Sold column. The sold column: tragic events through the eyes of eyewitnesses

REPORT TO THE STATE DUMA OF THE RF

Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Defense Lev ROKHLIN

upon the death of servicemen of the 245th motorized rifle regiment

The tragedy with the shooting of the column of the 245th motorized rifle regiment was a consequence of its unpreparedness for combat operations.

The history of the formation, deployment and combat activity of the regiment is typical for the mass of the same regiments and brigades of the Ministry of Defense and troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs fighting in the Chechen Republic.

The regiment's losses since its entry into the combat zone amounted to 220 people. In the last four months alone, the regiment suffered sensitive blows three times:

the first - during the capture of checkpoint No. 24 by the Dudayevites, when, due to a complete loss of vigilance, the sentries were disarmed, 31 servicemen were captured, 12 people were killed and 8 were wounded;
the second - in the battle for the village of Goyskoye, in which, due to an incorrect decision, 24 people were killed, 41 were wounded and 3 were missing;
and the third - on April 16, the shooting of a convoy in a gorge one and a half kilometers north of Yaryshmarda, where, as a result of carelessness, tactical illiteracy, lack of interaction, and loss of vigilance, 73 military personnel were killed, 52 were wounded, 6 infantry fighting vehicles, one tank, one BRDM, and 11 vehicles were destroyed.

Systematically, the regiment also suffered smaller losses.

This situation has developed, first of all, due to the dishonest performance of duties by the leadership of the Ministry of Defense.

The fault of the leadership of the Ministry of Defense is that, while reducing the army from 3.5 to 1.7 million people, it did not leave fully deployed, highly trained, materially equipped formations and units.

Experience shows that the presence of 2-3 such divisions from the very beginning of hostilities could provide a prompt solution to all military issues in Chechnya.

There were no such divisions, despite the fact that there were 18 of them in the Western Group of Forces alone before the withdrawal to Russia.

To get out of this situation, after the failure to capture Grozny, the leadership of the Ministry of Defense decides to urgently deploy reduced-strength units and send them to the combat zone.

The 245th motorized rifle regiment, stationed in the village, also falls into the number of such units. Mulino near Nizhny Novgorod.

For 10 days from January 8 to January 18, 1995, the regiment is deployed with an increase in its strength from 172 to 1,700 military personnel due to the replenishment of conscripts from the Far Eastern Military District and officers and warrant officers from the army. They are urgently trying to organize combat coordination, but due to lack of time this can only be done at the platoon level without conducting company, battalion and regimental exercises.

In addition, untrained soldiers had to be placed in the positions of riflemen, machine gunners, grenade launchers, and snipers, whose initial training usually takes 3-6 months, rather than the allotted 10 days.

Thus, already upon leaving for Chechnya, the regiment, due to its lack of coordination, lack of tactical skill, and low training of personnel, was doomed to losses.

This doom was compounded by other Department of Defense missteps.

Such mistakes include the decision to change officers in the combat zone after 3 months.

During the period the regiment was in Chechnya, 4 sets of officers were replaced. At the same time, the level of professional training of officers sent to replace them was constantly declining due to disabilities district, in which mainly reduced-strength units are located, and also due to the short time for their preparation at special training camps. This drawback is complemented by the short deadlines for changing officers, which was carried out within 2-3 days without transferring the accumulated experience.

I know from my own service that 3 or even 6 months in a combat area is clearly not enough to acquire combat experience. Therefore, having not yet really learned how to fight, having acquired initial experience at the cost of losing personnel, the officers handed over their positions to newcomers, who again learned from their mistakes, exposing themselves and their subordinates to enemy fire with inexperienced decisions.

The second omission is related to the replenishment of replacement of incapacitated personnel with volunteers directly from the military registration and enlistment offices without conducting preliminary preparation based on the skills they previously acquired during military service. Due to the fact that many of those drafted were not sent according to their specialty, forgot a lot or had weak previous training in the army, in fact they became “cannon fodder”.

The Secretary of Defense forgot how the reserves were trained for Afghanistan, when officers trained for months in officer reserve battalions, and soldiers were sent to combat units only after intense combat training in training units for at least four months.

The third omission is related to the lack of sufficient control and assistance to the troops both from the Ministry of Defense and the country's leadership.

Many warring units, especially in the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, are only 70 percent staffed with personnel, and 50-60 percent with serviceable equipment. For several months, military personnel are not issued wage, there are interruptions in the supply of units with food and clothing. There is often unprecedented pressure on the media army.

There is no strict enough demand from the army leadership for losses. The Minister of Defense again forgot how they asked for this in Afghanistan.

The leadership of the Ministry of Defense is a rare guest in the Chechen Republic, and if it appears there, it is no further than the Severny and Khankala airports, after which it urgently flies away.

Such an attitude to the matter, when the entire state is literally “sounding the alarm” about the events in Chechnya, when the issue of the country’s future is being decided, is of course unacceptable.

All of the above confirms that the 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment, like many other units, was doomed to losses throughout the entire period of hostilities.

This is also confirmed by the experience of the best units, such as the 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (commander - Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Vasilievich Dianov). This brigade was deployed before the outbreak of hostilities, before entering Chechnya it was re-equipped and given the opportunity to carry out intense work for three months. combat training. On this moment The brigade fights with great successes and minimal losses. The brigade skillfully uses all types of weapons, and competently organizes the interaction of all available forces and means.

The country's leadership is also to blame for what happened, because by their inattention and decreased control over the security forces, they allowed the situation to arise in the troops.

How could it happen that now, in addition to the lack of deployed units in the army, there is not enough military equipment in Chechnya?

Troops were withdrawn not only from the Western Group of Forces, but there were also the Central, Northern, Southern Groups, a group of troops in Mongolia and the Northwestern Military District.

During the period of “euphoria of democracy,” the onslaught on the army, as a result of which it found itself without a conscript contingent, was not stopped in a timely manner. There were no soldiers in the units. Officers went on guard duty.

Control over reform in the Armed Forces was not established either. The reduction affected mainly combat units, but there remained many redundant departments, institutes, and enterprises, the timely liquidation of which would increase the staffing of combat units and the level of their support.

And, finally, the most important thing is that the army was left without funding. Officers have not received their pay for months. They are no longer interested in combat training and mastering a combat specialty. They are faced with the question of how to survive. The soldiers are malnourished. The troops are not receiving the necessary equipment, without which it is impossible to decide on high level combat missions.

In Chechnya, the Minister of Defense and the leadership of the state became hostages of the attitude towards the army and the mistakes they made.

In addition to the objective reasons indicated above, in the case under consideration there were also a number of gross professional errors both directly in the 245th MRR and the neighboring 324th MRR, and in the leadership of the Operational Group of the Ministry of Defense.

In preparation for the departure of a column of 245 infantry regiments from a deployment point near Shatoi to Khankala, planned for April 15, for material resources, the Command and headquarters of the Operational Group (Commander - Major General Kondratyev) committed serious violations in the established procedure for preventing attacks by gangs on military columns. The commander was not personally involved in planning and preparing the convoy of the columns, entrusting these issues to the Chief of Staff of the Operational Group.

When preparing for the convoy, the headquarters did not clarify the assignments to the commanders of the units in whose area of ​​responsibility the routes of the convoys were determined, and the interaction of forces and assets in the base centers was not organized with the loss of episodes to repel an attack on the convoy. No written order was given to the commander of the 324th Motorized Rifle Regiment to provide escort for the convoy. The headquarters did not demand a report on the readiness of the route from the commanders of the 245th and 324th motorized rifle regiments. The order requiring the presence of two command and staff vehicles in the columns to organize reliable communications was violated. No aviation support was provided, although the convoy did not leave Khankala until 12:00 on April 16 due to bad weather conditions.

The sudden attack by militants on the convoy became possible due to lack of training, negligence and loss of vigilance of the command and personnel of the 324th and 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment, who had been stationed for a long time in the area that signed the peace agreements. Most of the permanent checkpoints in the regiments' area of ​​responsibility were removed. “Fire treatment” of the most dangerous areas of the terrain was not carried out.

The commander of the 245th infantry regiment, although there was direct communication, did not organize interaction with the commander of the 324th infantry regiment. The decision of the commander of the 324th infantry regiment to conduct a convoy in his area of ​​​​responsibility, where the destruction of the convoy occurred, was not worked out. Reconnaissance of the movement route was not carried out, temporary checkpoints were not set up in dangerous areas, which allowed the militants to prepare in advance in engineering terms and carefully camouflage firing positions in areas of the terrain advantageous for an ambush.

An inspection of the state of affairs in the base centers showed that in 324 small and medium-sized infantry regiments there are serious shortcomings in service and combat activities. Information about the passage of the convoy from the checkpoint to the regimental command post was not communicated; the armored group sent by the regimental chief of staff to assist the convoy was returned by the regimental commander. The chief of staff did not report to the regiment commander at all about the removal of checkpoints in the regiment's area of ​​responsibility.

In turn, the commander of the 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment, sending out the convoy, appointed its senior deputy regimental commander for armaments - a person incompetent in matters of conducting combined arms combat. Of the combined arms commanders in the convoy guard, the highest official was the platoon commander.

During the march of the column, no reconnaissance of the area was carried out using foot combat patrols, even in the most dangerous places. The deployment of side outposts in the most dangerous areas, as well as the occupation of advantageous heights along the route of movement, were also not carried out. The regiment did not create reserves of forces and means to provide immediate assistance to the column. And the lack of a communications reserve did not allow us to immediately transmit a signal about the attack.

The battle unfolded as follows.

At 14.20, in the area 1.5 km south of Yaryshmardy, the column was ambushed by a large gang of militants, which included foreign mercenaries. Due to the fact that the command vehicle was hit from the first minutes of the battle, and the senior column, Major Terzovets, was killed, the sergeant major of the communications company tried to transmit a message about the attack via a walkie-talkie, but it was not accepted.

According to the report of the commander of the 245th infantry regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Romanikhin, at 14.40 he heard the sounds of explosions coming from the gorge. At 14.45, he assigned the task to the commander of the reconnaissance company, located in the Argun Gorge at temporary checkpoints, to move towards the column, clarify the situation and, if necessary, provide assistance.

At 15.30, the commander of the reconnaissance company reported that on the southern outskirts of Yaryshmardy the company came under heavy fire, there was a wounded man and he was consolidating at the reached line.

At 16.00, the regiment commander sends out the armored group he formed, led by the commander of the 2nd MSB, who is tasked with bypassing Yaryshmardy, destroying enemy firing points with tank and infantry fighting vehicle fire, and breaking through to the column together with the reconnaissance company. At the same time, the regiment commander sets a task for his deputy, Lieutenant Colonel Ivanov, who was under locality Goyskoe with 1st MSB, send an armored group from the 324th MSB for the same purpose.

At 16.50, the commander of the 2nd MSB reported that he had destroyed two machine-gun crews on the southern outskirts of Yaryshmarda with tank fire and was moving towards the column. At 17.30 he reported that he had reached the column. At the same time, an armored group approached from the 324th Motorized Rifle Regiment. At 18.00 the resistance of the Dudayevites stopped.

The above analysis shows that urgent measures are required to streamline the activities of the Joint Group of Forces in the Chechen Republic and the Ministry of Defense Russian Federation, as well as to ensure the defense and security of the state as a whole.

For this purpose it is proposed:

1. Regarding the United Group of Forces in the Chechen Republic

1.1. Strengthen the responsibility of security ministers for the state of affairs in Chechnya.

1.2. In order to strengthen the coordination of the actions of security forces in the interests of the Commander of the Joint Group, as well as control over the condition of the troops and their comprehensive support, propose to the President of the Russian Federation to appoint his plenipotentiary representative when leading the group.

1.3. To propose to the President of the Russian Federation, by his Decree, to urgently introduce additional benefits for participants in combat operations in the Chechen Republic.

These benefits are provided for in the draft federal law “On Amendments and Additions to the Law of the Russian Federation “On the Status of Military Personnel,” developed by the State Duma Committee on Defense.

It would be extremely advisable for the State Duma and the Government of the Russian Federation to take all measures to speed up the entry into force of this bill.

1.4. Increase the terms of service for officers in the United Group of Forces in the Chechen Republic to one year.

At the same time, provide special benefits to encourage officers, warrant officers, sergeants and soldiers to serve beyond established periods.

1.5. Carry out an urgent replacement with trained troops of the least combat-ready units in the Chechen Republic.

1.6. Urgently organize enhanced training in the training units of personnel intended to supplement units in the Chechen Republic.

1.7. Urgently organize training at special training camps for officers sent for replacement to the Chechen Republic.

1.8. To propose to the Government of the Russian Federation:

1.8.1. make a decision on the production of the most necessary military equipment, primarily communications and control equipment, all types of reconnaissance and electronic suppression;

1.8.2. take measures to provide comprehensive support to the troops, including timely payment of pay and material support.

2. In the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation

2.1. Conduct an audit of all directorates, reduced-staff units, bases, arsenals, institutes, training grounds, enterprises and other institutions of the Ministry of Defense, reducing their composition and structure to reasonable limits.

2.2. Create the required number of fully deployed combat-ready divisions capable of resolving any local internal conflict if necessary.

3. To ensure the defense and security of the state as a whole

Based on the extremely difficult economic situation of the country, it is advisable to determine tasks in the field of ensuring the defense and security of the state for the near and long term.

It is proposed to consider the following tasks for the near future:

3.1. Preventing external aggression directed against Russia through nuclear deterrence.

At the same time, all possible opponents must firmly know that we do not have any claims against any country, but at the same time we have enough determination to suppress any external aggression using nuclear potential.

3.2. It should be recognized that while Russia has not strengthened, the main danger in the near future is represented by intranational conflicts.

To promptly suppress them, it is necessary to have a combat-ready united group of all security forces.

When creating divisions, it should be taken into account that the mother does not care in which troops her son died. Her grief in all cases will be immeasurable.

It is easier and cheaper to amend an article of the Constitution or law than to create divisions and overlapping organizations in parallel in different law enforcement agencies.

As for the future, we are faced with a choice of what kind of power structures we need to have.

Some argue that the army should make up 1 percent of the country's population. Others try to justify its composition and structure depending on external threats.

But given the current poverty of the state, no matter how wonderful a structure is proposed, if we “cannot afford it”, it is doomed to failure. An army cannot exist when wages are not paid for several months, when soldiers are malnourished, when not a single tank is renewed in a year.

Therefore, for the sake of the long term, the main task should be to reduce the security forces on the basis of their comprehensive solution of all tasks of ensuring the defense and security of the state and thereby maintaining priority areas for the creation and production of weapons.

This will make it possible, when favorable conditions arise, to ensure the necessary equipment for the army and navy in the future.

To implement this it is proposed:

1. Determine a unified concept for the further development of all security forces in the interests of ensuring defense and security and the state, establishing a strict framework for each of them;

2. Establish funding standards for each security agency, determining the level of appropriations for the “National Defense” item at least 5 percent of the gross domestic product.

At the same time, special priority should be given to supporting promising areas of R&D and weapons production.

3. Create a single, permanent, professional body under the leadership of the President of the Russian Federation to control and coordinate the activities of all law enforcement agencies, their construction and reform.

Subordinate to this body an independent inspection that could truthfully and objectively report the true state of affairs in a particular structure.

4. Ensure every possible increase in prestige military service and performing military duty, as the most difficult and dangerous profession.

To revive the military-patriotic education of the population on the basis of the historical and cultural traditions of the Russian people.

And of course, solve the social problems of military personnel.

The previously mentioned draft law on the status of military personnel, developed by the Committee, proposes differentiated approaches to the service and responsibilities of military personnel. If it is supported by the Government and the Duma, many things in the lives of military personnel will change for the better.

This report is planned to be sent to the President of the Russian Federation. To develop it, the Committee plans to hold parliamentary hearings on the problems of military reform.

Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Defense L.Ya. Rokhlin

Battle near the Vashindaro village of Yaryshmardy- episode of the First Chechen War, during which on April 16, 1996, a column of the 245th motorized rifle regiment of Russian troops was almost completely destroyed by a detachment Chechen militants under the command of Khattab. The battle took place in the Grozny district of Chechnya at a distance of 1.5 km from the bridge over the Argun River north of the village Yaryshmardy and near it.

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✪ The convoy was ambushed, what to do?

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Prerequisites

On April 14, at the central base of the 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment, another column was organized to Shatoy. She was supposed to bring young recruits, as well as logistics for the needs of the military unit. On Monday, April 15, the convoy reached Khankala without interference and stopped there for the night. That same night, approaching militant groups organized an ambush near the village of Yarysh-Mardy. Over a two-kilometer stretch along the highway, they built more than twenty firing positions. Ammunition warehouses have been prepared and mines have been laid on the road. The number of Chechen separatists, according to various Russian estimates, ranged from eighty to one hundred and sixty people. According to Khattab, in the video interview he gave on the occasion of the defeat of the convoy, the number of militants did not exceed 50 people. According to the Polish mercenary sniper, part-time journalist, Miroslav Kuleba (nicknames Vladislav Wilk, Mehmed Borz), Khattab had a detachment of 43 people in that battle.

In preparation for sending a convoy for material from the deployment point of the 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment near Shatoi to Khankala, planned for April 15, the command and headquarters of the Operational Group (commander - Major General Kondratiev) committed serious violations in the established procedure for preventing attacks by gangs on military columns . The commander was not personally involved in planning and preparing the convoy of the columns, entrusting these issues to the chief of staff of the Operational Group. When preparing for the convoy, the headquarters did not clarify the tasks of the commanders of the units in whose area of ​​responsibility the routes of the convoys were determined, and the interaction of forces and assets in the base centers was not organized with the loss of episodes to repel an attack on the convoy. No written order was given to the commander of the 324th Motorized Rifle Regiment to ensure the escort of the convoy. The headquarters did not demand a report on the readiness of the route from the commanders of the 245th and 324th motorized rifle regiments. The order requiring the presence of two command and staff vehicles in the columns to organize reliable communications was violated. No aviation support was provided, although the convoy did not leave Khankala until 12:00 on April 16 due to bad weather conditions.

Battle

From pre-prepared firing points located at a height on both sides of the road, the militants destroyed the equipment and personnel of the regiment with dagger fire for several hours. The soldiers burned alive, not having time to get out of the vehicles being fired at by “Bumblebees” (disposable rocket-propelled flamethrowers). The soldiers riding on sacks of food immediately became an excellent target for bandits. The large number of vehicles with fuel in the convoy also played into the hands of the enemy. Exploding, they destroyed all living things around them, burning fuel scattered everywhere. Wounded and shell-shocked soldiers trying to move away from the road were finished off by snipers. The militants destroyed trucks with ammunition using RPGs, and those carrying food were fired upon from small arms. Lucky were those who, in the first minutes of the battle, managed to find dead zones of fire where the Chechen fighters could not reach them. Many soldiers jumped from a high cliff near a dry river to escape enemy bullets. The next day, scouts combing the gorge and examining the banks of the Argun found their bodies. One group of fighters escaped by hiding in drainage pipe under the road, the other was able to run and take a position in the foundation of a house under construction located nearby.

At 14:40, the commander of the 245th MRR, Lieutenant Colonel Romanikhin, heard the sounds of explosions coming from the gorge. After the command of the 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment learned about the attack on the convoy, the order was given not to do anything until given instructions from above. At 14:45, Romanikhin assigned the task to the commander of the reconnaissance company, located in the Argun Gorge at temporary checkpoints, to move towards the column, clarify the situation and, if necessary, provide assistance.

At 15:30, a reconnaissance company of federal forces, which advanced from a checkpoint in the Argun Gorge to help the column of the 245th regiment, came under heavy fire and was forced to stop its advance. The militants met a small group of scouts near Yarysh-Marda. Pinned down by heavy fire, the scouts were unable to approach the site of the main battle.

At 16:00, the commander of the 245th regiment sends an armored group led by the commander of the 2nd MSB, Lieutenant Colonel Miroshnichenko, who is tasked with bypassing Yaryshmardy, destroying enemy firing points with tank and infantry fighting vehicle fire, and breaking through to the column together with the reconnaissance company. The 2nd MSB armored group consisted of two tanks and three infantry fighting vehicles. At the same time, Lieutenant Colonel Romanikhin sets the task for his deputy, Lieutenant Colonel Ivanov, who was located near the village of Goyskoye with the 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment, to send an armored group from the 324th Motorized Rifle Regiment for the same purpose. According to official information, the use of artillery by the 245th motorized rifle regiment began at 16:00, and the 324th regiment opened fire at five in the evening. On April 16, the artillerymen of the 245th regiment expended 669 shells, and the 324th regiment - 332 shells.

At 16:50, the commander of the 2nd MSB PPK Miroshnichenko reported that tank fire had destroyed two machine-gun crews on the southern outskirts of Yaryshmarda and was moving towards the column. Despite the fact that Miroshnichenko’s armored group was also attacked by militants, it managed to break through and reach the battle site by firing at the adjacent heights from infantry fighting vehicles and tanks. At 17:30 Miroshnichenko reported that he had reached the column. At the same time, an armored group approached from the side of the 324th Motorized Rifle Regiment, and with it a detachment of reconnaissance troops who were the first to try to get through to the column. The sixth motorized rifle company arrived from the village of Goiskoe in five infantry fighting vehicles. But by this time the battle had already ended, and the detachments of Chechen militants had fled the place. The personnel immediately began evacuating the wounded. At 18:00 the battle ended, the armed detachments of Chechen militants ceased fire and left the battlefield.

Memoirs of eyewitnesses

From the memoirs of contract soldier Denis Tsirulnik, a participant in the battle:

“At about 2 p.m. we set off. At 14.10 we passed Chishki and pulled the shutters in front of the entrance to the gorge. ... The column stretched out on the “mother-in-law’s tongue” (this is a serpentine). The trucks barely turned around on it, and I don’t even know how the MAZ trucks that pulled the faulty equipment got through. Everything is quiet, calm. We're going, telling jokes. We passed Yaryshmard, the head of the column had already gone around the bend, and the bridges crossed the dry riverbed. And then - an explosion ahead, we look - the tank turret was thrown up from behind a hillock, the second explosion was also somewhere at the head of the column, and the third just hit between the tank in front and ours. The explosion tore off the hood and broke the windows. That was the first time I was shell-shocked. ... Then a grenade slams past me into the pourer that was walking behind us. The pourer is on fire. ... I listened, the machine gun seemed to be working. Something was set on fire from behind, and black smoke came down the gorge in our direction. They gathered themselves and rushed across the road, falling behind the concrete blocks in front of the bridge. You can’t raise your head, and meanwhile the machine gunner is hammering away at the tanks, and not without success. He set them on fire. Dima and I are lying down, and a river of burning kerosene, about a meter and a half wide, flows past us towards the bridge. The flames are unbearably hot, but, as it turned out, this is not the worst thing. When the river of fire reached the “Ural” with charges for the self-propelled guns, all this stuff began to explode. ... Suddenly, in the second “Ural” with high-explosive ammunition, something exploded so much that the rear axle with one wheel went up 80 meters like a candle. We crawled out to the edge of the forest, and the tank, which stood at the tail of the column, was hit by spirits from RPGs. They hit eight times, but to no avail. Then they finally pierced the turret from the side of the commander’s hatch. Smoke poured out of it. Apparently, the crew was injured, and the mechanic began to back up. So he walked backwards through the entire column and, they say, reached the regiment. ... An hour has passed since the start of the battle. The shooting began to subside. The artillery started working, very carefully, only on the slopes, and without touching either the populated area or us. Then four Mi-24s came and worked in the mountains...”

senior sergeant Igor Izotov:

“I was in the third truck. When the lead tank exploded, he instinctively ducked down, and at that time a machine-gun burst pierced the windshield. Everyone quickly jumped out of our Ural, shooting at random. I managed to squeeze between the rocks and the front BMP. This saved my life and several other guys’ lives. The rest were not so lucky. Our sniper had both legs broken by a machine gun burst. He screamed, blocking the shooting, there was a sea of ​​blood, tendons and scraps of bones were sticking out of the wounds. We pulled him away, and all the time he tried to grab me by the hair, as if trying to stay in this world. He later died... The smell at the battle site was sickening. When I returned to the burnt-out Ural, I immediately found my friend Seryoga. Even at the beginning, hiding behind a stone, I saw him running to cover. The first burst broke his legs, the second shot through his torso. In some kind of haze, I kept trying to feel the pulse on Seryogin’s bloody body. I woke up when I was pushed in the back. I loaded the corpse into the Ural that arrived and only then looked around. The rest of the survivors also found acquaintances and friends. At the same time, someone was terribly swearing, someone was screaming, one soldier vomited when they pulled out the disfigured, burnt body of the tankman. Everyone was possessed by wild horror...”

senior warrant officer Sergei Cherchik:

“I moved and immediately a bullet pierced my heel. The Dukhovsky sniper obviously realized that I was alive. He managed to crawl under the car, didn’t throw the machine gun, dragged it behind him. And the sniper started shooting at the wheels so that the car would settle and crush me. A shell fired from a grenade launcher exploded nearby, and a fragment hit me in the thigh. I’m lying there, I can’t think of anything, and the car bridge is about to crush him. At the last moment, one contract soldier pulled me out by the collar. The equipment is all in flames, burning diesel fuel drips from above. The sniper takes out the soldier, interrupts him kneecap. A moment later, the two of us were being dragged by another conscript soldier. The three of us are lying under the bottom of the car again. Everyone ran out of cartridges, and my machine gun was smashed - two bullets hit the bolt frame. They often shouted from the mountain: “Surrender, Russians.” While the smoke was rising and we were not visible, no one fired. The smoke cleared and they started shooting again. No one then hoped that he would remain alive. And then our helicopters flew up! I saw two of them myself. At first they walked high, and then they descended and began firing rockets at the mountains. And then the artillery from the 324th regiment joined in... I don’t know how much time has passed since the start of the attack. When our first soldiers appeared from the 324th Regiment, it was already getting dark. For some reason, the militants did not shoot the medical “moto-league” of the column. And they began to gather us, the wounded, and put us in it. Six to eight people fit inside. The dead were placed on the armor."

Results of the battle

On April 17, in order to evacuate the remaining damaged equipment to the base center and clear the route, another armored group was sent under the leadership of the regiment commander, Colonel Romanikhin. The chief of artillery of the 245th motorized rifle regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Boris Kramchenkov, was also present in that raid:

“We arrived early in the morning, but the “spirits” were already waiting. There was fog that masked us. This made it possible to more or less calmly remove the burnt equipment. We evacuated everything that could still be useful, and pushed the rest into the cliff. At the same time, the bodies of the dead were found. Everyone was burned. “Everyone was wrapped in foil and taken to the regiment’s base camp.”

Officially, the column consisted of just under two hundred people, however, there were also unaccounted for conscripts and soldiers going home for family reasons [clarify(obs.)] . In addition, civilians who accompanied the convoy took part in the battle on the side of the federal forces, joining it in populated areas. Most of the corpses were almost completely burned. People were identified by the remains of things, documents, and personal numbers. They were unable to establish the identities of about three dozen fighters at the scene. Their bodies were sent to a special laboratory in Rostov-on-Don. Over fifty people were wounded, and only thirteen soldiers survived the battle completely unharmed.

Soon, the militants published a video recording of the shooting of the Russian convoy, as well as their visit, led by Khattab, to the battlefield, presumably the next day ( the highway has already been cleared, the corpses of Russian soldiers have been removed, the broken equipment has been thrown to the side of the road).

“...In excerpts of video footage of the bandits, filmed, according to experts, for sponsors, you can see burnt, broken and overturned equipment of the destroyed column. The armed militants are very happy, they are talking loudly and posing on broken cars. In the ditch lies an overturned infantry fighting vehicle, next to it is a Ural, overturned on its side, followed by another and another. There is a shot BMP in the river, bread is scattered near a burnt truck...”.

• The losses of the militants remained unknown, but in the following days, seven bodies belonging to residents of the Shatoi district of Chechnya were found in the surrounding area.

Reasons for the defeat

The shooting of a column of the 245th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment was the subject of consideration at a meeting of the State Duma of the Russian Federation. On April 26, 1996, the Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Defense, L. Ya. Rokhlin, in his report, placed responsibility for the death of the convoy on the Ministry of Defense and the country’s leadership

Trophy recording (of very poor quality) of the shooting of column 245 of SMEs in Chechnya on April 16, 1996. only 4 parts

At about 14.00 we set off. At 14.10 we passed Chishki and pulled the shutters in front of the entrance to the gorge. Arkasha says: “Look, there are only women and children.” And just yesterday the guys from the 324th Regiment told me a superstition: “If there are men, women and children on the road, everything is fine. If only women are idiots, there will soon be an ambush.”

The column stretched out on the “mother-in-law’s tongue” (this is a serpentine). The trucks on it barely turned around, and I don’t even know how the MAZ trucks that pulled the faulty equipment got through. Everything is quiet, calm. We're going, telling jokes. We passed Yaryshmard, the head of the column had already gone around the bend, and the bridges crossed the dry riverbed. And then - an explosion ahead, we look - the tank turret was thrown up from behind a hillock, the second explosion was also somewhere at the head of the column, and the third just hit between the tank in front and ours. The explosion tore off the hood and broke the windows. That was the first time I was shell-shocked. Arkasha had already gotten out of the car, and I got entangled in two door handles - well, I was simply stunned. Finally fell out of the cabin. The fire was very dense, but I already began to think and ran about 15 meters away from the pourer, despite the fire of the spirits. I found some kind of depression in the side of the road and pushed my butt into it. A conscript soldier lay down nearby. The first shock has passed - I’m observing how things are going. And things are not important. The trucks stood on the road. The guys from the pourer platoon are firing in all directions as best they can; where exactly the spirits are is still unclear. Arkasha wets the white light from under the wheel of his pourer.

Then a grenade slams past me and hits the tank that was walking behind us. The pourer is on fire. I figure that if it explodes now, we will all be very hot. I'm trying to figure out where this thing came from. I look like someone is fussing about 170 meters from us. I looked into the sight, and the “dushara” was already preparing a new grenade... I knocked him down with the first shot, and I really liked it. I begin to look for targets in the sight. Another “darling” is sitting in the trench, watering from a machine gun. I fired, but I can’t say with certainty whether I killed him or not, because the bullet hit the upper edge of the parapet at chest level, behind which he was sitting. The spirit disappeared. Either I finally got him, or he decided not to tempt fate anymore. I took aim again and saw that at the roll the spirit “on four bones” was crawling up the hill. I only scared him with the first shot. He moved his limbs more actively, but did not have time to escape. The second shot, like a good kick in the ass, threw him over his head.

While I was firing at the spirits, Arkasha drove away the burning pourer and threw it off the road. I listened and the machine gun seemed to be working. Something was set on fire from behind, and black smoke went towards us along the gorge, because of it we couldn’t see anything through the sights. Dmitry and I—that’s the conscript’s name—figured out that it was time for us to get out of here. They gathered themselves and rushed across the road, falling behind the concrete blocks in front of the bridge. You can’t raise your head, and meanwhile the machine gunner is hammering away at the tanks, and not without success. He set them on fire. Dima and I are lying down, and a river of burning kerosene, about a meter and a half wide, flows past us towards the bridge. The flames are unbearably hot, but, as it turned out, this is not the worst thing. When the river of fire reached the “Ural” with charges for self-propelled guns, all this stuff began to explode. I see some things with rags flying out of the car. Dima explained that these were lighting shells. We lie down and count: Dima said that there were about 50 of them in the car. Meanwhile, the second Ural with high-explosive shells caught fire. It’s good that it didn’t detonate entirely; the shells were thrown to the sides by explosions.

I lie there and think: “Damn, why isn’t anyone commanding us?” As it turned out later, Khattab planned everything so competently that literally at the very beginning of the battle, the entire control, which was riding on two command and staff vehicles, was mowed down by small arms fire, and the CVMs themselves stood untouched throughout the entire battle.

Suddenly, in the second "Ural" with high-explosive ammunition, something exploded so much that the rear axle with one wheel went up 80 meters like a candle, and, in our opinion, it should have plopped down right on us. Well, we think we've arrived. However, he was lucky: he fell about ten meters away. Everything is in smoke, everything explodes. You can't see anything through the scope because of the smoke. The shooting was erratic, but the spirit machine gunner stood out from the crowd. We decided to get out of this utter hell and ran to the green area. We distributed the firing sectors with Dima. I fire along the front, and he covers my rear and makes sure that no spirits come from above. We crawled out to the edge of the forest, and the tank, which stood at the tail of the column, was hit by spirits from RPGs. They hit eight times, but to no avail. Then they finally pierced the turret from the side of the commander’s hatch. Smoke poured out of it. Apparently, the crew was injured, and the mechanic began to back up. So he walked backwards through the entire column and, they say, reached the regiment.

An hour has passed since the start of the battle. The shooting began to subside. I say: “Okay, Dima, let’s go to the end of the column!” We ran under the bridge, I saw some people sitting in Afghan boots, about seven of them, with two corpses nearby. Let's run up. One of the people sitting turns around. Oh my God! He has a black beard, a hooked nose and wild eyes. I raise the rifle, press the trigger... The rest turn around - ours. Okay, I didn't press it. He turned out to be a bearded contractor. Even without me, he sits there, stunned, stuttering, unable to say anything. I shout: “Uncle, I almost killed you!” But he doesn’t get it.

The BMP is crawling “limping” towards us, collecting the wounded. They hit her in the torsion bar, and she hobbles around. They threw the wounded inside, drove onto the road - the cars around them were burning out, something was breaking in them. The firefight had almost died down.

Let's go. Somewhere on the road closer to Argun, men are shouting: “Guys! We have wounded here. Help!” I jumped down to them, and the car continued on. I approach the guys. They say: “Our major is wounded.” A major is sitting in camouflage, with the sign of the Marine Corps on his sleeve. Penetrating wound in the arm and chest. All pale from loss of blood. The only thing I had was a tourniquet. I pulled his hand. We got to talking and it turned out that he was the political officer of a battalion in the Pacific Fleet. At this time, one of the guys remembered that the car was carrying beer, cigarettes, juice, etc. I covered the guys, and they ran away and brought all this stuff. We lie down, drink beer, smoke. It started to get dark. I think: “Now it’s getting dark, the spirits will descend, there’s no help, and we’re screwed!” We decided to choose a better position. We took a fancy to a small hill, occupied it, lay there, and waited. The guys from RMO show me the situation. The vehicles with ammunition were burned by the spirits with RPGs, and those with food were simply cut down with small arms.

Will help come...

The artillery started working, very carefully, only on the slopes, and without touching either the settlement or us. Then four Mi-24s arrived and worked in the mountains. It got dark. We hear a terrible roar coming from the 324th Regiment. It turns out that help is on the way. Ahead is a T-72, followed by an infantry fighting vehicle, then a tank again. Not reaching 50 meters, he stops and points his gun at us. I think: “That’s it! They didn’t kill the spirits - they’ll finish off their own out of fright!” We jump up, wave our arms - they say, ours. The tank shook its barrel, turned around and darted into the “green stuff” 20 meters away. With this “help” people jumped out - crawling on the grass, watering around them with machine guns. We yell at them: “Guys, are you crawling? There’s no one here anymore.” It turns out that this was reconnaissance from the 324th Regiment. I approached the officers and said: “Why are you fighting here? We need to go to the head of the column!” And they told me: since you’ve been here and even have some sense, take ten people and move with them where you said.

I walked around, found the scouts, and we moved forward. I counted more than forty burnt corpses. Judging by which cars remained intact, the spirits had clear information about what was where. For example, the medical MTLB remained completely untouched, only the small arms mechanic was destroyed, and the ZUshka behind it was literally turned into a sieve. Then we wondered why help came so late: if they had arrived an hour and a half earlier, then someone at the head of the column would have survived, but there one BRDM resisted until the last, in which almost everyone was killed.

As the guys from the 324th regiment later said, when they reported that our column was being wetted in the gorge and it would be nice to rush to the rescue, they were told not to twitch and to stand where they were. Help came to us two and a half hours later, when everything was over.

During the First Chechen war Many dramatic events took place, as a result of which many Russian soldiers died an absurd and terrible death, suffered, and were mutilated physically and spiritually. Analyzing known facts and eyewitness accounts, as well as seeing the measures taken by the leaders of our country and the armed forces, it becomes very difficult to convince oneself that the main blame for what happened in those days does not lie on their conscience.

In the early spring of 1996, two major defeats of Russian troops occurred almost simultaneously. On March 31, in the Nozhai-Yurt region of Chechnya, near the village of Benoy, a column of paratroopers from the 104th division marching to the administrative center of Vedeno was shot. There were many killed and even more wounded soldiers. It seemed that the army command would draw the appropriate conclusions... But already on April 16, the militants struck a new blow, which again turned out to be extremely successful for them. In the Grozny region of Chechnya, north of the village of Yarysh-Mardy, Shatoi bandits attacked a column of the 245th motorized rifle regiment. The battle, or rather the massacre, the massacre, lasted about four hours, until Khattab and Gelayev and their people left their positions without hindrance. The terrorists filmed the results of the battle. It can still be found on the Internet today.
Departing from the usual article format, we will try to convey the madness and chaos that happened that day in the words of eyewitnesses...

Having celebrated Easter on April 14, at the central base of the 245th motorized rifle regiment they organized another column to Shatoy. She was supposed to bring young recruits, as well as logistics for the needs of the military unit. On Monday, April 15, the convoy reached Khankala without interference and stopped there for the night. That same night, approaching militant groups organized an ambush near the village of Yarysh-Mardy. Over a two-kilometer stretch along the highway, they built more than twenty firing positions. Ammunition warehouses have been prepared and mines have been laid on the road. The number of Chechen separatists, according to various estimates, ranged from eighty to one hundred and sixty people.

On Tuesday morning, the federal forces that advanced from Khankala carried out the established measures during the movement of the column. The reconnaissance company kept an eye on the Argun Gorge, and the artillerymen established contact with their brothers from the 324th regiment. After this, the column set off.

From the memoirs of sniper Denis Tsiryulnik: “We had one sign - if there are men, women and children on the road, then everything is in order. If there are only women, then expect an ambush. So that day we came across only women and children.”

Having passed the settlement of Dachu-Borzoi, at around two o'clock in the afternoon local time, the column reached the village of Yarysh-Mardy, stretching out on a narrow mountain serpentine. The length of the column, as it turned out later, was almost one and a half kilometers. When the first shots sounded, its head disappeared around the next bend in the road, and the rear passed the bridge over the bed of the narrow Argun River.

Denis Tsiryulnik: “We were driving, telling jokes. Everyone was calm. And then somewhere in front of the column there was an explosion. We saw a tank turret thrown up from behind a hill. Then a second explosion occurred. The third was already in front of our pourer. (A tanker is a fuel truck. In a convoy, tankers have always been the main target of militants. Driving a tanker was considered one of the most heroic professions. Hereinafter, the author’s notes). The explosion tore off the hood and knocked out the windows. I was concussed and got entangled in the door handles. When I managed to get out of the cab, I immediately ran about fifteen meters away, found some hole in the side of the road and shoved my butt into it. The fire was very dense. When the first shock passed, I began to observe how things were.”

It all started when the tank leading the convoy, equipped with a trawl, was blown up by a mine of enormous power, equipped with a remote control. Another landmine was later found at the tail of the column, but fortunately it did not go off. In total, seven unexploded landmines were discovered on the route from the site of the attack to Shatoi the next day. As soon as the tank was neutralized, the militants hiding on both sides of the gorge opened fire. Submachine gunners, machine gunners and snipers hit the column. Grenades and mines were thrown at our soldiers. The tank walking at the tail of the column received several hits from a grenade launcher. But only after the tower was breached did he begin to retreat, backing up. Thus, he managed to get out of the battle.

According to senior sergeant Igor Izotov: “I was in the third truck. When the lead tank exploded, he instinctively ducked down, and at that time a machine-gun burst pierced the windshield. Everyone quickly jumped out of our Ural, shooting at random. I squeeze between the rocks and the front BMP. This saved my life and several other guys’ lives. The rest were not so lucky. Our sniper had both legs broken by a machine gun burst. He shouted, blocking the shooting, there was a sea of ​​blood, tendons and scraps of bones were sticking out of the wounds. We pulled him away, and all the time he tried to grab me by the hair, as if trying to stay in this world. He later died."

The bandits planned everything correctly. The BMP and BRDM (armored reconnaissance and patrol vehicle) following the tank were shot at point-blank range from small arms fire in the first minutes of the battle. The senior column, Major Terzovets, and the artillery spotter, Captain Vyatkin, were killed. Sniper shots ended the lives of an aviation spotter and the driver of a reconnaissance vehicle. The column at one moment found itself cut off from the outside world, without the support of aviation and artillery. Chechen militants caused active interference on the VHF radio network, which completely deprived the fighters of communication with the command. From pre-prepared firing points located at a height on both sides of the road, the bandits destroyed the equipment and personnel of the regiment with dagger fire for several hours.

Returning to the story of contract soldier Denis Tsiryulnik: “A grenade flew past me and hit the tanker that was driving behind us. The pourer caught fire. I figured that when it exploded it would be very hot here. He got ready and ran across the road, hiding behind concrete blocks near the bridge. So I lay there and wondered where the command had gone. And there was smoke, explosions, and indiscriminate shooting all around. Nothing is visible through the scope. A one and a half meter long river of burning kerosene flowed nearby. Its flame was unbearably hot. I saw how charges for self-propelled guns began to explode nearby in the Ural. Behind it, another Ural was burning with high-explosive shells, which fortunately did not detonate entirely. They were scattered by explosions in all directions. Suddenly something exploded in the car, and the rear axle flew up eighty meters like a candle.”

The soldiers burned alive, not having time to get out of the vehicles being fired at by “Bumblebees” (disposable rocket flamethrowers of domestic production).

The soldiers riding on sacks of food immediately became an excellent target for bandits. The large number of vehicles with fuel in the convoy also played into the hands of the enemy. Exploding, they destroyed all living things around them, burning fuel scattered everywhere. Shell-shocked soldiers trying to get out of the way were finished off by snipers. The militants destroyed trucks with ammunition using RPGs, and fired at those carrying food with small arms.

From the story of senior warrant officer Sergei Cherchik: “I moved and immediately a bullet pierced my heel. The “Dukhovsky” sniper obviously realized that I was alive. He managed to crawl under the car, didn’t throw the machine gun, dragged it behind him. And the sniper started shooting at the wheels so that the car would settle and crush me. A shell fired from a grenade launcher exploded nearby, and a fragment hit me in the thigh. I’m lying there, I can’t think of anything, and the car bridge is about to crush him. At the last moment, one contract soldier pulled me out by the collar. The equipment is all in flames, burning diesel fuel drips from above. The sniper takes out the soldier and breaks his kneecap. A moment later, the two of us were being dragged by another conscript soldier.

Lucky were those who, in the first minutes of the battle, managed to find dead zones where the Chechen fighters could not reach. Many soldiers jumped from a high cliff near a dry river to escape enemy bullets. The next day, scouts combing the gorge and examining the banks of the Argun found their bodies. Some tried to hide from the fire under cars. But even there they were caught by snipers. Where the Chechen separatists could not hit our soldiers directly, they fired with a ricochet. One group of fighters escaped by hiding in a drainage pipe under the road, while another was able to run and take a position in the foundation of a house under construction located nearby.

And again from the notes of Denis Tsirulnik: “When the smoke cleared, I began to look for targets. I saw in my sights how a “dushara” was swarming about one and a half hundred meters from us. I took it off the first time. Shot another one nearby, but I’m not sure I killed him. The bullet hit the parapet, behind which he was hiding at chest level. But the “spirit” disappeared. I started looking through the scope again. On a roll, one of them crawled up the mountain “on four bones.” First shot into milk. He immediately moved faster, but did not have time to escape. The second, like a kick in the butt, threw him over his head.”

After the command of the 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment learned about the attack on the convoy, an order was given... to do nothing until given instructions from above. Only at the beginning of four (local time) the order came to break through to the column. The first to advance were the soldiers of the reconnaissance company blocking the Argun Gorge. There were few scouts, and the militants met them near the village of Yarysh-Mardy. Pinned down by heavy fire, the guys were never able to approach the site of the main battle. After another hour, the leadership of the federal forces in the region made a new attempt to release the ambushed convoy. An armored group of Lieutenant Colonel Miroshnichenko, who was the commander of the second motorized rifle battalion of the 245th regiment, was sent to help her. It consisted of two tanks and three infantry fighting vehicles. Despite the fact that the armored group also came under fire, it managed to break through and reach the battle site.

Word to Sergei Cherchik: “Again, the three of us are lying under the bottom of the car. Everyone ran out of cartridges, and my machine gun was smashed - two bullets hit the bolt frame. They often shouted from the mountain: “Surrender, Russians.” While the smoke was rising and we were not visible, no one fired. The smoke cleared and they started shooting again. Thank God, there was no explosion from the grenade launcher. No one then hoped that he would remain alive. I took the grenade and unbent the pin. I decided, if anything happens, I’ll pull it. Just to avoid being captured. And there is such pressure in my soul, such sorrow... Why am I suffering... Suddenly such a powerful explosion. Everything was buzzing in my head and my ears were ringing. It turned out that ammunition exploded in a burning infantry fighting vehicle nearby. A helmet rolled under our car. And there was silence. And then our helicopters flew up! I saw two of them myself. At first they walked high, and then they descended and began firing rockets at the mountains. And then the artillery from the 324th regiment joined in.”

At six o'clock in the evening, Miroshnichenko's armored group, having fired at the adjacent heights from infantry fighting vehicles and tanks, approached the column. The personnel immediately began evacuating the wounded. Around the same time, an armored group from the 324th regiment arrived, and with it a reconnaissance detachment battered by the militants. The sixth motorized rifle company arrived from the village of Goiskoe in five infantry fighting vehicles. But by this time the battle had already ended, and the detachments of Chechen militants had fled the place.

Denis Tsiryulnik: “I decided to get out of this hell, I ran to the greenery.” My friend and I distributed the sectors of fire. I fired along the front, and he covered the rear... It began to get dark, but there was still no help. Now, I think, the “spirits” will descend and that’s it, crap. Here the artillery began to work, carefully, along the slopes, without touching either the village or us. Then four Mi-24s arrived and shot at the mountains. It was already dark when we heard a terrible roar from the 324th Regiment. Help arrived. There is a tank ahead, followed by an infantry fighting vehicle, then a tank again. A lot of people jumped out of this equipment - reconnaissance of the 324th. Together with them we moved to the head of the column. While I was walking, I counted more than forty burnt bodies. After the first inspection of the damaged equipment, it turned out that the spirits had a clear picture of where and what we had. They didn’t touch the medical MT-LB (light armored multi-purpose transporter) at all, only they shot the mechanic, and turned the ZUshka behind him into a sieve. When we asked why help came so late, the guys from the 324th regiment replied that there was an order from their superiors not to twitch and to stand still. At the head of the column, one BRDM resisted to the last, in which almost everyone died. If help had come earlier, there might have been more survivors.”

In excerpts of video footage of the bandits, filmed, according to experts, for sponsors, one can see burnt, broken and overturned equipment of the destroyed column. The armed militants are very happy, they are talking loudly and posing on broken cars. In the ditch lies an overturned BPM, next to it is a Ural, overturned on its side, followed by another and another. There is a shot BMP in the river, bread is scattered near a burnt truck...

Senior Sergeant Igor Izotov: “The smell at the battle site was sickening. When I returned to the burnt-out Ural, I immediately found my friend Seryoga. Even at the beginning, hiding behind a stone, I saw him running to cover. The first burst broke his legs, the second shot through his torso. In some kind of haze, I kept trying to feel the pulse on Seryoga’s bloody body. I woke up when I was pushed in the back. I loaded the corpse into the Ural that pulled up and only then looked around. The rest of the survivors also found acquaintances and friends. At the same time, someone was terribly swearing, someone was screaming, one soldier vomited when they pulled out the disfigured, burnt body of the tankman. Everyone was possessed by wild horror...”

Officially, the column consisted of just under two hundred people, but there were also unaccounted for conscripts and soldiers going home for family reasons. In addition, civilians who accompanied the convoy took part in the battle on the side of the federal forces, joining them in populated areas. Later it was very difficult to calculate the exact number of those killed, which according to various estimates varies from 73 to 95 people. Each of them died in their own way. Some instantly, in the first seconds of the battle, some on the side of the road near exploding cars, shooting back to the last bullet, some burning alive in trucks. Most of the corpses were almost completely burned. People were identified by socks, pieces of documents, and personal numbers. They were unable to find out the identities of about three dozen fighters at the scene. Their bodies were sent to a special laboratory in Rostov. Fifty people were wounded, and only thirteen soldiers survived the battle completely unharmed. And everyone who was lucky enough to survive admits that it was probably the worst day of their lives...

There is less disagreement in the number of destroyed equipment - one tank, six infantry fighting vehicles, one reconnaissance patrol vehicle, about fourteen trucks. The losses of the militants remained unknown, but in the following days seven bodies belonging to residents of the Shatoi region were found in the surrounding area.

Sergei Cherchik described the rescue operation this way: “I don’t know how much time has passed since the start of the attack. When our first soldiers appeared from the 324th Regiment, it was already dark. For some reason, the militants did not shoot the medical “moto-league” of the column. And they began to gather us, the wounded, and put us in it. Six to eight people fit inside. The dead were placed on the armor. Some unknown fighter got into the cab, began to turn the motorcycle around, drove back, but the road was too narrow. The car hovered over the cliff. I remember how I managed to think that this is not what I survived for. All those killed from above, about ten to fifteen people, fell down into the Argun. Then the driver finally pulled out and parked the car on the road.”

According to official information, the use of artillery by the 245th motorized rifle regiment began at 16:00, and the 324th regiment opened fire at five in the evening. On April 16, the artillerymen of the 245th regiment expended 669 shells, and the 324th regiment – ​​332 shells. On April 17, in order to evacuate the remaining damaged equipment to the base center and clear the route, another armored group was sent under the leadership of the regiment commander, Colonel Romanikhin. The battlefield looked terrible. The flames had already subsided, and the cars stood in a column, covered in soot and burned to the ground, like ghosts.

The chief of artillery of the 245th motorized rifle regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Boris Kramchenkov, was also present in that raid: “We arrived early in the morning, but the “spirits” were already waiting. There was fog that masked us. This made it possible to more or less calmly remove the burnt equipment. We evacuated everything that could still be useful, and pushed the rest into the cliff. At the same time, the bodies of the dead were found. Everyone was burned. “Everyone was wrapped in foil and taken to the regiment’s base camp.”

An official investigation was conducted into the attack by Khattab militants on the convoy of the 245th motorized rifle regiment in the Yarysh-Mardy area. Due to the amazing naivety (or negligence) of our leadership, after the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of hostilities and a long absence of attacks in this region, all checkpoints were removed, and the vigilance of federal forces noticeably dropped. Already on the march, the 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment behaved extremely carelessly, failing to properly organize foot reconnaissance of the road and the surrounding area, which, most likely, would have been able to detect the landmines planted by the militants in advance. There was also no air cover. Side outposts were not set up at potentially dangerous points, and advantageous heights near the route of movement were not occupied. Later, after the start of the battle, the command, for unknown reasons, delayed too long with permission to begin artillery shelling. In general, a lot of “whys” arose during the investigation into the causes of what happened. For example, why was it not allowed to move in time to help a nearby armored group, which could distract the militants and block their escape routes? Why did the helicopters appear so late? Why were the checkpoints of the 324th Regiment near the village of Yarysh-Mardy removed from nearby heights just a couple of days before?

The militants chose the location for the ambush for a reason. They knew about the peace treaty signed on April 4, 1996 between representatives of the authorities of the village of Yarysh-Mardy and the command of the federal troops. They also knew that the village of Yarysh-Mardy was located at the limit of the maximum range of artillery fire. It turns out that the Chechen separatists knew a suspicious amount, but the results of counterintelligence work were not disclosed to the general public. But the investigation into the shooting of the column of the 245th regiment was soon discontinued. The perpetrators in the case were never found. Khattab and Gelayev were later destroyed.

Eternal memory to the guys who fell on that fateful day!

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Report by L.Ya. Rokhlina at a meeting of the State Duma “On the death of servicemen of the 245th motorized rifle regiment in the Chechen Republic on April 16, 1996”

The tragedy with the shooting of a column of the 245th motorized rifle regiment was a consequence of its unpreparedness for combat operations.

The history of the formation, deployment and combat activity of the regiment is typical for the mass of the same regiments and brigades of the Ministry of Defense and troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs fighting in the Chechen Republic. The regiment's losses since its entry into the combat zone amounted to 220 people. In the last four months alone, the regiment suffered sensitive blows three times:

The first - during the capture of checkpoint No. 24 by the Dudayevites, when, due to a complete loss of vigilance, the sentries were disarmed, 31 servicemen were captured, 12 people were killed and 8 were wounded;

The second - in the battle for the village of Goyskoye, in which, due to an incorrect decision, 24 people were killed, 41 were wounded and 3 were missing;

And the third was the shooting on April 16 of a column in a gorge one and a half kilometers north of Yaryshmarda, where, as a result of carelessness, tactical illiteracy, lack of cooperation, and loss of vigilance, 73 military personnel were killed, 52 were wounded, 6 infantry fighting vehicles, one tank, one BRDM, and 11 vehicles were destroyed.

Systematically, the regiment also suffered smaller losses.

This situation arose primarily due to the dishonest performance of duties by the leadership of the Ministry of Defense. The fault of the leadership of the Ministry of Defense is that, while reducing the army from 3.5 to 1.7 million people, it did not leave fully deployed, highly trained, materially equipped formations and units. Experience shows that the presence of 2-3 such divisions from the very beginning of hostilities could provide a prompt solution to all military issues in Chechnya. There were no such divisions, despite the fact that there were 18 of them in the Western Group of Forces alone before the withdrawal to Russia.

To get out of this situation, after the failure to capture Grozny, the leadership of the Ministry of Defense decides to urgently deploy reduced-strength units and send them to the combat zone. The 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment, stationed in the village, also falls into the number of such units. Mouline near Nizhny Novgorod.

For 10 days from January 8 to January 18, 1995, the regiment is deployed with an increase in its strength from 172 to 1,700 military personnel due to the replenishment of conscripts from the Far Eastern Military District and officers and warrant officers from the army. They are urgently trying to organize combat coordination, but due to lack of time this can only be done at the platoon level without conducting company, battalion and regimental exercises. In addition, untrained soldiers had to be placed in the positions of riflemen, machine gunners, grenade launchers, and snipers, whose initial training usually takes 3–6 months, rather than the allotted 10 days.

Thus, already upon leaving for Chechnya, the regiment, due to its lack of coordination, lack of tactical skill, and low training of personnel, was doomed to losses.

This doom was compounded by other Department of Defense missteps. Such mistakes include the decision to change officers in the combat zone after 3 months.

During the period the regiment was in Chechnya, 4 sets of officers were replaced. At the same time, the level of professional training of replacement officers was constantly declining due to the limited capabilities of the district, in which the majority of the reduced personnel are located, as well as due to the short time for their training at special training camps. This drawback is complemented by the short deadlines for changing officers, which was carried out within 2-3 days without transferring the accumulated experience.

I know from my own service that 3 or even 6 months in a combat area is clearly not enough to gain combat experience. Therefore, having not yet really learned how to fight, having acquired initial experience at the cost of losing personnel, the officers handed over their positions to newcomers, who again learned from their mistakes, exposing themselves and their subordinates to enemy fire with inexperienced decisions.

The second omission is related to the replacement of retired personnel with volunteers directly from military registration and enlistment offices without preliminary training based on the skills they previously acquired during military service. Due to the fact that many of those called up were not sent according to their specialty, forgot a lot or had weak previous training in the army, in fact they became cannon fodder.

The Secretary of Defense forgot how the reserves were trained for Afghanistan, when officers trained for months in officer reserve battalions, and soldiers were sent to combat units only after intense combat training in training units for at least four months.

The third omission is related to the lack of sufficient control and assistance to the troops both from the Ministry of Defense and the country's leadership.

Many warring units, especially in the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, are only 70 percent staffed with personnel, and 50-60 percent with serviceable equipment. For several months, military personnel have not been paid, and there have been interruptions in the supply of units with food and clothing. There is often unprecedented pressure on the media army.

There is no strict enough demand from the army leadership for losses. The Minister of Defense again forgot how they asked for this in Afghanistan.

The leadership of the Ministry of Defense is a rare guest in the Chechen Republic, and if it appears there, it is no further than the Severny and Khankala airports, after which it urgently flies away.

Such an attitude towards the matter, when the entire state is literally sounding the alarm about the events in Chechnya, when the issue of the future of the country is being decided, is, of course, unacceptable.

All of the above confirms that the 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment, like many other units, was doomed to losses throughout the entire period of hostilities. This is also confirmed by the experience of the best units, such as the 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (commander - Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Vasilievich Dianov). This brigade was deployed before the outbreak of hostilities, before entering Chechnya it was re-equipped and given the opportunity to conduct intense combat training for three months.

At the moment, the brigade is fighting with great successes and minimal losses. The brigade skillfully uses all types of weapons, and competently organizes the interaction of all available forces and means.

The country's leadership is also to blame for what happened, because by their inattention and decreased control over the security forces, they allowed the situation to arise in the troops.

How could it happen that now, in addition to the lack of deployed units in the army, there is not enough military equipment in Chechnya?

Troops were withdrawn not only from the Western Group of Forces, but there were also the Central, Northern, Southern Groups, a group of troops in Mongolia and the Northwestern Military District.

During the period of euphoria of democracy, the attack on the army was not stopped in a timely manner, as a result of which it found itself without a conscript contingent. There were no soldiers in the units. Officers went on guard duty.

Control over reform in the Armed Forces was not established either. The reduction affected mainly combat units, but there remained many redundant departments, institutes, and enterprises, the timely liquidation of which would increase the staffing of combat units and the level of their support.

And finally, the most important thing is that the army was left without funding. Officers have not received their pay for months. They are no longer interested in combat training and mastering a combat specialty. They are faced with the question of how to survive. The soldiers are malnourished. The troops are not receiving the necessary equipment, without which combat missions cannot be solved at a high level.

In Chechnya, the Minister of Defense and the leadership of the state became hostages of the attitude towards the army and the mistakes they made.

In addition to the objective reasons indicated above, in the case under consideration there were also a number of gross professional errors both directly in the 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment and the neighboring 324th Motorized Rifle Regiment, and in the leadership of the Operational Group of the Ministry of Defense.

In preparation for the departure of the 245th Motorized Rifle Convoy from the deployment point near Shatoi to Khankala, planned for April 15, for material resources, the command and headquarters of the Operational Group (commander - Major General Kondratyev) committed serious violations in the established procedure for preventing attacks by gangs on military columns. The commander was not personally involved in planning and preparing the convoy of the columns, entrusting these issues to the chief of staff of the Operational Group.

When preparing for the convoy, the headquarters did not clarify the tasks of the commanders of the units in whose area of ​​responsibility the routes of the convoys were determined, and the interaction of forces and assets in the base centers was not organized with the loss of episodes to repel an attack on the convoy. No written order was given to the commander of the 324th Motorized Rifle Regiment to ensure the escort of the convoy. The headquarters did not demand a report on the readiness of the route from the commanders of the 245th and 324th motorized rifle regiments. The order requiring the presence of two command and staff vehicles in the columns to organize reliable communications was violated. No aviation support was provided, although the convoy did not leave Khankala until 12:00 on April 16 due to bad weather conditions.

The sudden attack by militants on the convoy became possible due to lack of training, negligence and loss of vigilance of the command and personnel of the 324th and 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment, who had been stationed for a long time in the area that signed the peace agreements. Most of the permanent roadblocks in the regiments' area of ​​responsibility were removed. “Fire treatment” of the most dangerous areas of the terrain was not carried out.

The commander of the 245th infantry regiment, although there was direct communication, did not organize interaction with the commander of the 324th infantry regiment. The decision of the commander of the 324th infantry regiment to conduct a convoy in his area of ​​​​responsibility, where the destruction of the convoy occurred, was not worked out. Reconnaissance of the movement route was not carried out, temporary checkpoints were not set up in dangerous areas, which allowed the militants to prepare in advance in engineering terms and carefully camouflage firing positions in areas of the terrain advantageous for an ambush.

An inspection of the state of affairs in the base centers showed that in 324 small and medium-sized infantry regiments there are serious shortcomings in service and combat activities. Information about the passage of the convoy from the checkpoint to the regimental command post was not communicated; the armored group sent by the regimental chief of staff to assist the convoy was returned by the regimental commander. The chief of staff did not report to the regiment commander at all about the removal of checkpoints in the regiment's area of ​​responsibility.

In turn, the commander of the 245th motorized rifle regiment, sending the convoy, appointed the senior deputy regiment commander for weapons - a person incompetent in matters of conducting combined arms combat. Of the combined arms commanders in the convoy guard, the highest official was the platoon commander.

During the march of the column, there was no reconnaissance of the area using foot combat patrols, even in the most dangerous places. The deployment of side outposts in the most dangerous areas, as well as the occupation of advantageous heights along the route of movement, were also not carried out. The regiment did not create reserves of forces and means to provide immediate assistance to the column. And the lack of a communications reserve did not allow us to immediately transmit a signal about the attack.

The battle unfolded as follows.

At 14.20, in an area 1.5 km south of Yaryshmardy, the column was ambushed by a large gang of militants, which included foreign mercenaries. Due to the fact that the command vehicle was hit from the first minutes of the battle, and the senior column, Major Terzovets, was killed, the sergeant major of the communications company tried to transmit a message about the attack via a walkie-talkie, but it was not accepted.

According to the report of the commander of the 245th infantry regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Romanikhin, at 14.40 he heard the sounds of explosions coming from the gorge. At 14.45, he assigned the task to the commander of the reconnaissance company, located in the Argun Gorge at temporary checkpoints, to move towards the column, clarify the situation and, if necessary, provide assistance.

At 15.30, the commander of the reconnaissance company reported that on the southern outskirts of Yaryshmarda the company came under heavy fire.

At 16.00, the regiment commander sends out the armored group he formed, led by the commander of the 2nd MSB, who is tasked with bypassing Yaryshmardy, destroying enemy firing points with tank and infantry fighting vehicle fire, and breaking through to the column together with the reconnaissance company. At the same time, the regiment commander sets the task for his deputy, Lieutenant Colonel Ivanov, who was located near the village of Goyskoye with the 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment, to send an armored group from the side of the 324th Motorized Rifle Regiment for the same purpose.

At 16.50, the commander of the 2nd MSB reported that he had destroyed two machine-gun crews on the southern outskirts of Yaryshmarda with tank fire and was moving towards the column. At 17.30 he reported that he had reached the column. At the same time, an armored group approached from the 324th Motorized Rifle Regiment. At 18.00 the resistance of the Dudayevites stopped.

The above analysis shows that urgent measures are required to streamline the activities of the Joint Group of Forces in the Chechen Republic and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, as well as to ensure the defense and security of the state as a whole.

For this purpose it is proposed:

I. On the United Group of Forces in the Chechen Republic

1. Strengthen the responsibility of security ministers for the state of affairs in Chechnya.

2. In order to strengthen the coordination of the actions of security forces in the interests of the Commander of the Joint Group, as well as control over the condition of the troops and their comprehensive support, propose to the President of the Russian Federation to appoint his plenipotentiary representative when leading the group.

3. To propose to the President of the Russian Federation, by his Decree, to urgently introduce additional benefits for participants in military operations in the Chechen Republic.

These benefits are provided for in the project Federal Law“On Amendments and Additions to the Law of the Russian Federation “On the Status of Military Personnel””, developed by the State Duma Committee on Defense.

It would be extremely advisable State Duma and the Government of the Russian Federation to take all measures to speed up the entry into force of this bill.

4. Increase the terms of service for officers in the United Group of Forces in the Chechen Republic to one year.

At the same time, provide special benefits to encourage officers, warrant officers, sergeants and soldiers to serve beyond established periods.

5. Carry out an urgent replacement of the least combat-ready units in the Chechen Republic with trained troops.

6. Urgently organize enhanced training in the training units of personnel intended to complete the units in the Chechen Republic.

7. Urgently organize training at special training camps for officers sent for replacement to the Chechen Republic.

8. To propose to the Government of the Russian Federation: to make a decision on the production of the most necessary military equipment, primarily communications and control equipment, all types of reconnaissance and electronic suppression; take measures to comprehensively provide troops, including timely payment of pay and material support.

II. In the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation

1. Conduct an audit of all directorates, reduced-strength units, bases, arsenals, institutes, training grounds, enterprises and other institutions of the Ministry of Defense, reducing their composition and structure to reasonable limits.

2. Create the required number of fully deployed combat-ready divisions capable of resolving any local internal conflict if necessary.

III. To ensure the defense and security of the state as a whole

Based on the extremely difficult economic situation of the country, it is advisable to determine tasks in the field of ensuring the defense and security of the state for the near and long term.

It is proposed to consider the following tasks for the near future:

1. Preventing external aggression directed against Russia through nuclear deterrence.

At the same time, all possible opponents must firmly know that we do not have any claims against any country, but at the same time we have enough determination to suppress any external aggression using nuclear potential.

2. It should be recognized that while Russia has not strengthened, the main danger in the near future is represented by intranational conflicts.

To promptly suppress them, it is necessary to have a combat-ready united group of all security forces.

When creating divisions, it should be taken into account that the mother does not care in which troops her son died. Her grief in all cases will be immeasurable.

It is easier and cheaper to amend an article of the Constitution or law than to create divisions and overlapping bodies in parallel in different law enforcement agencies.

As for the future, we are faced with a choice of what kind of power structures we need to have.

Some argue that the army should make up 1 percent of the country's population. Others try to justify its composition and structure depending on external threats.

But given the current poverty of the state, no matter how wonderful a structure is proposed, if we “cannot afford it”, it is doomed to failure. An army cannot exist when wages are not paid for several months, when soldiers are malnourished, when not a single tank is renewed in a year.

Therefore, for the sake of the long term, the main task should be to reduce the security forces on the basis of their comprehensive solution of all tasks of ensuring the defense and security of the state and thereby maintaining priority areas for the creation and production of weapons.

This will make it possible, when favorable conditions arise, to ensure the necessary equipment for the army and navy in the future.

To implement this it is proposed:

1. Determine a unified concept for the further development of all security forces in the interests of ensuring the defense and security of the state, establishing a strict framework for each of them.

2. Establish funding standards for each security agency, determining the level of appropriations under the heading “National Defense” at least 5 percent of the gross domestic product.

At the same time, special priority should be given to supporting promising areas of R&D and weapons production.

3. Create a single, permanent, professional body under the leadership of the President of the Russian Federation to control and coordinate the activities of all law enforcement agencies, their construction and reform.

Subordinate to this body an independent inspection that could truthfully and objectively report the true state of affairs in a particular structure.

4. To ensure every possible increase in the prestige of military service and the performance of military duty, as the most difficult and dangerous profession.

To revive the military-patriotic education of the population on the basis of the historical and cultural traditions of the Russian people.

And, of course, to solve the social problems of military personnel.

The previously mentioned draft law on the status of military personnel, developed by the Committee, proposes differentiated approaches to the service and responsibilities of military personnel. If he is supported by the government and the Duma, many things in the lives of military personnel will change for the better.

This report is planned to be sent to the President of the Russian Federation. To develop it, the Committee plans to hold parliamentary hearings on the problems of military reform.