The history of the first partisan detachment of the Great Patriotic War. The role of barrage detachments during the great patriotic war.

Since the time of the Khrushchev "thaw", a myth was born about the barrage detachments of the NKVD, which fired machine guns at the retreating units of the Red Army. After the collapse of the USSR, these nonsense flourished.

In addition, the supporters of this lie also argue that most of the population of the USSR did not want to fight, they were forced to defend the Stalinist regime "on pain of death." By this they insult the memory of our valiant ancestors.

creation of barrage detachments

The concept of a detachment is rather vague - "a permanent or temporary military formation created to perform a combat or special task." It fits well under the definition of "special forces".

During the Great Patriotic War, the composition, functions, departmental affiliation of the barrage detachments were constantly changing. In early February 1941, the NKVD was divided into the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the People's Commissariat. state security(NKGB). Military counterintelligence was separated from the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and transferred to the People's Commissariat for Defense of the USSR Navy, where the Third Directorates of the NKO and the NKVMF of the USSR were created. On July 27, 1941, the Third Directorate of the NCO issued a directive on its work in wartime.

According to the directive, mobile control and barrage detachments were organized, they were supposed to detain deserters, suspicious elements at the front line. They received the right of preliminary investigation, after which the detainees were handed over to the judicial authorities.

In July 1941, the NKVD and the NKGB were again united, the organs of the Third Directorate of the NKO were transformed into special departments and transferred to the subordination of the NKVD. Special departments received the right to arrest deserters and, if necessary, shoot them. Special departments had to fight spies, traitors, deserters, saboteurs, alarmists, cowards. By order of the NKVD No. 00941 dated July 19, 1941, separate rifle platoons were created under special divisions of divisions and corps, and companies under special divisions of the armies, battalions at the fronts, they were manned by NKVD troops.

These units became the so-called "barrage detachments". They had the right to organize a barrage service in order to prevent the flight of deserters, carefully check the documents of all servicemen, arrest deserters and conduct an investigation (within 12 hours) and transfer the case to a military tribunal. To send stragglers to their units, in exceptional cases, to immediately restore order at the front, the head of the special department received the right to shoot deserters.

In addition, barrage detachments were supposed to identify and destroy enemy agents, check those who fled from German captivity.

Fighting bandits

Among the daily tasks of the barrage detachments was the fight against bandits. So, in June 1941, at the third department of the Baltic Fleet, a detachment was formed - it was a maneuverable company on vehicles, reinforced by two armored cars. He operated on the territory of Estonia. Since there were almost no cases of desertion in the zone of responsibility, the detachment with a group of operatives was thrown into the fight against the Estonian Nazis. Their small gangs attacked individual servicemen and small units on the roads.

The actions of the detachment significantly reduced the activity of the Estonian bandits. The detachment also took part in the "cleansing" of the Virtsu peninsula, which was liberated in mid-July 1941 by a counterstrike of the 8th Army. On the way, the detachment met a German outpost, defeated it in battle. He carried out an operation to destroy the bandits in the Varla borough and the village. Tystamaa, Pärnovsky district, destroyed the counter-revolutionary organization in Tallinn. In addition, the detachment took part in reconnaissance activities, throwing three agents behind enemy lines. Two returned, they found out the location of the German military installations, they were attacked by the aviation of the Baltic Fleet.

During the battle for Tallinn, the detachment not only stopped and returned the fleeing, but itself held the defense. It was especially difficult on August 27, some parts of the 8th Army fled, the detachment stopped them, a counterattack was organized, the enemy was thrown back - this played a decisive role in the successful evacuation of Tallinn. During the battles for Tallinn, more than 60% of the detachment's personnel and almost all of the commanders were killed! And these are cowardly scum who shoot their own people?

In Kronstadt, the detachment was restored, and from September 7 it continued to serve. Special departments of the Northern Front also fought the bandits.

By the beginning of September 1941, the military situation again became sharply complicated, so the Headquarters, at the request of the commander of the Bryansk Front, General A.I. Eremenko, allowed the creation of detachments in those divisions that proved to be unstable. A week later, this practice was extended to all fronts. The number of detachments was one battalion per division, one company per regiment. They were subordinate to the division commander and had vehicles for movement, several armored cars and tanks. Their task was to help the commanders, maintain discipline and order in the units. They had the right to use to stop the flight and eliminate the initiators of the panic.
That is, their difference from the detachments under the special departments of the NKVD, which were created to fight deserters and suspicious elements, is that army detachments were created in order to prevent unauthorized flight of units. They were larger (a battalion per division, not a platoon), they were manned not from the NKVD fighters, but from the Red Army. They had the right to shoot the initiators of panic and flight, and not shoot those who flee.

As of October 10, 1941, special departments and detachments detained 657,364 people, of which 25,878 people were arrested, of which 10,201 people were shot. The rest are again sent to the front.

Barrage detachments also played a role in the defense of Moscow. In parallel with the barrage divisional battalions, detachments of special divisions existed. Similar units were created by the territorial bodies of the NKVD, for example, in the Kalinin region.

Stalingrad battle

In connection with the breakthrough of the front and the exit of the Wehrmacht to the Volga and the Caucasus, on July 28, 1942, the famous order No. 227 of the NKO was issued. According to it, it was ordered to create 3-5 detachments in armies (200 fighters in each), to place them in the immediate rear of unstable units. They also received the right to shoot alarmists and cowards in order to restore order and discipline. They obeyed the Military Councils of the armies, through their special departments. The most experienced commanders of special departments were placed at the head of the detachments, the detachments were provided with transport. In addition, barrage battalions were rebuilt in each division.

By order of the People's Commissariat of Defense No. 227, 193 army detachments were created on October 15, 1942. From 1 August to 15 October 1942, these units detained 140,755 Red Army soldiers. 3980 people were arrested, 1189 of them were shot, the rest were sent to penal units. Most of the arrests and detentions were on the Don and Stalingrad fronts.

The defensive detachments played an important role in restoring order, and returned a significant number of servicemen to the front. For example: on August 29, 1942, the headquarters of the 29th rifle division was surrounded (due to the breakthrough of German tanks), the units, having lost control, retreated in panic. The defensive detachment of Lieutenant GB Filatov stopped the fleeing, returned to defensive positions. In another sector of the division's front, Filatov's detachment stopped the enemy's breakthrough.

On September 20, the Wehrmacht occupied a part of Melikhovskaya, the combined brigade began an unauthorized retreat. The defensive detachment of the 47th Army of the Black Sea Group of Forces restored order in the brigade. The brigade returned to its positions and, together with the detachment, threw back the enemy.

That is, the detachments in critical situations did not panic, but put things in order and fought the enemy themselves. On September 13, the 112th Rifle Division yielded its positions under enemy attack. A detachment of the 62nd Army under the command of State Security Lieutenant Khlystov repelled enemy attacks for four days and held the line until reinforcements arrived. On September 15-16, a detachment of the 62nd Army fought for two days in the area of ​​the Stalingrad railway station. The detachment, despite its small number, repulsed the enemy's attacks and itself counterattacked and surrendered the line in inviolability to the units of the approaching 10th Infantry Division.

But there was also the use of the barrage detachments for other purposes, there were commanders who used them as line units, because of this, some detachments lost most of their composition and they had to be formed anew.

During the Battle of Stalingrad, there were three types of barrage detachments: army detachments, created by order number 227, restored barrage battalions of divisions and small detachments of special departments. As before, the overwhelming majority of the detained fighters returned to their units.

Kursk Bulge

By order of the Council of People's Commissars dated April 19, 1943, the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD was again transferred to the NKO and the NKVM and reorganized into the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" ("Death to Spies") of the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense and the Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" of the People's Commissariat of the Navy.

On July 5, 1943, the Wehrmacht began its offensive, some of our units wavered. The detachments have fulfilled their mission here as well. From 5 to 10 July, the detachments of the Voronezh Front detained 1,870 people, arrested 74 people, the rest were returned to their units.

In total, the report of the head of the Counterintelligence Directorate of the Central Front, Major General A. Vadis, dated August 13, 1943, indicated that 4501 people were detained, of which 3303 people were sent back to the unit.

On October 29, 1944, by order of the People's Commissar for Defense I.V. Stalin, the detachments were disbanded due to a change in the situation at the front. The personnel was replenished with rifle divisions. In the last period of their existence, they no longer acted according to their profile - there was no need. They were used in the protection of headquarters, communication lines, roads, for combing forests, personnel were often used for logistical needs - cooks, storekeepers, clerks and so on, although the personnel of these detachments were selected from the best fighters and sergeants awarded with medals and orders, who had extensive combat experience.

Summarize: the detachments performed the most important function, they detained deserters, suspicious persons (among whom there were spies, saboteurs, agents of the Nazis). In critical situations, they themselves entered into battle with the enemy. After a change in the situation at the front (after the Battle of Kursk), the barrage detachments actually began to perform the functions of commandant companies. To stop the fleeing, they had the right to shoot over the heads of the retreating, shoot the initiators and lead them in front of the line. But these cases were not massive, only individual. There is not a single fact that the soldiers of the barrage detachments shot to kill at their own. There are no such examples in the memoirs of front-line soldiers. In addition, they could prepare an additional defensive line in the rear to stop retreating and so that they could gain a foothold on it.

The defensive detachments made their contribution to the common Victory, honestly doing their duty.

Sources:
Lubyanka in the days of the battle for Moscow: materials of the USSR state security agencies from the Central archive of the FSB of Russia. Compiled by A. T. Zhadobin. M., 2002.
"Arc of Fire": the Battle of Kursk through the eyes of the Lubyanka. Compiled by A. T. Zhadobin et al. M., 2003.
State security bodies of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. M., 2000.
Toptygin A.V. Unknown Beria. M., SPb., 2002.

The liberal media screams about the terrible and insidious detachments in the Red Army, which were shooting retreating soldiers with machine guns. This situation is depicted in some films about the war. In fact, these are nothing more than myths created to discredit the Stalinist period in Russian history. In this analytical article you will find figures and facts from the state archives, video chronicles of those years, as well as the memories of the participants of the past battles in the Second World War themselves on the topic of the actions of the barrage detachments in relation to their own army.

The famous order of the NCO No. 227 of July 27, 1942, which was immediately called "Not a step back" among the soldiers, among other very tough measures to strengthen order and discipline at the front, prescribed the creation of the so-called. barrage detachments. In this order, Stalin demanded:

B) to form within the army 3 - 5 well-armed barrage detachments (up to 200 people in each), put them in the immediate rear of unstable divisions and oblige them in case of panic and indiscriminate withdrawal of divisional units to shoot alarmists and cowards on the spot and thus help honest fighters divisions to fulfill their duty to the Motherland; ...

And somehow the information about these units immediately faded into the background. Nothing was written about them in the press either during the war or in the post-war years. Even at the time of "exposing the cult of Stalin's personality," they tried to bypass the topic of barrage detachments. Information about them was either simply hushed up, or they were dully blamed for the Stalinist regime. And again, without any details.

After the fall of the communist regime in our country, a lot of speculation appeared in the democratic press on the topic of barrage detachments. Taking advantage of the fact that people have no information on this issue, a number of pseudo-historians, who especially prefer to receive royalties in dollars from various foreign "democracy support funds", began to prove that the people did not want to fight for the Stalinist regime, that only commissars were driving the Red Army into battle and machine guns of detachments. That on the conscience of the detachment detachments hundreds of thousands of ruined lives, that, instead of fighting at the front themselves, the detachment detachments mowed down entire divisions with machine-gun fire, which in fact only helped the Germans.

And, again, without any evidence, documents, and more and more referring to the "memories" of very dubious personalities.

One of the most terrible myths of the Second World War is associated with the existence of detachments in the Red Army. Often in modern TV series about the war, you can see scenes with gloomy personalities in blue caps of the NKVD troops, shooting wounded soldiers out of battle with machine guns. By showing this, the authors take a great sin on their souls. None of the researchers have been able to find in the archives a single fact in support of this.

What happened?

Barrage detachments appeared in the Red Army from the first days of the war. Such formations were created by the military counterintelligence in the person of the 3rd Directorate of the NKO of the USSR, and from July 17, 1941 - the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR and subordinate bodies in the troops.

As the main tasks of the special departments for the period of the war, the decree of the State Defense Committee defined "a decisive struggle against espionage and betrayal in the units of the Red Army and the elimination of desertion in the immediate front line." They received the right to arrest deserters, and, if necessary, shoot them on the spot.

To ensure operational measures in special departments in accordance with the order of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs L.P. Beria by July 25, 1941 were formed: in divisions and corps - separate rifle platoons, in armies - separate rifle companies, in the fronts - separate rifle battalions. Using them, special departments organized a barrage service, setting up ambushes, posts and patrols on roads, refugee routes and other communications. Each detained commander, Red Army, Red Navy soldier was checked. If he was recognized as having fled from the battlefield, then he was immediately arrested, and an operational (no more than 12-hour) investigation began on him to be brought to trial by a military tribunal as a deserter. Special departments were entrusted with the responsibility of enforcing the sentences of military tribunals, including before the formation. In "especially exceptional cases, when the situation requires decisive measures to immediately restore order at the front," the head of the special department had the right to shoot deserters on the spot, which he had to immediately report to the special department of the army and front (fleet). Servicemen who had lagged behind the unit for an objective reason, in an organized manner, accompanied by a representative of a special department, were sent to the headquarters of the nearest division.

The flow of servicemen who had lagged behind their units in a kaleidoscope of battles, when leaving numerous encirclements, or even deliberately deserted, was enormous. From the beginning of the war and until October 10, 1941, operational barriers of special departments and barrage detachments of the NKVD troops detained more than 650 thousand soldiers and commanders. The German agents also easily dissolved in the general mass. Thus, a group of spies, neutralized in the winter and spring of 1942, had the task of physically eliminating the command of the Western and Kalinin Fronts, including the commanding generals G.K. Zhukov and I.S. Konev.

Special departments struggled to cope with this volume of cases. The situation demanded the creation of special units that would directly deal with the prevention of unauthorized withdrawal of troops from their positions, the return of lagging servicemen to their units and subunits, and the detention of deserters.

The first initiative of this kind was shown by the military command. After the appeal of the commander of the Bryansk front, Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko to Stalin on September 5, 1941, he was allowed to create barrage detachments in "unstable" divisions, where there were several cases of leaving combat positions without orders. A week later, this practice was extended to the rifle divisions of the entire Red Army.

These barrage detachments (up to a battalion in number) had nothing to do with the NKVD troops, they acted as part of the Red Army rifle divisions, were recruited at the expense of their personnel and were subordinate to their commanders. At the same time, along with them, there were detachments formed either by military special departments or by territorial bodies of the NKVD. A typical example is the barrage detachments formed in October 1941 by the NKVD of the USSR, which by order of the State Defense Committee took under special protection the zone adjacent to Moscow from the west and south along the Kalinin - Rzhev - Mozhaisk - Tula - Kolomna - Kashira line. Already the first results showed how necessary these measures were. In just two weeks, from 15 to 28 October 1941, more than 75 thousand servicemen were detained in the Moscow zone.

From the very beginning, the barrage units, regardless of their departmental subordination, were not guided by the leadership towards mass executions and arrests. Meanwhile, today in the press we have to deal with similar accusations; Zagradotryadovtsy are sometimes called punishers. But here are the numbers. Of the more than 650 thousand servicemen detained by October 10, 1941, after an inspection, about 26 thousand people were arrested, among whom special departments were: spies - 1505, saboteurs - 308, traitors - 2621, cowards and alarmists - 2643, deserters - 8772, distributors of provocative rumors - 3987, self-gunners - 1671, others - 4371 people. 10201 people were shot, including 3321 people in front of the line. The overwhelming number is more than 632 thousand people, i.e. more than 96% were returned to the front.

As the front line stabilized, the activity of the barrage formations was curtailed by default. A new impetus was given to her by order number 227.

The detachments created in accordance with it, numbering up to 200 people, consisted of soldiers and commanders of the Red Army, neither in uniform nor in weapons did they differ from the rest of the Red Army. Each of them had the status of a separate military unit and was subordinate not to the command of the division, behind the battle formations of which it was located, but to the command of the army through the OO NKVD. The detachment was led by a state security officer.

In total, by October 15, 1942, 193 barrage detachments were functioning in the units of the active army. First of all, the Stalinist order was carried out, of course, on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front. Almost every fifth detachment - 41 units - was formed in the Stalingrad direction.

Initially, in accordance with the requirements of the People's Commissar of Defense, the barrage detachments were obliged to prevent unauthorized withdrawal of line units. However, in practice, the range of military affairs in which they were engaged turned out to be wider.

“The defensive detachments,” recalled General of the Army P. N. Lashchenko, who was deputy chief of staff of the 60th Army in the days of the publication of order No. 227, “were at a distance from the front line, covered the troops from the rear from saboteurs and enemy landing forces, detained deserters who , unfortunately, there were; they put things in order at the crossings, sent soldiers who had strayed from their units to assembly points. "

Here is a document from the FSB archives. He is not able to illuminate the whole real picture of the barrage detachments, but he can lead to certain reflections. This is a summary report of the Directorate of Special Departments to the leadership of the NKVD. It is not dated, but a number of indirect signs indicate that it was written no earlier than October 15, 1942. From this it is clear that these are only the first results of the actions of the blocking detachments.

In accordance with the order of the NKO No. 227 in units operating in the Red Army as of October 15 of this year. 193 barrage detachments were formed.

Of these, 16 units were formed in the Stalingrad Front and 25 in the Donskoy Front, and only 41 detachments, which are subordinate to the Special Departments of the NKVD of the armies.

Since the beginning of their formation (from August 1 to October 15 this year), the defensive detachments have detained 140,755 servicemen who fled from the front line.

Of the detainees: 3980 people were arrested, 1189 people were shot, 2,776 people were sent to penal companies, 185 people were sent to penal battalions, 131,094 people were returned to their units and to transit points.

The largest number detentions and arrests were carried out by barrage detachments of the Don and Stalingrad fronts.

On the Don Front, 36,109 people were detained, 736 people were arrested, 433 people were shot, 1,056 people were sent to penal companies, 33 people were sent to penal battalions, 32,933 people were returned to their units and to transit points.

On the Stalingrad front, 15649 people were detained, 244 people were arrested, 278 people were shot, 218 people were sent to penal companies, 42 penal battalions, 14,833 people were returned to their units and to transit points.

It should be noted that the barrage detachments, and especially the detachments on the Stalingrad and Don fronts (subordinate to special departments of the NKVD armies) during the period of fierce battles with the enemy played a positive role in putting things in order in the units and preventing an unorganized withdrawal from the borders they occupied, returning a significant number of servicemen on the front line.

August 29 this year The headquarters of the 29th division of the 64th Army of the Stalingrad Front was surrounded by the enemy tanks that had broken through, parts of the division, losing control in panic, retreated to the rear. A barrier detachment operating behind the battle formations of the division's units (the head of the detachment is Lieutenant of State Security Filatov), ​​having taken decisive measures, stopped the military personnel retreating in disorder and returned them to the previously occupied lines of defense.
In another sector of this division, the enemy tried to break through into the depths of the defense. The detachment entered the battle and delayed the advance of the enemy.

September 14 this year the enemy launched an offensive against parts of the 399th division of the 62nd Army, which were defending the city of Stalingrad. The soldiers and commanders of the 396th and 472nd regiments began to retreat in panic, leaving the lines. The head of the detachment (junior lieutenant of state security Elman) ordered his detachment to open fire over the heads of the retreating. As a result, the personnel of these regiments was stopped and after 2 hours the regiments occupied their previous lines of defense.

September 20 of this year the enemy occupied the eastern outskirts of Melekhovskaya. The composite brigade, under the onslaught of the enemy, began an unauthorized retreat to another line. The actions of the blocking detachment of the 47th Army of the Black Sea Group of Forces restored order in the brigade. The brigade occupied the previous lines and, on the initiative of the political commander of the company of the same blocking detachment, Pestov, by joint actions with the brigade, the enemy was thrown back from Melekhovskaya.

At critical moments, when support was required to hold the occupied lines, the barrage detachments entered directly into battle with the enemy, successfully restraining his onslaught and inflicting losses on him.
On September 13 of this year, the 112-page division, under pressure from the enemy, withdrew from the occupied line. A detachment detachment of the 62nd army, under the leadership of the chief of the detachment (lieutenant of state security Khlystov), ​​took up defensive positions on the approaches to an important height. For 4 days, the soldiers and commanders of the detachment repelled the attacks of the enemy machine gunners and inflicted heavy losses on them. The detachment held the line until the arrival of the military units.

September 15-16 this year a blocking detachment of the 62nd Army for 2 days successfully fought against superior enemy forces in the railway area. railway station in Stalingrad. Despite its small number, the detachment not only repulsed the enemy's attacks, but also attacked him, causing him significant losses in manpower. The detachment left its line only when units of the 10th front division came to replace it.

A number of facts were noted when the barrage detachments were used incorrectly by individual commanders of the formations. A significant number of barrage detachments were sent into battle on a par with line subunits, which suffered losses, as a result of which they were diverted for reorganization and the barrage service was not carried out.
September 19 p. The command of the 240-page division of the Voronezh Front of one of the companies of the blocking detachment of the 38th Army gave a combat mission to clear the grove of a group of German submachine gunners. In the battles for the grove, this company lost 31 people, of which 18 people were killed.

The defensive detachment of the 29th Army of the Western Front, being in operational subordination to the commander of the 246th division, was used as a combat unit. Taking part in one of the attacks, a detachment of 118 personnel lost 109 people killed and wounded, in connection with which it was re-formed.

According to the 6th Army of the Voronezh Front, according to the order of the Military Council of the Army, 2 barrage detachments on September 4 of this year. were attached to 174 pp. division and put into battle. As a result, the detachments in battle lost up to 70% of their personnel, the remaining soldiers of these detachments were transferred to the named division and thus disbanded.
3rd detachment of the same army on September 10 this year. was put on the defensive.

In the 1st Guards Army of the Don Front, by order of the commander of the army 59 Chistyakov and a member of the Military Council 60 Abramov, 2 barrage detachments were repeatedly sent into battle, like ordinary units. As a result, the detachments lost more than 65% of their personnel and were subsequently disbanded. In this regard, the order of the Front Military Council on the transfer of 5 barrage detachments to the subordination of the 24th Army was not fulfilled.

Signature (Kazakevich)

Army General Hero Soviet Union P.N.Lashchenko:
Yes, there were barrage detachments. But I do not know that any of them fired at their own people, at least in our sector of the front. Already now I have requested archival documents in this regard, no such documents were found. The detachments were located at a distance from the front line, covered the troops from the rear from saboteurs and enemy troops, detained deserters, who, unfortunately, were there; put things in order at the crossings, sent soldiers who had strayed from their units to assembly points. I will say more, the front received replenishment, of course, not fired, as they say, not sniffing gunpowder, and the barrage detachments, which consisted exclusively of soldiers already fired upon, the most persistent and courageous, were, as it were, a reliable and strong shoulder of the elder. It often happened that the detachments found themselves face to face with the same German tanks, chains of German machine gunners and suffered heavy losses in battles. This is an irrefutable fact.

First of all, from this eloquent document it becomes clear why the topic of barrage detachments was hushed up at the time Soviet power... We were all brought up on the postulates of a nationwide rebuff to the enemy, the selfless devotion of the Soviet people to their Motherland, the mass heroism of Soviet soldiers.

These ideological attitudes somehow begin to erode when you read in this document that only within the Stalingrad front, by mid-October 1942, the detachments detained more than 15 thousand fugitives from the front, and more than 140 thousand along the entire Soviet-German front line, i. e. by the number of more than ten full-blooded divisions. At the same time, it is quite clear that not everyone who fled from the front has been detained. At best, half.

It remains only to be surprised that such detachments were not created back in 1941. After all, before my eyes there was an excellent example of the Wehrmacht, which had a field gendarmerie (Feldgendarmerie) in its structure, which, with professionally trained officers and soldiers, was engaged in catching fugitives, identifying simulators and crossbows, restoring order in the rear, and cleansing the rear units from excess soldiers.

Getting acquainted with the figures of the report, you come to the inevitable conclusion that the creation of the detachments was a necessary and greatly delayed measure. The liberalism of Stalin and his party entourage, instead of harsh disciplinary measures that were fully justified in war conditions, led to attempts to use ideological processing and, in fact, to persuade soldiers with the help of an outrageously bloated and extremely ineffective political apparatus, and brought us to the banks of the Volga. Who knows, if, instead of reviving the institute of military commissars, in the summer of 1941, they had created barriers, then Stalingrad would have remained a distant rear city on the Volga.

Note that soon after the creation of the barrage detachments, the institution of military commissars was finally abolished.

Whatever one may say, but associations suggest itself: there are commissars, there are no victories, there are no commissars, but there are detachments - there are victories.

More interesting numbers. Out of 140755 detained servicemen, only 3980 people were arrested, 1189 people were shot, 2776 people were sent to penal companies (i.e. soldiers and sergeants), 185 people (i.e. officers) were sent to penal battalions, returned to their units and to transit points 131094 person. A very soft attitude towards those who fled from the front. In total, 9.5 thousand of 141 thousand worthy of the most severe measures were repressed.

Well, if it was necessary, the barrage detachments themselves entered into battle with the Germans, often saving the situation.

As many participants in the war testify, the detachments did not exist everywhere. According to Marshal of the Soviet Union DT Yazov, they were generally absent on a number of fronts operating in the northern and northwestern directions.

The versions that the barrage detachments were "guarding" the penal units do not stand up to criticism either. The company commander of the 8th separate penalty battalion of the 1st Belorussian Front, retired Colonel A.V. frightening measures. It's just that there has never been such a need. "

The famous writer Hero of the Soviet Union V.V. Karpov, who fought in the 45th separate penal company on the Kalinin Front, also denies the presence of detachments behind the combat formations of their unit.

In reality, the outposts of the army detachment were located at a distance of 1.5-2 km from the front line, intercepting communications in the immediate rear. They did not specialize in penalty boxes, but checked and detained everyone whose stay outside the military unit aroused suspicion.

Did the barrage detachments use weapons to prevent the unauthorized withdrawal of line units from their positions? This aspect of their combat activities is sometimes highly speculatively covered.

The documents show how the combat practice of the barrage detachments developed during one of the most intense periods of the war, in the summer and autumn of 1942. From August 1 (the moment of formation) to October 15, they detained 140,755 servicemen who "fled from the front line." Of these: 3980 were arrested, 1189 were shot, 2776 were sent to penal companies, 185 were sent to penal battalions, the overwhelming number of detainees was returned to their units and to transit points - 131 094 people. The above statistics show that the absolute majority of servicemen, who had previously left the frontline for various reasons - more than 91% - were able to continue fighting without any loss of rights.

The participant of the war Levin Mikhail Borisovich:
The order is extremely cruel, terrible in its essence, but to be honest, in my opinion, it was necessary ...

This order "sobered" many, made them come to their senses ...
As for the detachments, I only once encountered their "activity" at the front. In one of the battles in the Kuban, our right flank trembled and ran, so the detachment opened fire, where it was across the path, where it was directly at the running ... After that, I never saw the detachment near the forward detachment. If a critical situation arose in a battle, then in a rifle regiment the functions of barriers - to stop those who skidded in panic - were performed by a reserve rifle company or a regimental company of submachine gunners.

Memory book. - Infantrymen. Levin Mikhail Borisovich. Hero of the Second World War. Project I Remember

Participant in the war A. Dergaev:
Now they talk a lot about the detachments. We were in the immediate rear. Directly behind the infantry, but I did not see them. That is, they must have been somewhere, perhaps even further behind us. But we have not encountered them. Several years ago we were invited to a Rosenbaum concert at the Oktyabrsky Concert Hall. He sings a song in which these words: “... we dug a trench at full height. The German hits us right in the forehead, and behind the barrage ... ". I was sitting on the balcony and could not stand it jumped up and shouted: “Shame! A shame!" And the whole audience swallowed. During a break, I tell them: "They are mocking you, but you are silent." He sings these songs even now. In general, we did not see women at the front, nor did the NKVD.

Memory book. - The gunners. Dergaev Andrey Andreevich. Hero of the Second World War

As for the criminals, the most severe measures were applied to them. This concerned deserters, defectors, imaginary patients, self-gunners. They did it - and they shot them in front of the formation. But the decision to enforce this extreme measure was made not by the commander of the detachment, but by the military tribunal of the division (not lower) or, in some cases, previously agreed upon, by the head of the special department of the army.

In exceptional situations, the soldiers of the barrage detachments could open fire over the heads of the retreating ones. We admit that individual cases of shooting at people in the heat of battle could have taken place: the soldiers and commanders of the detachment detachments in a difficult situation could have changed their restraint. But there is no reason to assert that this was the daily practice. Cowards and alarmists were shot in front of the formation on an individual basis. Karali, as a rule, are only the initiators of panic and flight.

Here are some typical examples from the history of the battle on the Volga. On September 14, 1942, the enemy launched an offensive against units of the 399th Rifle Division of the 62nd Army. When the soldiers and commanders of the 396th and 472nd rifle regiments began to retreat in panic, the chief of the detachment, junior lieutenant of state security Elman, ordered his detachment to open fire over the heads of the retreating ones. This forced the personnel to stop, and two hours later the regiments occupied the previous lines of defense.

On October 15, in the area of ​​the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, the enemy managed to reach the Volga and cut off from the main forces of the 62nd Army the remnants of the 112th Infantry Division, as well as three (115, 124 and 149th) separate rifle brigades. Suffering to panic, a number of servicemen, including commanders of various levels, tried to abandon their units and, under various pretexts, cross over to the eastern bank of the Volga. To prevent this, the task force under the leadership of the senior operative lieutenant of the state security Ignatenko, created by the special department of the 62nd army, put up a screen. For 15 days, up to 800 private and command personnel were detained and returned to the battlefield, 15 alarmists, cowards and deserters were shot in front of the formation. The detachments acted similarly later.

As the documents testify, it was necessary to support the subunits and units that had faltered, backed away, to intervene in the course of the battle themselves in order to bring a turning point in it, according to the documents. The replenishment arriving at the front was, of course, not fired at, and in this situation the barrage detachments, formed from the staunch, fired, with strong front-line hardening of commanders and fighters, substituted a reliable shoulder for the line units.

So, during the defense of Stalingrad on August 29, 1942, the headquarters of the 29th rifle division of the 64th army was surrounded by the penetrated enemy tanks. The detachment not only stopped the retreating servicemen in disorder and returned them to the previously occupied lines of defense, but also entered the battle itself. The enemy was driven back.

On September 13, when the 112th Rifle Division, under pressure from the enemy, withdrew from the occupied line, a detachment of the 62nd Army under the command of State Security Lieutenant Khlystov took up the defense. For several days, the soldiers and commanders of the detachment repelled the attacks of enemy submachine gunners, until the approaching units took up the defense. This was the case in other sectors of the Soviet-German front.

With a turning point in the situation that followed the victory at Stalingrad, the participation of barrage units in battles more and more turned out to be not only spontaneous, dictated by a dynamically changing situation, but also the result of a decision made in advance by the command. The commanders tried to use the detachments left without "work" with maximum benefit in matters not related to the barrage service.

The facts of this kind in mid-October 1942 were reported to Moscow by State Security Major V.M. Kazakevich. For example, on the Voronezh front, by order of the military council of the 6th army, two barrage detachments were attached to the 174th rifle division and entered into battle. As a result, they lost up to 70% of the personnel, the soldiers remaining in the ranks were transferred to replenish the named division, and the detachments had to be disbanded. The commander of the 246th Infantry Division, in whose operational subordination the detachment was, was used as a linear unit by a detachment of the 29th Army of the Western Front. Taking part in one of the attacks, a detachment of 118 personnel lost 109 people killed and wounded, in connection with which it had to be formed anew.

The reasons for the objections from the special departments are clear. But, as it seems, it was not by chance that from the very beginning the barrage detachments were subordinated to the army command, and not to the military counterintelligence bodies. The People's Commissar of Defense, of course, had in mind that the barrage formations would and should be used not only as a barrier for retreating units, but also as an important reserve for the direct conduct of hostilities.

As the situation on the fronts changed, with the transition to the Red Army of the strategic initiative and the beginning of the mass expulsion of the invaders from the territory of the USSR, the need for detachments began to decline sharply. The order "Not a step back!" finally lost its former meaning. On October 29, 1944, Stalin issued an order in which it was recognized that "in connection with the change in the general situation at the fronts, the need for further maintenance of the barrage detachments has disappeared." By November 15, 1944, they were disbanded, and the personnel of the detachments were sent to replenish the rifle divisions.

Thus, the barrage detachments not only acted as a barrier that prevented deserters, alarmists, and German agents from penetrating into the rear, not only returned servicemen who were lagging behind their units to the front line, but also conducted direct hostilities with the enemy, contributing to the achievement of victory over fascist Germany.

A new stage in the history of the detachments began in the summer of 1942, when the Germans broke through to the Volga and the Caucasus. On July 28, the famous order No. 227 of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR I.V. Stalin was issued, which, in particular, prescribed:

“2. To the military councils of the armies and, above all, to the commanders of the armies:

[...] b) form within the army 3-5 well-armed barrage detachments (200 people in each), place them in the immediate rear of unstable divisions and oblige them in case of panic and indiscriminate withdrawal of divisional units to shoot on the spot alarmists and cowards and so help honest fighters of divisions to fulfill their duty to the Motherland "(Stalingrad epic: Materials of the NKVD of the USSR and military censorship from the Central Archives of the FSB RF. M., 2000, p. 445).

In pursuance of this order, the commander of the troops of the Stalingrad Front, Lieutenant General V.N. Gordov, on August 1, 1942, issued his order No. 00162 / op, in which he prescribed:

"5. The commanders of the 21st, 55th, 57th, 62, 63, and 65th armies should form five barrage detachments within two days, and the commanders of the 1st and 4th tank armies - three barrage detachments of 200 people each.

Subordinate the defensive detachments to the military councils of the armies through their special departments. At the head of the barrage detachments to put the most experienced in a combat relation special officers.

The defensive detachments will be staffed with the best selected fighters and commanders from the Far Eastern divisions.

Provide roadblocks with vehicles.

6. Within two days, restore in each rifle division the barrage battalions formed according to the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 01919.

To equip the defensive battalions of divisions with the best worthy fighters and commanders. Report about the performance by August 4, 1942 " (TsAMO. F.345. Op.5487. D.5. L.706).

From the message of the Special Department of the NKVD of the Stalingrad Front to the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR dated August 14, 1942 "On the progress of the implementation of order No. 227 and the response of the personnel of the 4th Panzer Army to it":

“In total, 24 people were shot during the specified period. So, for example, the commanders of the 414 SP, 18 SD, Styrkov and Dobrynin, during the battle, chickened out, abandoned their squads and fled from the battlefield, both were detained by the barriers. by a detachment and a resolution of the Special Division, they were shot in front of the formation.

A Red Army soldier of the same regiment and division Ogorodnikov self-injured his left hand, was exposed for the crime, for which he was brought to trial by a military tribunal. [...]

On the basis of Order No. 227, three army detachments were formed, each with 200 men. These units are fully armed with rifles, machine guns and light machine guns.

Operational workers of special departments were appointed as the heads of the detachments.

By the indicated detachments and barrage battalions on 7.8.42, in units and formations in the army sectors, 363 people were detained, of which: 93 people. left the encirclement, 146 - lagged behind their units, 52 - lost their units, 12 - came from captivity, 54 - fled from the battlefield, 2 - with dubious wounds.

As a result of a thorough check: 187 people were sent to their units, 43 - to the staffing department, 73 - to special camps of the NKVD, 27 - to penal companies, 2 - to the medical commission, 6 people. - arrested and, as indicated above, 24 people. shot in front of the line "

(The Stalingrad epic: Materials of the NKVD of the USSR and military censorship from the Central archive of the FSB of the Russian Federation. M., 2000. S. 181-182).

In accordance with the order of the NKO No. 227, as of October 15, 1942, 193 army barrage detachments were formed, including 16 on the Stalingrad front armies) and 25 on the Donskoy.

At the same time, from August 1 to October 15, 1942, the detachments detained 140,755 servicemen who had escaped from the front line. Of those arrested, 3980 people were arrested, 1189 people were shot, 2,776 people were sent to penal companies, 185 people were sent to penal battalions, 131,094 people were returned to their units and to transit points.

The largest number of arrests and arrests was carried out by the barrage detachments of the Don and Stalingrad fronts. On the Don Front, 36,109 people were detained, 736 people were arrested, 433 people were shot, 1,056 people were sent to penal companies, 33 people were sent to penal battalions, 32,933 people were returned to their units and to transit points. On the Stalingrad front, 15649 people were detained, 244 people were arrested, 278 people were shot, 218 people were sent to penal companies, 42 penal battalions, 14,833 people were returned to their units and to transit points.

During the defense of Stalingrad, barrage detachments played an important role in putting things in order in the units and preventing an unorganized withdrawal from the lines they occupied, and the return of a significant number of servicemen to the front line.

So, on August 29, 1942, the headquarters of the 29th Infantry Division of the 64th Army of the Stalingrad Front was surrounded by the enemy tanks that had broken through, parts of the division, having lost control, retreated in panic to the rear. A detachment under the command of State Security Lieutenant Filatov, taking decisive measures, stopped the retreating servicemen in disorder and returned them to the previously occupied lines of defense. In another sector of this division, the enemy tried to break through into the depths of the defense. The detachment entered the battle and delayed the advance of the enemy.

On September 14, the enemy launched an offensive against units of the 399th Rifle Division of the 62nd Army. The soldiers and commanders of the 396th and 472nd Rifle Regiments began to retreat in panic. The head of the detachment, junior lieutenant of state security Elman, ordered his detachment to open fire over the heads of the retreating. As a result, the personnel of these regiments was stopped and two hours later the regiments occupied the former lines of defense.

On September 20, the Germans occupied the eastern outskirts of Melekhovskaya. The composite brigade, under the onslaught of the enemy, began an unauthorized retreat. The actions of the blocking detachment of the 47th Army of the Black Sea Group of Forces put things in order in the brigade. The brigade occupied the previous lines and, on the initiative of the political commander of the company of the same blocking detachment, Pestov, by joint actions with the brigade, the enemy was driven back from Melekhovskaya.

At critical moments, barrage detachments entered directly into battle with the enemy, successfully restraining his onslaught. So, on September 13, the 112th Rifle Division, under pressure from the enemy, withdrew from the occupied line. A detachment of the 62nd Army, under the leadership of the chief of the detachment, Lieutenant of State Security Khlystov, took up defensive positions on the approaches to an important height. For four days, the soldiers and commanders of the detachment repelled the attacks of the enemy machine gunners, inflicting heavy losses on them. The detachment held the line until the arrival of the military units.

On September 15-16, a detachment of the 62nd Army successfully fought for two days with superior enemy forces in the area of ​​the Stalingrad railway station. Despite its small number, the detachment not only repulsed the attacks of the Germans, but also counterattacked, inflicting significant losses on the enemy in manpower. The detachment left its line only when units of the 10th rifle division came to replace them.

In addition to the army detachments created in accordance with Order No. 227, during the Battle of Stalingrad, restored divisional barrage battalions operated, as well as small detachments staffed with NKVD servicemen under special divisions of divisions and armies. At the same time, army barrage detachments and divisional barrage battalions carried a barrage service directly behind the combat formations of units, preventing panic and mass exodus of servicemen from the battlefield, while security platoons of special divisions of divisions and companies under special divisions of armies were used to carry barrage services on the main communications of divisions and armies for the purpose of arresting cowards, alarmists, deserters and other criminal elements hiding in the army and front lines.

However, in an environment where the very concept of rear was very conditional, this "division of labor" was often violated. So, on October 15, 1942, during fierce battles in the area of ​​the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, the enemy managed to reach the Volga and cut off from the main forces of the 62nd Army the remnants of the 112th Infantry Division, as well as the 115th, 124th and 149th separate rifle brigades. At the same time, among the leading command staff, there were repeated attempts to abandon their units and cross over to the eastern bank of the Volga. In these conditions, to combat cowards and alarmists, a special department of the 62nd army created an operational group under the leadership of senior operative lieutenant of state security Ignatenko. Having united the remnants of the platoons of special divisions with the personnel of the 3rd Army Barrier Detachment, she did an exceptionally great job of putting things in order, arresting deserters, cowards and alarmists who, under various pretexts, tried to cross to the left bank of the Volga. Within 15 days, the operational group detained and returned to the battlefield up to 800 private and command personnel, and 15 servicemen were shot in front of the formation by order of the special agencies.

In a memo dated February 17, 1943 of the Special Department of the NKVD of the Don Front to the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR "On the work of special agencies to combat cowards and alarmists in parts of the Don Front for the period from October 1, 1942 to February 1, 1943", a number of examples of actions are given barrage detachments:

“In the fight against cowards, alarmists and restoring order in units that showed instability in battles with the enemy, an exceptionally large role was played by army detachments and divisional barrage battalions.

So, on October 2, 1942, during the offensive of our troops, individual units of the 138th division, met with powerful artillery and mortar fire from the enemy, wavered and fled in panic through the battle formations of the 1st battalion 706 SP, 204 SD, which were in the second echelon.

By the measures taken by the command and the detachment battalion of the division, the situation was restored. 7 cowards and alarmists were shot in front of the line, and the rest were returned to the front line.

On October 16, 1942, during a counterattack by the enemy, a group of Red Army men of 781 and 124 divisions, in the amount of 30 people, showed cowardice and in panic began to flee from the battlefield, dragging along other servicemen.

The army detachment of the 21st army located in this sector, liquidated the panic by force of arms and restored the previous position.

November 19, 1942, during the offensive of units of the 293st division, during the enemy's counterattack, two mortar platoons of 1306 joint venture together with platoon commanders, ml. Lieutenants Bogatyryov and Egorov, without an order from the command, left the occupied line and in panic, throwing their weapons, began to flee from the battlefield.

A platoon of submachine gunners of an army blocking detachment located in this area stopped the fleeing and, having shot two alarmists in front of the formation, returned the rest to their former lines, after which they successfully advanced forward.

On November 20, 1942, during a counterattack by the enemy, one of the companies of the 38th division, which was at the height, did not offer resistance to the enemy, without an order from the command, it began to indiscriminately withdraw from the occupied area.

The 83rd blocking detachment of the 64th Army, carrying the barrage service directly behind the battle formations of the 38th SD units, stopped the fleeing company in panic and returned it back to the previously occupied section of the height, after which the personnel of the company showed exceptional endurance and perseverance in battles with the enemy "(Stalingrad Epic. .. P.409-410).

End of the road

After the defeat of the Nazi troops at Stalingrad and the victory at the Kursk Bulge, a turning point came in the war. The strategic initiative passed to the Red Army. In this situation, the barrage detachments have lost their former significance. On August 25, 1944, the head of the political department of the 3rd Baltic Front, Major General A. Lobachev, sent to the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Colonel-General Shcherbakov, a memorandum "On the shortcomings of the activity of the front line detachments" with the following content:

“On my instructions, the front command control officers checked the activities of six detachments in August (a total of 8 detachments).

As a result of this work, it was established:

1. The blocking detachments do not fulfill their direct functions established by the order of the People's Commissar of Defense. Most of the personnel of the barrage detachments are used to protect the headquarters of the armies, guard communication lines, roads, combing forests, etc. The activity of the 7th detachment of the 54th army is characteristic in this respect. According to the list, the detachment consists of 124 people. They are used as follows: the 1st submachine gun platoon guards the 2nd echelon of the army headquarters; 2nd submachine gun platoon attached to 111th armament with the task of protecting communication lines from the corps to the army; a rifle platoon was attached to 7 sk with the same mission; the machine-gun platoon is in the reserve of the detachment commander; 9 people work in the departments of the army headquarters, including the platoon commander of Art. Lieutenant GONCHAR is the commandant of the rear services department of the army; the remaining 37 people are used at the headquarters of the detachment. Thus, the 7th detachment is not at all involved in the obstruction service. The same situation in other detachments (5, 6, 153, 21, 50)

In the 5th detachment of the 54th army of 189 people. staff only 90 people. are guarding the command post of the army and the barrage service, and the remaining 99 people. used in various jobs: 41 people - in the service of the Army Headquarters AXO as cooks, shoemakers, tailors, storekeepers, clerks, etc .; 12 people - in the departments of the army headquarters as messengers and orderlies; 5 people - at the disposal of the commandant of the headquarters and 41 people. serve the headquarters of the detachment.

In the 6th detachment of 169 people. 90 fighters and sergeants are used to protect the command post and communication lines, and the rest are in chores.

2. In a number of detachments, the staffs of the headquarters were extremely swollen. Instead of the prescribed staff of 15 people. officer, sergeant and rank-and-file staff of the 5th detachment has 41 people; 7th detachment - 37 people, 6th detachment - 30 people, 153rd detachment - 30 people. etc.

3. The headquarters of the armies do not exercise control over the activities of the detachments, left them to themselves, reduced the role of the detachments to the position of ordinary commandant companies. Meanwhile, the personnel of the detachments were selected from the best, proven fighters and sergeants, participants in many battles, awarded orders and medals of the Soviet Union. In the 21st detachment of the 67th army, out of 199 people. 75% of the participants in the battles, many of them were awarded. In the 50th detachment, 52 people were awarded for military merit.

4. Lack of control on the part of the headquarters has led to the fact that in most of the detachments military discipline is at a low level, people are dismissed. Over the past three months, 30 penalties were imposed on soldiers and sergeants in the 6th detachment for gross violations of military discipline. No better in other units ...

5. Political departments and deputy. The chiefs of staffs of the armies for political reasons have forgotten about the existence of detachments, they are not in charge of party political work ...

On the revealed shortcomings in the activities of the detachments 15.8 reported to the Military Council of the front. At the same time, he gave instructions to the chiefs of the political departments of the armies about the need to radically improve party-political and educational work in the detachments; revitalizing the internal party activities of party organizations, strengthening work with party and Komsomol activists, conducting lectures and reports for personnel, improving the cultural services for soldiers, sergeants and officers of detachments.

Conclusion: Most of the detachments do not fulfill the tasks defined by order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 227. The protection of headquarters, roads, communication lines, the performance of various economic work and assignments, the maintenance of commanders-chiefs, the supervision of the internal order in the rear of the army is in no way included in the functions of the detachments of the front troops.

I consider it necessary to raise the question before the People's Commissar of Defense on the reorganization or disbandment of the barrage detachments, as they have lost their purpose in the present situation ”(Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal. 1988. No. 8. P.79-80).

Two months later, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense IV Stalin No. 0349 of October 29, 1944 "On the disbandment of separate barrage detachments" was issued:

“In connection with the change in the general situation at the fronts, the need for further maintenance of the barrage detachments has disappeared.

I order:

Use the personnel of the disbanded detachments to replenish rifle divisions.

So, barrage detachments detained deserters and a suspicious element in the rear of the front, stopped the retreating troops. In a critical situation, they often fought the Germans themselves, and when the military situation changed in our favor, they began to perform the functions of commandant companies. Carrying out its direct tasks, the detachment could open fire over the heads of fleeing units or shoot cowards and alarmists in front of the formation - but certainly on an individual basis. However, none of the researchers have yet managed to find in the archives a single fact that would confirm that the barrage detachments fired to kill their troops.

Such cases are not cited in the memoirs of the front-line soldiers.

For example, in the "Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", an article by the Hero of the Soviet Union, General of the Army P.N. Lashchenko, says the following about this:

“Yes, there were barrage detachments. But I do not know that any of them fired at their own people, at least in our sector of the front. Already now I have requested archival documents in this regard, no such documents were found. The detachments were located at a distance from the front line, covered the troops from the rear from saboteurs and enemy troops, detained deserters, who, unfortunately, were there; put things in order at the crossings, sent soldiers who had strayed from their units to assembly points.

I will say more, the front received replenishment, of course, not fired, as they say, not sniffing gunpowder, and the barrage detachments, which consisted exclusively of soldiers already fired upon, the most persistent and courageous, were, as it were, a reliable and strong shoulder of the elder. It often happened that the detachments found themselves face to face with the same German tanks, chains of German machine gunners and suffered heavy losses in battles. This is an irrefutable fact. "

In almost the same words, the knight of the Order of Alexander Nevsky A.G. Efremov described the activities of the blocking detachments in the newspaper "Vladimirskie vedomosti":

“Indeed, such detachments were deployed in threatening areas. These people are not some kind of monsters, but ordinary soldiers and commanders. They played two roles. First of all, they prepared a defensive line so that the retreating could gain a foothold on it. Secondly, they suppressed alarmism. When the turning point in the course of the war came, I did not see more of these units. "

If you wish, more than a dozen more memories of this kind can be cited, but those given along with the documents are quite enough to understand what the barrage units actually were.

(ON THE EXAMPLE OF THE NORTHWESTERN MILITARY THEATER IN 1941)

The purpose, history of formation and actions of barrage detachments in the North-Western theater of operations in 1941 are considered.

One of the little-studied pages in the history of the Great Patriotic War is the activity of barrage detachments. In Soviet times, this issue was covered with a veil of secrecy. According to the "Rules for maintaining military secrets in the press of the Red Army (for wartime)", approved by the order of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky No. 034 dated February 15, 1944:

14. All information about the barrage detachments, penal battalions and companies "

A similar order was maintained after the end of the war. It is not surprising that with the beginning of the perestroika "revelations" in the public opinion, a certain ominous image of "executioners from the NKVD" was formed, shooting the retreating Red Army soldiers from machine guns.

In the last decade, a number of publications have been published with an attempt to analyze the history of barrage units based on archival documents (for example). However, the issue remains poorly understood. Thus, a widespread misconception is that the barrage detachments appeared only after the publication of the famous order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 227 of July 28, 1942.

Due to the vastness of the topic, it is impossible to consider it within the framework of one publication. In this article, we will restrict ourselves to the history of the creation and use of barrage detachments in the Northwestern theater of operations in 1941. Thus, the scope of research includes:

The Northwestern Front, formed on June 22, 1941, on the basis of the command and control forces of the Baltic Special Military District.

The Northern Front, formed on June 24, 1941, on the basis of the command and control forces of the Leningrad Military District. Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command No. 001199 of August 23, 1941, the Northern Front was divided into the Karelian and Leningrad fronts.

The Baltic Fleet, which was from June 28, 1941, under the operational control of the Northern Front, and from August 30, 1941, under the operational control of the Leningrad Front.

Volkhov Front, formed on December 17, 1941, i.e. two weeks before the end of the period in question is beyond the scope of this article.

In early February 1941, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs was divided into the NKVD itself and the People's Commissariat for State Security (NKGB). At the same time, military counterintelligence, according to the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of February 8, 1941, was separated from the NKVD and transferred to the People's Commissars of Defense and the Navy of the USSR, where the Third Directorates of the NKO of the USSR and the NKVMF of the USSR were created.

On June 27, 1941, the Third Directorate of the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense issued directive No. 35523 on the work of its bodies in wartime. Among other things, it provided for "the organization of mobile control and barrage detachments on roads, railway junctions, for clearing forests, etc., allocated by the command with the inclusion of operational workers of the Third Directorate in their composition with the tasks:

a) detention of deserters;

b) the arrest of all suspicious element that has penetrated the front line;

c) a preliminary investigation carried out by operational workers of the Third Directorate of NCOs (1-2 days) with the subsequent transfer of the material together with the detainees by jurisdiction ”.

In pursuance of this directive, on June 28, on the North-Western Front, a control and barrage detachment of the NKVD troops was created to guard the rear of the Army in the field. On July 2, 1941, it was disbanded, and in its place was created the 1st barrage detachment of the NKVD troops to guard the rear of the Army in the field.

In July 1941, the NKVD and NKGB were united. On July 17, 1941, by the decree of the State Defense Committee No. 187ss, the bodies of the Third Directorate of the NKO were transformed into special departments and also transferred to the subordination of the NKVD. This contributed to the establishment of a closer connection between them and the territorial bodies of state security. At the same time, special departments are given the right to arrest deserters, and, if necessary, shoot them on the spot.

The next day, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria, in his directive No. 169, explained the tasks of the special departments as follows: , deserters and all kinds of alarmists and disorganizers.

A ruthless reprisal against alarmists, cowards, deserters who undermine the power and defame the honor of the Red Army is just as important as the fight against espionage and sabotage. "

To ensure operational measures, by order of the NKVD of the USSR No. 00941 of July 19, 1941, separate rifle platoons were formed under special divisions of divisions and corps, separate rifle companies were formed under special divisions of the armies, and separate rifle battalions manned by the NKVD troops were formed under special front divisions. ...

Carrying out their tasks, special departments, in particular, set up barrage detachments in the rear of our troops, as evidenced, for example, "Instructions for special departments of the NKVD of the North-Western Front on combating deserters, cowards and alarmists":

Special departments of the division, corps, army in the fight against deserters, cowards and alarmists carry out the following measures:

a) organize a barrage service by setting up ambushes, posts and patrols on military roads, refugee roads and other traffic routes in order to exclude the possibility of any infiltration of military personnel who have left their combat positions without permission;

b) carefully check each detained commander and Red Army soldier in order to identify deserters, cowards and alarmists who fled from the battlefield;

c) all identified deserters are immediately arrested and an investigation is conducted to bring them to trial by a military tribunal. To complete the investigation within 12 hours;

d) all servicemen who have lagged behind a part are organized by platoon (port) and under the command of verified commanders, accompanied by a representative of a special department, are sent to the headquarters of the corresponding division;

e) in especially exceptional cases, when the situation requires decisive measures to immediately restore order at the front, the head of the special department is given the right to shoot the deserters on the spot. The head of the special department reports each such case to the special department of the army and front;

f) carry out the verdict of the military tribunal on the spot, and, if necessary, in front of the formation;

g) keep a quantitative record of all those arrested and sent to the unit and a personal record of all those arrested and convicted;

h) daily report to the special department of the army and the special department of the front about the number of detainees, arrested, convicted, as well as the number of commanders, Red Army men and materiel transferred to the unit. "

The next document is the directive of the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR No. 39212 of July 28, 1941 on strengthening the work of barrage detachments to identify and expose enemy agents deployed across the front line. In particular, it says:

“One of the serious means of identifying the agents of German intelligence sent to us are organized barrage detachments, which must carefully check all servicemen without exception, unorganizedly sneaking from the front into the front line, as well as servicemen, in groups or alone, entering other units.

However, the available materials indicate that the work of the barrage detachments is not yet sufficiently organized, the check of the detained persons is carried out superficially, often not by the operational staff, but by the military.

In order to identify and mercilessly destroy enemy agents in the Red Army, I propose:

1. To strengthen the work of the barrage detachments, for which purpose experienced operational workers should be allocated to the detachments. Establish, as a rule, that interrogation of all detainees, without exception, should be carried out only by operatives.

2. All persons returning from German captivity, both detained by barrage detachments and identified by agents and other means, should be arrested and thoroughly interrogated about the circumstances of capture and escape or release from captivity.

If the investigation does not obtain information about their involvement in the German intelligence agencies, release such persons from custody and send them to the front in other units, establishing constant surveillance over them both by the organs of the special department and by the unit commissar. "

The daily work of the barrage detachments in the first months of the war is given in the memorandum of the head of the 3rd department of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, divisional commissar Lebedev, No. 21431 dated December 10, 1941, to the Military Council of the KBF. A defensive detachment under the 3rd Division of the Baltic Fleet was formed in June 1941. It was a maneuvering company equipped with vehicles. To strengthen it, on the initiative of the 3rd department, two homemade armored vehicles were manufactured at one of the enterprises in Tallinn.

Initially, the detachment operated on the territory of Estonia. In order to combat desertion, barriers were set up on the roads leading to Tallinn and Leningrad. However, since the land front at that time was far enough, there were few cases of desertion in the area of ​​responsibility. In this regard, the main efforts of the detachment and the group of operational workers attached to it were aimed at combating the gangs of Estonian nationalists hiding in the forests and swamps. A significant number of small gangs, consisting mainly of members of the Kaitseliit organization, operated on the highways, attacking small units of the Red Army and individual military personnel.

As a result of the work of the detachment in the first days of the war in the Loks area, six bandits were caught, one of them was killed while trying to escape. According to intelligence reports, three people were arrested at the same time on charges of aiding the bandits.

Practice has shown that in the areas where gangs operate, it is very important to have informants in grocery stores, cafes and canteens in small settlements, since gangster groups from time to time had to buy food, matches, cartridges, etc. representatives. During one of these visits to a rural grocery store, four bandits were discovered by two scouts from the detachment. Despite the numerical superiority, the latter tried to delay them. As a result, one of the bandits was killed in a shootout, two managed to escape, the fourth, although, as it turned out, he was the Estonian champion in running in the past, did not manage to escape. He was wounded, captured and taken to the 3rd department.

The round-ups carried out by the detachment, combing the terrain, secrets and outposts significantly hampered the actions of the Estonian gangs, and the cases of armed attacks in those areas that the detachment controlled sharply decreased.

When the Virtsu Peninsula was liberated as a result of a counterstrike by the 8th Army in mid-July 1941, a platoon of a detachment detachment and a group of operational workers left for the area to carry out an operation to clear the peninsula of persons hostile to the Soviet regime and assisting the Nazis. On the way to Virtsu, a detachment platoon suddenly crashed into a German outpost, located at a fork in the Virtsu-Pärnu roads, on the Karuse farm. The platoon was fired upon by the enemy's rifle, machine-gun and mortar fire, dismounted and accepted the battle. As a result of the battle, the Germans, leaving the anti-tank gun, machine gun and ammunition, hastily retreated. The losses of the detachment were 6 killed and 2 wounded.

Having transferred the defense of the recaptured sector to regular units, the detachment platoon arrived in Virtsu. The task force immediately began work, as a result of which the head of the local organization "Kaitseliit", two former members of this organization who were members of the "self-defense" formation created by the German command, the owner of a local restaurant who was used by the Germans as a translator, as well as a provocateur who betrayed the fascist authorities two agents of our border guard. Six informants were recruited among the population of Virtsu.

In the same period, an operation was carried out to clear the bands from Cape Varbla and the village. Tystamaa, Pärnovsk district. Two platoons of the blocking detachment, reinforced with armored vehicles, together with a fighter battalion, seized the indicated settlements in battle, defeating the "self-defense" headquarters and capturing a heavy machine gun, 60 bicycles, over 10 telephones, several hunting rifles and rifles. Among the bandits there were killed and wounded, the captured 4 bandits were shot on the spot. Our losses are 1 killed.

In Tallinn, a detachment uncovered and liquidated a counter-revolutionary organization that was recruiting the local population into gangs. At the same time, weapons and explosives were seized.

In addition to the fight against banditry and desertion, the task force of the detachment launched work to send our agents into the German rear. Of the abandoned three agents, two returned. Having infiltrated the occupied city of Pärnu, they found out the location of German military installations. Using this information, the aviation of the Baltic Fleet successfully bombed enemy targets. In addition, information was collected about the local servants of the occupiers from among the Estonian nationalists.

During the battle for Tallinn, the detachment not only stopped and returned the retreating to the front, but also held the defensive lines. A particularly difficult situation developed on the afternoon of August 27. Separate parts of the 8th Army, having lost their leadership, leaving the last line of defense, fled. To restore order, not only a detachment was thrown, but the entire operational staff of the 3rd department. The retreating, under the threat of weapons, stopped and as a result of the counterattack threw the enemy back 7 kilometers. This played a decisive role in the successful evacuation of Tallinn.

The fact that the NKVD fighters did not hide behind other people's backs is evidenced by the losses suffered by the detachment during the battles for Tallinn - over 60% of the personnel, including almost all commanders.

Arriving in Kronstadt, the detachment immediately proceeded to replenishment and already on September 7, 1941 sent one platoon with two operatives to serve on the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland, and by September 18 the coast from Oranienbaum to the village. The mouth was fully serviced by the detachment.

In total, from the beginning of the war to November 22, 1941. the detachment detained over 900 people, of whom 77 were arrested and convicted. 11 people were shot on the spot or in front of the formation.

Their "land" colleagues operating in the vicinity of the Baltic Fleet detachment also fought against Estonian nationalists. From the special message of the special department of the NKVD of the Northern Front No. 131142 dated July 24, 1941 to the Front Military Council about the activities of the special department of the NKVD of the 8th Army to eliminate bandit groups on the territory of Estonia: “On July 15, 1941, two a spy from the local population who informed the enemy about the location of our units. Spies were shot on the spot. "

By the beginning of September 1941, the military situation had deteriorated significantly. In this situation, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, by directive No. 001650 of September 5, 1941, satisfied the request of the commander of the Bryansk Front, Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko: “The headquarters has read your memorandum and allows you to create barrage detachments in those divisions that have proven themselves to be unstable. The purpose of the barrage detachments is to prevent unauthorized withdrawal of units, and in case of flight, stop them, using weapons if necessary. "

A week later, a similar practice was extended to all fronts. "Directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 001919 to the commander of the fronts, armies, division commanders, to the commander-in-chief of the South-Western direction on the creation of barrage detachments in rifle divisions" read:

The experience of fighting German fascism has shown that in our rifle divisions there are many panicky and outright hostile elements, which at the very first pressure from the enemy throw down their weapons and begin to shout: "We are surrounded!" and carry away the rest of the fighters. As a result of such actions of these elements, the division takes to flight, abandons the material part and then begins to leave the forest alone. Similar phenomena are taking place on all fronts. If the commanders and commissars of such divisions were at the height of their task, alarmist and hostile elements could not have gained the upper hand in the division. But the trouble is that we do not have so many firm and stable commanders and commissars.

In order to prevent the above undesirable phenomena at the front, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:

1. In each rifle division, have a defensive detachment of reliable fighters, no more than a battalion (in the calculation of 1 company per rifle regiment), subordinate to the division commander and having at his disposal, in addition to conventional weapons, vehicles in the form of trucks and several tanks or armored vehicles.

2. The tasks of the barrage detachment are to consider direct assistance to the command staff in maintaining and establishing firm discipline in the division, stopping the flight of servicemen obsessed with panic, without stopping before using weapons, eliminating the initiators of panic and flight, supporting the honest and fighting elements of the division, not subject to panic, but carried away by the general flight.

3. To oblige the workers of special departments and the political personnel of the divisions to provide all kinds of assistance to the commanders of divisions and barrage detachments in strengthening the order and discipline of the division.

4. To complete the creation of barrage detachments within five days from the date of receipt of this order.

5. Report on receipt and execution by the commander of the fronts and armies.

Headquarters of the Supreme Command

I. Stalin

B. Shaposhnikov ".

In contrast to the barrage detachments that continued to exist under the special departments of the NKVD, focused mainly on detaining deserters and suspicious elements, army detachments were created in order to prevent unauthorized withdrawal of units. These units were much larger (battalion per division instead of platoon), and their personnel were recruited not from the NKVD servicemen, but from ordinary Red Army men. So, according to the staff of the barrage battalion of the 10th Infantry Division of the Leningrad Front, it should have 342 people (commanding personnel - 24, junior commanding personnel - 26, privates - 292). However, the actual number of barrage battalions, as a rule, was much lower.

Table 1

The number of barrage battalions of rifle divisions of the Leningrad Front and their equipment with automatic weapons

As you can see from the table. 1, only in one of the nine divisions the size of the barrage battalion corresponded to the regular one. A very indicative example is the 43rd division, which suffered heavy losses in the December battles (as of January 1, 1942, its personnel totaled only 1165 people). It is obvious that the barrage battalion of the division, the number of which dropped to 64 people, did not avoid serious combat losses.

Simultaneously with the creation of barrage battalions of divisions, a decree of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front No. 00274 of September 18, 1941 "On strengthening the fight against desertion and the penetration of enemy elements into the territory of Leningrad" was issued. In this document, signed by the commander of the Leningrad Front, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov and members of the military council of the front A.A. Zhdanov and 2nd secretary A.A. Kuznetsov, in particular, was prescribed:

"5. To the chief of the OVT (Protection of the military rear. - I.P.) of the Leningrad Front, Lieutenant General Comrade. Stepanov should organize four barrage detachments to concentrate and check all servicemen detained without documents.

The head of the rear of the Leningrad Front, Lieutenant General Comrade Mordvinov to organize feeding points at these barrage detachments ”. Indeed, these four barrage detachments were immediately created.

Nowadays it is often asserted that the barrage detachments did nothing but shoot at their own people. In this case, it is completely incomprehensible why they should organize feeding stations with them? To feed those being shot before execution?

In October 1941, the North-Western Front, together with the troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts, thwarted the enemy command's plan to bypass Moscow from the north. At the same time, according to a special message from the head of the special department of the NKVD of the North-Western Front, State Security Commissioner of the 3rd rank V.M. Bochkov dated October 23, 1941 addressed to the head of the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR, State Security Commissioner of the 3rd Rank V.S. Abakumov, during the fighting near the village of Lobanovo, a number of servicemen fled from the battlefield. During October 21, the detachment detained 27 people. In another area near the village of Lobanovo, a detachment detained 100 people, including 5 junior commanders. The vicious deserters were arrested, one was shot in front of the line.

According to the certificate prepared by the deputy. Head of the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR, State Security Commissar of the 3rd rank S.R. Milstein for the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria, “from the beginning of the war to October 10 of this year. Special departments of the NKVD and barrage detachments of the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear detained 657,364 servicemen who had lagged behind their units and fled from the front.

Of these, 249,969 people were detained by the operational barriers of the Special Departments and 407,395 servicemen were detained by the barrage detachments of the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear.

Of the detainees, the Special Departments arrested 25,878 people, the remaining 632,486 people were formed in units and sent back to the front.

According to the decisions of the Special Departments and the sentences of the Military Tribunals, 10,201 people were shot, of which 3321 people were shot in front of the line.

These data are distributed along the fronts:

Leningradsky: arrested - 1044 shot - 854 shot in front of the formation - 430 Karelian: arrested - 468 shot - 263 shot in front of the formation - 132 Northern: arrested - 1683 shot - 933 shot in front of the formation - 280 North-West: arrested - 3440 shot - 1600 shot in front of the line - 730 ... ”As we can see, the overwhelming majority of the servicemen detained by special departments and barrage detachments were not subjected to repression, but were sent to the front. Only about 4% of them were arrested, including 1.5% were shot.

Thus, under the name "barrage detachment" in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, formations of different subordination acted. The defensive detachments detained the deserters and a suspicious element in the rear, and stopped the retreating troops. In a critical situation, they themselves entered into battle with the Germans, often suffering heavy losses.

Bibliography:

Kokurin A., Petrov N. NKVD: structure, functions, personnel. Article two (1938-1941) // Free thought. - 1997. - No. 7.

Lubyanka in the days of the battle for Moscow: Materials of the USSR state security agencies from the Central archive of the FSB of Russia / Comp. A.T. Zhadobin et al. - Moscow: Zvonnitsa Publishing House, 2002. - 480 p.

RGANI. Form 89. Op. 18. D.8. L.1-3. Cit. Quoted from: Lubyanka. Stalin and the NKVD-NKGB-GUKR "Smersh". 1939 - March 1946 / Stalin's Archives. Documents of the highest bodies of party and state power. - M .: International Fund "Democracy", 2006. - S. 317-318. (636 s.)

State security bodies of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. T.2. Start. Book 1. June 22 - August 31, 1941. - M .: Publishing house "Rus", 2000. - 717 p.

State security bodies of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. T.2. Start. Book 2. September 1 - December 31, 1941. - M .: Publishing house "Rus", 2000. - 699 p.

Appendix No. 1 to the order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs No. 0205-1956. List No. 1 of directorates, formations, units, subdivisions and institutions of the NKVD troops that were part of the Army in the field during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. - B. m., 1956 .-- 100 p.

Pykhalov I.V. Great slandered war. - M .: Yauza, Eksmo, 2005 .-- 480 p.

Russian archive: Great Patriotic War: Orders of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR (1943-1945). - T. 13 (2-3). - M .: TERRA, 1997 .-- 456 p.

Soviet military encyclopedia: in 8 volumes. Vol. 2 / Ch. ed. commission. A.A. Grechko. - Moscow: Military Publishing, 1976 .-- 639 p.

Soviet military encyclopedia: in 8 volumes. Vol. 7 / Ch. ed. commission. N.V. Ogarkov. - Moscow: Military Publishing, 1979 .-- 687 p.

Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense (TsAMO). F.217. Op. 1221. D.5.

TsAMO. F.217. Op. 1221. D.94.

Since the time of Khrushchev's "thaw", some historians have carefully nurtured and "cultivate" to this day one "terrible and terrible" myth. about how the barrage detachment, originally created with a very specific, reasonable and decent purpose, has now turned into a horror movie.

What it is?

The very concept of it military formation very vague, it says, in particular, about the "performance of certain tasks on a certain sector of the front." By this one can even understand the formation of a separate platoon. Both the composition, the number and the tasks of the barrage detachments have repeatedly changed throughout the war. When did the first barrage detachment appear?

History of origin

It should be remembered that in 1941 the legendary NKVD was divided into two diverse objects: the internal affairs committee and the state security department (NKGB). Counterintelligence, from which the detachments went, was separated from the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. At the end of July 1941, a special directive was issued on work in wartime, after which the formation of special units began.

It was then that the very first barrage detachment was created, whose task was to detain deserters and "suspicious elements" in the front line. These formations did not have any "firing rights", they could only detain the "element" and then escort him to the authorities.

Again, when both departments were again united, the barrage detachment came under the jurisdiction of the NKVD. But even then no special "indulgences" were made: members of the formations could arrest deserters. In special cases, which included only episodes of armed resistance, they had the right to be shot. In addition, special units had to fight traitors, cowards, alarmists. Known NKVD order No. 00941 of 19.07.1941. It was then that special companies and battalions were created, staffed by the NKVD troops.

What function did they perform?

It was these barrage detachments that played the most significant role in the Second World War. Again, they were not in charge of any "mass shootings": these units were supposed to create defensive lines to defend against German counterattacks and detain (!) Deserters and transport them to the investigating authorities for the next 12 hours.

If a person simply lagged behind his unit (which was normal in 1941), again, no one shot him. In this case, there were two options: either the serviceman was sent to the same unit, or (more often) they were reinforced by the nearest military unit.

In addition, the barrage detachments in the Second World War played the role of a "filter" through which people who had escaped from German captivity, and those individuals in the front line whose testimony was in doubt, passed through. There is a known case when such a detachment caught a group of German spies ... on paper clips! The commandants noticed that the "seconded Soviet servicemen" had brand new stainless steel clips on their documents (ideal, by the way)! So you don't need to consider the fighters as murderers and sadists. But this is how they are portrayed by many modern sources ...

The fight against banditry and the role of the 33rd detachment

One of those tasks that some categories of historians for some reason "forget" about was the fight against banditry, which in some regions took on an openly threatening scale. So, for example, the 33rd defensive detachment (North-Western Front) showed itself.

Especially a company detached from the Baltic Fleet. Even several armored cars were "assigned" to her. This detachment operated in the Estonian forests. The situation in those parts was serious: there was practically no desertion in local units, but the army was very much in the way of local Nazi units. Small gangs constantly attacked small groups of military personnel and civilians.

Estonian events

As soon as "narrow specialists" from the NKVD entered the game, the perky mood of the bandits quickly faded away. In July 1941, it was the barrage detachments that participated in the cleansing of Virtsu Island, which was recaptured as a result of the Red Army counterattack. Also on the way, the discovered German outpost was completely destroyed. Many bandits were rendered harmless, the pro-fascist organization in Tallinn was destroyed. Barrage detachments also took part in reconnaissance activities. The formation already mentioned by us, acting on behalf of the Baltic Fleet, directed its own aviation to the discovered positions of the Germans.

During the battle for Tallinn, the same detachment took part in a difficult battle, covering (and not shooting) retreating soldiers and repelling German counterattacks. On August 27, there was a terrible battle, during which our people repeatedly threw back a stubborn enemy. It was only through their heroism that an organized retreat became possible.

During these battles, more than 60% of the entire personnel of the barrage detachment, including commanders, were killed. Agree, this is not very similar to the image of a "cowardly commendation" hiding behind the backs of his soldiers. Subsequently, the same formation took part in the fight against the bandits of Kronstadt.

Commander-in-Chief's directive of September 1941

Why did the barrage units get such a bad reputation? The thing is that September 1941 was marked by an extremely difficult situation at the front. The formation of special detachments was allowed in those units that had managed to establish themselves as "unstable". In just a week, this practice spread to the entire front. And what, there are barrage detachments of thousands of innocent soldiers? Of course not!

Subordinate to these detachments were armed with transport and heavy equipment. The main task is to maintain order, to help the command of the units. Members of the barrage detachments had the right to use military weapons in those cases when it was necessary to urgently stop the retreat or eliminate the most malicious alarmists. But that rarely happened.

Varieties

Thus, there were two categories of detachments: one consisted of NKVD fighters and caught deserters, and the second prevented the willful abandonment of positions. The latter had a significantly larger staff, since they consisted of the Red Army soldiers, and not the soldiers of the internal troops. And even in this case, their members had the right only to shoot individual alarmists! No one has ever shot their own soldiers en masse! Moreover, if there was a counterattack, it was the "animals from the barrage detachments" that took the whole blow, allowing the fighters to retreat in an organized manner.

Results of work

Judging by 1941, these units (the 33rd defensive detachment especially distinguished themselves) detained about 657,364 people. 25,878 people were officially arrested. 10,201 people were shot on the verdict of a court-martial. All the others were again sent to the front.

Barrage detachments played a significant role in the defense of Moscow. Since there was simply a sorely lack of combat-ready units to defend the city itself, the regular NKVD fighters were literally worth their weight in gold, they organized competent defensive lines. In some cases, barrage detachments were created at the local initiative of the authorities and internal affairs bodies.

On July 28, 1942, the Headquarters issued the notorious order No. 227 of the NKO. He ordered the creation of separate detachments in the rear of unstable units. As in the previous case, the fighters had the right to shoot only individual alarmists and cowards who voluntarily left their positions in battle. The detachments were provided with all the necessary transport, the most capable commanders were put in their head. There were also separate barrage battalions at the divisional level.

The results of the hostilities of the 63rd detachment

By mid-October 1942, 193 army detachments had been created. By this time, they managed to detain 140,755 Red Army soldiers. 3980 of them were arrested, 1189 servicemen were shot. All the rest were sent to penal units. The Don and Stalingrad directions were the most difficult, an increased number of arrests and detentions were recorded here. But these are "little things". It is much more important that such units provided real assistance to their colleagues at the most critical moments of the battle.

This is how the 63rd barrage detachment (53rd army) showed itself, having come to the aid of its unit, to which it was "attached". He forced the Germans to stop the counteroffensive. What conclusions follow from this? Simple enough.

The role of these formations in restoring order was very great, they also managed to return a considerable number of servicemen back to the front. So, once the 29th rifle division, into the flank of which the advancing German tanks managed to break through, began to retreat in panic. Lieutenant of the NKVD Filatov, at the head of his squad, stopped the fleeing, going out with them to combat positions.

In an even more difficult situation, the barrage unit under the command of the same Filatov made it possible for the soldiers of a heavily battered rifle division to retreat, and she herself began a battle with a breaking through enemy, forcing him to retreat.

Who were they?

In critical situations, the fighters did not shoot their own people, but competently organized the defense and led the offensive themselves. So, there is a known case when the 112th Rifle Division, having lost almost 70% (!) Of its personnel in the most difficult battles, received an order to retreat. Instead of them, a defensive detachment of Lieutenant Khlystov took up the position, which held the position for four days, doing this until the arrival of reinforcements.

A similar case is the defense of the Stalingrad railway station by the "dogs of the NKVD". Despite their numbers, which were significantly inferior to the German, they held their positions for several days and waited for the approach of the 10th Infantry Division.

Thus, barrage units are “last chance” units. If the fighters of the line unit leave their positions unmotivated, the members of the barrage battalion will stop them. If a military unit suffers heavy losses in a battle with an enemy superior in strength, the "minelayers" give them the opportunity to retreat and continue the battle themselves. Simply put, barrage detachments are military units of the USSR, during the battle, playing the role of defensive "bastions". Units made up of the NKVD troops, among other things, could be engaged in identifying German agents and catching deserters. When was their work completed?

End of work

By order of October 29, 1944, the barrage detachments in the Red Army were disbanded. If the personnel were recruited from ordinary linear units, similar formations were formed from them. Fighters of the NKVD were sent to special "flying detachments", whose activities consisted in the purposeful capture of bandits. By that time, there were practically no deserters. Since the personnel of many detachments was recruited from the best (!) Fighters of their units, these people were also often sent to further study, forming a new backbone of the Soviet Army.

Thus, the "bloodthirstiness" of such units is nothing more than a stupid and dangerous myth that insults the memory of the people who liberated the countries captured by fascist troops.