idea of ​​thinking as an independent sphere independent of the objective world.

The task of D. l. is to, relying on a generalization of the history of philosophy, the history of all individual sciences, the history of the mental development of a child, the history of the mental development of animals, the history of language, psychology, physiology of the sense organs, technical and artistic creativity, to explore the logical forms and laws of scientific knowledge, methods constructions and patterns of development of scientific theory, to identify ways of correlating knowledge with its object, etc. An important task of D. l. is the analysis of historically established methods of scientific knowledge and the identification of the heuristic possibilities of a particular method, the limits of its application and the possibility of learning new methods.

D. l. differs significantly from formal logic, mathematical logic, which, using the method of formalization, explore forms of thinking in abstraction from its content and the historical development of knowledge in its contradictions. D. l. how logic analyzes the dialectical contradictions of things and thoughts in the process of the development of knowledge, acting as a scientific method of cognition of both being and thinking itself. See Art. Dialectical Materialism.

Lit.: Lenin V.I., philosophical notebooks, Poln. coll. soch., 5th ed., v. 29; Bibler V.S., On the system of categories of dialectical logic, Stalinabad, 1958; Rosenthal M. M., Principles of dialectical logic, M., 1960; Kopnin P.V., Dialectics as logic, K., 1961; Batishchev G.S., Contradiction as a category of dialectical logic, M., 1963; Naumenko L.K., Monism as a principle of dialectical logic, A.-A., 1968; see also lit. to Art. Dialectics, Dialectical materialism.

A. G. Novikov.

Great Soviet Encyclopedia. - M.: Soviet Encyclopedia. 1969-1978 .

See what "Dialectical Logic" is in other dictionaries:

Dialectical logic is the philosophical branch of Marxism. In a broad sense, it was understood as a systematically detailed presentation of the dialectics of thinking: dialectics as logic is a presentation of the science of scientifically theoretical thinking, which is thereby ... ... Wikipedia

- (from the Greek dialegomai I am talking) philos. a theory that tried to identify, systematize and justify as universal the main features of the thinking of a collectivist society (medieval feudal society, communist ... ... Philosophical Encyclopedia

See Dialectical Logic. Antinazi. Encyclopedia of Sociology, 2009 ... Encyclopedia of Sociology

dialectical logic- "DIALECTIC LOGIC" by E.V. Ilyenkov (M., 1974). The book discusses basically the same problems and defends the same ideas as in the “Dialectics of the Abstract and the Concrete in Marx’s Capital” published 14 years earlier ... Encyclopedia of Epistemology and Philosophy of Science

The name of a philosophical theory that tried to identify, systematize and justify as universal the main features of the thinking of a collectivist society (medieval feudal society, totalitarian society, etc.). Basic… … Glossary of Logic Terms

DIALECTIC LOGIC- the science of thinking, capable of reflecting the dialectics of nature and society in knowledge; studies thinking in its development, contradictions and unity of form and content ... Professional education. Dictionary

DIALECTIC LOGIC- (dialectic logic) see Dialectics ... Big explanatory sociological dictionary

DIALECTIC LOGIC (MATERIALISTIC LOGIC)- English. logic, dialectical (materialist); German Logik, dialektische (mate rialistische). The science that studies the forms, content, patterns of history. the development of thinking, its relationship with objective reality and with the practical activity of a person ... Explanatory Dictionary of Sociology

This term has other meanings, see Thinking (meanings). Thinking in dialectical logic is understood as an ideal component (activity in terms of representation that changes the ideal image of an object) of real activity ... ... Wikipedia

See Art. Dialectics. Philosophical encyclopedic dictionary. Moscow: Soviet Encyclopedia. Ch. editors: L. F. Ilyichev, P. N. Fedoseev, S. M. Kovalev, V. G. Panov. 1983. DIALECTIC LOGIC… Philosophical Encyclopedia

Books

• dialectical logic. Essays on History and Theory, E. V. Ilyenkov. In the book of the famous Russian philosopher E. V. Ilyenkov, the most important, including debatable, issues of the theory of materialistic dialectics, dialectical logic, history are considered ...

Nowadays, teachings are named that differ significantly in understanding the boundaries of the subject of this science. So, the subject of dialectical logic, on the one hand, intersects with the subject of dialectics (theory of knowledge, ontology, method); on the other hand, the subject of DL (proper logic) is directly linked to the subject of formal logic. Both of them (formal logic and dialectical logic) are the sciences of reasoning, they lay the rational model of human thinking as the basis for the description and development of ideas about natural and artificial intelligence. Of course, each of the logical teachings claims not only and not so much for a name, but for the right to be considered the only modern stage in the development of world logical thought. That is why the history of the issue helps to form a correct understanding of the subject of science Logic. Systematization of knowledge of dialectical logic is possible on the following basis. In the textbook of logic by Yu. V. Ivlev (St. Petersburg State University-MSU), the name "dialectical logic" is given to the scientific discipline on the development of knowledge, which they tried to create in the 20th century, and the name "formal logic" in the textbook is called the science of forms of thinking, formal logical laws and connections between thoughts according to the logical forms of their expression. Dialectical logic is formally presented in the textbook by methodological principles arising from the worldview principles of philosophy, as well as methods and forms of knowledge development associated with logical forms of thought expression. The correctness of all these forms must be ensured in relation to specific subjects by specific sciences, and the role of logic is reduced to ensuring that these forms correspond to the subject. In this regard, it is possible to isolate logic as a scientific discipline from science in general only in relation to the forms of expression of thoughts and forms of development of knowledge, as well as methods and methodological principles, and they must be applied in unity in order to ensure that the language of the individual who applies them corresponds to normative principles. the language of science. In a full-fledged scientific and philosophical knowledge, logical methodology should be an integral part of philosophical methodology, and this requirement complicates the application of logical methodology even more. Therefore, philosophical methodology is nowhere presented as something whole, including scientific and logical methodology, and the methodology of scientific and philosophical knowledge does not represent a single system of means of knowledge. The lack of a unified methodology does not allow traditional science to turn into a true science of the world as a whole, therefore, in traditional science there is no unity of methodologies and languages ​​of different sciences - logic, philosophy, neurophysiology, psychology, semantics, linguistics, communication theory, cybernetics, synergetics, operations theory, system analysis, etc.

At this stage, it is not yet necessary to speak of philosophy as a special science - for the simple reason that there are no other sciences yet. There are only weak germs of mathematical, astronomical and medical knowledge, growing on the basis of practical experience and oriented quite pragmatically. No wonder that “Philosophy” from the very beginning includes all these few germs of scientific knowledge and helps them develop in its bosom, trying to free them from those magic-healer layers with which they are intertwined as part of the religious-mythological worldview .

The development of philosophy here coincides completely and without a trace with the development of a scientific understanding of the world around us. But that is precisely why its reflections naturally include everything that will subsequently make it up. special item , what will remain for her when, like King Lear, she distributes her kingdom piece by piece to her daughters - the "positive sciences": the study of universal laws within which both “being” and “thinking” exist and change, both the comprehensible cosmos and the soul comprehending it.

It should be noted that the very existence of such laws, equally governing both the cosmos and the "soul", for the thinkers of that time was something taken for granted, as self-evident as the existence of the surrounding world..

At first glance, it may seem that philosophy at that time did not touch at all those questions that would later constitute its special subject, and above all the question of the relationship of “thinking to being”, spirit to matter, consciousness to reality, the ideal to the real. But this is only at first glance.

The philosophy of that era did not simply explore the external world, although, acting as theoretical thinking in general, it actually explored it, but did so in the course of critical overcoming of the religious and mythological worldview, in the process of polemic with it, that is, constantly comparing two spheres clearly demarcated from each other: on the one hand,

• the outside world, as she herself began to realize it,
• and on the other hand, the world as it was presented in the present, that is, religious-mythological, consciousness.

Moreover, her own views were formed precisely as antitheses of the ideas she refuted.

The first step of philosophy is precisely critical understanding of the actual relation of the world of present consciousness and will to the world of reality independent of them: to space, to nature, to "being".

Dialectical logic in the system of Aristotle

If “Greek philosophy outlined all ... those areas of knowledge from which the theory of knowledge and dialectics should develop,” then Aristotle’s system is the first of its kind consciously carried out attempt to create an encyclopedic summary of the entire body of theoretical knowledge. The first attempt to give an organic synthesis of all previous principles was in Greece and the last, it brought to full clarity the expression of the internal incompatibility of materialism and idealism, dialectics and metaphysics as principles for solving the basic problem of philosophical science.

Therefore, it is no coincidence that the teachings of Aristotle served as a common theoretical source for several, subsequently fundamentally divergent, directions in philosophy. For the same reason, each of the clashing points of view on logic and on the relation of logic to "ontology" always has reason to consider Aristotle's teaching as an undeveloped prototype of itself, and its author as its supporter and progenitor. Each of the points of view on these things sees in Aristotle's system as "essential" and "interesting" that which in the trend leads to itself.

Summing up his "Experience on the Human Mind", John Locke defines the subject and task of logic as follows: "The task of logic is to consider the nature of the signs that the mind uses to understand things or to convey its knowledge to others." He interprets logic as "the doctrine of signs", as semiotics.

Since objective reality was interpreted by representatives of a purely mechanistic view of both the world and thinking in an abstract geometric way (that is, only purely quantitative characteristics were considered the only objective and scientific ones), the principles of thinking in mathematical natural science merged in their eyes with the logical principles of thinking in general. This trend appears in its finished form in Hobbes, who develops the concept of logic as a calculus of word-signs.

Dialectical logic in German classical philosophy

Hegel

The sphere of the logical is divided by Hegel into three forms:

• abstract or intellectual
• dialectical, or negatively reasonable, and
• speculative, or positively reasonable.

Hegel specifically emphasizes that these three forms “do not constitute three parts of logic, but are moments of any logically real, that is, any concept or everything true in general”

In the empirical history of thought (as in any given historically attained state), these three forms, as a rule, appear in the form of three different and adjacent systems of logic.

Hegel gives a description of three "moments" of logical thinking, which should be part of Logic:

1. “Thinking, as understanding, does not go beyond immovable determinateness and the difference of the latter from other determinateness; such a limited abstraction is considered by this thinking to have an independent existence. A separate (isolated) historical embodiment of this "moment" in the activity of thinking is dogmatism, and its logical-theoretical self-consciousness is "general", that is, purely formal, logic.
2. "The dialectical moment is the sublimation by such finite definitions of themselves and their transition into their opposite."
3. “The speculative, or positively rational, comprehends the unity of determinations in their opposition, the affirmative, which is contained in their resolution and transition.” In the systematic development of this last "speculative moment" as a development of the first two, Hegel sees his own mission and goal of his work.

Abstractly, these moments appear as parts of the logical and are considered by Hegel as three steps of the same speculative-logical system.

From this follows the external, abstract division of his logic into: 1) the doctrine of being, 2) the doctrine of essence, and 3) the doctrine of the concept and idea.

Return to materialism

Feuerbach

Marx, Engels

Engels in his unfinished book (published in the USSR in the 1960s) Dialectics of Nature outlined the unity of the laws and principles of the objective logic of nature, man and society. Marx formulated the basic methodological principles, which were later called the principles of dialectical logic. They formed the basis of the scientific method (objective and materialistic).

Unity of logic, dialectics and theory of knowledge

expresses the unity of the laws of development, the totality of the development process that captures nature, and human thinking, and society. This principle led to some confusion among Marxist dialecticians. In Hegelian dialectics, this principle was embodied (as the principle of the identity of thinking and being) with all possible consistency. Difficulties arose with its application in materialistic dialectics. Its other formulation is the unity of the objective dialectic, the dialectic of nature, and the subjective dialectic, the dialectic of thinking. In this formulation, the difference between different forms of dialectics is recognized, but not disclosed. When the names of three different theoretical disciplines appear - dialectics, logic and the theory of knowledge, then the existence of development in various forms becomes obvious and “principled”. One of the proposed answers is as follows: dialectics studies the manifestation of development in nature, it is the dialectics of the objective; logic studies the features of development in human thinking; the theory of knowledge attempts to link the dialectics of objective and subjective with the help of the principle of reflection.

Categories of dialectical logic

• as an objective content (that is, a content that is independent not only of thinking, but also of a person in general),
• and subjective content (that is, content from the side of the active role that these categories play in the process of theoretical knowledge, from the side of their logical function).

• Formation

• historical
• Boolean

Principles and methods of dialectical logic

The principle of correspondence of thinking to reality

This principle obliges us to consider thinking not “in itself”, that is, in isolation from reality, but in the process of transforming reality into thought. The principle of correspondence is implemented through the "dialectical method", which is provided by fulfilling certain requirements for the organization of the consideration of reality. In Yu. V. Ivlev's textbook of logic, these requirements form the basis of the dialectical method and are formulated in the form of principles of objectivity and comprehensive consideration. In turn, the principle (or requirement) of objectivity of consideration has consequences: to consider primary phenomena as the causes of consequences, to consider the specific features of the object and subordinate the research method to them. In logic, reality (and not reality) is the most important and, moreover, a specific category. In fact, the subject of dialectical logic can be the logic of the objective world and the logic of human thinking. If, however, no essential distinction is made between them, as is often done in the philosophical examination of knowledge about logic, knowledge of worldview laws and principles of philosophy are presented as principles of dialectical logic, and confusion arises about the methods of developing knowledge in logic and philosophy. Ideally, philosophical methodology should be considered as more general, including logical methodology, but the implementation of this ideal requires a unified methodological structure of the means of knowing, evaluating and transforming the world, which is described in the book “Omega Variant based on VNMS”.

VNMS is a "universal non-material means" of organizing thinking and cognition based on the scientific method of cognition and transformation of reality. The logical structure of the VNMS takes into account that there are “two sides” in science - worldview and methodological, therefore it is a “logical structure of a single scientific and philosophical method of cognition and transformation of reality”, which could become the basis of the science of the development of knowledge of dialectical logic. It should be borne in mind that the scientific formation of the "science of logic" should also take into account both sides of science, starting with the principle of correspondence of thinking to reality and its ontological (naturally scientific) explanation. There can be no "pure logic" divorced from the reality of the human world, although one can endlessly create artificial formulas of symbolic logic. It is impossible to explain the “logically correct following” of one thought from another, if each such thought is not defined by worldview objects. The “correct logic” may be that ONE follows from the OTHER, but these same ONE and OTHER must be, at a minimum, defined, and as a maximum, defined in their dialectical development. The denial of the dialectics of the world and the very idea of ​​the need for the science of dialectical logic as a science of the development of knowledge can be justified by the idea of ​​the formation of "pure logic", but it is impossible to realize such an idea in the conditions of the modern world, in which there are no unambiguous definitions of concepts about the world. If the concepts are not refined, and they are not refined, then it is impossible to describe the “refined logic of thinking”. Any example of "correct inference" would require an explanation of what the First means, from which the Second is derived in the example. The problem lies in the fact that the "ideological and methodological" sides of science are interrelated, and they need to be separated in order to first study and remember, in order to apply them in unity. Let's look at it starting with the concepts.

Concepts, although they are means of understanding the world, but it is on their basis that a worldview is formed. Thus, worldview and methodology are in fact always interconnected, but in the textbook on philosophy of Moscow State University (Alekseev and Panin) only one thing was noted: "worldview determines the methodology." But it is not said what defines a worldview as a "system of views on the world." If the attention of an individual is offered fragmentary and contradictory knowledge, then the worldview cannot be formed as an integral system. And, on the contrary, if the methodology is formed in the form of a scientific system of non-material means of cognition and transformation of reality, as indicated in the first edition of the textbook of logic by Yu. V. Ivlev (1992), then such a methodology gradually begins to form a systemic worldview. In this process, there is a dilemma of self-control: what is the specific system of views on the world (worldview) - summative or holistic at the time of its consideration? It is extremely difficult to form a worldview by simply summing up the knowledge of different sciences, since their theories contain a lot of hypothetical and contradictory, or not corresponding to other sciences. And the human brain ontologically needs a holistic picture of the world, therefore it can only integrate such knowledge that does not contradict each other. In textbooks on the humanities, this can manifest itself in the fact that their principles are common to all sciences, but at some point specialization leads thinking into the problems of a separate science, and they are consequences of the unscientific development of the world. That is, specialization is aimed at combating the consequences of the unscientific or anti-scientific development of science and society.

The easiest way is to digress from the false problems of science and realize the needs of the brain in a holistic understanding of the world in relation to the use of methodological knowledge, and not worldview, since scientific methodology in its essence boils down to the implementation of the principles of the scientific method. The non-obligatory fulfillment of these principles in a particular science prevents its integration with other sciences and their transformation into a true science of the world as a whole. This also makes it difficult for the language of a particular science to conform to the normative principles of scientificity. Under such conditions, it is important to facilitate the implementation of all these principles, and this can be done both in science and in practice, if one masters the simple-to-understand "sign-image gestalt of the VNMS" with thinking, inside which a graph of the scientific method of cognition and transformation of the world is shown. Gestalt VNMS (simplified shown at WWW.UNMM.ru) denotes in the Cartesian coordinate system only the first 4 dimensions of the logical structure of VNMS, since the remaining 3 require the division of concepts (and other non-material means) into real, imaginary and complex, and therefore the display of the graph of the universal The method requires the “space of the Mandelbrot set”, which allows to display the logic of the natural development of the names of a person’s language, so that a learned person would not perceive imaginary names as real, would not mislead himself and society, would not waste time of his life and others.

The purpose of the VNMS gestalt is the economy of thinking, and the practical limit of generalization in relation to the world is economics. The ideological basis of the VNMS gestalt is built on the principle “less contains more”: nature is considered as the basic form of the development of matter. The idea of ​​these forms is borrowed from K. Marx - his forms "technology, organization and economy" in the hierarchical structure of the VNMS are based on Nature, above which Science rises (under Marx it was born), and Technique rises above Science. And only above Technique do Marxist forms rise. Thus, for the formation of economic thinking, it is necessary to form in training the following types of thinking: naturally scientific, technical, technological and organizational. If politicians are shaped in this way, they will be able to create a “knowledge economy” in the future. All the variety of aspects of the application of VNMS cannot be described here. Unfortunately, in the Russian Federation, the development of logic has gone along the path of purification from “non-logical knowledge”. The latest, 4th edition of Yu. V. Ivlev's textbook on logic (2008), developed on the basis of fundamental research, is an attempt to separate knowledge of logic from worldview knowledge. Below, someone gave his assessment of this direction in the development of logic.

In thinking, a person is aware of the method and nature of his cognitive actions, keeps the process of reflection under the control of categories, logical forms that express the universal forms of everything that exists, a form of reality, as an internally dissected "unity in diversity" (that is, "concreteness"). That is why, without categories that express the universal forms and laws of reality, it is impossible to understand or express the “specifics of thinking” at all, and logic, which is closed in the consideration of the so-called “specifics of thinking”, that is, considering thinking “in itself”, outside of its relationship to reality, in the end it does not grasp just the desired “specificity”, replacing the logical aspect of the study with psychological, phenomenological, descriptive-historical or linguistic consideration.

Way (method) of ascent from the abstract to the concrete

The method of ascent from the abstract to the concrete ensures the correspondence of consciousness with reality, achieved through a complex dialectically contradictory process of the development of concepts and categories.

The way (method) of ascent from the abstract to the concrete is, first of all, the conscious expression of the law to which the development of theoretical cognition of reality as a single whole, connected in all its manifestations, as an objective “unity in diversity”, which is in the process of emergence, formation and development.

Contradiction

Contradiction is the most important logical principle and form of development of definitions, the principle of logical transition from fact to fact. This principle only ensures the objectivity of the transition from category to category, that is, the agreement of the development of definitions with the development of reality. Dialectical materialism understands such moments, "sides", etc., which are in inseparable unity, mutually exclude each other, and not only in different, but also in the same respect, that is, they interpenetrate.

There are no opposites without their unity, there is no unity without opposites. The unity of opposites is relative, temporary, the struggle of opposites is absolute. This law explains the objective internal "source" of any movement, without resorting to any extraneous forces, allows us to understand the movement as self-movement. He reveals the concrete unity of diversity precisely as a concrete and not a dead identity. Dialectical thinking does not dissect the whole, abstractly separating the extremes, but, on the contrary, masters the whole as organic, as a system in which opposites mutually penetrate, causing the entire process of development. This reproduces the concrete integrity and development of the subject "in the logic of concepts." This law most concentratedly expresses the opposite of dialectical thinking to rational metaphysical, which interprets the “source” of movement only as different from the movement itself and external to it, and unity as existing alongside diversity.

Metaphysics pushes on the path of replacing movement and the concrete unity of diversity by describing the external results of movement and only externally juxtaposed aspects of the subject. The entire history of dialectics is the history of the struggle around these problems, attempts to solve them.

Dialectical contradiction in cognition cannot be reduced to a collision of thesis and antithesis. It consists in moving towards its resolution. To understand dialectical contradiction means to understand how it develops and is resolved. Its resolution is by no means reduced to a simple elimination of confused formal-logical contradictions in reasoning. The dialectical contradiction within a theory can be adequately formulated only in the creative process of ascent from the abstract to the concrete (abstract and concrete). Therefore, a detailed presentation of the theory cannot be squeezed into the framework of a single "consistent system." The process of development is carried out through the clash of both internal and external opposites. Dialectics considers external opposites not as originally different entities, but as a result of the bifurcation of the one, ultimately as derivatives of internal ones. The Marxist doctrine of social development is built on the application of this law, on the study of the contradictions of society; it substantiates the thesis of class struggle as the driving force behind the development of class society and draws its own conclusions from it.

Every social order is the natural result of the development and resolution of the contradictions of the social order that preceded it through a social revolution. Contradictions and forms of their resolution are diverse. Marxism claims that socialism also develops through contradictions, but they are of a specific nature (antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions). The category of dialectical contradiction has an important methodological significance for modern natural science, which is increasingly confronted with the contradictory nature of objects.

The Law of the Transition of Quantitative Changes into Qualitative

The law of the transition of quantitative changes into qualitative ones is the universal law of the development of the material world, which tells how the process of development of objects, phenomena takes place, what is the mechanism of this process. It is based on the relationship of two properties - quality and quantity. Despite significant differences, quantity and quality are the same, since they are sides of the same subject. This unity is called a measure and is a boundary that defines the limits of possible quantitative change within a given quality. If the measure is violated, quantitative changes entail a qualitative transformation. Thus, development acts as a unity of two stages - continuity And jump.

• continuity in development - the stage of slow quantitative accumulation, it does not affect the quality and acts as a process of increasing or decreasing the existing.
• jump- the stage of fundamental qualitative changes in the subject, the moment or period of the transformation of the old quality into a new one. These changes proceed relatively quickly even when they take the form of a gradual transition.

There are the following types jumps:

• by the scale of qualitative changes: intrasystem(private) and intersystem(indigenous);
• according to the direction of the ongoing changes: progressive(leading to higher quality) and regressive(leading to a decrease in the level of the structural organization of the object);
• according to the nature of the contradictions: spontaneous(resolving internal contradictions) and induced(as a result of external factors).

Hegel denied the absoluteness of qualities and believed, unlike Aristotle, that any new quality is only the result of accumulated quantitative changes. In support of his thesis, Hegel cited changes in the aggregate state of matter: melting, boiling, etc. - where the appearance of a new quality, for example, fluidity, is the result of quantitative changes, for example, an increase in temperature

Law of negation of negation

According to this law, any development in animate and inanimate nature is carried out in a spiral. As an example of the operation of the third law of dialectics, all textbooks cite an ear of wheat. The ear grows due to the death of the grain, that is, it, as it were, negates the grain. However, when the ear itself ripens, new grains appear in it, and the ear itself, as it were, dies, and it is cut off with a sickle. Thus, the negation of the grain is the cause of the emergence of the ear, and the negation of the ear is the cause of the emergence of new grains. In the spiritual realm, an example of the operation of the law of negation of negation is Hegel's return to some provisions of Heraclitus. This return is a consequence of double negation /Aristotle denied Heraclitus, Hegel - Aristotle/. As Hegel himself noted, all this is similar to the operation with negative numbers / “minus times minus gives plus”, etc. /.

Criticism of dialectical logic

Kondakov N.I.: (Beginning of quotation) “DIALECTICAL LOGIC is a philosophical term introduced by the German philosopher Hegel at the beginning of the 19th century, which he, in contrast to the formal logic distorted by him, called his idealistic doctrine of the laws of development of all “natural and spiritual things.” He correctly noticed one of the flaws of his contemporary philosophical theories, which consisted in the fact that the laws and forms of thinking were considered metaphysically, as something eternally given and unchanging ... But Hegel, instead of criticizing the metaphysical philosophical systems in detail, directed his blows against formal logic, which, by the way, never set as its goal and did not consider the emergence, formation and development of thinking as its subject, correctly believing that this is the competence of the theory of knowledge. Formal logic is the science of the laws of inferential knowledge, that is, the laws of obtaining new true knowledge in a logical way from other true knowledge, without resorting to experience and the history of the genesis of thinking in each specific case. Not understanding this, Hegel excluded formal logic, laws and rules which people have been using since the day when human thinking arose, from among the sciences and reduced it to empty metaphysics. Accusing formal logic without evidence of being concerned with just some kind of “external material”… that its subject matter is “dead content”…, while the laws and rules are “very empty and trivial”…, Hegel began to vilify it, without being embarrassed. in the choice of expressions: "sane reason ... mocks her" ..., it is "high time for her to completely leave the stage" ..., she "has become an object of contempt" ..., her laws and rules are "little better than sorting out sticks of unequal length" ... and that in general, there is “not even a premonition of the scientific method” in it ... etc. As it is easy to see, the explosion of such dissatisfaction with formal logic is explained not only by a misunderstanding of the subject of this science, but also by Hegel’s idealistic position. He was disgusted by the fact that the materialists of the old and new times strictly followed it in formal logic ... Having set himself the task of “revitalizing” the “dead bones of logic” with the spirit ..., Hegel opposed his dialectical logic to formal logic, as “a system of pure reason, as a realm of pure thought “... as “the realm of shadows, the world of simple entities, freed from any sensual concreteness” ... Moreover, the dialectical logic developed by him was, as a study of his works shows, not logic in the accepted sense of the word, not a universal science of the laws and rules of inferential knowledge, but philosophical science about the laws of origin, development and change of nature, society and thinking, proceeding from an objective-idealistic position. The subject of dialectical logic, according to Hegel, is how the absolute idea, which forms the basis of all reality, itself deploys its moments as inherent in the category itself. As a prerequisite for this logic, he chooses the fundamentally false, idealistic principle of the identity of thinking and being, and the logical is recognized as primary in relation to the historical. True, contrary to the idealistic system, Hegel achieved remarkable successes in the philosophical doctrine of the emergence, development and change of thinking. In the development of categories, he "guessed" the dialectic of things. Logical categories, said the German philosopher, should be considered as comprehensively connected, becoming, passing into each other, disappearing into each other. The source of the development and mutual transitions of categories is, in his opinion, the dialectical contradiction, which Hegel called the root of all movement and vitality. Something, he emphasized, moves, has an impulse and activity, "only because ... it has a contradiction in itself." Although he himself was not consistent and came to the conclusion about the need for reconciliation, the neutralization of the contradiction, which meant, according to Marx, his surrender to reality” (End of citation).