Russian army 1 world. Russian army during the First World War. Combat and operational training

The armed forces in all countries consisted of ground forces and the navy. The structure of the ground forces was as follows: infantry accounted for 70-75%, cavalry - 5-8%, artillery - 15-17%, engineering and auxiliary troops - 2-7%. From this it is clear that military leaders and theorists assumed that almost all combat missions should be carried out by infantry forces with little support from other combat arms.

The imperialist powers paid much attention to the development of their naval forces. It was believed that the combat power of the fleet depends primarily on the number of heavy battleships... Along with surface ships of different class submarines also entered service.

By the beginning of the war, England possessed the strongest fleet. The fleets of the Entente countries were much stronger than the naval forces of the Triple Alliance, which ensured the Entente's conquest of supremacy at sea.

Other types of armed forces, except for land and sea, did not yet exist. Aviation was in its infancy; it was not even a branch of the army and was used only as one of the technical means of reconnaissance and communication.

The organizational structure of most European armies was built according to a binary scheme: two regiments made up a brigade, two brigades made up a division, and two divisions made up a corps. The infantry divisions of 1914 had the following forces and assets:

The infantry corps, in addition to two divisions, had a cavalry regiment, an artillery division (regiment), an aviation detachment (six aircraft), communications, engineering and logistics units. The corps artillery divisions were armed with howitzers: the Russian division - with a caliber of 122 mm, the German division - 150 mm, the French corps had an artillery regiment (48 75-mm guns).

The infantry regiments did not have their own artillery. The infantry of all capitalist countries was armed with magazine rifles with a caliber from 7.62 to 8 mm with a firing range of up to 4 - 5 km and a small amount heavy machine guns.

The soldiers were trained to conduct an offensive battle in shallow, but dense battle formations (dense rifle chains) without applying to the terrain and entrenching.

Thus, the armament of the armies on the eve of the First World War did not differ in variety. Nevertheless, magazine rifles, machine guns and rapid-fire artillery significantly increased the firepower of the troops. But the general staffs still did not take into account the increased force of fire and intended to achieve victory by striking large masses of infantry.

Strategic plans of the parties.

The general staffs of all countries developed strategic plans for the war long before it began. The authors of the strategic plans did not use the experience of the first wars of the era of imperialism. They did not notice that the conditions for waging war had changed dramatically. In particular, the increased role of economic and moral factors was underestimated.

In all the general staffs the idea prevailed that the war would be short, that victory could be won with one or several general battles. The survivability of modern armies, due to the presence of numerous reserves and the massive release of weapons, was not taken into account. The plans of each of the belligerent countries expressed its imperialist aspirations, its predatory goals.

Germany's strategic plan was developed by Chief of General Staff Schlieffen. The main idea of ​​the plan is to defeat the armies of France and Russia consistently and quickly and thereby avoid a protracted war on two fronts. Initially, it was planned to concentrate the main forces in the strip from the Dutch border to the Metz fortress, strike a surprise blow through the territory of Belgium and Luxembourg, bypass and defeat the French armies from the north, occupy Paris and force France to surrender. During this period of the war, it was supposed to defend with limited forces on the section of the Franco-German border south of Metz. Considering that Russia, with a weak development of transport, cannot quickly carry out a mobilization deployment, Schlieffen proposed in the first period of the war to cover East Prussia with the forces of one army, and after the victory over France, transfer all forces from the western front to the east and defeat the Russian armies. It was planned to defeat France and Russia in three or four months.

The German strategic plan was fundamentally flawed. The capabilities and forces of the enemy were underestimated, which gave the plan an adventurous character. It was also unrealistic to expect to defeat the armed forces of a major power (France) in one general battle.

Along with the fundamental flaws, the German plan also had strengths. He was imbued with the spirit of active, decisive action. The direction of the main attack, chosen correctly, made it possible to carry out a maneuver with an exit to the enemy's flank. In the direction of the main attack, forces were concentrated, significantly superior to the enemy. The role of surprise was taken into account.

However, the presence of a number of correct operational-strategic provisions in the German plan could not compensate for its main shortcomings and miscalculations.

French strategic plan ("plan number 17") had an indecisive and ambivalent character. The French planned to deploy: the 1st and 2nd armies in the area of ​​the fortresses of Belfort, Epinal, Nancy with the task of attacking Alsace and Lorraine; 3rd Army - to the north, in the Verdun area, and 5th Army - on the border with Belgian Luxembourg. In the second line, behind the adjacent flanks of the 2nd and 3rd armies, the 4th army was deployed. The actions of the 3rd, 4th and 5th armies in accordance with the plan entirely depended on how the enemy behaved, where he would deliver the main blow. Thus, the strategic initiative was yielded to the enemy, and their troops were doomed to passive defensive actions.

In particular, the 4th Army was not intended to build up forces during an offensive, but to counter the enemy in the direction of his main attack.

Strategic plan of Russia formed under the strong influence of its political and economic dependence on its Western allies.

Russia pledged to launch an offensive against East Prussia 15 days after the announcement of mobilization and thereby create a threat to the central regions of Germany. To solve this problem, Russia deployed two strong armies (1st and 2nd) on the Neman and Narev rivers.

The main aspirations of the Russian landowners and the bourgeoisie were directed towards Galicia and the Balkans. Therefore, according to the strategic plan, it was planned to deploy four armies (3, 4, 5 and 8) against Austria-Hungary, on the 19th day of mobilization to begin an offensive, to encircle and destroy the Austro-Hungarian armies.

The Russian army was supposed to attack simultaneously in two strategic directions, which was completely inconsistent with the economic and military capabilities of the country.

Austria-Hungary was planning decisive action against Russia and Serbia at the same time. The Austro-Hungarian plan, drawn up under German pressure, did not take into account the real balance of power, the weakness of economic resources and the low morale of a significant part of its troops.

England planned to preserve and strengthen its dominance at sea. For operations on land, it was supposed to send only one small expeditionary army to France, consisting of six infantry and one cavalry divisions. Thus, England intended to shift the main burdens of the war onto the allies and, with the help of the latter, defeat its main rival and rival - Germany.

The stake "on lightning war" was also expressed in the grouping of forces outlined by all plans. All countries deployed their forces in one strategic echelon. The wide deployment of strategic reserves was not envisaged, since each country planned to conquer victory in a short time, by routing the enemy in one or more general battles.

Despite the existence of military alliances and the coalitional nature of the war, none of the military coalitions has created a single strategic plan and a single command.

The plans of the allied countries were very poorly coordinated. Moreover, the imperialist powers in every possible way avoided fulfilling their allied duty and feared great successes for their allies.

The beginning of the war. Military art in the 1914 campaign

The reason for the outbreak of the First World War was the murder on June 28, 1914 of the heir to the Austrian throne by Serbian nationalists in Sarajevo.

The declaration of war and the beginning of open hostilities was preceded by a threatened period that lasted for one month, during which the countries of the German bloc and the Entente secretly carried out a number of pre-mobilization measures. These included checking the state of mobilization agencies, replenishing fuel and food supplies at naval bases and in designated areas of concentration of troops, strengthening the protection of borders, bridges and other important facilities, canceling vacations in the army, returning troops from camps to places of permanent deployment, the advance of covering troops and the invasion of the deployment areas, etc. For example, Germany during June 1914 deployed three cavalry corps and six infantry brigades along the western border and concentrated a group of troops intended for the invasion of Belgium in order to seize the river crossings. Maas.

Only after the completion of the preliminary preparations did the imperialists of the German-Austrian bloc present ultimatum demands to their adversaries and unleashed a war.

July 28, 1914 Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. On the same day, Russia began a general mobilization. Germany on August 1 declared war on Russia, and two days later - on France. On August 4, England declared war on Germany. In 1914, Japan joined the Entente, and Turkey joined the German bloc.

Initial period World War I lasted 16 - 20 days and had a number of important features. During this period, the covering forces deployed along the borders and the invading armies fought only with limited forces. The belligerent states sought to carry out mobilization and strategic deployment as quickly as possible in the border areas, under the protection of covering forces. The main forces of the belligerent states began to conduct active operations only 16-20 days after the start of mobilization and the declaration of war. At the same time, the main forces of the Russian army went on the offensive in East Prussia and Galicia, without even completing their deployment completely, with an incomplete set and unsettled rear.

In the initial period of the First World War, primarily cavalry units were used as cover troops. They were also intended for long-range reconnaissance. Conducted reconnaissance and aviation, but the range of the aircraft then lay within up to 100 km.

The active operations of the limited invasion forces were also conducted with the aim of creating the most favorable conditions for subsequent offensive operations of the main forces.

Thus, the content of the initial period of the First World War was the combat operations of the covering and invasion troops, the conduct of deep reconnaissance, the mobilization, concentration and strategic deployment of the main forces of the belligerent countries.

The mobilization and strategic deployment of the armed forces in all the belligerent countries, carried out according to pre-developed plans, did not encounter any serious interference from the enemy.

The balance and grouping of forces in the main theaters of military operations did not correspond to the decisive strategic goals outlined in the war plans.

At the Western European Theater Germany deployed 7 armies, which included 86 infantry and 10 cavalry divisions. They were opposed by five French, one English and one Belgian armies, which had 85 infantry and 12 cavalry divisions.

With a general equality of forces, the five German armies, which delivered the main blow through Belgium and Luxembourg, had one and a half superiority over the forces of the French, British and Belgians operating in these areas.

At the Eastern European Theater against Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary deployed five armies (one German and four Austro-Hungarian), which included 51 infantry and 12.5 cavalry divisions. Russia initially deployed six armies with 54 infantry and 17.5 cavalry divisions.

The Russian armies were divided into two fronts: Northwestern (1st and 2nd armies) and Southwestern (3rd, 4th, 5th and 8th armies). Russia was the first country to create front-line associations. In all other countries, the command of the armies was carried out by the headquarters of the main command.

Active hostilities began in the West on August 4, 1914, when German troops, not yet completing their concentration, invaded Belgium.

From the very first days of the war, serious miscalculations of the German strategic plan were revealed. Belgians using p. The Meuse and the fortresses of Liege and Namur were detained by the German armies for two weeks. During this time, the French 4th and 5th armies managed to reach the Franco-Belgian border. The Germans failed to use the surprise factor to the full.

August 21-25 in the so-called "border battle" five German armies defeated three French and one English, forcing the latter to withdraw.

At that moment, Russia provided important assistance to France. The armies of the North-Western Front, without even completing the concentration, launched an offensive in East Prussia in mid-August and forced the 8th German Army to retreat.

The German command was forced to take two corps and one cavalry division from its strike force in France and send them to East Prussia. Another corps, intended for operations in the West, was detained in the Metz area with the aim of sending it to the Russian front. In a short time, the German armies lost the numerical superiority they had created at the beginning of the war in the decisive direction. The German command did not have strategic and operational reserves for building up forces.

The counterattacks of the French armies inflicted at the end of August forced the German command to abandon original plan bypassing Paris from the west. The right-flank German armies were turned south, towards the r. Marne, east of Paris. They lost their enveloping position and found themselves under the threat of a blow from the area of ​​Paris, where the new (6th) French army was deployed, along the completely unsecured right flank.

September 5-9, 1914 on the river. Marne German armies suffered a serious defeat and were forced to retreat beyond the river. Ena, where they switched to positional defense. This is how the complete failure of the plans to defeat France with one blow and the quick end of the war was determined.

Military operations in the 1914 campaign took on a large scale. Eastern European theater... The successfully launched offensive of the Russian armies in East Prussia was not completed. Mediocre control on the part of the command of the North-Western Front, the lack of interaction between the two armies of this front and the criminal behavior of the commander of the 1st Army allowed the German troops not only to avoid defeat, but also to inflict successive defeat. both armies. By mid-September, these armies were driven out of East Prussia.

More successful were the fighting of the Southwestern Front, whose armies in Battle of Galicia, which took place from August 19 to September 21, 1914, inflicted a heavy defeat on the enemy and captured the territory of Galicia. But tsarist Russia, economically backward, quickly used up its mobilization reserves and did not have the means at all to build on the achieved success and achieve victory over Austria-Hungary and Germany.

The attempts of the German command to defeat the Russian troops in the area of ​​Warsaw and Lodz were also unsuccessful.

Not a single belligerent country has been able to fulfill its strategic plan and achieve rapid and decisive success. In the fall of 1914, in the West, both sides tried to bypass the enemy's open flank from the north, which led to a rapid extension of the positional front. These attempts, which were figuratively called "run to the sea" in the historical literature, did not give success to either side and ended in mid-November, when a continuous positional front was established throughout the Western European theater of operations - from the border of neutral Switzerland to the coast of the North Sea.

Military operations unfolded in 1914 also in the Far East and Africa (the struggle for the German colonies), in the Transcaucasus, the Balkans and the Middle East (the struggle against Austria-Hungary and Turkey). The Western European and Eastern European theaters of operations were the main ones throughout the war.

Naval forces in 1914, they limited themselves to laying minefields, shelling ports and cities on the enemy's coast, attacks on merchant ships on ocean and sea lanes, and individual naval battles involving a limited number of warships. There were no major sea battles. Submarines have proved to be effective remedy fighting at sea, which required the organization of anti-submarine defense. A significant drawback of the combat activity of the naval forces was that it was poorly coordinated with the actions of the ground forces.

The 1914 campaign revealed a complete discrepancy between the theoretical concepts and views of bourgeois military theorists and military leaders and the actual conditions of warfare, operations and battles.

The strategic plans of all countries, which outlined the conquest of victory by the forces of cadre armies in a short time, suffered a complete failure. It turned out that in the era of imperialism armies have great survivability, that the losses incurred in manpower and equipment can be replenished from the reserves accumulated in peacetime and the expansion of the production of military products. The war turned into an all-round test for the countries participating in it and required the mobilization of all economic resources and human reserves.

The armies of all states prepared for maneuvering actions, outlined envelopes, bypasses and encirclement of the main enemy forces. But none of the armies was able to carry out their plan, and soon after the start of the war, continuous positional fronts began to take shape on the most important axes with their inherent immobility.

Results of the campaign. In the 1914 campaign, large-scale operations of a strategic scale were objectively formed (the operation on the river Marne, the Battle of Galicia, the East Prussian operation). But the command and staffs did not yet have the experience of organizing and conducting operations on such a scale. Therefore, in the course of operations, the armies had considerable independence, the interaction between the armies was not close enough, the headquarters and the front command poorly coordinated the efforts of the armies.

The experience of the war has shown that for a successful offensive to great depths it is necessary to mass forces and assets in decisive directions, to create several operational echelons in order to be able to build up efforts and maintain the superiority achieved at the beginning of the operation over the enemy. The lack of second strategic and operational echelons among the belligerent countries led to the incompleteness and rapid decay of their offensive operations.

The extremely heavy losses suffered by all the armies in the first months of the war are proof that the tactics of these armies did not correspond to the new conditions, in particular the new means of struggle.

The infantry was the main branch of the troops, and it was entrusted with the solution of the main combat missions. However, the increased power and effectiveness of fire was underestimated. small arms and artillery. The battle formations of formations and units consisted of combat sectors and reserves. The combat unit consisted of subunits deployed in a very dense rifle chain, with an interval between fighters in 1-2 steps. The offensive was carried out linearly, without the use of maneuvers. The battlefield was oversaturated with infantry, and artillery densities were low (20-25 guns per 1 km of front). The interaction between infantry and artillery was weak.

They did not know how to use machine guns in an offensive battle, they were used only to consolidate the occupied terrain. The infantry was forbidden to dig in during the offensive.

Artillery, machine-gun and rifle fire on the advancing uncovered infantry was highly effective, and the infantry suffered heavy casualties.

Field positional defense received significant development in the 1914 campaign. Initially, such a defense had a focal linear character. The defense consisted of one line of individual and group rifle trenches. Then these trenches began to be connected with each other by a continuous trench, and wire barriers were built in front. From the trenches to the rear, communications were torn off, shelters and shelters were created for the reserves.

The infantry division in the defense occupied a strip 10-12 km wide. Small arms fire formed the basis of the defense, therefore, when repelling an enemy attack, they tried to place the maximum number of shooters in the first trench.

In order to better shelter the infantry from artillery fire and increase the stability of the defense, by the end of 1914, one or two more trenches were being built behind the first trench at a distance of 100-150 m from one another. Defensive positions equipped according to such a system, covered from the front by a system of wire obstacles, reliably sheltered the infantry from enemy cannon artillery fire and made it possible to repel the enemy's infantry offensive. None of the sides had any other means of attack at that time. The situation arose when the defense was stronger than the offensive. The armies of both sides buried themselves in the ground and for a long period went over to the defensive on a motionless continuous front.

Military art in the 1915 campaign

The complete failure of the strategic plans developed before the start of the war forced the military leaders of all belligerent states to look for new ways to victory.

England and France decided to go over to strategic defense, using 1915 to rebuild the economy, deploy military production and accumulate reserves. They planned active actions for 1916. The British and French imperialists shifted the main burdens of the struggle against the Austro-German bloc to Russia.

Germany decided in 1915 to fulfill the second part of the Schlieffen plan, that is, to crush the Russian army and force Russia to surrender. This would save Germany from the need to fight on two fronts - and would give her the opportunity to use Russian food and raw materials to continue the war in the West.

Russia, under pressure from its allies, also planned active offensive actions, although it did not have the necessary material and technical means.

Thus, in the 1915 campaign, the Russian front was the main one. Active hostilities were conducted on this front from February to October. The German command, having concentrated powerful groupings of troops in East Prussia and in the Carpathian region, tried to encircle and destroy the main forces of the Russian army on Polish territory by advancing in converging directions.

The offensive operations of the German and Russian troops in January-March 1915 on the North-Western Front did not bring decisive success to either side. The German command was unable to carry out the intended deep bypass of the right wing of the Russian armies, and the command of the North-Western Front did not have enough strength to carry out plans to defeat the enemy and capture East Prussia.

Intense battles unfolded on the southern wing of the Russian-German front, where the troops of the Southwestern Front unsuccessfully tried in January-April to seize the Carpathians and invade Hungary.

In May, the German troops, secretly concentrating a strong group on a narrow sector, broke the stubborn resistance of the 3rd Russian army near Gorlitsy and, building on their success, pushed the Russians back beyond the San and Dniester rivers. A decisive role in ensuring the success of the German troops was played by their overwhelming superiority in artillery. In the area of ​​the breakthrough near Gorlitsa, where the Russian troops had 141 light and 4 heavy guns, extremely poorly provided with ammunition, the enemy concentrated 457 light and 159 heavy guns and a huge amount of ammunition (1200 shells for a light one and up to 600 shells for a heavy gun).

In the summer of 1915, the German command tried to implement its plan to encircle and defeat the Russian troops in Poland and launched an offensive from the regions of Galicia and East Prussia. Russian units were forced to conduct heavy defensive battles and, avoiding the threat of encirclement, retreat to the east. In early October, they completely eliminated the offensive of the German armies and went over to positional defense on the line Riga, r. Western Dvina, Smorgon, Baranovichi, Dubno, r. Strypa.

Thus, in the fall of 1915, the maneuvering actions also ceased on the Russian-German front. From that time on, armed struggle on all decisive fronts of the First World War acquired a positional character. The belligerent parties were faced with the problem of organizing a breakthrough of the prepared enemy defense, without which it was impossible to carry out an offensive operation even on a small scale.

Operations with limited objectives were conducted in the Western European theater of operations. Both sides focused on developing and improving their defensive positions.

In the fall of 1915, the French and British armies tried to break through the defenses of the German troops in Champagne and Artois. Strong groupings of troops and artillery were concentrated in selected areas of the breakthrough. However, these operations, despite the huge amount of money spent and heavy losses, were not successful. Both in Champagne and in Artois, the advancing infantry managed to capture only the first enemy position, completely destroyed by artillery during many days of artillery preparation. Attempts to overcome the subsequent positions, which were densely occupied by the approaching reserves, were carried out without sufficient artillery support and were repelled by the German troops.

In 1915 Italy joined the Entente, and Bulgaria joined the Austro-German bloc. An Italian front was formed, and the struggle intensified in the Balkans, where an Anglo-French expeditionary force arrived through the Greek port of Thessaloniki.

Combat operations at sea were also not decisive enough. The English fleet blocked the coast of Germany. In turn, German submarines inflicted quite heavy damage on the British merchant fleet. Nevertheless, the British Admiralty, by organizing patrols and strengthening the anti-submarine defense, eliminated the threat of a complete disruption of sea communications.

In general, the 1915 campaign was marked by the failure of the plans of the German bloc, designed to defeat Russia and withdraw it from the war. The German imperialists and their allies were forced to wage a long war on two fronts, which doomed them to inevitable defeat.

Russia lost vast territories (parts of the Baltic states, Poland and Galicia), but the Russian army retained the ability to continue the war. She fettered the huge forces of the enemy. The western allies of Russia, having shifted the brunt of the armed struggle onto it, were able to rebuild their economy on a war footing, expand the production of weapons, ammunition and equipment, and prepare numerous reserves.

The peculiarity of this campaign is: on the Russian-German front - in the conduct of broad maneuvering operations, which, however, did not yield decisive results; on the Western European front - in the failure of the first serious attempts to break through a continuous positional defense.

The means and methods of armed struggle have undergone significant changes. Artillery developed rapidly; At that time, it was the main weapon of fire for the ground forces, capable of seriously disrupting the stability of positional defense and ensuring the success of an infantry offensive. Along with a rapid increase in the number of artillery in its composition, qualitative changes took place: the production of howitzers and heavy systems increased, and mortars were widely used. Anti-aircraft artillery was born.

Aviation turned into a combat weapon, as the aircraft received small arms and bomber weapons. The world's first heavy bombers, the Ilya Muromets aircraft, were built and successfully used at the front in the Russian army at the beginning of 1915. The Muromets raised up to 500 kg of bombs and had three firing points to defend against fighters that had just appeared on the fronts of the First World War. Thus, along with the increasingly widespread use of reconnaissance aircraft, new types of aviation arose - bomber and fighter.

In the same year, the use of chemical warfare agents began. The German troops were the first to use them: before the attack, with the wind blowing towards the enemy, they let the suffocating gas chlorine from the cylinders. The use of toxic substances required the provision of gas masks to the troops and the organization of chemical protection.

In a situation where the war reached a positional impasse, when the technical equipment of the armies was rapidly improving, an intense search was conducted for new methods of preparing and carrying out offensive operations and battles. In order to break through the prepared positional defense, a large number of infantry, artillery and aviation began to concentrate on the intended section of the breakthrough. For example, during the offensive in Champagne, infantry divisions operated in strips of 1.5-2 km; the density of artillery reached 50-60 guns per 1 km of the front. The artillery preparation lasted for several days, and the fire was fired across the squares to the depth of the first enemy position. Such a long and limited depth of artillery preparation helped to capture the first position, but the defending side at that time managed to pull up reserves and prepare to repel the offensive in the second and third positions. The advancing troops did not yet have the means to reliably suppress the entire depth of the defense.

When attacking a prepared defense, the infantry began to use deeper battle formations: the division had two regiments in the first line (combat areas) and one or two regiments in the second (reserves). The regiments of the first line created several dense rifle lines that moved at distances of about 50 m.

The reserves were intended to make up for losses and preserve the striking force of the attacking chains. This form of formation of battle formations was called "chain waves" (in contrast to one rifle chain used in 1914).

Field positional defense was also developed significantly. The depth of defense was increased by creating a second and sometimes a third position and by echeloning battle formations. The number of machine guns increased two to three times, which accordingly increased the density of fire. Machine guns were rarely used during the offensive. The engineering equipment of the area was improved. The defending troops were covered with barbed wire, various artificial and natural obstacles, equipped their positions with a system of trenches, communication trenches, firing positions, dugouts and shelters.

Defense in 1915 became not only anti-personnel, but also anti-artillery, anti-aircraft and anti-chemical.

Military art in the 1916 campaign

On the experience of the campaigns of 1914-1915. the military leaders of the Entente countries became convinced of the expediency of coordinating the efforts of their armies. According to the strategic plan of the Entente, adopted at the allied conferences, it was planned to carry out a large offensive operation in the area of ​​the r. Somme. Since attempts to break through the enemy's defenses at one point, in a narrow sector, were unsuccessful, a plan was developed to break through the defenses of the German troops on a continuous wide front in the offensive zone of several armies. The start of the offensive was planned for July 1, 1916.

On June 15, Russian troops were supposed to launch an offensive in the Berlin strategic direction, divert the maximum of German troops to themselves and thereby ensure the success of the offensive for the British and French on the river. Somme.

The German command gave great importance maintaining the strategic initiative. Therefore, it was decided to start active operations in February in order to forestall the impending strike by the Entente armies. All Germany's calculations again boiled down to the fact that France would not be able to endure a long tense struggle.

Since Germany did not have the strength to attack on a wide front, she outlined a plan for a powerful strike in a narrow sector - at such an important point as the Verdun Fortified Region. To protect him, the French command would have been forced to throw all available forces. This area covered the way to Paris.

With the strategic planning and military-political leadership of the events of the 1917 campaign, the governments and general staffs were forced to reckon with the growing protest of the masses against the imperialist war.

The Entente countries intended to use their economic and military superiority in the upcoming campaign and deliver decisive blows to the German-Austrian bloc. February revolution in Russia partially undermined these plans, and the final withdrawal of Russia from the war significantly weakened the Entente. To some extent, this loss was compensated for by the entry into the war of the United States of America (April 1917). The first American divisions arrived in the Western European theater of operations in the fall of 1917.

Germany, after huge losses, did not have the forces and means to conduct offensive operations. Therefore, the German command decided to go over to the defensive on all fronts and use 1917 to accumulate reserves and boost military production.

In order to undermine the military-economic potential of the Entente, disrupt the delivery of raw materials, food and troops from the colonies and from America, it was decided to deploy merciless submarine war, that is, block the shores of Europe with submarines and destroy merchant ships even of neutral countries carrying cargo to England or France.

The French and British armies, implementing the adopted strategic plan, crossed in April on the offensive trying to break through the enemy front in the Reims-Soissons sector. Huge forces took part in the offensive: four armies, 5,580 guns, 500 aircraft, up to 200 tanks, and over 30 million shells were concentrated on the main axis alone.

The German troops knew about the impending offensive and in advance created a solid, echeloned defense. Even the ten-day artillery preparation carried out in the direction of the main attack of the French and British forces did not crush the German defenses. The advancing infantry suffered huge losses from the fire of German machine guns, and the tanks were almost completely destroyed by artillery fire. In no sector did the French troops succeed in advancing beyond the second position.

In this unsuccessful operation, the French lost over 125 thousand people, and the British - 80 thousand. Mass anti-war protests began in the French army, brutally suppressed by the government.

In the summer and autumn, the armies of the Entente countries conducted several private operations, which are characterized by the massive use of artillery, aviation, tanks and other military equipment and the extremely limited territorial successes of the attacking side. Among these operations, the operation at Cambrai is of great interest from the point of view of the history of military art.

The Entente countries failed to fulfill their strategic plans and achieve a final victory over the German bloc in 1917.

Given the rapid growth of anti-war and revolutionary sentiments, the belligerent countries tried to use massive use of new military equipment to compensate for the decline in the morale of the troops and achieve victory.

The German command announced on February 1, 1917. unlimited submarine warfare. Merchant ships bound for British ports were destroyed. England's shipping and economy suffered severe damage. Only by organizing a broad patrol service, anti-submarine defense and a system of escorting caravans of merchant ships was it possible to significantly reduce losses and ensure an uninterrupted supply of raw materials, food and other materials.

The 1917 campaign was marked by a further increase in artillery and aviation densities and the first experiments in the massive use of tanks. Combined with other types of troops, the tanks were able to carry out a tactical breakthrough. However, it has not yet been possible to find the means and methods of developing a tactical breakthrough into an operational one.

Further improvement of the defense continued. In order to increase its depth and stability, they began to build forward, cut-off and rear positions. The battle formations of formations and units were echeloned in depth. From a tough, linear defense, the goal of which was to hold the first position, the German troops are moving to the so-called "elastic" defense, in which a temporary loss of one or several positions is allowed, and the enemy's offensive is eliminated by counterattacks and strikes of the second echelons and brought up reserves.

Campaign of 1918. End of the First World War.

Strategic plans for 1918 were developed in the context and taking into account the growing revolutionary crisis in most of the belligerent countries. The imperialists of the Entente and the German bloc, alarmed by the victory of the October Revolution, along with the continuation of the armed struggle among themselves, organized a military intervention against Soviet Russia.

The Entente countries tried to liquidate Soviet power and force Russia to continue the war. In the Western European theater, the British and French intended to conduct active operations only after the arrival of large contingents of American troops in Europe.

The German command, taking into account the possibility of a revolutionary explosion in the country, decided to achieve victory in 1918 at any cost. The German imperialists developed adventurous plans for an offensive in the East and West. They wanted to seize the rich regions of the Soviet Republic and at the same time achieve decisive successes in the Western European theater, where by the beginning of 1918 Germany had concentrated 193 divisions against 181 divisions of the Entente countries. Germany's opponents had significant reserves and a great superiority in tanks and aircraft.

In pursuit of their predatory goals, the German imperialists treacherously violated the truce with the Soviet Republic.

On February 18, 1918, they launched an offensive on the Russian-German front. At the call of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, the working people of our country rose up to defend the socialist Fatherland. At the same time, the Soviet state continued its struggle for peace. On March 3, the Brest Peace Treaty was signed. Despite the difficult conditions of the treaty for our country, the conclusion of peace was a huge success for the young Soviet republic, which received a vital peace respite.

Meanwhile, in the territories occupied by the German invaders (the Baltic States, Belarus, Ukraine), a nationwide guerrilla war... She fettered the forces of Germany, which were so necessary for her at a time when active operations were unfolding in the Western European theater.

In March, German troops, concentrating 62 divisions, more than 6,000 guns, 1,000 mortars and 1,000 aircraft on the 70-kilometer front sector, struck at the junction of the British and French armies in Picardy. The idea of ​​the operation was to push the British armies back to the coast of the English Channel and completely defeat them, and then concentrate all forces against the French armies.

The offensive of the German troops in Picardy began on March 21 with a short (five hours) but powerful artillery preparation, during which not only the first position was suppressed and destroyed, but also firing positions, defensive structures, command posts, bridges and other important objects in the depth of the defense. The infantry attack was supported by a double barrage and air assault strikes. The battle formations of the German infantry consisted of battle groups (squads and platoons) echeloned in depth.

On the first day of the operation, the German infantry advanced 3-7 km and continued the offensive in the following days. However, it was delayed by the approaching reserves of the French. The German command had no reserves at its disposal to build up forces and develop success. German troops, having advanced 65 km in two weeks of intense fighting, suffered heavy losses and were forced to stop the offensive. The strategic goals outlined by the command were not achieved, and the operation brought only partial successes, which did not provide sufficient compensation for the losses incurred and the lengthening of the front line.

To retain the strategic initiative, the German command in the spring and summer of 1918 undertook several more offensive attempts with decisive goals, but these operations led only to the formation of "dents" and "ledges", to the stretching of the front and to new heavy losses that Germany there was nothing to replenish.

Already in August 1918, the Entente troops seized the initiative of action. During the summer, French, British and American forces conducted a series of successive operations to eliminate the ledges formed as a result of previous German offensives.

The successful outcome of these operations showed that Germany had completely exhausted its capabilities and could not withstand the onslaught of the Entente armies. In the fall, the Entente armies launched a general offensive against Germany. It was carried out by means of simultaneous powerful blows by the allied armies in various sectors of the front. Unable to withstand the hardships of the war, the German coalition collapsed: on September 29, Bulgaria surrendered, on October 30, Turkey withdrew from the war. Defeats at the front and the outbreak of the revolution forced Austria-Hungary to surrender on November 3. The German government, in order to avoid complete defeat, at the beginning of October turned to the Entente countries with a proposal to start negotiations on an armistice.

Germany, having lost all allies, in an atmosphere of continuous retreat and collapse at the front, a stormy upsurge of the revolutionary struggle within the country could no longer continue the war and on November 11, 1918. was forced to sign the terms of surrender dictated by the Entente. The first World War, which lasted four years and three and a half months, is over.

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS

The First World War arose amid the outbreak of the general crisis of capitalism. Its most important political result was the further exacerbation of this crisis, which manifested itself especially clearly in the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the establishment of a socialist social system in one-sixth of the world.

Great changes have taken place on the political map of the world. Collapsed and ceased to exist "dual monarchy" - Austria-Hungary. New states were formed in Europe: Hungary, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia. Under the terms of the Versailles Peace Treaty, the victorious countries took from Germany all the colonies, Alsace, Lorraine, Saarland and other territories. Germany was deprived of the right to maintain an army of more than 100 thousand people, military aircraft, tanks, submarines and some other types of weapons.

The First World War was characterized by the main features of the wars of the era of imperialism. For the first time in the history of mankind, war has acquired such a grand scale and destructive character.

Lenin's position was fully confirmed that wars are now being waged by the peoples.

The war demanded gigantic material costs, devastated many areas, destroyed and maimed tens of millions of people. At the fronts, about 10 million people died, and 20 million people were wounded.

Consequently, modern wars are distinguished by their destructive power, which continuously increases as new means of warfare appear.

The First World War showed that the economic factor acquired extremely great importance in the era of imperialism. To organize the material support of the multimillion-dollar armies, it took a military restructuring of the economy, the mobilization of all economic opportunities. War production has reached unprecedented proportions; the entire territory of the belligerent country turned into a strategic rear. The superiority of the economic resources of the Entente served as the material basis for its victory over the German bloc.

The moral factor also had a profound influence on the course and outcome of the war.

During the First World War, strategy, operational art, and tactics developed significantly. The war overturned the previous strategic theories that prevailed in the 19th century about the possibility of winning victory by defeating the enemy in one or more general battles. Therefore, the outcome of the war was determined only in a long, tense struggle.

The First World War was a war between two large imperialist factions. An important task of the strategy was to coordinate the efforts of the allied armies. The bourgeois military leaders were unable to solve the problems of the coalition strategy, since acute internal contradictions are inherent in the imperialist coalitions, and the selfish interests of each country prevail over the all-Union interests.

Military actions in the First World War, unexpectedly for all its participants, acquired a positional character. For a certain period, a situation developed when the defense proved to be stronger than the offensive. The art of war found itself in a "positional impasse". A way out of the impasse was found when large masses of heavy artillery, tanks and combat aircraft appeared on the battlefields.

The protracted war has shown that the conquest of victory is unthinkable without the broadest systematic efforts to prepare, build up and correctly use strategic reserves.

The enormous scope of the armed struggle during the First World War demanded a change in the methods of strategic management. Formed new structure of the highest governing bodies: headquarters - front (army group) - army.

The use of technical means of communication (telephone, telegraph, radio, airplanes, etc.) made it possible to increase the degree of centralization of control; over the years of the war, the armies lost their former independence and acted according to the directives of the main and front command.

The First World War was an important stage in the development operational art. In the course of the war, the operation finally took shape as a combination of battles and battles conducted by an operational formation according to a single plan and under a single leadership in order to solve a specific operational or strategic task.

The maneuvering operations of 1914 were distinguished by a large scale. Five German armies trying to outflank French troops, attacked on a front of 250 km and in one month advanced to a depth of 400 km.

In the Battle of Galicia, four Russian armies advanced in a strip of 400 km, advancing in 33 days to a depth of 200 km.

Six armies of the Entente in the operation on the r. The Marne attacked in a zone of up to 300 km and in 8 days threw the German troops back 50 km.

The average rate of advance in maneuvering operations reached 8-10 km per day.

The most characteristic of the First World War were operations to break through the positional front. Such operations had various forms: frontal impact on a narrow section (12-15 km); strike on a relatively wide continuous section of the front (40-80 km); a simultaneous strike in a number of sectors on a wide front. The latter form of operation is the most advantageous, since the enemy's counter-maneuver with the aim of eliminating the resulting breakthrough was extremely difficult.

Only by the end of the war was it possible to solve the problem of organizing a breakthrough of positional defense by massive strikes by infantry, artillery, tanks and aviation. A new problem arose before the art of war - the development of a tactical breakthrough into an operational one. It remained unresolved until the end of the war, because the range of actions of military equipment of those years did not go beyond the tactical zone.

Tactics developed greatly during the First World War. The very nature of combat changed radically, which was due to the improvement of the old and the emergence of new means of struggle.

At the beginning of the war, almost all the tasks of an offensive battle were carried out by the forces of the infantry. The small number of artillery conducted short artillery preparation, but did not support the infantry at the time of the attack and did not accompany them during the battle in depth. The battle formation of infantry units and formations had no depth; it consisted of a dense rifle chain and reserves feeding it. A single chain during the offensive had a weak impact force and suffered heavy losses from enemy fire. The firepower of the chain was low, since machine guns and escort weapons were not used in the offensive at that time.

The experience of battles in 1914 revealed the need to increase the depth of battle formations and increase the firepower of the infantry in an offensive battle. This was achieved by echeloning battle formations and saturating them with machine guns, mortars, flamethrowers and escort weapons. Hand grenades and various types of grenade launchers were widely used. A new form of infantry battle formation was formed - "waves of chains", and the intervals between the fighters in the chain increased, and the chains advanced one after another at a distance of 75-100 m.

With the advent of light machine guns, battalion and regimental mortars and cannons, as well as tanks, the form of the battle formation of infantry units and formations changed again. Instead of "waves of chains", small groups of infantry acted (from squad to platoon), which advanced with the support of tanks, escort guns and machine guns. Such groups could maneuver on the battlefield, suppress, destroy or bypass enemy firing points and strongpoints, boldly penetrate into the depths of the defense, and conduct an offensive at a higher pace.

The tactics of defensive combat were greatly developed during the First World War. At the beginning of the war, during the transition to the defense, the troops created one line of group rifle trenches and repelled the enemy's offensive with rifle, machine-gun and artillery fire. It was a focal defense, devoid of depth. It was based on small arms fire.

By the winter of 1914, the trenches were connected by a continuous narrow trench, the retention of which was the main task of the troops in defense.

The second and third trenches were built to accommodate the reserves. The distance between the trenches was 100-150 m. Consequently, the defense was linear, its depth did not exceed 250-300 m. The battle formations of formations and units in defense were not echeloned. The infantry division defended itself in a zone of 10-12 km.

In order to strengthen the stability of the defense and reduce losses from artillery fire, in the 1915 campaign, they began to create a second position 2-4 km from the first position, on which divisional and corps reserves were located. Wire fences were built in front of the first position.

In the 1916 campaign, formations and units in the defense continued to build battle formations in one echelon, but the depth of defense increased due to the reduction of strips and sections and the construction of a third and intermediate position. The division defended itself in a zone of 8-10 km, occupying the first and intermediate positions with the main forces and reserves of the regiments and the second position with divisional reserves. The third position was occupied by corps reserves.

The total defense depth reached 7-8 km.

Within the positions, forces were not evenly distributed, but concentrated in well-equipped "centers of resistance" (strong points) adapted to all-round defense.

In the 1917 campaign, they began to create a forward position ("foreground") in order to hide the true leading edge from the enemy and reduce losses from artillery fire.

To repel tank attacks, they used cannon artillery and tore off anti-tank ditches. Consequently, the defense also became anti-tank.

Due to the great force of the initial strikes, which fell primarily on the first position, there were some changes in the methods of defense. A temporary loss of one or several positions was allowed, the struggle was shifted into the depths in order to defeat the enemy by counterattacks and counterattacks into the flank of the advancing groupings and throw him back to their original positions.

An important moment in the development of defense during the First World War was the development of a fortified area system that combined elements of long-term and field fortification.

World War I. Armed forces of the parties before the start of the war

Land armies

To characterize the military power of the belligerent parties, it would be necessary to assess the totality of the means at the disposal of each state that took an active part in the war at the time of its outbreak in August 1914. Such a task in its full scope is hardly feasible in the limited amount of this work.

The data below provide only some starting data on the size of the ground forces of both alliances at the beginning of the war, based on the latest statistics. In reality, the military power of any country is made up of a number of factors, among which the bare number of living forces alone does not give a complete picture of the power of the state. And by the beginning of the world war, not a single state foresaw the size of the coming struggle, especially its duration. As a result, the warring parties, having only peacetime ammunition, faced during the war itself with a number of surprises, which had to be overcome hastily in the process of struggle.

Russian army

Ten years before the outbreak of World War II, of the great powers, only Russia had a combat (and unsuccessful) experience of war - with Japan. This circumstance was supposed to have, and in fact did, influence on further development and the life of the Russian armed forces.

Russia has managed to heal its wounds and take a big step forward in terms of strengthening its military power. The mobilized Russian army in 1914 reached the grandiose number of 1816 battalions, 1110 squadrons and 7088 guns, 85% of which, according to the current situation, could be moved to the Western theater of military operations. The expansion of re-training of reserve personnel for training, as well as a number of verification mobilizations, improved the quality of the reserve and made all mobilization calculations more reliable.

In the Russian army under the influence Japanese war training was improved, the battle formations expanded, their elasticity began to be implemented, attention was paid to the importance of fire, the role of machine guns, the connection of artillery with the infantry, individual training of an individual soldier, to the training of junior command and especially officer personnel and to the education of troops in the spirit of active decisive action. But, on the other hand, the importance put forward by the Japanese war in the field of heavy artillery was ignored, which, however, should be attributed to the errors of all other armies, except for the German one. Neither the enormous consumption of ammunition, nor the importance of technology in a future war were sufficiently taken into account.

Paying great attention to the training of troops and the improvement of junior command personnel, the Russian General Staff completely ignored the selection and training of senior command personnel: it was not uncommon to appoint persons who had spent their entire life after graduating from the academy in the administrative chair immediately to the position of division chief and corps commander. The General Staff was cut off from the troops, in most cases limiting its acquaintance with them to a short qualifying command. The implementation of the idea of ​​maneuver in the troops was limited only by regulations and small military formations, but in practice, large military commanders and large military formations did not practice using it. As a result, the Russian impulse forward was groundless and inept, the divisions and corps slowly walked in the theater of operations, did not know how to perform maneuver marches in large masses, and at a time when the German corps easily passed 30 km in such an environment for many days in a row, Russians barely made 20 km each. Defense issues were neglected. The oncoming battle began to be studied by the entire army only with its appearance in the field regulations of 1912.

A uniform understanding of military phenomena and a uniform approach to them was not achieved either in the Russian army or in its General Staff. The latter, starting in 1905, received an autonomous position. He did very little to bring into the life of the army a unified view of modern military art. Having managed to destroy the old foundations, he could not give anything integral, and his young and most energetic representatives split, following the German and French military thought. With such a discrepancy in the understanding of the art of war, the Russian General Staff entered the world war. In addition, the Russian army began the war without a sufficiently well-trained officer and non-commissioned officer staff, with a small supply of personnel for new formations and for training conscripts, with a sharp, in comparison with the enemy, lack of artillery in general and heavy artillery in particular, very poorly supplied by all. technical means and ammunition and with poorly trained senior command personnel, having in their rear a country not prepared for waging a big war and its military administration and an industry completely unprepared for the transition to work for military needs.

In general, the Russian army went to war with good regiments, with mediocre divisions and corps and with bad armies and fronts, understanding this assessment in the broad sense of training, but not personal qualities.

Russia was aware of the shortcomings of its armed forces and from 1913 began to implement a large military program, which by 1917 was supposed to greatly strengthen the Russian army and in many ways make up for its shortcomings.

In terms of the number of aviation, Russia, with 216 aircraft, was in second place, following Germany.

French army

For more than forty years, the French army was under the impression of its defeat by the Prussian army and was preparing for an undoubted future clash with its enemy neighbor, not for life, but for death. The idea of ​​revenge and protection of its great-power existence at first, the struggle with Germany for the world market subsequently forced France to treat the development of its armed forces with special care, putting them, if possible, on an equal footing with its eastern neighbor. For France, this was especially difficult, due to the difference in the size of its population compared to Germany and the nature of the country's government, due to which the concern about its military power increased and then decreased.

The political tension of the last years before the war forced the French to show increased concern for their army. The military budget has increased greatly.

France was especially concerned about the growing difficulties in the development of its forces: in order to keep up with Germany, it was necessary to increase the annual recruitment of new recruits, but this measure was impracticable due to the weak growth of the population. Shortly before the war, France decided to switch from a 2-year to a 3-year term of active service, which increased the size of the standing army by 1/3 and facilitated its transition to a mobilized state. On August 7, 1913, a law was introduced on the transition to a 3-year service. This measure made it possible in the fall of 1913 to call under the banner of two ages at once, which gave a contingent of recruits of 445,000 people. In 1914, the composition of the standing army, without the colonial troops, reached 736,000. Special attention was paid to the increase in the native troops in the French colonies, which had such a significant benefit to their mother country. The strong staff of the French regiments contributed to the speed and strength of the new formations, as well as the speed and ease of mobilization, especially the cavalry and border troops. The French army of 1914 cannot be called widely provided with all the means of technology of that time. First of all, it draws attention, in comparison with Germany and Austria-Hungary, the complete absence of heavy field artillery, and in comparison with Russia, and the absence of light field howitzers; light field artillery was very poorly supplied with communications equipment, the cavalry did not have machine guns, etc.

As for aviation, by the beginning of the war, France had only 162 aircraft.

The French corps, like the Russians, were less well supplied with artillery than the German ones; only recently, before the war, attention was drawn to the importance of heavy artillery, but by the beginning of the war nothing had been done yet. In terms of calculating the necessary availability of ammunition, France was as far from the actual need as other countries.

The commanding staff were at the height of the demands of modern warfare, and great attention was paid to their training. There was no special cadre of the General Staff in the French army; persons with higher military education alternated their service between the formation and the headquarters. Special attention was paid to the training of high command personnel. Troop training stood at high level that time. The French soldiers were individually developed, skillful and fully prepared for field and trench warfare. The army was thoroughly preparing for mobile war; special attention was paid to the practice of marching movements of large masses.

French military thought worked independently and resulted in a certain doctrine opposite to the views of the Germans. The French developed the 19th century method of conducting operations and battles from the depths, and at the right moment maneuvered large forces and available reserves. They sought not to create a continuous front, but to enable the entire mass to maneuver, leaving sufficient strategic gaps between the armies. They pursued the idea of ​​the need to first clarify the situation and then lead the main mass for a decisive counterattack, and therefore, during the period of strategic preparation of operations, they were located on very deep ledges. Encounter fighting in the French army was not only not cultivated, but it was not even in the field manual.

The French guaranteed their method of ensuring the maneuvering of massive armies from the depths with a powerful network of railways and an understanding of the need for widespread use of vehicles in the theater of war, on the path of development of which they became the first of all European powers and in which they achieved great results.

In general, the Germans quite rightly considered the French army their most dangerous enemy. Its main drawback was the indecision of the initial actions up to and including the Marne victory.

English army

The character of the British army was sharply different from the armies of other European powers. The English army, intended mainly for service in the colonies, recruited hunters with a long period of active service. The units of this army, located in the metropolis, made up the field expeditionary army (6 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division and 1 cavalry brigade), which was intended for the European war.

In addition, a territorial army was created (14 infantry divisions and 14 cavalry brigades), intended to defend their country. According to the testimony of the German General Staff, the British field army was quoted as a worthy enemy with good combat practice in the colonies, with a trained command staff, but not adapted to waging a major European war, since the high command did not have the necessary experience for this. In addition, the British command did not manage to get rid of the bureaucracy that reigned in the headquarters of the higher formations, and this caused a lot of unnecessary friction and complications.

The lack of familiarity with other branches of the army in the army was striking. But the long service life, the fortress of tradition created tightly welded parts.

The training of the individual soldier and units up to the battalion was good. The individual development of the individual soldier, the execution of the campaigns and the training in shooting were at a high level. Armament and equipment were quite at their height, which made it possible to highly cultivate the art of shooting, and indeed, according to the testimony of the Germans, the machine-gun and rifle fire of the British at the beginning of the war was unusually marks.

The shortcomings of the English army were sharply revealed in the very first clash with the German army. The British failed and suffered such losses that in the future their actions were distinguished by excessive caution and even indecision.

Serbian and Belgian armies

The armies of these two states, like all their people, experienced during the war the most difficult fate of the first strike of neighboring colossi and the loss of their territory. Both of them were distinguished by high fighting qualities, but otherwise there is a noticeable difference between them.

Belgium, provided with "eternal neutrality", did not prepare its army for a big war, therefore it did not have characteristic, firmly established features. The long absence of combat practice left a well-known imprint on her, and in the first combat clashes she showed a natural inexperience in waging a big war.

The Serbian army, on the other hand, had a great and successful combat experience in the Balkan war of 1912-1913. and represented, like a solid military organism, an impressive force, quite capable, as it was in reality, of diverting the outnumbered enemy troops.

German army

The German army, after the success of its weapons in 1866 and especially in 1870, enjoyed a reputation as the best army in Europe.

The German army served as a model for a number of other armies, most of which were under its influence and even exactly copied its structure, German regulations, and followed German military thought.

With regard to organizational issues, the German military department, by the consistent development of personnel in quantitative and qualitative terms and by maintaining reserve personnel in the sense of training and education, has achieved the ability to develop its armed forces to the maximum use of the male population. At the same time, he managed to preserve the almost complete uniformity of the combat qualities of the newly formed units with personnel. Investigating the experiences of each war, the German General Staff cultivated this experience in its army. Germany turned out to be more ready for war than her enemies. The stronghold of the German army was a close-knit, monotonous and well-trained officer and non-commissioned officer corps. It was so numerous that during the war it could partly serve the allied armies.

In training the army, not only in theory, but also in practice, the principle of activity, audacity and mutual assistance and gain was widely applied. It cannot be said that the center of gravity in the training of troops was the individual fighter: discipline, turning into drill, the movement to attack in dense chains were characteristic of the German army in 1914. The retract and dense formation, together with German punctuality, made it the most capable of maneuvering and marching movements in large masses. The main type of battle was considered a meeting battle, in the principles of which the German army was mainly trained.

At the same time, it paid more attention to tactical defense than other armies.

German military thought crystallized into a very definite and clear doctrine, which ran through the entire command staff of the army.

The last teacher of the German army before the world war, who managed to carry out his teachings with energy in the thickness of the army, was the chief of the German General Staff Schlieffen, a big fan of flanking operations with double coverage (Cannes). Schlieffen's idea was that modern battles should be reduced to a struggle for the flanks, in which the winner will be the one who will have the last reserves not behind the middle of the front, but on its extreme flank. Schlieffen proceeded from the conclusion that in the coming battles, the natural desire to provide for oneself, in connection with the desire to use the full force of modern weapons, will lead to an enormous lengthening of the battle fronts, which will have a completely different length than it was before. To achieve a decisive result and defeat the enemy, it is necessary to conduct an offensive from two or three sides, that is, from the front and from the flanks. In this case, the means necessary for a strong flank attack can be obtained by weakening as much as possible the front, which in any case must also participate in the offensive. All troops that were previously held up for use at a decisive moment must now be moved into battle; the deployment of forces for battle must begin from the moment troops are unloaded from the railways.

The German Grand General Staff, promoted by the care of Field Marshal Moltke the Elder to a dominant place in the construction of the armed forces of the empire and in preparation for war, has preserved the traditions of its founder. The connection of officers of the General Staff with the formation, a detailed study of all elements of war, practical conclusions from this study, a monotonous approach to understanding them and a well-organized staff service technique were its positive side.

From a technical point of view, the German army was well equipped and differed in favor of its enemies by the comparative wealth of field, not only light, but also heavy artillery, the significance of which it understood better than others.

Austro-Hungarian Army

The Austro-Hungarian army occupied one of the last places among the initial participants in the war. The available composition of the military units was very weakened (60, later 92 people in the company); there was not enough trained people to bring the field troops to full combat strength; Landwehr had no artillery until 1912. Although the principles underlying the regulations were in line with the times, the teachings were lame, and the senior military commanders had no experience in commanding the troops.

A distinctive feature of the Austro-Hungarian army was its multi-ethnic character, since it consisted of Germans, Magyars, Czechs, Poles, Rusyns, Serbs, Croats, Slovaks, Romanians, Italians and Gypsies, united only by officers. In the opinion of the German General Staff, the Austro-Hungarian army, being simultaneously engaged in fighting on two fronts, could not free the German forces assembled on the Russian border, and its numerical strength, degree of training, organization and, in part, weapons left much to be desired. In terms of the speed of mobilization and concentration, the Austro-Hungarian army was superior to the Russian, against which it had to act.

Comparison of both sides

Comparing the armed forces of the first-class powers that clashed in 1914, one can come to the following conclusion.

1. With regard to the size of the army and manpower, the Entente, thanks to Russia, was in a more advantageous position than the Central Powers. However, the slowness of the mobilization and concentration of the Russian army, as well as the lack of railways in Russia, which made it difficult to transfer troops from one theater to another, greatly diminished, and at the beginning of the war completely destroyed this advantage.

2. The development of the armed forces during the war to the limit corresponding to the size of the population was quite achievable in Germany and France, less achievable in Austria and proved to be beyond the strength of Russia, constrained by personnel, reserves, the presence of a large territory and the weakness of the rail network. This condition was especially disadvantageous for the Entente, since Russia represented a large share in it.

3. The training of all armies was conducted in one direction, but for the better it distinguished the French and especially the German armies; the Russian army, which made great improvements in this respect after the Japanese war, did not manage to reach the limit of desirable perfection by 1914. The Austro-Hungarian army was inferior to the Russian in this respect.

4. The highest command personnel in their total mass stood at the proper height only in the German and French armies.

5. Military thought in crystallized form resulted in French and German military doctrines.

6. The speed of mobilization and deployment was on the side of the Central Powers.

7. With regard to the supply of artillery, especially heavy artillery, the German and partly the Austro-Hungarian armies stood out in an advantageous direction.

8. In the matter of supplying equipment, the Russian army lagged far behind all the others; it was followed by the Austro-Hungarian.

9. Both sides began the war with an offensive, and the idea of ​​bold action became guiding for both sides. But in the sense of preparing for the implementation of this idea, carrying it through the entire thickness of the army was achieved by constant and methodical work only in the German army, which distinguished it in positive side compared to the Entente.

10. The German army went to war, intoxicated by the successes of the Austro-Prussian wars of 1866 and the Franco-Prussian wars of 1870-1871.

11. Both sides prepared for the inevitable war in order to march fully armed. If France and Germany achieved this, then the large military program, which was supposed to strengthen the power of the Russian army, ended in 1917, and in this respect, the start of the war in 1914 was extremely beneficial for the Central Powers. With such an approximate equality of the armed forces of the warring parties and, if necessary, waging a war until the complete destruction of the enemy, it was difficult to count on a quick end to the war, unless the exceptional case of lightning-fast crushing of one of the main constituent parts of the coalition intervened. Taking into account such a case, the Germans, as we will see below, built their own plan, but their map was battered.

The degree of preparation of the parties to conduct modern warfare

But if all states prepared their armed forces with special effort for the inevitable war, then the same cannot be said about preparing them for the proper nourishment of modern war. This is explained by the general failure to take into account the nature of the coming war in the sense of: 1) its duration, since everyone proceeded from the expectation of its brevity, believing that modern states cannot withstand a long war; 2) the enormous consumption of ammunition and 3) the enormous consumption of technical means and the need to procure various equipment, especially weapons and ammunition, in an unexpectedly large amount during the war itself. All states, not excluding Germany, faced a sad surprise in this respect, and during the war itself were forced to correct the shortcomings of peaceful preparation. France and England, with their extensive development of heavy industry and with comparatively free supplies thanks to their domination of the sea, easily coped with this matter. Germany, surrounded by enemies on all sides and deprived of sea communications, suffered from a shortage of raw materials, but coped with this matter with the help of her firm organization and maintaining communication with Asia Minor through the Balkan Peninsula. But Russia, with a poorly developed industry, with a bad administration, cut off from its allies, with a huge area of ​​its territory and a poorly developed rail network, began to cope with this deficiency only towards the end of the war.

It remains to note one more feature that sharply distinguished Russia from other belligerent powers - poverty in rail tracks. If France, militarily, was fully provided with a richly developed network of railways, supplemented on a large scale by road transport, if Germany, which is equally rich in railways, in last years before the war, it built special lines in accordance with the war plan established by it, then Russia was provided with railways in an amount that did not at all correspond to the conduct of a big war.

Maritime forces of the belligerent powers

The decade preceding the world war can be marked in the development of naval forces by three facts: the growth of the German navy, the restoration of the Russian fleet after its catastrophic defeat during the Japanese war, and the development of the submarine fleet.

Naval preparations for war in Germany were carried out in the direction of building a fleet of large warships (7.5 billion gold marks were spent on this in several years), which caused strong political excitement, especially in England.

Russia developed its fleet exclusively with active defensive missions in the Baltic and Black Seas.

The submarine fleet received the greatest attention in England and France; Germany shifted the center of gravity of the naval struggle to it already during the war itself.

Distribution of naval forces of both sides before the start of the war

In the general balance of the naval forces of the belligerent states, the British and German fleets were of dominant importance in terms of their power, a combat meeting of which was expected with particular concern throughout the world from the first day of the war. Their clash could immediately have very serious consequences for one of the parties. On the eve of the declaration of war, there was a moment when, according to some assumptions, such a meeting was included in the calculations of the British Admiralty. Already beginning in 1905, the British naval forces, until then scattered on the most important sea routes, began to pull together to the shores of England in the composition of three "home" fleets, that is, intended for defense British isles... When mobilized, these three fleets were combined into one "Big" fleet, which in July 1914 consisted of a total of 8 battleship squadrons and 11 cruiser squadrons, - a total of 460 pennants with small ships. On July 15, 1914, an experimental mobilization was announced to this fleet, culminating in maneuvers and a royal review on July 20 at the Spitgad roadstead. In connection with the Austrian ultimatum, the demobilization of the fleet was suspended, and then on July 28 the fleet was ordered to go from Portland to Scapa Flow near the Orkney Islands off the northern coast of Scotland.

At the same time, the German High Seas Fleet set out on cruise to Norwegian waters, from where it was returned on July 27 - 28 to the shores of Germany. The English fleet went from Portland to the north of Scotland not along the usual route - west of the island, but along the east coast of England. Both fleets sailed in the North Sea in opposite directions.

By the beginning of the war, the British Grand Fleet was located in two groups: in the far north of Scotland and in the English Channel near Portland.

In the Mediterranean, according to the Anglo-French agreement, the entente's naval supremacy was entrusted to the French fleet, which, among its best units, was concentrated at Toulon. It was his responsibility to provide routes of communication with North Africa. An English cruising squadron was stationed off the island of Malta.

British cruisers also served as the guard of sea routes in the Atlantic Ocean, off the coast of Australia, and, in addition, significant cruising forces were stationed in the western Pacific.

In the English Channel, in addition to the second English fleet, a light squadron of French cruisers was concentrated near Cherbourg; it consisted of armored cruisers supported by a flotilla of mineships and submarines. This squadron guarded the southwestern approaches to the English Channel. V Pacific Indochina had 3 light French cruisers.

The Russian fleet was divided into three parts.

The Baltic Fleet, immensely inferior in strength to the enemy, was forced to adopt an exclusively defensive course of action, trying to delay, as far as possible, the offensive of the enemy fleet and landing into the depths of the Gulf of Finland on the Reval-Porkallaud line. In order to strengthen oneself and even out the chances of a battle, it was planned to equip a fortified mine position in this area, which by the time of the outbreak of the war was far from complete (or rather, just begun). On the flanks of this so-called central position, on both shores of the bay, on the islands of Makilota and Nargen, batteries of long-range large-caliber guns were installed, and a minefield was placed in several lines throughout the position.

The Black Sea Fleet remained on the Sevastopol roadstead and was inactive, failing even to properly lay minefields at the entrance to the Bosphorus. However, one cannot but take into account the entire difficulty of the position of the Black Sea Fleet, not only with regard to the lack of combat forces, but also in the sense of the absence of other operational bases, except for Sevastopol. It was very difficult to base on Sevastopol to monitor the Bosphorus, and operations to block the enemy's entry into the Black Sea in these conditions were completely unsecured.

Far Eastern squadron - from its composition 2 light cruisers ("Askold" and "Pearl") tried to cruise off the southeastern shores of Asia.

The German High Seas Fleet consisted of 3 battleship squadrons, a cruising squadron and a fighter fleet. After cruising off the coast of Norway, this fleet returned to its shores, with 1 line and cruising squadrons at Wilhelmshaven in the roadstead, under the cover of the batteries of Heligoland Island, and 2 other line squadrons and a flotilla of fighters - at Kiel in the Baltic Sea. By this time, the Kiel Canal was deepened for the passage of dreadnoughts, and thus the squadrons from Kiel could join the squadrons of the North Sea if necessary. In addition to the aforementioned High Seas Fleet, along the coast of Germany there was a large defensive fleet, but from already outdated ships. The German cruisers "Goeben" and "Breslau" skilfully slipped past the British and French cruisers into the Black Sea, which later caused enough trouble for the Russian Black Sea Fleet and the coast. In the Pacific Ocean, the German ships were partly at their base - Qingdao, near Kiao-chao, and Admiral Spee's light squadron of 6 new cruisers cruised near the Caroline Islands.

The Austro-Hungarian fleet was concentrated on the raids of Paul and Katarro in the Adriatic Sea and took refuge behind coastal batteries from the cruisers and mine ships of the Entente.

Comparing the naval forces of both coalitions, the following can be noted:

1. The forces of England alone exceeded the strength of the entire fleet of the Central Powers.

2. Most of the naval forces were concentrated in the European seas.

3. The English and French fleets were fully able to operate jointly.

4. The German fleet could receive freedom of action only after a successful battle in the North Sea, which it would have to give with the most unfavorable balance of forces, i.e., in fact, the German surface fleet was locked in its territorial waters, having the ability to undertake offensive operations only against the Russian Baltic Fleet.

5. The naval forces of the Entente were the actual masters of all water areas, with the exception of the Baltic and Black Seas, where the Central Powers had a chance of success - in the Baltic Sea in the struggle of the German fleet with the Russian and in the Black Sea in the struggle of the Turkish fleet with the Russian.

After the end of the unsuccessful war for Russia with Japan, a set of measures was taken that were carried out from 1905-1912. and touched upon various aspects of the Russian armed forces. In particular, with the introduction of a territorial recruitment system, the centralization of military command was strengthened; the terms of service in the army and the navy were reduced, the officer corps was rejuvenated; new programs for military schools, new regulations and models of artillery pieces have been adopted; heavy field artillery has been created, engineering troops have been strengthened, and material support has been improved; reconstruction of fleets in the Pacific Ocean and the Baltic, which suffered heavy losses in ships.

In 1912, under the leadership of General M.A. Belyaev in Russia, a "Large Program for Strengthening the Army" was developed. In March - October 1913, the provisions of the program were approved by NikolaiII, however, it was approved only on June 24, 1914, when before the start ofNSWorld War I was just over a month away.

"Two more years of peace, and Russia, with its 180 million souls, had such a powerful army in terms of quantity, education and supply that it would be able, in its own interests, to give direction to the solution of all political issues of the European continent."

V. A. Sukhomlinov - Minister of War of Russia in 1909-1915.

On the eve of the war, Russia came with a peacetime army of 1 million 423 thousand people. After mobilization, it numbered about 6 million people. In total, during the years of the First World War, almost 16 million people were mobilized into the Russian army. All of the above figures exceeded those of any of the belligerent countries during the war years.

General Alexei Aleksevich Brusilov

In the historical and journalistic literature, you can find two polar points of view on the command staff of the Russian army during the First World War. The first represented the officers and generals as people endowed with outstanding qualities. According to the second point of view, the commanders of the first half of the 1910s. quite often they were mediocrity, and even mediocrity. Of course, the bulk of the Russian command staff was neither the one nor the other. These were professional military men, graduates of specialized military institutions, for whom military science became a profession (it is difficult to blame L.G.Kornilov, M.V. Alekseev, A.I.Denikin, A.V. Samsonov, A.A. and etc.). It is they who will subsequently form the backbone of the command staff in the years civil war both the "whites" and the "reds".

Huge losses among the personnel of the Russian army already in the first year of the war led to the fact that after mobilization in the army there was an increase in the proportion of the peasant population, half of which were illiterate. This did not prevent the Russian soldier from being brave and resilient on the battlefields, but at the same time the German soldier, who at that time was the product of one of the most technically prepared nations in the world, had to resist. And here such categories as endurance, patience, obedience, inherent in the communal psychology of the Russian warrior, turned out to be insufficient in the incipient war of technologies.

The main tactical unit of the Russian army was an infantry division, numbering 14.5 thousand people, which, as a rule, was reduced to four infantry regiments. The main weapon of the Russian army was the Mosin three-line rifle, model 1891, which was distinguished by its simplicity and reliability, and undemanding manufacturing technology. Unfortunately, especially in the early years of the war, due to various circumstances in the Russian army, there was not only an understaffing, but sometimes even a catastrophic shortage of rifles among the rank and file of the infantry. The more advanced rifles V.G. Fedorov and F.V. Tokarev were not accepted for mass production either before or during the war.

Mosin rifle model 1891

In addition, Japanese Arisaka rifles, captured Austro-Hungarian Mannlicher rifles, German Mauser, Winchester rifles were used to varying degrees, mainly modifications of the end of the XIXcentury, but their use was secondary in relation to the Mosin rifle.

By July 1914, the Russian army had 4157 machine guns (mainly the Maxim, Vickers, Colt Browning, Shosha, etc. machine guns were presented), which was clearly not enough to meet the needs of the army - this the problem will persist throughout the entire period of the war, even despite the influx of captured weapons and allied supplies from France and the United States.

Perhaps one of the problematic branches of the troops in Russia on the eve of the First World War was artillery. The roots of these problems lie in outdated pre-war ideas about the nature of war. The prevailing fascination with theories about the omnipotence of the Russian bayonet strike, the belief that not a single enemy was able to withstand it, therefore, the fate of the war would be decided by quick sudden strikes in a field battle. The artillery was in the stage of formation, especially the heavy ones. In addition, the problem of a shortage of shells arose very quickly. Already at the end of 1914, the need was determined at 1.5 million shells per month. It was not possible to provide this need with the forces of the domestic military industry. In the future, they will partly try to compensate for the problem with the lack of shells through increased production and allied supplies of weapons, but they will not be able to fully resolve it.

By the beginning of the twentieth century. lost its former significance such an arm of troops as the cavalry. During the First World War, although the cavalry was the only mobile combat arm, numerically, it amounted to no more than 10% of the armies of the belligerent countries. The peculiarities of military operations during the war years (the active use of artillery, machine guns, aviation) led to large losses of personnel and horses, which made this branch of the military ineffective. Numerous Russian cavalry (36 cavalry divisions, 200 thousand people) as a result, in fact, was sometimes forced to turn into infantrymen, conducting hostilities from the trenches. It should be noted that two-thirds of the total Russian cavalry was made up of Cossack cavalry. Taking into account the high percentage of equestrian units among them and the traditions of horse breeding, the Cossacks found it most difficult to reorganize in the conditions of the changed nature of the war. Often, the Cossacks were not psychologically ready to "get off the horse", perceiving this as a kind of betrayal of the age-old foundations.

Don Cossack Kozma (Kuzma) Firsovich Kryuchkov - the first Knight of St. George among the lower ranks of the Russian army

The First World War actually only marked the use of vehicles in war conditions. Only on the eve of the war was the "Regulations on military-automobile conscription" approved, which provided for the transfer of the army by the civilian population of all privately owned Vehicle with reimbursement to the owners of their value. After the start of the war, in accordance with this provision, 3.5 thousand cars and 475 trucks were seized from the population. Under wartime conditions, vehicles equipped with guns, including anti-aircraft guns, began to be created. Ambulance detachments also provided great assistance in the field army.

Ambulance car during the First World War

One of the problems that permanently existed during the First World War was the organization of the supply of the Russian army. Difficulties with transport support can be explained by the huge distances over which it was necessary to carry out transportation in Russia - they were 3-4 times higher than the German ones. Unfortunately, corruption and mercantile factors were widespread in matters of supply. It has long been no secret that war is one of the ways to get rich (this is clearly seen in the example of the United States, which, as a result of the First World War, turned from debtors into the largest creditors on a global scale). The normal operation of railway transport (it was the main transport for transportation) and the state of the tracks and steam locomotives did not contribute to the normal operation of troops and supplies on enemy territory). To this should be added the climatic features of Russia - the long duration of the winter period and the lower winter temperature regime, which means the need for more use of fuel (coal, first of all). All this naturally increased costs, both time and financial. Repeated attempts to establish normal supplies between the rear and the front were unsuccessful.

Sworn soldier tries to stop deserters

February Revolution of 1917, abdication of NicholasIIand then his brother Mikhail from the Russian throne led to significant changes in the Russian army. Order No. 1, which effectively removed the soldier from the authority of the commanders, contributed to a sharp drop in the discipline and combat capability of the army. The army was negatively affected by the incessant propaganda from various parties, which had an anti-government, anti-militaristic character. Since the spring of 1917, desertions have intensified even more (by November 1917 there were about 1.5 million deserters registered), facts of "fraternization at the front" and voluntary surrender have become frequent. The Russian army was close to collapse.

Ph.D. Vladimir Gizhov,

Alexander Gizhov.

Especially for the magazine "Russian Horizon"

World War I (1914 - 1918)

The Russian Empire collapsed. One of the goals of the war has been accomplished.

Chamberlain

The First World War lasted from August 1, 1914 to November 11, 1918. It was attended by 38 states with a population of 62% of the world. This war was quite ambiguous and extremely contradictory described in modern history... I deliberately cited Chamberlain's words in the epigraph to once again emphasize this inconsistency. A prominent politician in England (Russia's ally in the war) says that one of the goals of the war has been achieved by overthrowing the autocracy in Russia!

The Balkan countries played an important role at the beginning of the war. They were not independent. Their policies (both foreign and domestic) were greatly influenced by England. Germany by that time had lost its influence in this region, although it controlled Bulgaria for a long time.

  • Entente. Russian Empire, France, Great Britain. The USA, Italy, Romania, Canada, Australia, New Zealand were allies.
  • Triple Alliance. Germany, Austria-Hungary, Ottoman Empire... Later they were joined by the Bulgarian kingdom, and the coalition became known as the "Quadruple Alliance".

The following large countries took part in the war: Austria-Hungary (July 27, 1914 - November 3, 1918), Germany (August 1, 1914 - November 11, 1918), Turkey (October 29, 1914 - October 30, 1918), Bulgaria (October 14, 1915 - 29 September 1918). Entente countries and allies: Russia (August 1, 1914 - March 3, 1918), France (August 3, 1914), Belgium (August 3, 1914), Great Britain (August 4, 1914), Italy (May 23, 1915), Romania (August 27, 1916) ...

One more important point. Initially, Italy was a member of the Triple Alliance. But after the outbreak of the First World War, the Italians declared neutrality.

Causes of the First World War

The main reason for the outbreak of the First World War is the desire of the leading powers, primarily England, France and Austria-Hungary, to redistribute the world. The fact is that the colonial system collapsed by the beginning of the 20th century. The leading European countries, which for years prospered through the exploitation of colonies, now could not get resources just like that, taking them away from the Indians, Africans and South Americans. Now resources could only be won back from each other. Therefore, contradictions grew:

  • Between England and Germany. England sought to prevent the strengthening of Germany's influence in the Balkans. Germany sought to gain a foothold in the Balkans and the Middle East, and also sought to deprive England of naval domination.
  • Between Germany and France. France dreamed of regaining the lands of Alsace and Lorraine, which it had lost in the war of 1870-71. Also, France sought to seize the German Saar coal basin.
  • Between Germany and Russia. Germany sought to take Poland, Ukraine and the Baltic states away from Russia.
  • Between Russia and Austria-Hungary. The contradictions arose because of the desire of both countries to influence the Balkans, as well as the desire of Russia to subjugate the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

The reason for the start of the war

The events in Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina) served as a pretext for the outbreak of the First World War. On June 28, 1914, Gavrilo Princip, a member of the Black Hand of the Young Bosnia movement, assassinated Archduke Frans Ferdinand. Ferdinand was the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, so the murder had a huge resonance. This was the reason for Austria-Hungary to attack Serbia.

The behavior of England is very important here, since Austria-Hungary on its own could not start a war, because this practically guaranteed a war in all of Europe. The British at the embassy level convinced Nicholas II that Russia should not leave Serbia without help in case of aggression. But then all (I emphasize this) the English press wrote that the Serbs are barbarians and Austria-Hungary should not leave the murder of the Archduke unpunished. That is, England did everything so that Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia did not evade the war.

Important nuances of the reason for war

In all textbooks we are told that the main and only reason for the outbreak of the First World War is the assassination of the Austrian Archduke. At the same time, they forget to say that the next day, June 29, another significant murder took place. The French politician Jean Jaures, who actively opposed the war and had great influence in France, was killed. A few weeks before the assassination of the Archduke, there was an attempt on the life of Rasputin, who, like Jaures, was an opponent of the war and had a great influence on Nicholas 2. I also want to note some facts from the fate of the main characters of those days:

  • Gavrilo Principin. He died in prison in 1918 from tuberculosis.
  • Russian Ambassador to Serbia - Hartley. In 1914 he died at the Austrian Embassy in Serbia, where he attended a reception.
  • Colonel Apis, leader of the Black Hand. Shot in 1917.
  • In 1917, Hartley's correspondence with Sozonov (the next Russian ambassador to Serbia) disappeared.

All this indicates that there were a lot of black spots in the events of the days, which have not been revealed until now. And this is very important to understand.

England's role in starting the war

At the beginning of the 20th century, there were 2 great powers in continental Europe: Germany and Russia. They did not want to openly fight against each other, since the forces were approximately equal. Therefore, in the "July crisis" of 1914, both sides took a wait-and-see attitude. English diplomacy came to the fore. She, through the press and secret diplomacy, conveyed to Germany the position - in case of war, England would remain neutral or take the side of Germany. By open diplomacy, Nicholas II received the opposite idea that in the event of the outbreak of war, England would side with Russia.

It should be clearly understood that one open statement by England that she will not allow war in Europe would be enough for neither Germany nor Russia to think about anything of the kind. Naturally, in such conditions, Austria-Hungary would not have dared to attack Serbia. But England, with all her diplomacy, pushed European countries to war.

Russia before the war

Before the First World War, Russia carried out an army reform. In 1907, the fleet was reformed, and in 1910 the land forces were reformed. The country has multiplied military spending, and the total army in peacetime was now 2 million people. In 1912, Russia adopted a new Charter of the Field Service. Today it is rightfully called the most perfect charter of its time, since it motivated soldiers and commanders to show personal initiative. An important point! The doctrine of the army of the Russian Empire was offensive.

Despite the fact that there were many positive changes, there were also very serious miscalculations. The main one is the underestimation of the role of artillery in the war. As the course of events of the First World War showed, it was a terrible mistake, which clearly showed that at the beginning of the 20th century, Russian generals were seriously behind the times. They lived in the past when the role of the cavalry was important. As a result, 75% of all losses of the First World War were inflicted by artillery! This is a sentence to the imperial generals.

It is important to note that Russia never completed preparations for war (at the proper level), and Germany completed it in 1914.

The ratio of forces and means before the war and after it

Artillery

Number of guns

Of these, heavy weapons

Austro-hungary

Germany

According to the data from the table, it can be seen that in heavy guns Germany and Austria-Hungary were many times superior to Russia and France. Therefore, the balance of forces was in favor of the first two countries. Moreover, the Germans, as usual, created an excellent war industry before the war, which produced 250,000 rounds daily. By comparison, Britain was producing 10,000 shells a month! As they say, feel the difference ...

Another example showing the importance of artillery is the fighting on the Dunajec Gorlice line (May 1915). In 4 hours, the German army fired 700,000 shells. For comparison, during the entire Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) Germany fired just over 800,000 shells. That is, in 4 hours a little less than in the entire war. The Germans clearly understood that heavy artillery would play a decisive role in the war.

Armament and military equipment

Production of weapons and equipment during the First World War (thousand units).

Shooting

Artillery

United Kingdom

TRIPLE ALLIANCE

Germany

Austro-hungary

This table clearly shows weakness Russian Empire in terms of equipping the army. In all the main indicators, Russia is much inferior to Germany, but also inferior to France and Great Britain. Largely because of this, the war turned out to be so difficult for our country.


Number of people (infantry)

The number of fighting infantry (millions).

At the start of the war

By the end of the war

Casualties

United Kingdom

TRIPLE ALLIANCE

Germany

Austro-hungary

The table shows that Great Britain made the smallest contribution, in terms of both combatants and deaths, to the war. This is logical, since the British did not really participate in major battles. Another example from this table is indicative. We are told in all textbooks that Austria-Hungary, due to heavy losses, could not fight on its own, and she always needed the help of Germany. But pay attention to Austria-Hungary and France in the table. The numbers are identical! Just as Germany had to fight for Austria-Hungary, so Russia had to fight for France (it is no coincidence that the Russian army three times during the First World War saved Paris from surrender by its actions).

The table also shows that in fact the war was between Russia and Germany. Both countries lost 4.3 million people killed, while Britain, France and Austria-Hungary together lost 3.5 million. The numbers are eloquent. But it turned out that the countries that fought the most and made efforts in the war ended up with nothing. First, Russia signed the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, shameful for itself, having lost many lands. Then Germany signed the Treaty of Versailles, essentially losing its independence.


The course of the war

Military events of 1914

On July 28, Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia. This entailed the involvement in the war of the countries of the Troitsvenny Alliance, on the one hand, and the Entente, on the other.

Russia entered World War I on August 1, 1914. Nikolai Nikolayevich Romanov (Nikolai's uncle 2) was appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

In the first days of the outbreak of the war, St. Petersburg was renamed Petrograd. Since the war with Germany began, and the capital could not have the name of German origin - "burg".

Historical reference


German "Schlieffen Plan"

Germany was under the threat of war on two fronts: the East with Russia, the West with France. Then the German command developed the "Schlieffen plan", according to which Germany must defeat France in 40 days and then fight with Russia. Why 40 days? The Germans believed that that was exactly how much Russia would need to mobilize. Therefore, when Russia is mobilized, France will already be out of the game.

On August 2, 1914, Germany captured Luxembourg, on August 4, they invaded Belgium (a neutral country at that time), and by August 20, Germany reached the borders of France. The implementation of the Schlieffen plan began. Germany advanced deep into France, but on September 5 was stopped at the River Marne, where a battle took place, in which about 2 million people participated on both sides.

Northwestern Front of Russia in 1914

At the beginning of the war, Russia did something stupid that Germany could not possibly calculate. Nicholas 2 decided to enter the war without fully mobilizing the army. On August 4, Russian troops, under the command of Rennenkampf, launched an offensive in East Prussia (present-day Kaliningrad). Samsonov's army was equipped to help her. Initially, the troops operated successfully, and Germany was forced to retreat. As a result, part of the forces of the Western Front was transferred to the Eastern. The result - Germany repulsed the offensive of Russia in East Prussia (the troops acted disorganized and lacked resources), but as a result, the Schlieffen plan failed, and France was not captured. So, Russia saved Paris, though by defeating its 1st and 2nd armies. After that, trench warfare began.

Southwestern Front of Russia

On the southwestern front in August-September, Russia launched an offensive operation against Galicia, which was occupied by the troops of Austria-Hungary. The Galician operation was more successful than the offensive in East Prussia. In this battle, Austria-Hungary suffered a catastrophic defeat. 400 thousand people killed, 100 thousand captured. For comparison, the Russian army lost 150 thousand people killed. After that, Austria-Hungary actually withdrew from the war, since it lost the ability to conduct independent actions. Austria was saved from complete defeat only by the help of Germany, which was forced to transfer additional divisions to Galicia.

The main results of the military campaign in 1914

  • Germany failed to implement Schlieffen's plan for lightning war.
  • No one has won a decisive advantage. The war turned into a trench war.

Map of military events 1914-15 years


Military events of 1915

In 1915, Germany decided to shift the main blow to the eastern front, directing all its forces to the war with Russia, which was the weakest country of the Entente, according to the Germans. It was a strategic plan developed by the commander of the Eastern Front, General von Hindenburg. Russia managed to thwart this plan only at the cost of colossal losses, but at the same time 1915 turned out to be simply terrible for the empire of Nicholas II.


Position on the northwestern front

From January to October, Germany led an active offensive, as a result of which Russia lost Poland, western Ukraine, part of the Baltic states, and western Belarus. Russia went into deep defense. The losses of the Russians were gigantic:

  • Killed and wounded - 850 thousand people
  • Captured - 900 thousand people

Russia did not capitulate, but the countries of the Triple Alliance were convinced that Russia would no longer be able to recover from the losses it had received.

The successes of Germany in this sector of the front led to the fact that on October 14, 1915, Bulgaria entered the First World War (on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary).

Position on the southwestern front

The Germans, together with Austria-Hungary, organized the Gorlitsky breakthrough in the spring of 1915, forcing the entire southwestern front of Russia to retreat. Galicia, which was captured in 1914, was completely lost. Germany was able to achieve this advantage thanks to the terrible mistakes of the Russian command, as well as a significant technical advantage. German superiority in technology reached:

  • 2.5 times with machine guns.
  • 4.5 times in light artillery.
  • 40 times with heavy artillery.

It was not possible to withdraw Russia from the war, but the losses in this sector of the front were gigantic: 150 thousand killed, 700 thousand wounded, 900 thousand prisoners and 4 million refugees.

Position on the western front

"Everything is calm on the western front." This phrase can be used to describe the course of the war between Germany and France in 1915. There was a sluggish military action in which no one strove for the initiative. Germany implemented plans in Eastern Europe, and England and France calmly mobilized the economy and the army, preparing for further war. Nobody provided any help to Russia, although Nicholas II repeatedly appealed to France, first of all, to initiate active operations on the Western Front. As usual, no one heard him ... By the way, this sluggish war on the western front for Germany is perfectly described by Hemingway in his novel A Farewell to Arms.

The main result of 1915 was that Germany was unable to withdraw Russia from the war, although all forces were thrown into this. It became obvious that the First World War would drag on for a long time, since no one was able to gain an advantage or strategic initiative during 1.5 years of the war.

Military events of 1916


"Verdun meat grinder"

In February 1916, Germany launched a general offensive against France, with the aim of capturing Paris. For this, a campaign was carried out to Verdun, which covered the approaches to the French capital. The battle lasted until the end of 1916. During this time, 2 million people died, for which the battle was named "Verdun meat grinder". France resisted, but again thanks to the fact that Russia came to its rescue, which became more active on the southwestern front.

Events on the southwestern front in 1916

In May 1916, Russian troops launched an offensive that lasted 2 months. This offensive went down in history under the name "Brusilov Breakthrough". This name is due to the fact that the Russian army was commanded by General Brusilov. The breakthrough of the defense in Bukovina (from Lutsk to Chernivtsi) happened on June 5. The Russian army managed not only to break through the defenses, but also to advance into its depths in places up to 120 kilometers. The losses of the Germans and Austro-Hungarians were catastrophic. 1.5 million dead, wounded and prisoners. The offensive was stopped only by additional German divisions, which were hastily transferred here from Verdun (France) and from Italy.

This offensive of the Russian army was not without a fly in the ointment. The allies threw her up, as usual. On August 27, 1916, Romania entered the First World War on the side of the Entente. Germany very quickly defeated her. As a result, Romania lost the army, and Russia received an additional 2 thousand kilometers of the front.

Events on the Caucasian and Northwestern Fronts

Positional battles continued on the North-Western Front during the spring-autumn period. As for the Caucasian Front, here the main events lasted from the beginning of 1916 to April. During this time, 2 operations were carried out: Erzurmur and Trebizond. According to their results, Erzurum and Trebizond were conquered, respectively.

Outcome of 1916 in the First World War

  • The strategic initiative went over to the side of the Entente.
  • The French fortress of Verdun survived thanks to the offensive of the Russian army.
  • Romania entered the war on the side of the Entente.
  • Russia launched a powerful offensive - the Brusilov Breakthrough.

Military and political events 1917


The year 1917 in the First World War was marked by the fact that the war continued against the background of the revolutionary situation in Russia and Germany, as well as the deterioration of the economic situation of the countries. Let me give you an example of Russia. Over the 3 years of the war, prices for basic products have grown by an average of 4-4.5 times. Naturally, this caused discontent among the people. Add to this the heavy losses and the exhausting war - it is an excellent ground for revolutionaries. The situation is similar in Germany.

In 1917, the United States entered the First World War. The positions of the "Triple Alliance" are deteriorating. Germany with its allies cannot effectively fight on 2 fronts, as a result of which it goes on the defensive.

The end of the war for Russia

In the spring of 1917, Germany launched another offensive on the Western Front. Despite the events in Russia, Western countries demanded that the Provisional Government implement the agreements signed by the Empire and send troops on the offensive. As a result, on June 16, the Russian army launched an offensive in the Lvov region. Again, we saved the allies from major battles, but we ourselves were completely substituted.

The Russian army, exhausted by the war and losses, did not want to fight. The issues of provisions, uniforms and supplies during the war years have not been resolved. The army fought reluctantly, but moved forward. The Germans were forced to redeploy troops here, and Russia's allies in the Entente again isolated themselves, watching what would happen next. On July 6, Germany launched a counteroffensive. As a result, 150,000 Russian soldiers were killed. The army actually ceased to exist. The front fell apart. Russia could no longer fight, and this catastrophe was inevitable.


People demanded that Russia withdraw from the war. And this was one of their main demands on the Bolsheviks, who seized power in October 1917. Initially, at the 2nd congress of the party, the Bolsheviks signed the decree "On Peace", actually proclaiming Russia's withdrawal from the war, and on March 3, 1918, they signed the Brest Peace. The conditions of this world were as follows:

  • Russia makes peace with Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey.
  • Russia loses Poland, Ukraine, Finland, part of Belarus and the Baltic states.
  • Russia yields to Turkey Batum, Kars and Ardahan.

As a result of its participation in the First World War, Russia lost: about 1 million square meters of territory, about 1/4 of the population, 1/4 of arable land and 3/4 of the coal and metallurgical industries were lost.

Historical reference

Events in the war in 1918

Germany got rid of the Eastern Front and the need to wage a war in two directions. As a result, in the spring and summer of 1918, she attempted an offensive on the Western Front, but this offensive had no success. Moreover, in its course it became obvious that Germany was squeezing the maximum out of herself, and that she needed a break in the war.

Autumn 1918

The decisive events in the First World War took place in the fall. The Entente countries, together with the United States, went on the offensive. The German army was completely driven out of France and Belgium. In October, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria signed a truce with the Entente, and Germany was left to fight alone. Her position was hopeless after the German allies in the Triple Alliance had effectively surrendered. This resulted in the same thing that happened in Russia - the revolution. On November 9, 1918, Emperor Wilhelm II was overthrown.

End of the First World War


On November 11, 1918, the First World War of 1914-1918 ended. Germany signed a complete surrender. It happened near Paris, in the Compiegne forest, at the Retonde station. The capitulation was accepted by the French Marshal Foch. The terms of the signed peace were as follows:

  • Germany admits complete defeat in the war.
  • The return of France to the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine to the borders of 1870, as well as the transfer of the Saar coal basin.
  • Germany lost all of its colonial possessions, and also pledged to transfer 1/8 of its territory to its geographical neighbors.
  • For 15 years, the Entente troops are on the left bank of the Rhine.
  • By May 1, 1921, Germany had to pay the members of the Entente (Russia was not entitled to anything) 20 billion marks in gold, goods, securities, etc.
  • For 30 years Germany has to pay reparations, and the amount of these reparations is set by the winners themselves and can increase them at any time during these 30 years.
  • Germany was forbidden to have an army of more than 100 thousand people, and the army was obliged to be exclusively voluntary.

The conditions of "peace" were so humiliating for Germany that the country actually became a puppet. Therefore, many people of that time said that although the First World War ended, it ended not in peace, but in a truce for 30 years. So it ultimately happened ...

Results of the first world war

The First World War was fought on the territory of 14 states. It was attended by countries with a total population of more than 1 billion people (this is about 62% of the total population of the world at that time). In total, 74 million people were mobilized by the participating countries, of which 10 million died and another 20 million were injured.

As a result of the war political map Europe has changed significantly. Such independent states as Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, Albania appeared. Auto-Hungary split into Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Romania, Greece, France, Italy have increased their borders. Losers and losers in the territory were 5 countries: Germany, Auto-Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey and Russia.

World War I 1914-1918 map

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