Weapons of Afghan dushmans in the war with the USSR. Heavy machine guns and other small arms. Commander of the combat vehicle
Experienced, cruel and merciless warriors, they caused a lot of trouble for our soldiers. What distinguished the “dushmans” from other opponents of the USSR, what were their characteristics?
Lack of unity
The Mujahideen appeared in Afghanistan after the arrival of Soviet troops there. Initially these were small groups of local residents, as well as people from neighboring countries - Pakistan and Iran. However, by the end of the 1980s, the number of “dushmans” opposing our soldiers exceeded 250 thousand people. However, contrary to popular belief, there was no unity and cohesion among their ranks. The Mujahideen did not act as a united front against the Soviet troops; they often fought with each other no less fiercely than with the “shuravi” (as they called our soldiers). Under the collective designation “Mujahideen” were hidden dozens and hundreds of groups, divided along national, religious and territorial lines. Shiites, Sunnis, Hazaras, Pashtuns and many others - all of them periodically entered into violent confrontation with each other, which made the task much easier for our troops.
In medieval conditions
Often the “dushmans” took refuge in the mountains, but being in populated areas completely dissolved among the local residents. Soviet officers who were on raids and cleansing operations in cities and villages said that the Mujahideen lived in truly medieval conditions, little similar to human conditions. Dirt and unsanitary conditions reigned everywhere; the militants considered it not very important to take care of the cleanliness of their homes. As our servicemen noted, the only reminder that in the 20th century were sometimes Japanese tape recorders, which somehow ended up in the hands of the “dushmans”.
Mercenaries for food The militants themselves did not always want to fight, so they often used local residents for their purposes. And since poverty in Afghanistan was off the charts, people had no choice but to agree to go to the “dushmans” for food and water. As Major Alexander Metla recalled, the peasant was given a mine, he placed it on the road where the Soviet column was blown up. For a successful operation, the Mujahideen generously rewarded the accomplice; for failure, they could punish him. Ordinary peasants aroused less suspicion among Soviet military personnel, and the militants actively took advantage of this.
Weapon camels
The main transport of the Afghan “spirits” were camels. They were mainly used to transport weapons. The Mujahideen preferred to move at night, when our soldiers had much less opportunity to track them. The “dushmans” weighed each animal with a huge number of bales, which is why even a machine gun would not take the camels. Under the guise of peaceful products, Afghan militants managed to transport weapons. From above the animal was loaded with bales of fabrics and equipment. But below, under the belly, a weapon was imperceptibly suspended.
Compliant "dushmans"
There is a widespread opinion that it was impossible to come to an agreement with the Mujahideen; they were supposedly intractable and extremely principled. This is wrong. In 1986, the Soviet command sent KGB major Nikolai Komarov to negotiate with the militants. His task was to secure the gas field near Jizdan from attacks by “spirits”. Initially, the field commanders all as one refused to make a deal, but there were also amenable ones. One of them is the leader of a large gang, nicknamed Jafar. Komarov arrived at the negotiations without weapons and began a conversation with the Mujahideen. When all the details were discussed and an agreement was reached, Jafar took the pilaf from the vat with dirty hands and brought it to the major’s mouth. The officer swallowed the “offering,” which meant the deal was done.
The main thing is faith
Despite the fierce confrontation with the Shuravi, those of them who agreed to become Muslims were easily accepted into their ranks. Several hundred Soviet soldiers During the war they were captured, some deserted and came to join the militants themselves. One of these servicemen was Sergei Krasnoperov. The Mujahideen accepted him and brought him closer to the mullahs. The deserter quickly learned the language and converted to Islam. Soon he had children with a local woman. Krasnoperov still lives in Afghanistan; it is no longer possible to distinguish him from the indigenous Afghans.
Inhuman cruelty
American journalist George Crile recalled that the brutality of the Mujahideen was rational in nature, reminiscent of the sacrifices of pagan times. He described a savage execution called the “red tulip.” According to the journalist, one day at the base in Bagram, a Soviet sentry discovered several bags containing the bodies of USSR military personnel, wrapped in their own skin. All of them were killed by the "red tulip". First, the “spirits” injected the unfortunate man with a strong drug that dulled the pain. They hung me up by the arms and cut off the skin around the body. After the effects of the dope wore off, the condemned person experienced severe pain shock and died.
The war in Afghanistan served as an impetus that brought the thoughts of military inventors of various defense research institutes out of a state of slumber. At the end of this war and immediately after it, the troops began to receive new equipment, uniforms, equipment and weapons. But before this, all kinds of improvements were forced to be carried out by the military personnel themselves, who served as part of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan.
For the armed forces of the Soviet Union, the war in Afghanistan was the first real war since September 1945. This was not a short-lived border conflict on Damansky Island, or the introduction of troops into Hungary or Czechoslovakia to suppress a rebellion. It was real war, which required intense, clear and coordinated work of all units and services not only of the 40th Combined Arms Army, but also of the Turkestan Military District and the USSR Ministry of Defense. However, the inertia of the command of the Soviet army, which relied primarily on the experience of World War II when organizing combat training and logistics, left the resolution of these issues at the post-war level.
Therefore, the army was not ready for long-term combat operations in a local conflict. The uniform adopted in the Soviet Army, as well as equipment, did not meet the requirements of the tasks facing the Limited Contingent, which had to be solved in a hot climate and very rough terrain. The ongoing operations to detect and destroy the enemy required high mobility from the fighters on the battlefield. Ammunition pouches, a flask, and a sapper's shovel placed on the soldier's belt hampered his movements both on the battlefield and on the march, and when secretly advancing to the specified lines they created excessive noise.
Quite soon, the command of the units of the 40th OA learned that for relatively unimpeded movement across the territory of the DRA it was necessary to control the few roads of this country. In this regard, outposts, or, as they are now called, roadblocks, were installed on all communications. The life and activities of such an outpost, where personnel operate autonomously for a long time, also required changes not only to the existing equipment and uniforms, but also to weapons. The conduct of convoys delivering supplies in conditions of constant anticipation of an ambush attack influenced the tactics of action and the armament of army units.
Since the reaction time of such a gigantic management machine, which was the Soviet army, is quite long, the performers on the ground had to show reasonable initiative and soldierly ingenuity.
Throughout the entire period of combat operations in Afghanistan, Soviet military personnel modified both existing uniforms and weapons and military equipment. Below are just a few examples of these improvements. It must be said that not everything was effective. We will try to comment on some of the most interesting rationalization proposals of the army Kulibins.
Vest and pouch for carrying cartridges. The main item of uniform, improved by personnel, was the so-called “bra”, or, in modern terminology, “unloading” - a vest for carrying weapons and ammunition. It was manufactured in almost all units, with the exception of units where commanders strictly followed the letter of the Combat Regulations and forced soldiers to carry pouches. But time has shown that homemade new items in a combat situation are much more convenient than a standard pouch.
Homemade equipment can be divided into two types: an unloading vest and a chest pouch.
The unloading vest was most often made from a life jacket, which was included in the armored vehicle kit. Foam plastic was pulled out of the vest and magazines, signal and lighting cartridges, etc. were inserted into the resulting cavities. Further, everything depended on the needs and imagination of the manufacturer. It should be noted that “bras” made from floating vests had a lot of inconveniences: while running, the magazines jumped out of the pockets, and if it was necessary to quickly change the magazine, then getting it out of the pocket was not as easy as inserting it. I had to completely rip apart the insides of the vest, reshape and alter them. They added pockets for signal signals, grenades and fuses, and for clips for pistols.
The chest pouch was made using the chest pouch of the People's Liberation Army of China as a model. They were worn by the Mujahideen, who used Chinese Kalashnikov assault rifles, which came with the breastplates. Of course, the bulk of the military personnel tried to get their hands on a “native” Chinese breastplate. But demand exceeded supply, so everyone else had to practice their tailoring skills.
The process of making such a new item was purely individual; everyone, as they say, sewed for themselves and their own wishes. Most often, RD-54 pouches and trouser belts were used, as well as RD-54 belts on which the pouches hung.
To make one breastplate, two RD-54s were required, from which pouches for magazines and grenades were removed. Then the pouches were sewn together: in the center there were two for magazines, and on the sides for grenades. The “bra” for machine gun magazines for 45 rounds had to be sewn from scratch.
In addition to convenience when carrying ammunition, the bib had another important purpose. It protected against bullets and shrapnel in battle.
Staff fashion.
By the way, it was in Afghanistan that the fashion arose to tie two magazines together with insulating tape. Theoretically, this reduces the time it takes to reload a machine gun when the magazine runs out of ammunition. Some managed to connect three stores. However, it must be said right away that in a combat situation this technique does not reduce reloading time, but increases it. The shooter, as a rule, some consciously, some unknowingly, rests the machine gun with its magazine on the ground. Naturally, dirt gets into the second magazine, and when reloading, the chamber becomes clogged with a dirty cartridge. Then the hassle of extracting it begins.
The use of an RPK machine gun magazine on assault rifles is also ineffective. Its capacity is one and a half times higher than that of a machine gun. However, when aiming while lying down, the shooter is forced to rise, since the size of the magazine does not allow for normal aiming. So there is an alternative here. You will be able to shoot a little longer until the cartridges run out, but your head will be 10 centimeters higher above the ground and, naturally, more noticeable to the enemy.
Therefore, such foppish methods took root only among the “staff” officers, who saw the “spirits” only as prisoners.
Carrying grenades.
In addition, the grenade pouches for the GP-25 under-barrel grenade launcher also had to be redesigned. Placing them on their sides hampered movement, which in battle is often of paramount importance for survival and victory over the enemy. Therefore, horizontally located pockets of five pieces in two rows were ripped apart and sewn together in the form of a bandoleer, and a belt was sewn to the grenade pouch for fastening on the belt. Some people also sewed shoulder straps to this pouch for better load distribution.
When worn, the grants were located at the back, which was convenient in all respects.
In the presence of captured equipment, a Chinese belt of a similar design was also used for these purposes for carrying cartridges in packs. Its pockets were convenient for placing FOGs.
Backpacks and satchels.
The RD-54 backpacks themselves were also redesigned. For example, foam rubber shoulder pads were sewn on, and a MON-50 mine bag was sewn on the back, which could hold two 1.7 liter flasks. The machine gunners cut out the inner walls and installed thin plywood to the back - they got a box for machine gun belts.
From a letter from the head of the radio station 177 OoSpN Eduard Ptukhin: “Since the RD-54 did not fit all the radio operator’s property, it was necessary to sew two RDs together: in one, closest to the back, the radio station was placed (R-159, R-143 or “Angara” ), in the second - spare ammunition, spare batteries, dry food, etc. As a rule, flasks of water were placed in the resulting four side pockets.”
However, this innovation, it must be said, did not catch on. In any case, 173 ooSpN also experimented in a similar way, but the “new product” was subsequently abandoned. The fact is that as the capacity of the backpack increases, the ease of carrying it decreases in direct proportion. The center of gravity is greatly shifted back due to the second backpack attached.
It was another matter when the second backpack was attached above the main one. And the main one dropped somewhat to the level of the belt. A wide belt was attached to the main one. In this case, the load was distributed more evenly. On the march it was more convenient. However, I have only encountered this option once. I can’t say that it stuck for long.
Radio communications.
In 177 ooSpN, the head of the detachment's communications team recommended that the scouts on duty or in an ambush use the following method of camouflage: the microphone holder on the cheekpiece headset should be extended, which allowed them to speak on the radio in a whisper, and this was important in the above conditions.
Steel arms.
Privates and non-commissioned officers often made knives from rebar and car springs as a replacement for standard bayonet knives. Homemade knives, as a rule, were distinguished by excellent sharpening and steel strength. The sheath was made of rubber hoses to safely carry the knife.
Armored vehicles.
With the tacit permission of the command staff and with the help of military personnel, armored vehicles received additional weapons and took on a changed appearance.
Thus, in 370 ooSpN (Lashkargah), the senior driver of the armored personnel carrier RGSpN No. 631 Yuri Denisov, together with other enthusiasts, installed a helicopter unit of 80-mm NURS “S-8” (unguided rocket projectile) for 16 shots on his vehicle. The rod was connected to the KPVT barrel casing. It was adjusted according to the machine gun sight. During zeroing at the shooting range, the aiming lines were approximately aligned. But when firing, it was necessary to rotate the turret so that the jet stream did not hit the engines when firing. It was possible to use this installation several times in combat operations. The downside of this innovation was the inability to use this installation with the troops on board.
A similar “multiple rocket launcher” was installed at one of the posts in the Baraka Valley.
Scout 668 ooSpN recalls: “The installation with NURS was fitted in place of the BRDM turret (we did not have time to find out the history of the loss of the turret, we took off our group and left). The electric trigger button was displayed on the commander's instrument panel instead of the KPVT firing safety button. The BRDM stood in a caponier with radial walls. The walls of the caponier were marked, the area was targeted according to these marks.”
Frequent shelling of remote outposts (points) forced those serving there to also show creativity and ingenuity. Thus, near Asadabad, at one of these points, an 80-mm S-8 NURS helicopter unit was installed, similar to that described above. But not on armor or a vehicle, but on a stationary stand.
Here are the lines from a letter from an eyewitness to those events: “Who exactly installed this block - the infantry or the “specialists” (meaning 334 ooSpN - D.R.), unfortunately, it was not possible to find out. It is known that initially they tried to pull the pipe out of the block and, securing it on an ordinary stick, fire in this way.
But nothing good came of this idea. Then we approached the process creatively: we welded an adjustable frame from a car wheel and iron. They made her heavier. We started shooting. Great! But the standard battery did not pull out of the turntable. They took a Kamaz truck - it’s a completely different matter! Covers area targets well! But again only in short bursts. The long ones (the machine is still light) caused it to sway a lot. Using this installation, they fired at the “spirits” quite successfully.
A common occurrence was the installation of AGS-17 armored personnel carriers. In 173 ooSpN (Kandahar), the grenade launcher was installed on the roof of the tower, where the tire was previously attached. A machine was attached to the tire. The body of the grenade launcher was installed before the armored group exited.
Armament of armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles.
BMPs were not spared the changes either. The command and staff infantry fighting vehicle was not equipped with weapons. An antenna mast extended from the tower. The absence of any serious weapons forced the radio operators of 334 ooSpN (Asadabad) to weld a captured English 12.7 mm anti-aircraft gun onto the back of the turret, which was successfully matched with DShK cartridges.
It was also common to install DShK machine guns by welding on radium BTR-60PB “Chaika”. Other weapons and equipment were also attached.
On the armored personnel carrier, the “Luna” searchlight from the commander’s hatch was moved to the turret and attached to the casing of the KPVT machine, which made it possible to instantly hit a detected enemy with fire at night.
In the 334th and 173rd detachments, the BMP-KSh was equipped with a 14.5-mm captured ZGU (anti-aircraft mountain installation) with a KPV machine gun (Vladimirov heavy machine gun) and a 360-degree rotation “seat” made in China.
Scout 668 ooSpN recalls: “Probably, because the combat experience of our detachment was still small, improvements in the design of combat vehicles, weapons and uniforms were not so radical. At least at the beginning, during my stay in Afghanistan (we are talking about the first years of the stay of 668 special forces in Afghanistan, starting in the fall of 1984 - D.R.). On the "Chaika" of our company, on the armor between the driver's and commander's hatches and the radio operator's compartment hatch, the guys welded brackets into which the AGS machine could be secured. But “Chaika” rarely went on combat missions.”
Improvements also affected the placement of additional ammunition for the armored personnel carrier machine guns and the group’s small arms. “Usually, the vehicle stored two or even three ammunition in zinc, in addition to loaded boxes for machine guns, five or six zinc for 5.45 mm AK and 7.62 mm AKM, three or four for SVD and PK. All this had to be somehow secured in the car so that it would not get in the way underfoot, and the zinc was secured to the hatches of the engine compartment with seat belts. But the strap fasteners weren't designed to hold that kind of weight, and while driving over rough terrain, the straps became loose and the boxes fell apart. I had to fold them and tighten them with straps again and again. We quickly got tired of this, and we found a hood from some car, cut strips and bent them into brackets that were attached to the wings of the engine hatches.”
Motor transport and helicopters.
In 370 ooSpN, whose area of responsibility included the Dashti-Margo desert, motor transport was actively used. DShK machine guns were also installed on Urals and captured vehicles. In addition, when conducting columns, vehicles were often used, in the bodies of which a ZU-23 anti-aircraft twin installation was installed.
And in the open door of the helicopter, a homemade frame was installed that extended beyond the vehicle. An ordinary mortar mine was attached to it, cocked with a blow and, if necessary, dropped.
Everyday life.
Harsh living conditions forced military personnel to use almost all available means to make certain household items. There are any number of examples. Table lamps were made from Italian-made TS 6.1 mine bodies; A nozzle for a bathhouse, dining room or other room was made from a fan from the PAZ (anti-nuclear protection) system with a damaged infantry fighting vehicle, a piece of water pipe and a dropper faucet with diesel fuel. A 200-liter barrel with an installed gasoline engine from an AB-1 electric unit turned into a decent concrete mixer.
And here is the design of a homemade air conditioner. A box was placed in the window opening of the tent, which was very tightly stuffed with camel thorn. The box was through. From the inside, the thorn in the box was watered, as we do in a bathhouse, pouring water over hot stones. The water was absorbed by the thorn, and the air heated by the sun, passing through this filter, was cooled and refreshed. This system worked for a long time - it was not necessary to splash water very often. There was also culinary know-how. For example, the dough for pancakes was made from condensed milk and flour. And they were baked on baking sheets, spatulas or... irons.
Sand, mountains, thirst and death - this is how Afghanistan greeted Major Alexander Metla. There were two years left before the withdrawal of Soviet troops, which not everyone had the chance to survive. Every Afghan knows well how dangerous it is to step off to the side of the road, pick up an “accidentally” dropped object, or become separated from one’s own.
The political officer who first set foot on the concrete road of Kabul in early April 1987 had to endure all the horrors of the war. At the request of the site, Alexander Metla spoke about the features of that war and his inventions - improvised self-propelled mortars and the Metla 2 guntruck.
Scorpions were worse than bullets
– At first, I was no longer afraid of bullets, but of the local fauna, which was very unfriendly. Scorpions, tarantulas and various poisonous snakes did not allow us to relax. It was very risky to just fall asleep in the shade under the Ural. And before entering the room, you had to check all the dark corners that Scorpios love so much.
Most often, young people who had not been shot at suffered from bites. Once our fighter was bitten by a viper at night, the guy had less than an hour to live, and he was at an outpost in the mountains at an altitude of 3500 m. As soon as they told us about this on the radio, he rushed to the Mi-8 pilot, who was sleeping in the tent. I shook it up, I said, our fighter is dying, so the pilot didn’t even put on his overalls, that’s what he was wearing, and that’s what he flew in. At altitude, the engines began to run out of steam, and the helicopter literally fell onto the site, but the vaccine was delivered on time. They didn’t even fly back, but fell: the car literally dived down into the gorge. Then the pilot was able to level it, and we were soon home, and all this was done in pitch darkness - our helicopter pilots were unique guys. 
The simplest and most effective solution in the fight against dangerous insects turned out to be an ordinary sheepskin coat, which Alexander received at the warehouse.
– Afghan sheep are special animals: they are practically omnivores; there is not much food in the dusty expanses of this country, so they eat everything they come across along the way. There were cases when soldiers threw away oily paper from cartridges, and it was instantly eaten by sheep. They also did not disdain scorpions and other insects. Therefore, the smell of sheep forced all the poisonous little things to retreat.
Their life is truly medieval
The conditions in which the Afghans lived amazed Soviet soldiers, but for the locals they were the norm—they didn’t know anyone else. 
– If in Kabul living conditions were at a more or less civilized level, then in distant villages the real Middle Ages reigned. As a rule, peasants lived very poorly in adobe houses with small windows. And if the men’s half was more or less clean, the women’s half was dirty and unsanitary. Wives usually slept on hard mats on the floor, children and goats lived nearby, and the latrine was there. The only reminder that it was the 20th century was a Japanese tape recorder mounted on a wooden plow.
Ignorance of customs often led to misunderstandings with locals. For example, only the owner could enter the women’s half of the house, and if a woman was seriously ill and a Soviet doctor tried to help her, then most often an angry husband with a hoe would attack him.
In addition, the dushmans treated prisoners very cruelly, especially mercenaries who were trained in training camps in Pakistan.
– Many soldiers carried grenades in their breast pockets so as not to be captured alive. The death of those who were captured by the dushmans was very terrible. Do they have this special feature?- to mock prisoners. As a rule, I carried an F-1 with me, just to be sure.
– The best-packed ones were the scouts who went to inspect the caravans. Dushmans often smuggled weapons under the guise of peaceful products. It was done like this: several boxes with fabrics, equipment and other goods were secured on top of the donkey, and weapons were hung from below, under the belly. The enemy was supplied by the whole world - weapons, ammunition, uniforms and equipment were supplied from the USA, Canada, China and other countries. Once from a raid, scouts brought me a pair of Canadian boots; they were soft, comfortable and durable throughout their service life. Unloadings were also valued; in our country they were also called “bras.”
They contained from 4 to 6 magazines and a couple of hand grenades. In addition to being easy to carry, this also provided good protection; as a rule, the bullet did not penetrate a full magazine. Many sewed such unloadings themselves. Rucksacks, durable and with many compartments, were also valued - these were not available in the Soviet Union. Today you can buy them in any store, but before they were in terrible short supply. And the coveted trophies were combat boots, watches, compasses, radio stations and many other useful things, the likes of which we simply had no analogues.
But our weapons were better. For example, Chinese copies of AK-47s were often found as trophies; their metal was poor: it was enough to fire a couple of magazines for the machine gun to start “spitting” and the accuracy of the fire dropped catastrophically. The Soviet machine gun worked under any conditions; I don’t remember our Kalashnikov jamming. In general, the dushmans were armed very variegatedly, from flintlock rifles of the century before last to the brand new M16s.
Commander of the combat vehicle
The 56th Guards Separate Assault Brigade, which included Alexander Metla, was entrusted with ensuring the security of the Kabul-Gardez road. The soldiers of the unit accompanied the columns and constantly suffered losses from the fire of the dushmans, who often set up ambushes and mined roads. It also happened that ordinary peasants became demolitionists, who fought not for faith, but for money - they paid well for the destruction of Soviet equipment.
– Most of the local population lived below the poverty line, so for them the war was one of the ways to earn a piece of bread. It was done like this: the peasant bought a mine with his own money and installed it on the road, if an armored personnel carrier, infantry fighting vehicle or other equipment was blown up, he received a reward, but if the sappers neutralized it, then the peasant was ruined. Therefore, often the locals also stood guard not far from the mine, opening fire on our sappers when they tried to defuse the mine.And the dushmans themselves gave no rest. They had good reconnaissance; often, when a column of Soviet troops left the base, they already knew its composition and route.
The mountainous terrain gave the attackers a great advantage; perched high on the rocks, the “spirits” could fire at the column without hindrance. Tanks could not raise their barrels that high, however, neither could armored personnel carriers or infantry fighting vehicles. Here the Shilka self-propelled guns came in handy, from which the radio-electronic equipment necessary for firing at air targets was removed, and in its place additional ammunition and Metla self-propelled mortars were placed. The latter got their name precisely thanks to the political officer who invented them.
– It so happened that along the route of our column in the same place the “spirits” constantly ambushed us. They approached the place along the bed of a dried-up river, made a small fire raid and quickly retreated. Artillery opened fire on them, including the Grad MLRS, but due to the terrain, the shells simply flew over the position of the spirits without causing them harm. The only weapon that was capable of reaching the Mujahideen was mortars. But if you equip positions along the column’s route in advance, the “spirits” will either mine them or set up ambushes and slaughter the crews.
Then Alexander Metla had the idea to make a self-propelled mortar. The political officer came to the unit commander, but he was very busy and, after listening half-heartedly, he just waved him off – "do". The basis was taken from the Ural car, in the back of which a ZU-23 carriage was installed, rotating 360 degrees. An 82-mm 2B9M "Cornflower" mortar was welded onto it, thanks to which the weapon had a circular firing sector. The improvised carriage was protected with a bulletproof shield, and the truck itself was armored with steel plates.
Having seen the self-propelled mortar, the deputy for armaments categorically forbade its use. They say that it is unknown how the weapon will behave and in general all amateur activities should be stopped. But the brigade commander, Colonel Vitaly Raevsky, did not allow the project to be buried, and he allowed the system to be tested at the test site.
–The deputy for armaments intervened here too, ordering to fire with a weakened charge. But what the hell is range and accuracy, especially since, on the recommendation of the same deputy, a rope was tied to the descent, and the fighter himself was sitting a couple of meters away in the trench. Realizing that everything would now go down the drain, he approached the brigade commander and asked him to fire with a full charge on his own responsibility. They shot at the hull of an old armored personnel carrier, located two kilometers away. The first shot is overshot, the second is undershot. All– a fork, the next salvo with a burst of almost a hundred mines, the armored personnel carrier is literally torn to pieces - everyone watching is delighted.
The first combat use of the installation was also successful. When the “spirits,” confident in their impunity, opened fire on the column, Alexander Metla ordered the mortar crew to open fire. In just a minute, a hundred mines fell on the positions of the “spirits”. The fire from the Mujahideen stopped instantly. Later, scouts discovered more than 60 corpses at the ambush site; how many were wounded is anyone's guess.
The military quickly recognized the effectiveness of Alexander Metla’s installations, and soon three more of the same ones were built. Alexander himself, as the commander of installation No. 1 (all of them received the name “Broom” as recognition of the creator’s merits), each time went to accompany the convoy. The Mujahideen launched a real hunt for this unusual type of shuravi weapon. And one day they managed to knock out installation No. 1.
– During the next battle, we got carried away and stopped watching the rear. And there was no time for that: every silent enemy machine-gun point meant that another guy would return home alive. At this time, a 12-year-old boy passed us on the kiryaz. I only managed to notice out of the corner of my eye how he threw off the RPG, which was cumbersome for him, and fired. A grenade hit the side, our entire crew was wounded, except me - all the fragments were taken by the helmet and body armor. Meanwhile, the boy threw down his weapon and disappeared into the kiryaz.
Appropriate conclusions were drawn from the incident and a new self-propelled gun, “Broom,” was built. This time, a hull from a BRDM was placed in the back of the Ural, and a NURS unit from a Mi-24 helicopter was welded onto its turret. The Ural itself was thoroughly armored. Of course, it was impossible to conduct targeted fire from the NURS unit, but the psychological effect was strong. The dushmans simply ran away when the shuravi used their shaitan machine.
Alexander Metla was often told, why do you need to go into battle? I would sit, fill out cards, and the war would be safer, “... did you get this front line?” But the political officer always believed that one must educate and gain authority only by one’s own example.
–I was never eager to fight, I just did my job. And even without being under bullets, what could I say to those guys who walk under death every day and may not return from battle at any moment, could I understand them, will they believe me? Hardly. War is not a science or a craft - it is a test, which is very difficult to pass to the end without breaking down.
P.S. You will be able to see live how Belarusians fought in Afghanistan
The history of the Afghan state remembers many wars. The military coup of April 1978 sparked another war when Soviet Union decided to intervene in domestic policy of this state. At the end of the revolution, in December of the same year, an agreement was signed in Moscow between the USSR and Afghanistan, according to which the Soviet Union assumed obligations to rearm the Afghan army.
Thus, the Afghan armed forces actually came under the control of the Soviet military command; the total number of military advisers who arrived from the USSR in Afghanistan amounted to over a thousand people. Among whom were also representatives of the KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the border troops.
The local military conflict that the Soviet government unleashed on the territory of Afghanistan is the only one since World War II in which the Soviet armed forces, in particular ground forces and air force formations, have been directly involved for 10 years. The decision to start the war was made by a group created as part of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, which included L. Brezhnev, Y. Andropov, D. Ustinov, A. Gromyko, K. Chernenko. The basis for this decision was the inability of the Afghan government to resist counter-revolutionary forces, since the country did not have a combat-ready army.
The entry of Soviet troops began on December 25, 1979, when in the Termez region the 108th motorized rifle division of the TurkVO crossed the Amu Darya River in the direction of Kabul. Two days later, the 5th Guards Motorized Rifle Division moved from the Kushki area to Shindand, Herat and Kandahar. At the same time, an airborne force appeared at the military airfields of Bagram and Kabul, which included the 103rd Airborne Division and the 345th Separate Parachute Regiment. Thus, the beginning of a long and bloody war was laid.
Initially, the purpose of the presence of Soviet armed forces on Afghan territory was defined as stabilizing the situation in the country. According to the plan, military formations were only supposed to position themselves, but under no circumstances engage in hostilities. Their main task was to provide assistance to the local population in the form of protection from militants, providing food and everything necessary. However, as can be seen from history, the troops were gradually drawn into armed conflicts. Therefore, it was decided that it was necessary to expand the Soviet military contingent to 120-150 thousand people.
Since the combat effectiveness of the Afghan government troops was very low, from the beginning of the 80s, Soviet troops took over almost the entire fight against armed opposition groups. Thus, thanks to Soviet units, large detachments of militants were defeated near Talikan, Faizabad, Kandahar, Takhar, Jalalabad, and Bagram. In the current situation, the Afghan opposition refused to carry out armed conflicts with large forces. They divided their formations into small groups of 100-200 people, and moved on to tactics guerrilla warfare. Foreign instructors in specially created centers taught militants how to use communications equipment and modern weapons, as well as methods of subversion. Some foreign countries have begun supplying weapons. Thus, 12-mm DShK machine guns made in China, automatic small arms made in China, Egypt and Iraq, Italian anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, and grenades were obtained. A little later, the Stinger and Strela-2 anti-aircraft missile systems appeared. In 1982, the first “ultrasounds” appeared, which was irrefutable evidence that Israel was supplying weapons to the militants. Moreover, the Israeli instructors acted on the spot without hiding much. Supplies of copies of Berets, Brownings, Walthers were established from Pakistan, and besides, the Afghans themselves learned to make weapons on their own. Japan has repeatedly stated that it does not supply weapons to Afghan militants, although the mujahideen had Japanese radios adapted to the conditions of the mountainous terrain. In addition, a formidable weapon that caused a lot of trouble for Soviet technology was the English Bur carbine, capable of penetrating armor.
At a time when Soviet military units were just entering Afghan territory, the number of militant formations was small. But before 1983 their number had already reached 45 thousand people, and before 1986 - 150 thousand. At the same time, the total number of Afghan and Soviet armed forces was about 400 thousand people (of which 150 thousand were Soviet). They could easily control a quarter of the state territory. Rural areas were mainly under the control of the Mujahideen. Until 1988, there were already 5 thousand gangs operating in Afghanistan, which already included 200 thousand people. Their distinctive feature was excellent knowledge of the area and high endurance.
When Soviet troops switched to organizing raids conducted by reinforced battalions and air assault groups, such tactics were not always successful, as militant groups mobile withdrew their main forces or avoided armed clashes altogether.
More often fighting were carried out in mountainous areas, in the desert, near roads, as well as in areas where there were a large number of bushes and trees. In such a situation, it turned out that military equipment had certain disadvantages: tanks were deprived of the necessary operational space, and artillery could not do without roads.
During armed clashes, such types of weapons as RPG-7, recoilless rifles, homemade land mines and anti-tank mines, 12-mm DShK machine guns, portable air defense systems "Strela-2M", "Stinger", "Red Eye", "Blowpipe", 37- and 40-mm mountain anti-aircraft guns, 76-mm mountain guns, 60- and 80-mm mortars, 4-, 6- and 12-barreled rocket launchers.
The militants' tactics were distinguished by the effect of surprise and a large number of military tricks. Thus, they carefully studied the conditions of the situation in which military operations were planned, and prepared for battle in every possible way - they used ambushes, mining, stone blockages, and undermining roads. Their intelligence was no less effective: the militants had their agents among government officials and among local residents, and they did not refuse to spread disinformation, carry out terrorist attacks, or block roads.
Soviet units initially fought against small mobile groups of militants according to the classical scheme, but it turned out to be ineffective, since such tactics involved conducting combat operations in standard conditions against regular troops. In addition, in the Afghan conflict there was no front line or rear lines as such, which significantly complicated the task of the Soviet troops. They were forced to be in constant combat readiness, devote large forces to providing rear security, and also conduct constant battles throughout the country, thus scattering their forces.
Vast experience was gained in the use of military equipment, the tactics of which were constantly changing. Thus, numerous battles in mountainous areas showed that it is possible to cover troops with the help of self-propelled anti-aircraft guns ZSU-23-4 “Shilka” and ZU-23-2. For more efficient use, the radar equipment was removed from the ZSU and an additional 4 thousand rounds of ammunition were installed for each installation, and the charger was transported in a truck.
The most popular automatic grenade launcher was the AGS-17 “Plamya”. Thanks to this weapon, the capabilities of the BMP-1, BTR-60, and Mi-8 helicopter were improved. At the same time, some of the technology had some disadvantages. Thus, the 85-mm D-44 field howitzers, despite the fact that they could reach targets at a distance of up to 15 kilometers, had a small elevation angle. Therefore, they were replaced with more powerful 122-mm D-30 howitzers, and after some time with self-propelled 2S1 “Gvozdika”. The 152-mm Akatsiya self-propelled howitzers and the 2S5 Geotsint self-propelled guns, as well as the 2A36 of the same caliber, were also suitable for mountainous terrain. The 82mm BM-37 mortar was also used effectively. Later it was replaced by the 82 mm 1B14 “Tray”. During the years of hostilities in Afghanistan, automatic mortars 2B9 "Cornflower" of 82 mm caliber and a 120mm universal self-propelled gun NONA based on the BTR-D were also tested.
Since the militants used RPG-7s in large numbers, the Soviet troops had certain difficulties in ensuring the protection of their equipment. For this, improvised means were used - bags or boxes of sand, which were attached to the outside of the equipment.
There was also a factory modernization: some of the combat vehicles were sheathed with additional layers of armor, and the bottom and turrets were also strengthened. The command sought to find the most effective method protection. One such example is the protection of the MT-LB tractor from small arms and cumulative grenades. These tractors were used as combat vehicles, but they only had a 7.62 mm PKT machine gun. It was decided to install 12-mm DShKMT and NSVT “Utes” machine guns on them, but, unfortunately, a sufficient number of such machine guns were not found.
Among small arms, it is necessary to highlight the 7.62-mm AKM assault rifle and, in particular, its modification - AKMS. As for the 5.45-mm Kalashnikov assault rifles, AKS-74, AK-74, AKS-74U, they were also quite effective. However, when fighting in the bushes, in the case of using cartridges with bullets with a displaced center of gravity, which were used in the initial period of hostilities, a large number of ricochets occurred. An ordinary cartridge did not give any ricochets in the bushes.
It is also worth noting the 7.62 mm Kalashnikov machine gun, the 12.7 mm Utes heavy machine gun, and the 7.62 caliber SVD sniper rifle, equipped with a PSO-1 optical sight.
It was during the Afghan war that under-barrel grenade launchers GP-25 of 40 mm caliber were used for the first time for the AK assault rifle and its modifications. The paratroopers used the RPG-18 “Fly” to force the militants to leave their shelters. The Cornflower mortar, BMP-2 combat vehicle and flamethrowers were also effective.
The Soviet-Afghan war proved that the effectiveness of combat operations depends not only on the ability to destroy enemies, but also on the constant modernization of weapons. Today it is obvious that the Soviet command did not take into account a number of important factors when sending its troops into Afghan territory, in particular, the nature of the terrain, limited opportunities for military equipment. The experience gained made it possible to determine priorities in matters of modernization of weapons in mountainous areas.
The Afghan war showed that large-caliber machine guns are indispensable for infantry units and special forces units. IN modern structure Motorized rifle units of the army do not have large-caliber machine guns at the company level.
In the weapons system of the Soviet army in the post-war years, due attention was not paid to equipping troops with large-caliber machine guns. Only the Afghan war showed that these weapons are indispensable for infantry units and special forces units. However, this problem is still relevant today, since in the modern structure of motorized rifle units Russian army There are no heavy machine guns at the company level (with the exception of KPV machine guns mounted on armored personnel carriers).
INFANTRY NEED FOR HEAVY CALIBER MACHINE GUNS
In the post-war years, Soviet strategists saw the future war as a war of engines. However, the nature of the fighting in Afghanistan in the early 80s. forced the military to reconsider this opinion. The use of infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers in mountainous areas as the main means of fire support for dismounted motorized rifle units turned out to be ineffective or completely impossible in most cases. The infantry needed powerful collective fire support weapons. Of the standard equipment in motorized rifle battalions, only the 30-mm automatic grenade launcher AGS-17 was such, in the paratroopers - AGS-17 and 82-mm mortar, and only air assault battalions were armed, in addition to the listed systems, with 12.7 -mm machine guns Nikitin-Sokolov-Volkov NSVS-12.7 “Cliff”.
The very first lessons of the Afghan war forced the military to reconsider the organizational structure of almost all branches of the military involved in “providing international assistance to the Afghan people.” 12.7 mm Utes machine guns and other heavy weapons were included in the staff of infantry units, and sometimes outside the staff list.
The choice of “Utyos” was not accidental. From the first days of the Afghan campaign, Soviet troops were actively opposed by rebel formations, the main heavy weapon of which was the DShKM heavy machine gun (Degtyarev-Shpagina large-caliber, modernized) in the Chinese version. Moreover, the saturation of gang formations with Chinese 12.7 mm Type 54 machine guns was growing every day. According to the requirements of the leadership of the Afghan armed opposition, a large-caliber machine gun was assigned to each combat group of 15-20 people. Faced with the destructive fire of Dushman DShKMs in highlands inaccessible to armored vehicles, the Soviet infantry at first could only oppose them with ineffective fire from personal small arms.
In the current situation, only the presence in the arsenal of our infantry of a machine gun similar to the DShKM could turn the situation around. This was the “Utyos”, adopted by the Soviet army back in 1972.
MACHINE GUNS NSVS-12.7 AND NSV-T
Both versions of the “Utes” - the easel NSVS-12.7 and the tank NSV-T - began to enter service with the troops from the beginning of 1972 at the same time. The weapon itself has the same design. The “infantry version” differs only in the presence of a machine gun, while the tank version differs in the presence of an electric trigger in the rear part of the receiver. “Utyos” compared favorably with its predecessor DShKM in all respects. Only one thing is surprising - why the weapon designers equipped the machine gun with a sight designed for a distance of 500 m shorter than that of the DShKM. And this despite the fact that this sight was optical with a maximum magnification factor of x6. The second disadvantage of the Utes machine gun was its cost - about 5,000 rubles, a huge amount at that time, although, of course, this disadvantage did not affect the effectiveness of the weapon in any way had no effect. This price is not surprising. If you look inside the machine gun, its design is really sophisticated and much more complex than that of the DShK. However, the complex design of the machine gun did not affect the operation of the Utes in the extreme conditions of the mountainous desert terrain of Afghanistan.
"UTES" AGAINST DShKM
The Soviet infantry in Afghanistan used NSVS-12.7 machine guns mainly to suppress the heavy weapons of dushmans in the mountains. The presence of an optical sight on the Utes gave it enormous advantages in a duel with the Dukhovsky DShKM. Our crews also won in maneuverability. If it was necessary to change the firing position, the Utes heavy machine gun was easily moved by two soldiers (the weight of the machine gun-machine-sight system was 42.7 kg). The Mujahideen could not change the firing position as quickly as the Soviet soldiers did with the NSWS-12.7. To change position without disassembling the weapon into parts, the DShKM heavy machine gun is equipped with a wheeled machine gun, which is useless in the mountains. In the highlands and other rugged terrain, in order to move, it is necessary to remove a machine gun weighing 35.7 kg from a carriage with a machine weighing even more than the weapon itself, and then also disconnect the carriage from the machine. Although the disassembly operation itself is not that long, 4-5 people are needed to change the firing position. Usually this number of dushmans made up the calculation of the DShKM. The only thing that made it easier for the Mujahideen to transport heavy weapons was pack animals. Two donkeys are quite enough to transport a DShKM with an ammunition load of 2-3 hundred rounds of ammunition.
Due to the low maneuverability of the DShKM machine gun, our enemy in the vast majority of cases used equipped positions, where destroying it with fire from the Utes was not an easy task. Therefore, usually such fortified machine-gun nests were only suppressed by the crews of our heavy machine guns and other small arms, and then destroyed by military aircraft, artillery, or taken by storm.
Due to the design features of the DShKM machine and the fortification equipment of its firing position in the mountains, the heavy-caliber machine guns of the dushmans had large dead zones, which were successfully used by the assault units of the Soviet troops when capturing and destroying them. The Moja Heads used only two types of fortifications for the DShK machine gun - buried and ground. The first ones, also called “fox holes,” were used for firing at air targets, and firing at ground targets from them was possible only in a sector limited in height and targeting horizon. Ground shelters are more versatile and make it possible to hit all types of targets. They were made of stones, less often of bags of soil, in the form of a closed round or semicircular wall. Such firing points were called SPS (rock machine gun structure) and were used in one form or another in Afghanistan by both warring sides. Moreover, they used SPS not only for machine guns, but also for other weapon systems, as well as as individual and group (for a combat trio) shelters. SPS for DShKM could often be partially buried in the ground. A separate topic is an ordinary trench for firing a large-caliber machine gun. It was located in soils suitable for this purpose and, usually, had the appearance of a round depression in terms of plan. In the trenches, the DShKM was installed for firing from the machine while standing or sitting, while in the SPS only standing, the SPS for machine guns differed from the “infantry” ones not only in size (internal diameter 2-2.5 m), but also in thickness masonry walls, which could have a thickness of up to 1 m at the base. Only aviation and artillery ammunition, anti-tank grenades, and the RPO-A Shmel infantry flamethrower, which appeared in service with our units in Afghanistan in 1984, could “pick out the spirits” from such a shelter "
If the NSVS-12.7 “Utyos” heavy machine gun served as a fire support weapon for infantry, then when it was created, the DShKM was also tasked with combating low-flying air targets. It was supplied with an anti-aircraft forward sight, allowing the crew to fight aircraft at altitudes of up to 1500 m. In Afghanistan, “spiritual” DShKMs posed a serious threat to helicopters of Soviet and Afghan government troops.
There is no need to talk about the effectiveness of anti-aircraft fire from the DShKM against high-speed attack and fighter aircraft (the altitude and flight speed do not allow for targeted shooting), but for a rotary-wing aircraft, getting a 12.7-mm bullet into the engine or other components was very dangerous.
Due to the fact that the basis of the air defense of the armed formations of the Afghan opposition was the large-caliber machine guns 12.7 mm DShKM, 14.5 mm ZGU-1 and ZGU-2, they covered all the base areas of the rebels. Any aviation intrusion into the air defense zone of a fortified area was accompanied by the opening of concentrated anti-aircraft fire by the enemy. However, as strange as it may seem, the helicopters suffered the main losses from anti-aircraft machine-gun fire not in the fortified areas of the rebels. Our troops did not penetrate into fortified areas so easily; these were well-planned operations involving the suppression of rebel air defense positions identified during the preparation of the operation by bomber aircraft and artillery. Significant losses of rotorcraft from DShKM machine gun fire are explained by their defeat from anti-aircraft ambushes on flight and air patrol routes, landing of infantry units and special forces, conducting local combat operations outside the base fortified areas of the Mujahideen, during the emergency evacuation of the wounded and reconnaissance groups. Operating from an anti-aircraft ambush, the Mujahideen usually did not reveal the location of the DShKM firing position, even if they engaged in fire combat with our infantry, but opened sudden fire on the helicopters that appeared from a distance of up to 500 m. In the anti-aircraft ambush on the routes of flight and patrol of helicopters, the rebels usually placed one or two DShKM machine guns, and from the mid-80s. and calculations of MANPADS.
HEAVY MACHINE GUNS ON VEHICLES
In the lowland southeastern, southern, western and northern provinces of Afghanistan, rebels installed DShKM heavy machine guns in the backs of pickup trucks. The Mujahideen's "off-road vehicles" armed with machine guns mainly carried out the functions of escorting and guarding caravans with weapons and ammunition transferred from Pakistan and Iran deep into Afghan territory. Combat vehicles with machine gun armament were used as roving anti-aircraft fire weapons, as well as mobile fire support for “infantry”.
Soviet troops did not immediately appreciate the capabilities of off-road vehicles with heavy weapons installed in the back. This class of military equipment in the USSR Armed Forces was used only in separate air assault battalions, which were armed with GA3-69, UAZ-469 and LuAZ-967M vehicles (they were also called TPK - front line transporter), in the back of which large-caliber machine guns were installed, anti-tank missile systems (ATGM) and mounted grenade launchers. These vehicles did not reach Afghanistan. Compensating for the lack of combat vehicles in service, reconnaissance officers of the 22nd separate special purpose brigade (obrSpN), operating in desert and semi-desert areas of the provinces of Kandahar and Helmand, were forced to use captured “SUVs” with the same Chinese DShKM machine guns (Type 54 ). The Mujahideen mainly used Japanese pickup trucks as chassis vehicles. The captured combat vehicle of our special forces, in addition to the DShKM, was retrofitted with the domestic NSVS-12.7 “Utes” or the 30-mm AGS-17 grenade launcher. The crew of such a vehicle consisted of a driver, a commander, a heavy weapons crew and two or three scouts armed with Kalashnikov assault rifles with under-barrel grenade launchers. When performing combat missions in captured vehicles, special forces often dressed in Afghan national clothing, differing from the Mujahideen only in some details of equipment.
So, for example, a special purpose reconnaissance group (RG SpN) of Lieutenant Gennady Dolzhikov operated on two Toyota pickups armed with heavy machine guns and a Ural-4320 truck with a 14.5-mm KPVT machine gun installed in the back. One day, scouts discovered a Mujahideen convoy of five cars from their OP camouflaged in the dunes. Two Toyotas headed to approach the enemy. Having approached the range of actual fire from large-caliber machine guns, the special forces opened fire on the unsuspecting enemy from 12.7-mm DShKM and NSVS-12.7 machine guns. At the same time, the Ural “combat vehicle” also entered the firing position and opened fire with a KPVT machine gun. The enemy was broken with virtually no resistance. Leaving three vehicles and 26 militants destroyed by reconnaissance vehicles at the battle site, the Mujahideen retreated in two vehicles bringing up the rear of the column.
This and other episodes of the use of combat vehicles by reconnaissance officers did not go unnoticed by the leadership of the Main Intelligence Directorate, to which the special forces were operationally subordinate. In 1986-1987 Separate OKSV special forces units began to receive UAZ-469 vehicles with installed turrets for NSVS-12.7 heavy machine guns and AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers, similar to those that were in service with individual air assault battalions. However, UAZ-based combat vehicles “did not take root” in Afghanistan.
NSVS-12.7 MACHINE GUN “UTOS” IN BATTLE
But here is an example of a different plan - combat use Soviet special forces in Afghanistan with a heavy machine gun NSVS-12.7. We are talking about a raid by scouts of the 154 Special Forces on an ammunition depot near the Jigdalai pass (Nangarhar province) on November 14, 1986.
“As soon as the capture group began to descend from the ridge to the ammunition depot, its guards pinned it to the ground with fire from a PK machine gun. The scouts of the 2nd company managed to successfully and quite quickly shoot down the guards, forcing them to retreat.
- Comrade Lieutenant, spirits! - I hear the loud whisper of my observer.
- Where? - Below, two people are running from the gorge!
- Don't shoot anyone!
- I loudly give a general command for the “forgetful”, as I strictly warned the fighters not to open fire without my order.
It was about 600 m to the two mujahideen from the warehouse security running below. I let them emerge from the gorge onto the plateau, making adjustments to the sight of the NSVS-12.7 heavy machine gun. I set the SPP optical sight switch ("small-machine gun sight") with variable magnification x3 and x6 to "6" (maximum magnification), as well as the firing range regulator - "6" (600 m). I clearly see in the hands of one “spirit” a PK machine gun, and in the other a “Bur” carbine (Lee Enfield). The belt contains cartridges with “explosive” bullets, or more precisely, instantaneous incendiary bullets. The machine's feet are securely secured with stones. Short turnout burst. The second one, with one figure in advance, knocks the Mujahideen machine gunner to the ground. The second rebel immediately jumps behind a rock, but at a firing angle of almost 30 degrees, his cover is unreliable. I give a couple of single shots and a short burst at the boulder with a black figure behind it. The “Spirit” cannot stand it and jumps out from behind the stone, rushing to a meter-long ravine at the bottom of the gorge - the only reliable shelter in such conditions. Having guessed the Mujahideen's maneuver, I hit him with two short bursts.
My entire group is silent - there was no order to shoot. Only then did I “notice” next to me the company commander, Major Alexander Kukhtin, who was tugging at my shoulder during shooting, “Let me shoot with a machine gun...” and eventually sent me away.
- Next time Nikolaevich, sorry. - I shrug with an innocent smile, moving away from the sight.
I contact the commander of the capture group, Lieutenant Viktor Timoshchuk, by radio and warn him that there are two “darlings” lying at the exit of the gorge. A few minutes later our scouts appeared there, heading towards the two destroyed Mujahideen. At that moment, we noticed another “spirit” flashing at the top of the slope of the ridge, blocking our entrance to the gorge. Being invisible to the capture group, the “spirit” found itself between us, practically in its rear, and could calmly shoot the scouts below from its position, and then go over the ridge with impunity. With impunity? Yes, if it weren’t for the hill we occupied. I am again at the sight of the “Cliff”, a short burst and the spirit, twitching, noticeably dragging its leg, takes cover behind the nearest large stone. I fire a couple more bursts at the cover and hear a cry on the air that I’m shooting at my own people. How about yours? It is impossible to make a mistake with an optical sight at 450-500 m. I explain to those who are indignant what’s what. Soon three fighters from the capture group appeared on the ridge.
An examination showed that this “spirit” had his leg broken and when the scouts approached him, he was already unconscious.
While the scouts of the capture group were busy at the warehouse, taking out its contents and preparing it for loading into a helicopter and detonating, the “spirits” did not waste time. The first 107-mm rockets they fired exploded one and a half kilometers away from us. The Mujahideen began to target the helipad at the top of the ridge, where the capture group and support group of the 2nd company had landed, forcing the support group to take cover behind the ridge. I was somewhat reassured by the fact that the enemy had not yet discovered our group, because we were located only three kilometers from the MLRS firing position, and the 2nd company was about 4.5 km away.
Noticing dust rising in the greenery above the position of the 107-mm rocket launcher, I raised the barrel of the machine gun above the maximum aiming mark of 2000 m and began firing in that direction in short bursts, thus trying to suppress the MLRS crew. My efforts were not in vain - the Mujahideen stopped firing.
The result of the raid on the rebel ammunition depot near the Jigdalai pass was the captured two Chinese Hunyin-5 MANPADS (analogous to Strela-2, USSR), a PKM machine gun, 4 RPGs, 2 machine guns and 2 carbines, about two tons of anti-tank weapons mines, 107-mm rockets, RPG rounds and mortar shells (all destroyed by explosion, with the exception of a few seized samples). Of the five warehouse guards, three were destroyed by fire from a 12.7-mm Utes machine gun at a distance of 450-600 m, using only 14 rounds. Moreover, the fire of a large-caliber machine gun also suppressed the crew of a 107-mm MLRS at a distance of about 3000 m, with the target firing range of the machine gun being 2000 m.”
Firing from a large-caliber machine gun with an optical sight with single shots (provided by briefly pressing the trigger) or short bursts of 2-3 rounds is equivalent in effectiveness to sniper fire. Although many units of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan sinned by not taking “optics” to the mountains. But in vain. In the case of the Utes, 1.7 kg of sight weight is not that heavy.
At one time, I managed to convince my classmate at the military school, Vadim Matyushin, of this (died in a helicopter shot down by a Stinger MANPADS on November 27, 1987). On March 9, 1987, the special forces reconnaissance group of Lieutenant V. Matyushin, with a crew of NSVS-12.7, was placed in ambush at the crossing of the Lagman River. At dawn, the rebels, disturbed by our demonstrative actions, began to ford across the river, but were stopped by heavy machine gun fire. Only a few managed to get ashore. The firing distance was about 600 m.
The NSVS-12.7 “Utyos” machine gun was carried by soldiers of the 14th group of the 1st company of the 334th ooSpN (in the episode described above) to the place of combat use for about 12 km through swampy greenery and mountains. The scouts carried it disassembled. Three people carried the weapon itself: a barrel (9.2 kg) and a sight 1.7 kg - the first number of the crew, who is also the commander; the body of the machine gun (15.8 kg) is number two and the machine gun (16 kg) is number three. The group commander distributed ammunition for the machine gun among the rest of the reconnaissance group personnel. In this way, the NSVS-12.7 machine gun and the rest of the “Afghans” - motorized riflemen, paratroopers, military reconnaissance officers, border guards, etc. - were carried in the mountains.
Carrying heavy support weapons and, in particular, the NSVS-12.7 machine gun in the mountains is a separate issue. High altitudes, heat in summer, deep snow and cold in the winter months place a significant burden on the human body when moving in the mountains, even if it is not burdened with a heavy burden. The stories about the “60-kilogram load” in the memories of individual “veterans of the Afghan war” are just a figment of their rich imagination. The actual weight of a machine gunner's combat equipment was usually 16-25 kg and only in some cases a little more (a machine gun and its ammunition kit - 10-12 kg, fragmentation grenades and pyrotechnics - 1.5-2 kg, water and food for three days - 4-5 kg, equipment and clothing - 2-3 kg in summer and up to 6 kg in winter, steel helmet and body armor (who wore - 6-8 kg).Although this “extra” load for an untrained person it is enough to fall during the first hundred meters of ascent into the mountains Naturally, in addition to a personal machine gun with ammunition, water, dry rations, clothing and equipment, it was necessary to carry various support weapons and ammunition for them into the mountains (large-caliber machine guns, automatic grenade launchers, 82-mm mortars, anti-tank systems, rocket-propelled infantry flamethrowers, anti-tank grenades, etc.), radio stations and batteries for them, various optical instruments observation and targeting. In such cases, experienced commanders simply reduced the weight of the ammunition of their subordinates’ personal weapons, disassembling the support weapons into the maximum possible number of parts in order to optimally distribute the load on the soldiers. The same NSVS-12.7 machine gun was disassembled when carried not into three main parts and was carried not by two crew numbers, as prescribed by the Manual, but by a larger number of parts. All that was additionally required was to protect the open parts of the receiver, gas chamber and barrel from dust and sand. For this, an ordinary rag, sleeve or trouser leg of a worn-out uniform was quite sufficient.
In the battle at the Dzhigdalai pass and at the crossing over Lagman, special forces used MDZ bullets, which have explosive properties, to fire from the NSVS-12.7. The design of the bullet has an explosive and flammable substance, which, when it hits a solid barrier, causes the destruction of the ammunition body, forming damaging elements - fragments. When such a bullet hits a person or animal, it causes serious pain shock, even if it hits a limb. Spetsnaz and other OKSVA units used MDZ bullets in “Utyos” not out of bloodthirstiness, but because of the ability to adjust fire based on flashes of bullet explosions when they hit rocks and soil, since tracer bullets unmask the firing position.
The use of cartridges with an MDZ bullet for shooting is not always justified. It is impossible for an MDZ bullet to penetrate rocky machine-gun structures (SPS), built of stones into the clay walls of the duvala and other solid barriers, for which purpose the ammunition of the Utes necessarily included cartridges with armor-piercing incendiary bullets B-32 or armor-piercing - incendiary tracers BZT-44. Typically, OKSVA units had in their portable ammunition belts loaded only with cartridges with MDZ bullets and, separately, belts with alternating B-32 and BZT-44 cartridges. As a rule, in the NSVS-12.7 portable ammunition, every 3-4th link of the belt was equipped with cartridges with tracer bullets, while on machine guns mounted on armored vehicles (NSV-T and DShKM) the entire belt could be equipped with “tracers” since the issue of unmasking the firing position of armored vehicles in Afghanistan was not critical.
The consumption of 14 rounds of ammunition in the battle on November 14, 1986 at the Jigdalai Pass is also noteworthy. The indicated amount of ammunition is significantly lower than the tabulated data on ammunition consumption given in the Weapon Manual for hitting two tall figures at a distance of 600 m and one at a distance of 450 m. Why? Taught by the bitter experience of shooting from a large-caliber machine gun "Utyos" from firing positions in the mountains, when the weapon gallops on the rocks like an unbridled mustang, the crews covered the front paw of the machine with stones, fired with single shots or short bursts of 2-3 rounds.
In the 154 Special Forces Special Forces, and in other parts of the OKSV in Afghanistan, many classes and training shootings were devoted to developing techniques and skills for the effective combat use of “Utyos” in the mountains. “In the end, I was convinced that the 12.7-mm machine gun, in terms of all its characteristics, was much more convenient for use in the mountains than the 30-mm automatic grenade launcher AGS-17 “Plam-mya,” which for some reason was more popular with us special forces.” .
MACHINE GUN "UTES" AND GRENADE LAUNCHER AGS-17 "FLAME" - WHICH SUPPORT WEAPON IS MORE EFFECTIVE?
What is the advantage of the Utes machine gun over the AGS-17 automatic grenade launcher as a support weapon for infantry units?
Firstly, the weight and dimensions of the weapon-ammunition complex of the Utes compare favorably with grenade launchers. In a combat position, a machine gun is actually heavier than a grenade launcher (42 kg and 31 kg, respectively). But when carried, the machine gun can be disassembled into four parts (machine - 16 kg, body - 15.8 kg, barrel - 9.2 kg, optical sight - 1.7 kg), and the grenade launcher only into three (machine - 12 kg, body - 18.5 kg, optical sight - 1 kg) and the maximum weight of one AGS-17 part is 18.5 kg, which is almost 3 kg more than the heaviest part of the Utes. The difference in the total mass of ammunition is also significant. A hundred machine gun rounds weigh 12.3-12.7 kg (depending on the type of bullet), and 100 VOG-17 rounds weigh about 35 kg (excluding the weight of the belts and the box)! Using simple calculations, it is determined that the mass of 100 rounds of a 12.7 mm machine gun in belts is equal to the mass of 30-32 VOG-17 rounds. Special forces reconnaissance groups in Afghanistan included 100-150 large-caliber rounds for NSVS-12.7 and 58-116 rounds for AGS-17 (29 rounds in a box or in belts of 14 rounds) in their wearable ammunition. That is, the total mass of weapons and ammunition for an automatic grenade launcher was 2-3 times higher than that of the NSVS-12.7 machine gun.
Secondly, the “Utyos” has the greatest effective range of fire - 2000 m (AGS-17 -1750 m), respectively, but from a 12.7 mm machine gun with an optical sight it is possible to suppress enemy manpower and unarmored fire weapons at a greater distance ( up to 2500-3000 m), and the firing range of 1750 m for the AGS-17 is the maximum.
Thirdly, the speed of hitting a maneuvering target with the Utes machine gun significantly exceeds the same indicator for the AGS-17. We explain - the initial speed of a 12.7 mm bullet is 845 m/s, i.e., having noticed a target at 800 m, the machine gunner fires a short burst, covering it in approximately 4-6 s (cycle “target detection - aiming - hitting "). For an automatic grenade launcher when firing at the same 800 m (the initial speed of the grenade is -185 m/s), this figure is 12-15 s, and here not only an additional 6-7 are added from the grenade’s flight to the target (speed - this is the initial one!), but also a longer process of aiming the grenade launcher at the target (rotary mechanisms are used).
The only thing that an automatic grenade launcher wins in “competition” with a heavy machine gun is the ammo’s power factor. Nevertheless, the grenade provides a zone of continuous destruction of openly located manpower with an area of 50 sq.m (tabular indicators)! But, again, with an equal mass of ammunition, the amount of ammunition in a machine gun is almost three times the number of VOG-17 shots.
In the “competition” between an easel heavy machine gun and an automatic grenade launcher, there can be no losers or winners. Both infantry fire support weapon systems only complement each other, having the right to be a weapon not only of infantry, but also of special forces, proven by combat use. At the same time, the machine gun provides more effective destruction of maneuvering targets (manpower and Vehicle, including lightly armored ones), and an automatic grenade launcher - stationary objects and those located behind various shelters. It is not for nothing that in the reconnaissance and infantry units of the US Armed Forces, both weapon systems, the 12.7-mm M2HB Browning machine gun and the 40-mm Mk19 automatic grenade launcher, are installed on HMVW (Hummer) off-road vehicles. In our country, in the Armed Forces of the USSR, and subsequently in Russia, there was a noticeable bias towards an automatic grenade launcher. As a result, the 12.7-mm machine gun NSVS-12.7 “Utyos” and the more advanced “Kord” that replaced it did not find a place in the infantry ranks of the Russian Armed Forces.
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