How much does the plane su 27. Fighter-interceptor Su-27: performance characteristics. Aircraft control system

The most formidable military fighter of the Air Force of the Russian Federation is deservedly considered the Su-35... A powerful military air transport was created by talented Russian engineers on the basis of the Su-27 fighter, created by Soviet designers.

Su-35 aircraft

After making numerous upgrades, not one powerful engine was installed on modern aerial technology, but two at once. The plane on the very first test was able to demonstrate the development of tremendous speed and rapid climb.

The technical characteristics of the Su-35, the modern electronic equipment provided in the aircraft, and the weapons have turned the model under consideration, one might say, into the most dangerous enemy for any enemy force that decides to start air combat with the Russian air force.

Model creation

Russian designers began working on the creation of the first test model in 2006. According to the previously approved plan, testing of the prototype was supposed to begin at the end of 2007, but the deadline had to be postponed for almost a whole year.

The first test flight of the Su-35 was carried out in early 2008. At the helm of the military equipment was an experienced test pilot S. Bogdanov, who more than once proved his professionalism in practice.

The performance characteristics of the Su-35 pleasantly surprised everyone present at the site of the first test flight... And the next day, military equipment was presented to V.V. Putin for familiarization. And on the second trial test, air transport was able to confirm its incredible technical abilities.

Taking into account the obvious advantages of the new fighter, it was decided to conclude a deal on the acquisition of a large batch of military fighters, which in the future will be able to replenish the Air Force of the Russian Federation. Initially, the cost of the Su-35 was agreed upon between the Sukhoi aircraft manufacturer and the Russian military departments. Finding a compromise on the cost of military equipment, the business partners signed an impressive contract for the creation of more than 47 units of aircraft over 3 years, starting in 2012 and ending in 2015.

The first models of production aircraft were presented to the Russian public at the end of 2011. The letter "C" was added to the name of the fighter, indicating that the vehicle is in serial production.

The Sukhoi automobile industrial enterprise successfully coped with the task set before it - in 2016, the Russian army had more than 64 Su-35S units in service.

Su-35 cockpit

Design features

Impressive and at the same time aesthetic - this is how you can describe the appearance of a military fighter in two words. And the photo with full armament is somewhat confusing, because the power of the military transport is really amazing. The external shape of the Su-35 in some way resembles a predator soaring in the sky, proudly spreading its huge wings. The formidable winged "bird" has rotary steering panels installed in the rear of the hull.

The designers managed to significantly improve controllability by equipping the aircraft with additional horizontal tail. Among the most significant changes made to the base model of the Su-27 are the following:

• a solid base made of durable aluminum and titanium was used for the construction of the case;
• the cockpit was equipped with a modern K-36 ejection seat;
• It was decided to equip the nose of the aircraft with a so-called spear-shaped receiver for the flow of air masses;
• due to the increase in the vertical tail area, it was possible to increase the flight range and significantly improve the maneuverability of military air transport;
• changed its location and the parachute necessary for braking: the designers decided to move it to the upper part of the fuselage.

It is impossible not to mention the classified cover of the aircraft called "Stealth", due to which both thermal and radar signature of a military fighter is reduced several times.

Particularly noteworthy is the Su-35 engine, or rather two aircraft engines equipped with ATC thrust vectors, the Al-41-F1S model. This design is the prototype of the engine used in the 5th generation military aircraft.

After carrying out certain upgrades, the engineers managed to underestimate both non-afterburner and afterburner thrust, which in turn reduced the working life several times. Such an engine helps the aircraft to gain supersonic speed even without switching to a mode called "Afterburner". A twin-engine power plant is controlled in an electronic-mechanical mode.

Each Su-35 model is equipped with a modern radar system capable of detecting a target at a distance exceeding 350 km, called "Irbis, radar-NO-35". In addition to this design, there is an OEIS and a locating station.

Technical characteristics of a military fighter

• the parameter of the body length reaches 21.9 meters;
• aircraft height - 5.9 meters;
• the maximum speed of the Su-35 fighter is 2250 km / h, at an altitude of 11 thousand meters;
• the wingspan reaches 15.3 meters;
• maximum takeoff weight - 34,500 kg;
• payload mass - 8 tons;
• with full refueling at the maximum permissible altitude, the cruising speed range is 3600 km;
• at normal takeoff weight, the takeoff run is 420-450 meters;
• the length of the landing distance when using a special braking parachute is 680 meters;
• the rate of climb reaches 300 m / s;
• weight of fuel with tanks is 14295 kg;
• fuel weight without tanks - 11520 kg;
• the radius of warfare is 1650 km;
• the distance to the ground at a speed of Mach 0.7 is 1590 km.

The modern military fighter Su-35 is operated by a single pilot.

The global aviation industry continues to grow and develop. Given this fact, it can be assumed that Russian engineers will also try to create a more advanced model of the Su-35 military fighter.

Some ideas for the next modernization are already being considered. For example, the engineers set out to install a functional radar blocker in the air intake. Another idea is also being considered, the essence of which is the additional installation of weapons. Engineers are also thinking about improving the by-pass turbojet power plant.

The prospects of the considered military fighter are very obvious. The Su-35 is of interest to both domestic buyers and aviation markets operating in foreign countries.

In contact with

In the aviation history of the 60s. were marked by the entry into service of the Air Force of the main aviation powers of the world of supersonic fighters, which, with all the differences in layout and flight weight, had a number of unifying features. They had a speed twice the sound speed and a ceiling of about 18-20 km, equipped with airborne radar stations and guided air-to-air missiles. This coincidence was not accidental, since bombers carrying nuclear bombs were considered the main security threat on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Accordingly, the requirements for new fighters were formed, the main task of which was to intercept high-speed, non-maneuverable targets at any time of the day and in any weather conditions.

As a result, a number of aircraft were born in the USA, the USSR and Western Europe, which were subsequently assigned to the second generation of fighters by the combination of layout features and performance characteristics. The thesis about the conventionality of any classification was confirmed by the fact that in the same company with "licked" aerodynamics, "Mirage" III, "Starfighter" and "Draken" there were a light F-5 fighter "Freedom Fighter" converted from a training aircraft and a heavy twin-engine two-seater F -4 "Phantom", nicknamed by the Americans themselves "the victory of brute forces over aerodynamics."

In pursuit of high maximum speed, the designers took the path of introducing wings with a high specific load and a thin profile, which, of course, had great advantages at supersonic, but had a serious drawback - low bearing properties at low speeds. As a result, second-generation fighters had unusually high takeoff and landing speeds, and maneuverability was also unimportant. But even the most venerable analysts then believed that in the future, a combat aircraft would increasingly resemble a manned reusable missile. "We will never see air battles like those that took place during the Second World War ..." - wrote the famous theorist Camille Rougeron. Time soon showed how dry the theory was, but several more years passed before the next sharp turn in fighter tactics took place.

In the meantime, it was necessary to get rid of the main shortcomings of the second generation, namely, to increase the range and improve takeoff and landing characteristics to ensure basing on poorly prepared airfields. In addition, the relentlessly growing price of fighters dictated the need to reduce the absolute size of the fleet while expanding the functions of aircraft. A qualitative leap was not required, although the tactics of air war were already changing before our eyes - the widespread development of anti-aircraft guided missiles led to the withering away of the doctrine of a massive invasion of bombers at high altitude. The main stake in strike operations began to be made more and more on tactical aircraft with nuclear weapons, capable of breaking through the air defense line at low altitude.

To counteract them, the third generation fighters were intended - Mirage F.1, J37 Wiggen. Their entry into service, along with the modernized versions of the MiG-21 and F-4, was planned for the early 70s. At the same time, design studies began on both sides of the ocean to create fourth-generation fighters - promising combat vehicles that would form the basis of the air force in the next decade.

The first to solve this problem were started in the United States, where, back in 1965, the question of creating a successor to the F-4C Phantom tactical fighter was raised. In March 1966, the FX (Fighter Experimental) program was deployed there. Over the course of several years, the concept of a promising fighter has undergone a number of significant changes. It was most influenced by the experience of using American aviation in Vietnam, where the heavily armed Phantoms had advantages in battles at long and medium distances, but were constantly defeated by the lighter and more maneuverable Vietnamese MiG-21s in close air battles.

F-15 Eagle

The design of the aircraft according to the specified requirements began in 1969, in the same year the fighter was assigned the designation F-15. Further work on the FX program has advanced at McDonell-Douglas, North American, Northrop and Republic. The winner of the competition was the McDonell-Douglas project, which is close in aerodynamic layout to the Soviet MiG-25 interceptor, which then had no analogues in the world in terms of flight data. On December 23, 1969, the firm was awarded a contract for the construction of prototype aircraft, and 2.5 years later, on July 27, 1972, test pilot I. Barrows raised the prototype of the future "Igla" - an experienced YF-15 fighter on its first flight. The next year a two-seater combat training version of the aircraft was flown, and in 1974 the first production fighters F-15A "Eagle" and "twin" TF-15A (F-15B) appeared.

The progress of the FX program was closely followed in the USSR. The information leaked to the pages of the open foreign press (and there was not so little of it), as well as information received through intelligence channels, were carefully analyzed. It was clear that it was the F-15 that would have to be guided by when creating a new generation of Soviet fighters, now called the fourth. The first studies in this direction in three leading domestic "fighter" design bureaus - P.O. Sukhoi (Machine-building plant "Kulon"), A.I. Mikoyan (Moscow machine-building plant "Zenit"), and A.S. Yakovleva (Moscow machine-building plant) plant "Speed") - began in 1969-1970, but they were initially carried out on an initiative basis, without the instructions "from above" necessary for their "legalization". Finally, at the beginning of 1971, the decision of the Commission on Military-Industrial Issues under the Council of Ministers of the USSR followed, and then the corresponding order of the Minister of Aviation Industry on the deployment in the Soviet Union of a program for the creation of a "Advanced Front-Line Fighter" (PFI), which would be a response to the emergence of in the US aircraft F-15.

As well as overseas, the Soviet fighter of the new generation - PFI, called by the designers among themselves "anti-F-15", it was decided to create on the terms of a competition with the participation of the Design Bureau of P.O. Sukhoi, A.I. Mikoyan and A.S. Yakovlev ... At the beginning of 1971, P.O. Sukhoi ordered the development of a preliminary design for a promising front-line fighter, which received the factory code T-10 and then still the secret name Su-27.

It was decided to base the technical proposal on the first version of the appearance of the aircraft, prepared for (February 1970 in the design department of the OKB. Headed by Oleg Sergeevich Samoilovich. The first sketches of the layout of the new fighter were made at the OKB P.O. Sukhoi back in the fall of 1969. Initially only one person was involved in this - the designer of the project department Vladimir Ivanovich Antonov.Based on the studies of V.I. Antonov in the project department, the first version of the T-10 layout was prepared. head of the brigade of the projects department V.A. Nikolaenko The main feature of the aircraft was to be the interpretation of the so-called integral aerodynamic layout, according to which the airframe was made in the form of a single load-bearing body from a set of deformed aerodynamic profiles with smooth conjugation of the wing and fuselage. applied by OKB P.O. Sukhoi in the development of the project of strategic ogrezhimny plane T-4MS.

In front of the carrier body of the fighter, the head part of the fuselage was "built up", which included the nose compartment with the radar, the cockpit, the niche of the front landing gear support, the under-cockpit and the under-cockpit equipment compartments, and under it, in the rear, two insulated gondolas with turbojet engines, air channels and adjustable air intakes located under the center section. The consoles of the all-turning horizontal and two-keel vertical tail, as well as two ventral ridges, were attached to the engine nacelles. The integrated circuit provided a significant increase in the aerodynamic quality of the fighter and made it possible to organize large internal compartments for storing fuel and equipment. To implement the specified flight characteristics in a wide range of altitudes and flight speeds and angles of attack, the wing of the new fighter was given an ogival ("sinusoidal") shape and provided with a developed root inflow.

According to the calculations of the developers, the influx was supposed to provide an increase in the bearing properties of the aircraft at high angles of attack (more than 8-10º) with a simultaneous increase in the pitching moment for pitching. In the presence of an influx at high angles of attack, a stable vortex system of two vortex bundles was formed above the wing (one appeared on the root influx and spread over the wing, the second - at the leading edge of the base wing). With an increase in the angles of attack, the intensity of the vortex bundles increased, while on the surface of the wing under the vortex bundle, the rarefaction increased, and, consequently, the lift of the wing increased. The greatest increase in rarefaction was located in front of the center of gravity of the aircraft on the part of the wing adjacent to the root influx, as a result of which the focus shifted forward and the pitching moment increased. Root nodules also had a great influence on the magnitude and distribution of lateral forces, which led to a decrease in the destabilizing effect of the head of the fuselage.

Another important feature of the T-10 for the first time in domestic fighter aviation was to be the implementation of the concept of longitudinal static instability of the aircraft at subsonic flight speeds with the provision of its longitudinal balancing in flight by means of the automation of a quadruple redundant fly-by-wire control system (EDSU). The idea of ​​replacing the traditional mechanical control wiring with an EDSU was already used by the OKB when creating the T-4 aircraft, the tests of which confirmed the correctness of the main technical solutions. The adoption of the concept of longitudinal static instability (otherwise - "electronic stability") promised serious advantages: for balancing the aircraft at high angles of attack, it was necessary to deflect the stabilizer toe up, while its lift was added to the lift of the wing, which gave a significant improvement in the bearing properties of the fighter with insignificant the growth of his resistance. Thanks to the use of an integral statically unstable layout, the Su-27 was to acquire exceptional maneuverability, allowing it to carry out evolutions in the air that are inaccessible to conventional aircraft, and to have a long flight range without outboard tanks.

Problems with the layout of the tricycle chassis on this first version of the T-10 forced the developers to use a bicycle chassis scheme, but with the load distribution as in the traditional tricycle scheme, while the main (rear) landing gear was retracted into the center section niche, equipped with a fairing, between the engine nacelles , and additional support struts were placed in the fairings on the wing consoles between the aileron and the flap.

The blows of the T-10 model, performed in the T-106 wind tunnel of the Central Aerohydrodipamic Institute, gave encouraging results: with a moderate wing elongation (3-2), an aerodynamic quality of 12.6 was obtained. Despite this, TsAGI specialists strongly recommended not to use the integral layout on promising fighters. Here a certain conservatism of the then leaders of the institute, who also referred to information from abroad, had an effect (the F-15 was built according to the classical scheme!). In this regard, to some extent as a safety net, and with an eye on the F-15, in the second half of 1971 in the team of the design department of the P.O. Sukhoi Design Bureau, headed by A.M. Polyakov, under the leadership of A. Andrianov, the second version of the T-10 layout was worked out according to the traditional scheme, with a conventional fuselage, a high wing, side air intakes and two engines installed side by side in the tail section. In terms of the shape of the wing in plan and the empennage scheme, this option generally corresponded to the option with an integral layout.

Tests of the T-10 models, made according to the traditional scheme, did not reveal any advantages over the original layout. Over time, TsAGI realized the groundlessness of their fears, and the institute became a staunch supporter of the integrated circuit. Later, in the process of in-depth study of the T-10, the Design Bureau created and tested in the TsAGI wind tunnels a significant number of other variants of the fighter layout (more than 15 in total), differing mainly in the placement of engines, air intakes and chassis schemes. V.I. Antonov recalls that the Su-27 was jokingly called a "variable layout aircraft." It is noteworthy that in the end, preference was given to the very first option - with an integral layout, insulated engine nacelles, longitudinal static instability and EDSU. The changes mainly affected only the chassis layout and airframe contours (for technological reasons, it was necessary to abandon the widespread use of double-curved surfaces).

The fact that the Su-27 took place in precisely this configuration is a great merit of the General Designer P.O. Sukhoi. Despite the serious objections of the supporters of the traditional scheme (and there were many), even at the earliest stages of design, Pavel Osipovich had the courage to make the decision to use the most advanced innovations in aerodynamics, flight dynamics and aircraft design in the creation of the Su-27 - such as integral layout, statically unstable circuitry, fly-by-wire control system, etc. In his opinion, given the real state of affairs in the USSR in the field of aviation radio-electronic equipment, etc. first of all, the weight and size characteristics of existing and future onboard long-range radar stations, as well as onboard computing systems, only with the use of these unconventional solutions it was possible to create an aircraft that is not inferior in performance to the best foreign counterparts. Time has shown him to be right.

In 1971, the first tactical and technical requirements (TTT) of the Air Force for the promising front-line fighter PFI were formulated. By this time, the requirements for the new American F-15 fighter became known in the USSR. They were taken as a basis for the development of TTT to PFI. At the same time, it was envisaged that the Soviet fighter should surpass the American counterpart in a number of basic parameters by 10%. Below are some of the characteristics that, according to the tactical and technical requirements of the Air Force, the PFI should have:

- the maximum number M of the flight - 235-2.5;

- maximum dropping speed at an altitude of over 11 km - 2500-2700 km / h:

- the maximum flight speed at the ground - 1400-1500 km / h;

- maximum rate of climb at the ground - 300-350 m / s;

- practical ceiling -21 -22 km;

- the range of the sung without PTB near the ground - 1000 km:

- flight range without PTB or high altitude -2500 km;

- maximum operational overload - 8-9;

- acceleration time from 600 km / h to 1100 km / h - 12-14 s;

- acceleration time from 1100 km / h to 1300 km / h - 6-7 s;

- starting thrust-to-weight ratio - 1.1-1.2.

The main combat missions of the PFI were defined as:

- destruction of enemy fighters in close air combat using guided missiles (UR) and a cannon;

- intercepting air targets at long range when guided from the ground or autonomously using a radar sighting system and conducting air combat at medium distances using guided missiles;

- covering troops and industrial infrastructure from air attacks;

- counteraction to enemy air reconnaissance means:

- escorting long-range and reconnaissance aircraft and protecting them from enemy fighters;

- conducting aerial reconnaissance;

- destruction of small-sized ground targets in conditions of visual visibility using bombs, unguided missiles and guns.

The preliminary design of the Su-27 aircraft, which generally satisfied the TTT of the Air Force to the PFI, was developed at the P.O. Sukhoi Design Bureau in the second half of 1971. It considered two options for the layout of the fighter - integral and classical, developed in two brigades of the project department (chiefs brigades V.A. Nikolaenko and A.M. Polyakov, work supervisors V.I. Antonov and A.I. Andrianov, respectively) and received the code names T-101 and T-102 (not to be confused with the names of the first experimental aircraft Su-27 that appeared in 1977-1978!).

The version of the aircraft, made according to the integrated circuit, presented in the preliminary design, generally corresponded to the first appearance of the T-10, prepared in the project department at the beginning of 1970.

Based on the calculations of the main characteristics of the aircraft, performed at the OKB using the initial data on the AL-31F engine (thrust 10,300 kgf), the expected weight characteristics of the components of the onboard radio-electronic equipment and the results of the blowing of the T-10 models in the TsAGI wind tunnels, the preliminary design provided the following main aircraft data (for a variant with an integral layout, with an estimated ammunition load of two K-25 missiles, six K-60 missiles and a full cannon ammunition):

- normal takeoff weight (without PTB) -18000 kg; - maximum takeoff weight (with PTB) - 21000 kg;

- maximum flight speed at an altitude of 11 km - 2500 km / h;

- maximum flight speed at the ground - 1400 km / h;

- practical ceiling with 5096 fuel remaining - 22500m;

- maximum rate of climb at the ground with 50% fuel remaining - 345 m / s;

- maximum operational overload with 50% fuel remaining - 9;

- acceleration time at an altitude of 1000 m with 50% fuel remaining: - from 600 to 1100 km / h -125 s; -from 1100 to 1300 km / h - 6s;

- practical flight range near the ground with an average speed of 800 km / h: - without PTB - 800 km; - from PTB -1400 km;

- practical flight range at high altitude with a cruising speed: - without PTB - 2400 km; - from PTB - 3000 km;

- takeoff run length on unpaved runway: - without PTB - 300 m; - from PTB-500 m;

- the length of the run with the use of a braking parachute - 600 m.

Due to the fact that the calculated range characteristics of the Su-27 were somewhat inferior to the requirements of the Air Force, proposals were formulated in the preliminary project to bring them into line with TTT. Such measures included: an increase in the internal fuel supply and take-off weight (up to 18800 kg), a decrease in the specific weight of the engine under development (from 0.12 to 0.1) while maintaining its thrust, a decrease in the estimated ammunition load of the K-60 missiles from 6 to 4, the use of onboard products. equipment with less weight. In addition, in order to increase the combat effectiveness of the fighter, it was proposed in the future to equip it with medium-range missiles of a new generation (type K-27) and modernized melee missiles K-60M.

In 1972, a meeting of the Joint Scientific and Technical Council (STC) of the Ministry of Aviation Industry (MAP) and the Air Force was held, at which the state of work on promising fighters within the framework of the PFI program was considered. Representatives of all three design bureaus made reports. On behalf of MMZ "Zenith" them. A.I. Mikoyan was reported by G.E. Lozino-Lozinsky, who presented to the commission the draft of the fighter (still in the version of the classic layout, with a high-located trapezoidal wing, side air intakes and a single-fin tail unit). MZ "Kulon" presented the preliminary design of the Su-27 at the NTS, with the main attention of the speaker O.S. Samoilovich paid attention to the version with an integral layout (the posters also showed the second, "reserve" version of the Su-27 - the classic scheme). From MMZ "Speed" acted General Designer A.S. Yakovlev with projects of the Yak-45I light fighter (based on the Yak-45 light attack aircraft) and the Yak-47 heavy fighter. Both were a development of the Yak-33 supersonic interceptor scheme with a variable sweep wing and engine nacelles with frontal air intakes installed at the break of its leading edge and differed from each other mainly only in size and weight.

Two months later, the second meeting of the NTS took place. The composition of the participants has not changed, however, the OKB im. A.I. Mikoyan presented a fundamentally new project of the MiG-29 fighter, now made according to an integrated circuit and having a smaller dimension (normal takeoff weight is 12800 kg). According to the results of two meetings of the Scientific and Technical Council, the A.S. Yakovlev Design Bureau dropped out of the competition due to the need to finalize the aerodynamic scheme to ensure the safety of the fighter's continued flight in the event of failure of one of the engines installed on the wing, while the other two participants faced a "third round".

And here the leadership of the MMZ "Zenith" them. A.I. Mikoyan proposed another option for solving the problem - to divide the PFI program into two separate programs, within the framework of which it would be possible to continue the creation of both the Su-27 aircraft (as a heavy promising multipurpose front-line fighter) and the MiG-29 (as a light promising front-line fighter ), ensuring the unification of both aircraft in a number of equipment systems and weapons. As an argument, the first results of studies deployed in 1971 by the institutes of industry and the customer on the formation of the concept of building a fleet of fighter aircraft (IA) of the country's air force in the 80s were presented. based on two types of fighters - heavy and light, just as the US Air Force planned to do.

The proposal of MMZ "Zenith" was accepted, and thus both design bureaus were relieved of the need to participate in the exhausting race to obtain a lucrative order. Thus, the competition ran out of steam, and in the summer of 1972, the orders of the Minister of Aviation Industry were issued, "legalizing" the continuation of the development of both fighters - the Su-27 and MiG-29.

BIRTH OF SU-27

In accordance with the order of the Ministry of Aviation Industry, the Design Bureau of P.O. Sukhoi in the second half of 1972 began an in-depth study of the preliminary design, and then the creation of a draft design of the T-10 aircraft. In connection with the need to expand the front of work, the design of the Su-27 in February 1973 was transferred to the design team headed by Leonid Ivanovich Bondarenko. At the end of the year, the theme also had a chief designer. It was Naum Semenovich Chernyakov, who had previously directed the creation of the T-4 ("100") aircraft, the design of the T-4MS ("200") and the Korshun RPV.

One of the most difficult tasks in the development of the Su-27 was maintaining weight limits. Reducing the weight of the aircraft structure was given priority. Even in the early stages of the development of the T-10, the head of the project department O.S. Samoilovich obtained disappointing data on an increase in the takeoff weight of a fighter when using new equipment systems: calculations showed that an increase in the mass of onboard avionics by 1 kg entailed an increase in the takeoff weight of the entire aircraft by as much as 9 kg! For the engine and aircraft systems, these indicators were 4 and 3 kg, respectively. It was clear that without the utmost lightening of the design, the take-off weight of a fighter could go beyond all conceivable limits, and the necessary flight characteristics would not be achieved. First Deputy General Designer Evgeny Alekseevich Ivanov dealt with issues of maintaining a high weight culture, personally carefully following the development of almost every structural unit, where there were reserves for reducing weight. It was E.A. Ivanov gave instructions to the deputy chief designer for strength N.S. Dubinin, to carry out the strength calculation of the Su-27 from the condition of the action on it of loads that are 85% of the calculated ones, with the possible subsequent strengthening of the structure according to the results of static tests.

In addition, we managed to convince the customer to clarify the TTT in terms of the maximum operational overload with a full refueling of the fuel tanks. The fact is that the first version of the requirements for the Su-27 provided for an approximately 10 percent superiority of the new fighter over its American counterpart. Thus, if the flight range of the F-15 without outboard fuel tanks was 2300 km, then for the Su-27 it was required to get 2500 km, which, with the given consumption characteristics of the power plant, required about 5.5 tons of fuel. An in-depth study of the design of the Su-27 showed that the integral layout of the airframe of an aircraft of the selected dimension allows it to accommodate almost 9 tons of kerosene. According to the strength standards that existed in the USSR, the mass with 80% of the remainder of the full refueling was taken as the calculated flight mass of the aircraft. Naturally, to achieve the same overload with a 3-5 t greater flight mass, significant reinforcement was required, and, consequently, a heavier structure. The plane had to reach the required range even with incomplete refueling of the tanks. At the same time, it seemed inexpedient for the Sukhovites to abandon the "extra" almost 1500 km of range, which was provided by a full supply of fuel that could fit into the internal volumes of the developed integral layout.

As a result, a compromise solution was found. TTT for the Su-27 aircraft was divided into two parts:

- with the main (incomplete) refueling option (about 5.5 t), which provided the required flight range (2500 km) and all other flight characteristics, including the maximum operational overload (8);

- with a full supply of fuel (about 9 tons), at which the maximum flight range (4000 km) was ensured, and the maximum operational overload was limited based on maintaining a constant product of the flight mass and overload.

Thus, the option of full refueling began to be considered as an option with a kind of "internal suspended tank". Of course, no one demanded that a fighter with a PTB have the same maneuverability as an aircraft without outboard tanks. Thus, on the one hand, it was possible to avoid overweighting the structure due to the conditions for ensuring strength, and on the other hand, to obtain a flight range without real outboard tanks even greater than that of other fighters with PTBs brought into the stream.

The use of composite materials based on carbon fiber reinforced plastics had great prospects for reducing the weight of the structure. A workshop for the production of parts from composites was specially built at the Kulon plant, but even before the assembly of the first prototypes of the aircraft, the widespread use of composite materials in the design of the Su-27 was abandoned due to the instability of their characteristics. By the way, the creators of the MiG-29 also had to deal with this insidious property of composites, only it happened much later. Already in the process of operation on the "MIGS" cases of destruction of composite structures began to be observed. It was necessary to urgently replace composites in a number of MiG-29 units (for example, air ducts of engines and deflected wing tips) with traditional aluminum alloys. As a result, on the Su-27, composite materials have found application mainly only in the design of fairings for various electronic devices.

The widespread introduction of titanium alloys and the development of advanced technologies, first of all, welding of titanium parts in an argon atmosphere, as well as chemical milling, shaping with the effect of metal superplasticity, etc., helped to reduce the weight of the aircraft. In the process of detailed design, unique welded titanium structures were developed and then manufactured during the construction of prototypes of the T-10 - panels of the center section, aft fuselage, power frames, etc. Only the use of titanium panels of the center section reduced the weight of the airframe structure by more than 100 kg. A significant contribution to the development of new technological processes in the pilot production of the P.O. Sukhoi Design Bureau, which were then transferred to the serial plant, was made by the director of the Kulon plant A.S. Zazhigip, chief engineer G.T. Lebedev, chief welder V.V.Redchits , Deputy Chief Engineer V.V. Tareev, Head of Production A.V. Kurkov and others.

By 1975, the work on the preliminary design of the Su-27 was completed, the aerodynamic and structural-power schemes of the aircraft were formed, the main design solutions were found, and it was possible to start producing working drawings and building prototypes. A year later, in 1976, the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR finally issued a decree on the creation of the Su-27 aircraft - the main document in the Soviet Union in the "biography" of any aircraft.

FIRST FLIGHTS

The bulk of the design work on the Su-27 aircraft was generally completed by the mid-70s. In 1975, the production of working drawings began, and soon that MZ "Kulon" began to manufacture the first prototypes of the aircraft. Unfortunately, Pavel Osipovich Sukhoi did not wait for the birth of a new fighter: he died on September 15, 1975, and the OKB, which received his name, was headed by the first deputy of Sukhoi, Evgeny Alekseevich Ivanov (for two years he was acting General Designer and only in at the end of 1977 he was officially approved for this position). Soon the head of the Su-27 was also replaced: in connection with the illness of N.S. Chernyakov, Mikhail Petrovich Simonov was appointed chief designer of the aircraft in February 1976. Under his direct supervision until the end of 1979, when Simonov went to work at the Ministry of Aviation Industry of the USSR, and all work was carried out on the construction of prototypes of the T-10, conducting their flight tests and designing aircraft modifications.

The assembly of the first prototype of the Su-27 - the T-101 aircraft - was completed in early 1977, and it was relocated to the OKB flight station at the LII airfield in Zhukovsky. As mentioned above, the two-circuit turbojet engines of the new generation AL-31F, envisaged by the project, were not ready by that time, and they decided to equip the first T-10 with AL-21F-ZAI engines, which are a modification of the serial turbojet engines AL-21F-3, which were widely used on other aircraft of the firm (Su-17M, Su-17M2, Su-17MZ, Su-17UM, Su-20, Su-24). The AL-21F-3 installation - albeit less powerful, less economical and heavier than the standard AL-31F, but already mastered in production and operation, made it possible to start testing the Su-27 already in 1977, while the first operational AL-31F could appear only in 1978-1979. On aircraft with AL-21F-3, it was possible to work out the aerodynamics of the new layout scheme in real flight tests, determine the main characteristics of stability and controllability, some flight data, and fine-tune a new complex of on-board equipment and weapons. Thus, without waiting for the receipt of the first flight copies of the standard engine, it was planned to carry out a significant amount of tests under the program, and, consequently, to speed up the terms of the aircraft's adoption into service.

The chief pilot of the MZ im. ON. Sukhoi Hero of the Soviet Union Honored Test Pilot of the USSR Major General of Aviation Vladimir Sergeevich Ilyushin. The preparation of the aircraft for testing was carried out under the leadership of the leading engineer Rafail Grigorievich Yarmarkov, the test team also included engineers H.P. Ivan and N.F. Nikitin (later - Chief Designer of the Su-27M aircraft, and now - General Designer and General Director of the military-industrial complex " After carrying out the necessary ground checks and performing high-speed taxiing, permission was obtained from the LII Methodological Council for the first flight, and on May 20, 1977, V. S. Ilyushin lifted the T-101 into the air. Later, this instance was used to determine the characteristics of stability and controllability, as well as to fine-tune the control system of the new fighter. The weapon control system was not installed on it. During the first 8 months of testing, 38 flights were performed on the T-101. G. Yarmarkov, N.F. Nikitin was appointed the lead engineer for testing the T-101 on another aircraft. placed in front of 110-1, were completed, the aircraft was transferred to the Air Force Museum in Monino near Moscow.

In 1978, in the pilot production of the MZ im. P.O. Sukhoi, the second prototype aircraft (T-102) was built. Its flight tests were conducted by test pilot of the OKB Yevgeny Stepanovich Soloviev, the lead engineer was Mark Belenky. Soloviev.

The cause of the accident was the destruction of the aircraft in the air due to its unintentional withdrawal to an overload exceeding the maximum allowable. In accordance with the assigned task, the pilot conducted tests to select the optimal gear ratios for the fighter's remote control system. Prior to that, V.S. Ilyushin on the T-101, while both pilots have already assessed the functioning of the system at high and medium altitudes. Solovyov had to go further and obtain handling characteristics at an altitude of 1000 m and a speed of 1000 km / h.

The implementation of two "sites" at heights of 11 and 5 km with the assessment of the work of the CDS did not cause any problems. Solovyov dropped to 1000 m. And here the reaction of the aircraft to pulling the handle "on itself" turned out to be unforeseen. The overload has significantly exceeded expectations. With a reflex movement of the stick "away from himself" the pilot tried to level the plane, but this created a negative overload of 8 units. One more grab of the handle - and the overload exceeded the destructive one. The films of the objective control system deciphered after the crash testified that the T-102 had fallen into the previously unexplored area of ​​resonance modes with the "swinging" of the aircraft in the longitudinal channel with increasing amplitudes. The development of the emergency was so transient that the most experienced pilot, Honored Test Pilot of the USSR, Hero of the Soviet Union E.S. Soloviev, who gave a ticket to the sky for more than one Su aircraft, did not even have time to resort to the use of rescue equipment. An analysis of the circumstances of the disaster made it possible to establish the true cause of the tragedy and to make the necessary changes in the setting of the remote control system.

In the same 1978, at the Far Eastern Machine-Building Plant named after V.I. Yuri Gagarin in Komsomolsk-on-Amur began preparing the release of the pilot batch of Su-27 with AL-21F-ZAI engines. At the same time, two prototypes were being built here), on which it was planned to install AL-31F engines for the first time. These two vehicles were named T-103 and T-104. The final assembly and additional equipment of the aircraft was supposed to be carried out in the pilot production of the M.Z. Sukhoi in Moscow. The construction of the T-103 (serial No. 01-01) at the Komsomol plant was completed in August 1978 and at the end of the same month, after undocking the wing and empennage consoles from it, on a special transport device in the An-22 Antey cargo plane he was taken to the LII airfield in Zhukovsky, and then transported to the M.Z. P.O. Sukhoi. The delivery of the first flight copies of the AL-31F engines had to wait for several more months. Finally, in March 1979, the assembly of the T-103 was completed, and the aircraft was relocated to the OKB flight station in Zhukovsky.

Under the leadership of the leading flight test engineer V.P. Ivanov, the necessary ground checks were carried out, and V.S. Ilyushin performed the first taxiing on the T-103. However, the LII methodological council, headed by the head of the institute V.V. Utkin, was in no hurry to issue an opinion for the first flight: the first copies of the new engine had too many flight restrictions. As a result, it was decided to remove the engines from the aircraft and send them for revision to the Saturn plant. (Experts from the AMLyulka OKB managed to complete the necessary work in a short time, and most of the restrictions on the first AL-31Fs were removed. Finally, on August 23, 1979, V.S. Ilyushin lifted the T-103 on its first flight. T-104 (serial number 01-02), on which the Mech onboard radar station was first installed (in its first version with a slot antenna) .The first flight on the T-104 was performed on October 31, 1979. Then the T-103 was modified for research at the Nitka training complex in order to create a ship modification of the Su-27, and the T-104 was tested on the radar. the flight range on these machines, as well as on the first two experimental T-10s, was not determined.

It is worth noting here that the AL-31F engines used on the T-103 and T-104 aircraft differed from all subsequent ones, which began to be equipped with serial Su-27 fighters, in the lower location of the remote boxes of aircraft units (VKA). Such a scheme had a number of operational advantages: generators and hydraulic pumps located under the engine were easier and more convenient to service from the ground, besides, fire safety was higher - oil that accidentally leaked from the units could not get onto the hot engine parts. There was only one drawback: the lower location of the VKA required an increase in the cross section of the engine nacelles, which led to an increase in drag. Later, for reasons of aerodynamics, the arrangement of the gearbox on the engine was redesigned to the upper one, but at that stage the AL-31F variant with the lower VKA was preferred.

THE NOT EASY WAY TO THE SERIES

By the end of 1979, three experimental aircraft (T-101, T-103 and T-104) took part in the Su-27 test program, and soon the first machines of the installation series were to join them. It seemed that everything was going according to plans and in a couple of years the new fighter could go into service. However, the chief designer M.P. Simonov.

In 1976, when the T-101 was still under construction, a number of circumstances emerged that jeopardized the fulfillment of certain points of the technical assignment (TZ) concerning the requirements for the flight characteristics of the future Su-27. As noted above, problems with the creation of uncooled engine turbine blades and the need to introduce their cooling with air bleeding from the compressor led to an increase in the specific fuel consumption in cruising mode by 5% (already in the preliminary design of the AL-31F, a minimum specific fuel consumption of 0.64 kg / (kgf-h) instead of the specified 0.61 kg / (kgf-h), but in practice it increased by almost 5%) and to a decrease in the thrust characteristics of the engine when flying at high speed at altitude and near the ground (bench thrust remained at the level of the specified 12500 kgf). Secondly, the developers of radio-electronic equipment "did not fit" into the weight characteristics determined by the technical specifications for the corresponding complexes.

The total excess of the weight of the equipment was several hundred kilograms, which, naturally, entailed a general overweight of the aircraft, and most importantly, a shift in its centering forward, as a result of which the T-10 became statically stable in the longitudinal channel. As a result, the main advantage of the developed statically unstable arrangement was lost - the absence of balancing losses. Now, to balance the aircraft, it was required to deflect the stabilizer toe down, and its lift was no longer added, but subtracted from the wing lift. Naturally, in this case, the bearing properties of the aircraft decreased. Weight limits were also exceeded by the creators of missile weapons.

An updated calculation of the performance characteristics of the Su-27 aircraft, taking into account all these circumstances, clearly testified: the maximum flight range of the fighter with full fuel refueling only slightly exceeded 3000 km, the maximum flight speed was 2230 km / h, the flight speed at the ground was 1350 km / h , i.e. for these three main indicators, the Su-27 was 10-20% inferior to the TTT. The calculations were confirmed by the research of specialists of the Siberian "Scientific Research Institute of Aviation (SibNIA), which conducted the bulk of aerodynamic research on the Su-27 since 1972. The updated data of the Su-27 and F-15 were used in mathematical and semi-natural simulation of air battles. with the participation of these aircraft, which was carried out at NIIAS MAP in the department headed by Doctor of Technical Sciences A.S. Isaev.The results of this simulation also turned out to be disappointing: there was no longer an absolute superiority over the American analogue.

There was a need for a radical revision of the Su-27 project. Back in 1975-1976. at the OKB and SibNIA, the main directions for improving the design of the T-10 were formulated, thanks to which, in the current conditions, it was possible to ensure that the specified characteristics were obtained. To increase the range and speed of flight, it was necessary to significantly reduce the aerodynamic drag of the aircraft by reducing the curvature of the wing profile, as well as the washed surface and amidships of the fuselage and center section. An increase in the internal fuel supply could also increase the range, it was only necessary to find a place where it was still possible to "pour" kerosene. To improve the characteristics of the aircraft at high angles of attack and slip, it was proposed to introduce mechanization of the leading edge of the wing and change the location of the vertical tail. Thus, such fundamental elements of the aircraft layout as the shape and area of ​​the wing, the configuration of the cross-sections of the head part of the fuselage, the center section and the engine nacelles, and the placement of the empennage were to be revised.

Chief designer M.P. Simonov was a convinced supporter of this approach, but the leadership of the Ministry of Aviation Industry had a different opinion. Minister V.A. Kazakov counted on the possibility of gradual fine-tuning of the fighter of the adopted layout due to minor design modifications, an increase in the fuel supply, etc. Many representatives of the customer also supported him. In principle, the General Designer E.A. Ivanov was not against it either. Too great expenses had already been made, and the termination of the serial production that was being mastered in Komsomolsk-on-Amur with the transfer of the plant to the production of a new model meant not only new expenses, but also further postponing of the date for the adoption of the aircraft into service.

However, MN Simonov stubbornly insisted on the need for a radical revision of the project, especially since the group of like-minded people led by him with the participation of SibNIA scientists back in 1976-1977. a new layout of the fighter, devoid of the shortcomings of the existing one, was created on its own initiative, and in the next two years it was tested in a wind tunnel. The chief designer (and since the end of 1977 - and the first deputy general designer) showed exceptional energy and was able to convince the management to take the risk and take measures to radically change the design of the aircraft that had already been tested. A positive solution to this issue was influenced by the support of Simonov by the Deputy Minister of the Aviation Industry IS Silaev (in 1981-1985 - the Minister of the Aviation Industry of the USSR).

This is how MP Simonov himself recalls this: “We set the task of creating an aircraft that would be superior in combat effectiveness to any other fighter in service with the Air Force at that time — an aircraft for conquering air supremacy. We had to get permission for this from the MAP. We turned to Ivan Stepanovich Silaev, who was then deputy minister. We told him: “We have everything based on calculation data and mathematical half-spline modeling.” Silaev courageously supported us. He only asked me: "Are you sure there is no other way?" "Of course, I am sure, although there is another: to serially produce hundreds and thousands of mediocre fighters, and if there is no war, no one will know about their mediocrity. But we are working on that rainy day when our weapons should be at the highest level. , and therefore there is no other way! ".

Soon after that, MP Simonov moved to work in the ministry, to the post of deputy minister of the aviation industry for new technology. Chief designer of the Su-27 in December 1979 was appointed Artem A. Kolchin, under whose leadership work was carried out to create a fundamentally new version of the aircraft. As time has shown, the difficult decision made turned out to be the only correct one, and as a result, a fighter was created, which, after almost two decades, is still considered one of the best in the world. The release of the Su-27 in the final version of the layout of the MZ im. P.O. Sukhoi confirmed his reputation as the world leader in the aircraft industry, remaining faithful to the long-standing traditions of the OKB not to put into service mediocre aircraft.

FROM T-10 TO T-10S

The variant of the fighter with a new layout received the code T-10S at the OKB. Full-scale work on its design unfolded in 1979. Preliminary studies to find ways to overcome the shortcomings of the T-10 "first edition" and ensure the characteristics specified in the technical specification, performed at the Design Bureau and SibNIA (here these works were led by the chief aerodynamicist of the institute, Candidate of Technical Sciences Stanislav Timorkaevich Kashafutdipov ), made it possible to formulate the main directions for modifying the original layout. In the course of their development, the T-10S in the structural and layout plan more and more moved away from the T-10. As a result, it became clear that the designers would have to design a virtually new aircraft. According to the figurative expression of M.P. Simonov, from the T-10 to the T-10S, only the tires of the wheels of the main landing gear, and the ejection seat of the pilot, have survived. It was not only the general principles laid down in the Su-27 project by P.O. Sukhim that were questioned - the integral layout of the supporting body, the statically unstable circuit, the fly-by-wire control system, the placement of engines in insulated nacelles with air intakes under the supporting body, etc.

TESTS

In 1980, when at the MZ im. P.O. Sukhoi was already in full swing on the production of prototypes of the fighter of the new layout, at the plant in Komsomolsk-on-Amur, the assembly of the first aircraft of the pilot batch was being completed. Structurally, they almost completely corresponded to the experienced T-101 and T-102, only their keels were installed with some collapse, like in the T-103. Their power plant still included AL-21F-ZAI engines. Despite the fact that they had very little in common with the future serial Su-27, they decided not to abandon the completion of the aircraft of the pilot batch and use them to refine and fine-tune the weapons control system and other equipment of the fighter while they are being manufactured and going through the initial stage. flight tests of the first T-10S. Thus, it was planned to compensate for the inevitable delay in terms associated with the need to retool production for the release of an aircraft of a new layout.

The lead copy of the installation batch, which received the code T-105 and serial No. 02-02 (No. 02-01 had a copy for static tests), was ready in June 1980. In the same year, it was followed by the T-106 (No. 02-03 ) and T-109 (No. 02-04) (codes T-107 and T-108 were reserved for the first T-10S). In 1981, the Komsomol plant built two more machines - T-1010 (No. 03-01) and T-1011 (No. 03-02), bringing the number of flight copies of the pilot batch produced to five (to distinguish them from future production vehicles, they were called "Su -27 type T-105 "). In total, taking into account the prototypes collected at the M. P.O. Sukhoi, by 1982, 9 flight copies of the aircraft of the original layout and one copy for static tests were manufactured.

Aircraft of the pilot batch were used for flight tests and refinement of onboard radio-electronic equipment. At the beginning of 1981, the initial version of the OEPS-27 optical-electronic sighting system with the Argon-15 digital computer was installed on the T-105 aircraft for the first time. This specimen was specially allocated for carrying out autonomous tests of OEPS. A little later, the T-1011 was equipped for the same purposes. The tests of the OEPS-27 "first edition" were carried out until mid-1982, when it was decided to replace the on-board computer "Argon-15" with a more advanced Ts100, which required the revision of the entire OEPS-27 software. At the end of 1982, a modified optical-electronic sighting system was installed on the T-1011 for testing it as part of the C-27 weapons control system.

A significant role in the design and development of the avionics complex of the Su-27 fighter was played by the State Research Institute of Aviation Systems (at that time - NIIAS MAP), headed by Academician E.A. Fedosov. GosNIIAS created and debugged all the software for the on-board computers of the 4th generation fighters. To develop radar and optoelectronic sighting systems and improve the algorithmic support of the SUV S-27, the institute built a KPM-2700 semi-natural modeling complex. It was at the stands of this complex that all elements of the C-27 SUV were first checked and tested, and only after that they were installed on experimental aircraft.

The construction of the first prototype of a fighter in the T-10S layout named T-107 (otherwise - T-10S-1, serial number 04-03), was completed at the MZ im. PO Sukhoi at the end of 1980. In March 1981, he was relocated to the flight station of the OKB in Zhukovsky. Preparations for the first flight began. As well as 4 years ago, when the first T-10 went out for testing, R.G. Yarmarkov was appointed the leading engineer on the aircraft, and V.S. Ilyushin was appointed test pilot. On April 20, 1981, Ilyushin lifted the T-107 into the air for the first time. The flight was successful. In the same year, a static (T-108, or T-10S-0, serial No. 04-04) and a second flight (T-1012, or T-10S-2, No. 04-05) copies of the T-10S fighter were assembled ... The T-107 and T-1012 aircraft were used to determine the main flight performance, stability and controllability characteristics of the aircraft of the new layout, as well as to evaluate the operation of the new power plant with upper drive boxes.

Unfortunately, both cars were not destined to have a long life. On September 3, 1981, the T-107 was lost: when performing a task to determine the maximum duration of a flight at a range near the LII, the plane unexpectedly for the pilot was left without fuel, and V.S. Ilyushin had to eject. The car with almost empty tanks fell to the ground and collapsed, and for the first time in his life, the ejected Ilyushin safely landed on a parachute. "Organizational conclusions" were not long in coming: chief designer AA Kolchin was dismissed from his post, lead engineer RG Yarmarkov was dismissed, and VS Ilyushin was permanently suspended from flights. On December 23 of the same year, the T-1012 also crashed: when flying at the maximum mode (number M = 2.35, high-speed pressure of about 9450 kg / m2), the head of the fuselage was destroyed, and the plane collapsed in the air, piloted by the OKB test pilot Alexander Sergeevich Komarov died.

The reasons for the disaster of A.S. Komarov have not been found out. According to one version, the culprit of the tragedy was the control and recording equipment units installed during the tests in the wing inflow compartment, which fell from their seats during the aircraft maneuver at the maximum permissible speed and damaged one of the structural elements of the fuselage head section, as a result of which there was its destruction in the air. However, the official conclusion of the emergency commission indicated that the cause of this disaster, which occurred at the White Omut test site, 70 km east of the LII airfield, could not be established. And although there were no complaints about the material part, the Komarov disaster affected the fate of the General Designer E.A. Ivanov. It was Ivanov, who was preparing at that time for the elections to the Academy of Sciences, who was the direct initiator of this first flight at the maximum mode. Some time later, at the end of 1982, he was transferred to another job at NIIAS MAP and, deprived of the opportunity to do what he loved, soon died (this happened on July 10, 1983).

After the dismissal of A.A. Kolchin, Aleksey Ivanovich Knyshev was appointed chief designer of the Su-27 in 1981, who had previously headed the branch of the P.O. Sukhoi Design Bureau at the aviation plant in Komsomolsk-on-Amur and put a lot of work into mastering the serial production of the T-10 first, and then the T-10C. AI Knyshev to this day manages all the work on the Su-27 aircraft. In 1983, the General Designer of the MZ im. P.O.Sukhoi was appointed M.P. Simonov, under whose general supervision work continued on fine-tuning the Su-27 and creating new modifications on its basis.

Meanwhile, fate was preparing another blow for the program. The results of the flight tests of the first version of the Mech radar station, which began in accordance with the scheduled dates, indicated that the radar did not meet the requirements of the technical specifications for a number of positions. A whole list of shortcomings was identified, which, according to experts, did not allow to provide the specified characteristics even in conditions of sufficiently long debugging of the equipment. The main complaints were about the digital computer and the slot antenna with electronic scanning of the beam in the vertical plane, there was a significant lag with the development of the RLPK software.

As a result, in May 1982, it was decided to stop testing and further refinement of the Mech radar in its first version and to develop for it a new antenna with mechanical scanning based on the Rubin radar antenna of the MiG-29 aircraft, but with an increase of 1.5 times. diameter (the use of a radar with a slot antenna was postponed until the creation of a modified version of the fighter - Su-27M). The creation of such an antenna was entrusted to FIDI specialists. Instead of a computer developed by NIIP, it was proposed to use a new-generation on-board computer Ts100, created at the Research Institute of Digital Electronic Computing (NIITSEVT, Moscow). The development of new software was entrusted to NII-AS MAP. V.K. Grishin was dismissed from the post of General Designer of NPO Fazotron and chief designer of the unified SUV for Su-27 and MiG-29 fighters and was appointed chief designer of SUV S-27, and T.O.Bekirbaev became his deputy.

Through the efforts of specialists from four institutes - NIIP, NIIR, NIITSEVT and NIIAS - the task was completed in a very short time. Already in March 1983, a conclusion was drawn up on the readiness of the updated radar (it received the code N001) for flight tests as part of the C-27 SUV on the Su-27 aircraft. They were carried out at the Air Force Research Institute in Akhtubinsk (now the V.P. Chkalov GLITs) and were completed at the beginning of 1984. The radar was presented for joint tests, which were successfully completed just two months later. After minor modifications to the software in 1985, the CUB C-27 was recommended for service.

And although not all the ideas of the designers were ultimately realized, the N001 radar fully met modern requirements. For the first time in domestic aviation radar, when creating this radar, the tasks of providing an average repetition rate of IM pulses for detecting and tracking a target from the side of the rear hemisphere at low altitudes, a radio correction mode for controlling at the first stage of guiding missiles of the R-27 type, using a single transmitter were solved for the operation of the radar and target illumination for the guided missile, operating sequentially in the mode of pulsed and continuous radiation. The use of new technical solutions and modern element base made it possible to reduce the weight and size characteristics of the equipment by about half in comparison with the equipment of the previous generation. The following main characteristics of the radar were obtained: detection range of a fighter-type target - 100 km from the front hemisphere and 40 km from the rear hemisphere, the number of simultaneously tracked targets on the pass - 10, the number of simultaneously attacked targets - 1, the number of simultaneously guided missiles - 2, the range of heights of detected targets in a solid angle of 120º is from 50-100 m to 25 km. At the same time, protection was provided against almost all types of interference that existed at that time.

In 1982, the first aircraft of a new layout, soprano at the serial plant in Komsomolsk-on-Amur, T-1015 (serial No. 05-01), joined the test program for the new fighter. T-1017 (No. 05-02) and, a little later, T-1016 (No. 05-04). The flight of the lead serial Su-27 was performed on June 2, 1982 by the OKB test pilot Alexander Nikolaevich Isakov. The following year, the Komsomol plant delivered 9 more aircraft of the 5th, 6th and 7th series (OKB codes T-1018, T-1020, T-1021, T-1022, T-1023, T-1024, T1O-25, T- 1026 and T-1027), most of which took part in the State Joint Tests (GSI) of the Su-27 fighter, carried out in parallel with the deployment of mass production and the beginning of the development of a new machine in the army. On the T-1018 and T-1022 aircraft, in particular, the optical-electronic sighting system OEPS-27 was adjusted. With the new Ts100 computer, on the T-1020 and T-1022 group actions of fighters were practiced.

Not everything went smoothly at this stage of testing either. In one of the flights in 1983 near the T-1017 aircraft, which was piloted by test pilot Nikolai Fedorovich Sadovnikov, while performing the "platform" at low altitude and high speed, part of the wing console collapsed, while structural debris damaged the vertical tail. Only thanks to the great skill of the tester, later Hero of the Soviet Union and world record holder, the flight ended safely. N.F.Sadovnikov landed a damaged aircraft on the airfield - without most of the wing console, with a chopped off keel and, thus, provided invaluable material to the developers of the machine. It was found that the cause of the destruction was an incorrectly calculated hinge moment that occurs when the wing tip deflects in some flight conditions. The flight of Sadovpikov dotted all the "i's" in the investigation of another incident with one of the first serial Su-27 T-1021 (serial no. 05-03), which found itself at about the same time in a similar situation during tests at the LII. However, unlike the T-1017, this machine was lost, and the pilot managed to eject. Urgently, measures were taken to refine the aircraft: the structure of the wing and the airframe as a whole was strengthened.

According to the test results, the aircraft structure underwent further modifications several times: the head part of the fuselage and the wing were reinforced (previously released fighters were supplied with additional external strength plates, and the newly built ones had a reinforced power set and skin panels); the shape of the tips of the vertical tail has changed; the weight balancers previously installed on the keels were abolished; to accommodate passive jamming blocks, the length and construction height of the aft "flipper" - the compartment of the tail section of the fuselage between the central boom and the engine nacelles, have increased.

During the tests, the helmet-mounted target designation system (NSC) "Shchel-ZUM" was introduced into the OEPS-27. This equipment, developed at the Kiev plant "Arsenal" (chief designer A.K. Mikhailik), included a helmet-mounted sighting device and an optical location unit with a scanner device for determining the angle of rotation of the pilot's head. The NSC made it possible to measure the coordinates of the line of sight during visual tracking of the target by the pilot in the zone + 60º in azimuth and from -15º to + 60º in elevation at a line of sight speed of up to 20º / s, as well as to aim at the target of the automatic capture zone of the OLS with simultaneous transmission coordinates of the line of sight of the target in the radar and the missile homing head. The combined use of the NSC and the OLS made it possible in close maneuvering combat to reduce the aiming time, to quickly lock the target, to provide target designation to the missile homing heads before the target entered the cone of possible target engagement angles with the head, and thus to launch the missiles at the maximum permissible angles.

In the mid 80s. state tests were completed, and the adoption of a new generation of guided air-to-air missiles took place: medium-range missiles R-27R and R-27T with semi-active radar and thermal homing heads (in 1984), short-range air-to-air missiles R- 73 with a thermal homing head (in 1985) and an extended-range missile launcher R-27ER and R-27ET (in 1987). Thus, by this time the composition of the armament system and on-board equipment of the Su-27 aircraft was finally formed.

The basis of the avionics was the S-27 armament control system, which includes: an RLPK-27 radar sighting system with an N001 radar, a state identification interrogator and a Ts100 digital computer; an optical-electronic sighting system OEPS-27 with an optical-locating station OLS-27, a helmet-mounted target designation system "Shchel-ZUM" and a digital computer Ts100; system of unified indication SEI-31 "Narcissus" with sighting and aerobatic indicator against the background of the windshield and indicator of direct vision; weapon control system. The SUV interacted with the PNK-10 flight and navigation complex, the onboard part of the Spektr command radio link, the state recognition system, telecode communication equipment (TCS) and the equipment of the onboard defense complex (the Bereza radiation warning station, Sorption active jamming station and devices for emission of passive interference APP-50). SUV S-27 ensured the use of the Su-27 aircraft in ground guidance systems with command control and semi-autonomous actions with targeting both a single aircraft and a group. In addition, autonomous group actions of fighters (up to 12 aircraft in a group) were provided.

The first Su-27s entered the armed forces in 1984, by the end of the next year a significant number of such fighters had already been produced, and the massive rearmament of fighter aviation units of the Air Defense Forces and the Air Force began with a new type of aircraft. State joint tests of the Su-27 were completed in 1985. The results obtained indicated that a truly outstanding aircraft had been created, unmatched in fighter aviation in terms of maneuverability, flight range and combat effectiveness. However, some systems of onboard radio-electronic equipment (first of all, the REB equipment and the group action control system) required additional tests, which were carried out according to special programs already after the end of the GSE. After debugging the entire avionics complex, by the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated 23 August 1990, the Su-27 was officially adopted by the Air Force and Air Defense Aviation of the Soviet Union.

The completion of the creation of the Su-27 aircraft was marked by a number of state awards and prizes, which were presented to the developers, testers and manufacturers of the fighter. A team of authors was nominated for the State Prize, consisting of:

- Sukhoi Pavel Osipovich (General Designer of the Design Bureau until 1975), posthumously;

- Mikhail Petrovich Simonov (General Designer of Sukhoi Design Bureau since 1983, in 1976-1979 - Chief Designer of the Su-27 aircraft);

- Avramenko Vladimir Nikolaevich (during the development of serial production of the Su-27 - director of the Komsomolsk-on-Amur APO, then director of the P.O. Sukhoi Ministry of Health);

- Antonov Vladimir Ivanovich (Deputy Head of the Projects Department of the Sukhoi Design Bureau, one of the authors of the Su-27 layout):

- Ilyushin Vladimir Sergeevich (leading test pilot of the Sukhoi Design Bureau, who lifted and tested the prototype T-10 and T-10S aircraft on the first flight and is currently the Deputy Chief Designer of the Sukhoi Design Bureau);

- Kashafutdinov Stanislav Timorkaevich (chief aerodynamicist of SibNIA, one of the authors of the aerodynamic configuration of the Su-27);

- Alexey I. Knyshev (chief designer of the Su-27 aircraft since 1981);

- Pogosyan Mikhail Aslanovich (during the development of modifications of the Su-27K, Su-27M, Su-27UB - head of the fighter brigade of the project department, then head of the project department, chief designer, 1st Deputy General Designer, currently - General Director of OKB Sukhoi ").

MASS PRODUCTION

Serial production of Su-27 fighters was launched in 1982 at an aircraft plant in Komsomolsk-on-Amur. This enterprise, which by that time had almost half a century of history, had been building supersonic aircraft of the "Su" brand for more than 20 years.

The mastering of the serial production of the 4th generation Su-27 fighters, the preparation of which began in 1976, required the plant's specialists to fully exert their efforts. The new fighter was too different in constructive and technological terms from the Su-17 aircraft under construction at the enterprise at that time, and the time allotted by the government for the changeover of production was too tough. The main features of the Su-27, to which the Komsomol members had to get used to, were the widespread use of titanium alloys, large-sized monolithic panels, welding as one of the main assembly processes in the aircraft structure, as well as the use of a complex complex of avionics on the fighter.

The design and technological features of the aircraft posed many difficult tasks for the production workers. The number of new technological processes to be mastered amounted to many tens. The complexity of the manufacture of individual units and assemblies was prohibitively high, which limited the possibility of rapid deployment of mass production.

A wide range of scientific and technical problems were associated with the use of high-strength titanium alloys in the aircraft structure. Mechanical processing of titanium power units was to be carried out on metal-cutting machines with cutters and cutters of increased rigidity, capable of developing high torques at low cutting speeds. Technological sites equipped with such CNC machines were created in machine shops. It also required the creation of specialized areas for performing fire hazardous processes of stripping titanium assemblies after machining.

The deployment of serial production of the Su-27 required the reconstruction and technical re-equipment of almost all workshops of the main and auxiliary production. The plant was replenished with hundreds of units of modern technological equipment.

Despite the high complexity of the item-by-item tasks, the hard work of the plant staff in Komsomolsk-on-Amur ensured that the deadlines for the launch of the aircraft into serial production were met. As a result, already in 1979 at the DMZ im. YA Gagarin, the first samples of the Su-27 were co6p in the initial version of the layout, and in 1981 - the first aircraft of the serial layout. A great contribution to the organization of the serial production of the Su-27 was made by the director of the plant V.N. Avramenko, chief engineer V.G. Kutsepko, chief metallurgist T.B ... Betlievsky. Deputy Chief Engineers OV Glushko and BV Tselybeev. Significant assistance in mastering the production of the Su-27 in Komsomolsk-na-Amur was provided by the specialists of the P.O. Sukhoi branch of the OKB created at the plant, headed at that time by A.N. Knyshev. After the appointment of L.I. Knyshev to the post of chief designer of the design bureau for self-defense Su-27, the branch of the design bureau of the DMZ was headed by A.Ya. Maranov.

In 1985, the enterprise produced a pilot batch of two-seat combat training aircraft Su-27UB, in 1989 production of ship-based Su-27K (Su-33) fighters began, in 1992 - modernized multipurpose Su-27M fighters (Su-35 p Su-37). Since the mid-80s. the plant in Komsomolsk-na-Amur is the main and only enterprise of the domestic aviation industry for the manufacture of all single-seat modifications of the Su-27 fighter family. Since the late 90s. here began the development of production and new two-seat variants - the ship-based combat training Su-27KUB and the multipurpose Su-30MKK.

The manufacture of components for the Su-27 fighters was established at various enterprises of the aviation, radio engineering, electronic, defense and other industries. So, gas turbine starters-power units GTDE-117 are produced by the St. Petersburg Machine-Building Enterprise "Krasny Oktyabr", airborne radar sighting systems RLPK-27 - by the State Ryazan Instrument Plant and PO "Oktyabr" (Kamenets-Uralsk), optical-electronic sighting systems OEPS-27 - by the Ural Optical and Mechanical Plant (Yekaterinburg).

SU-27: THE SECRET BECOMES DISCOVER

The first mentions of the development of a new generation of fighters in the USSR appeared in the Western aviation press in the second half of the 70s. In August 1977, the Swiss magazine "International Defense Review" flashed a message that a new Soviet fighter, called the MiG-29, was being tested at the Flight Research Institute near Moscow (then called the Ramenskoye test center in the West). It is worth noting that at that time the MiG-29 had not yet flown, and the author of the article most likely had in mind the Su-27 - the flights of its first prototype T-101 began in May 1977. The following circumstances were the reason for the publication. In 1977, an American reconnaissance satellite that followed the "events" on the territory of LII took pictures of two new fighters, which the US Department of Defense assigned temporary codes Ram-K and Ram-L (the Pentagon gave such names to all new unidentified Soviet combat aircraft, found at an airfield near Ramenskoye). The first of them, as it turned out later, was the Su-27, the second was the MiG-29.

The United States, however, was slow to make official statements about the materials received and the publication of photographs. The first information about the existence of a new fighter by the Sukhoi Design Bureau was disseminated by the Pentagon in the press in March 1979, and the "spy" images from the satellite were published only in November 1983, when the new "flashes" and "dry" ones were already put into mass production and the American intelligence began to have more complete information about these aircraft. The name Su-27 first appeared on the pages of foreign press in 1982, at the same time the Ram-K temporary code was replaced by the standard NATO name Flanker. The quality of the first "satellite" photographs left much to be desired: by and large, only the general aerodynamic layout of the fighter could be seen on them. However, these pictures made a great impression on foreign experts. In the West, for example, back in 1982, they were sure that the Su-27 is equipped with a variable geometry wing (!), And it is in this version that the aircraft is being prepared for serial production with the possible start of deliveries to combat units in 1983. Up to the mid-80s. -x years high-quality photographs of the aircraft still did not exist, and the drawings published in foreign open editions were very, very approximate.

The official Soviet press was completely silent about the existence of new fighters in the country. The first scarce information on this matter appeared only in the summer of 1985, when a documentary film was shown on Central TV, dedicated to the life and work of General Designer P.O. Sukhoi in connection with his 90th birthday. In the film, among other things, a ten-second story about the Su-27 flashed: several frames were shown that captured the takeoff and flight of an experienced T-101. In the same year, the first copy of the aircraft was transferred to the exposition of the Air Force Museum in Monino, Moscow Region. Western aviation journalists rushed to comment and analyze the information received from the TV screen, reproduced in the form of photographs in the foreign press in December 1985 (access to Monino for foreigners was still very limited at that time). It is noteworthy that, being mistaken in details and having received an idea of ​​the appearance of only the first prototype of the fighter, as we know, significantly different from subsequent production vehicles, in general they came to the correct conclusions about the purpose and general characteristics of the Su-27. The evaluation of the aircraft was enthusiastic: "The new development of the Sukhoi Design Bureau is a wonderful aircraft, the appearance of which is almost the same as the American F-14 and F-15 fighters hit at the time." But even then in the West they knew that in the serial version the aircraft would be quite different from the T-101 (according to NATO classification - Flanker-A), shown on television, in particular, in the design of the wing and empennage. The modified version of the aircraft received the "NATO" Flanker-B code.

Since by the end of 1986, Su-27 fighters were already widely used in the air defense and air forces of the Soviet Union and began to be involved in patrol flights over neutral waters, it became inevitable that Western pilots would meet them in the air. enemy. As a result of one of these "encounters" in the air, the crew of the Norwegian Orion aircraft took the first photographs of the serial Su-27 with side number 21, published in Oslo on April 26, 1987, and then replicated by the foreign aviation press. After that, photographs of serial Su-27s began to appear in the Soviet aviation and military press (at that time, without specifying the name of the aircraft). The first of them were published in June 1987 in the journal Technics and Armaments.

In the fall of 1987, a detailed photo reportage went around the pages of Western magazines, capturing from close range the Su-27 with side number 36 and suspended missile weapons. It was filmed under rather piquant circumstances. On September 13, 1987, a patrol aircraft of the 333rd squadron of the Norwegian Air Force Lockheed R-3V Orion monitored a group of Soviet warships in the neutral waters of the Barents Sea 260 km southeast of Vardo in northern Norway and 90 km from the nearest Soviet territory. According to some reports, the pilot of the nearby Su-27 fighter V. Tsimbal was given a command to carry out a training interception of a NATO intelligence officer. At 10:39 local time, the Su-27 approached the Orion, passing at a distance of only 2 meters from it.

A quarter of an hour later, the Soviet fighter reappeared behind and below the reconnaissance aircraft. As a result of dangerous maneuvering, the machines came into contact: the fighter touched the left keel with the radio-transparent tip of the rotating propeller blades of the rightmost engine of the Orion, as a result of which they were destroyed, and the propeller fragments pierced the reconnaissance fuselage. Fortunately, there were no casualties: the Orion crew turned off the right engine, feathering the propeller, and turned the plane towards the coast. At 1157 hours Orion landed safely at the Banak airfield; landed at its airfield and the Su-27. On the same day, Norway made a formal protest to the Soviet embassy. As Flight magazine reported a week after the incident, “The Norwegians believe that the cause of this incident was the pilot’s indiscipline, and not an attempt to prevent the P-3 aircraft from observing Soviet naval maneuvers. R-3 aircraft of the Norwegian Air Force patrol the Barents Sea area almost daily and are routinely intercepted by Soviet fighters. However, until now, Soviet interceptors have not passed in such proximity. "

A curious version of this incident reported in the English aviation magazine Air International in August 1988: “The Orion plane was on patrol over the Barents Sea when it was intercepted by the Flanker plane, whose pilot, no doubt, intended to get some good pictures of this Norwegian aircraft: in the fairings on the lower part of the nacelles behind the chassis compartments for this very purpose there were apparently built-in cameras directed to the sides. Unfortunately, the Soviet pilot, probably for a moment enthusiastic to get a real close-up shot to decorate the wall in the crew room, forgetting about the size of his plane, allowed the left keel of his plane to come into contact with the outer right propeller of the Orion plane. Pieces of the destroyed propeller pierced the fuselage of the Orion aircraft, and there is little doubt that the keel of the Flanker aircraft also required repair after that. Fortunately, both planes returned safely to their bases, although it is believed that the Soviet pilot is now 'flying around the table'! "

On the basis of these first photographs of the Su-27 in the West, very professional diagrams of the general types and layout of the aircraft were prepared and published in print. The assessments of the main characteristics of the fighter were also very close to the truth. Not having then the opportunity to really "touch" the new Soviet fighter, foreign experts "hit the spot" with the definition of some geometric parameters (for example, the wingspan was named with an accuracy of a centimeter), flight speed, range of onboard radar, etc. The manufacturer of serial fighters was correctly indicated, as well as the fact that "in a carrier-based version, this aircraft can be used on a large Soviet aircraft carrier currently under construction in Nikolaev." However, there were also a number of serious mistakes. So, the aircraft engines were attributed to the S.K. Tumapsky Design Bureau (the designation P-32, provided by the Soviet side to the FAI during the registration in 1986 of aviation records of the P-42 aircraft, was misleading, which will be discussed below, but how, he wrote the same source, "there is reason to believe that the fighter, designated by the Soviet Union P-42, is a specially prepared version of the Su-27 aircraft"). It is worth recalling that the Su-27 was finally declassified only at the beginning of 1989, and before that one could only dream of publishing any details about the aircraft, and even more so its characteristics in the Soviet press.

FOREIGN DEBUT

In the fall of 1988, the glasnost proclaimed in the USSR finally touched on military aviation technology. At the traditional international aviation exhibition in Farnborough (Great Britain), the Soviet side presented two military aircraft: the MiG-29 fighter and the MiG-29UB combat training aircraft. The unprecedented demonstration of the latest Soviet fighter jet made a great impression on the world community and business interests. There are real prospects for signing contracts for the export of modern military equipment abroad. Satisfied with the success, the Soviet leadership in February 1989 decided to show for the first time at the next air show in Le Bourget several Sukhoi Design Bureau combat aircraft. Among them were two Su-27 fighters - single (serial number 24-04, OKB code - T-1041, which had side number 41, then replaced by "exhibition" number 388), piloted by test pilot of OKB P.O. Sukhoi VG Pugachev, and combat training ("exhibition" No. 389), piloted by EI Frolov. In early June 1989, the planes arrived in Paris. The flight from Moscow to Le Bourget with a length of 2384 km was performed without intermediate landings in 3 hours of flying time.

Authoritative Western experts called the Su-27 supersonic fighter the "star of the cabin". The aerobatic complex carried out on this aircraft by the test pilot Hero of the Soviet Union V.G. Pugachev made a huge impression on those present at the airfield. The "highlight" of the performance, which was an alternation of complex and aerobatics, was the implementation of a unique maneuver - the so-called dynamic braking, or dynamic access to extra-large angles of attack, which was named "Cobra Pugachev" in honor of its first performer. Its essence is as follows: an airplane performing a horizontal flight suddenly throws mine up sharply. but does not go up, but continues to fly forward. At the same time, the angle of attack increases, passes the 90-degree mark and reaches 120º. The plane actually flies "tail first". In a few moments, the speed is reduced to 150 km / h, then the car lowers its nose and returns to normal horizontal flight. This technique is not available to any other combat aircraft in the world. Experts pointed out that dynamic braking can be used in aerial combat when attacking a target from a disadvantageous position, for example, to launch missiles into the rear hemisphere.

V.G. Pugachev began working out the regime of dynamic approach to ultra-large angles of attack in March 1989 on an experimental "twin" T-10U-1 equipped for safety with an anti-spin parachute and anti-screw missiles, in preparation for the first demonstration of the Su-27 on foreign air show. On April 28, 1989, test pilot Pugachev for the first time demonstrated the famous "cobra" to specialists at the LII. At an altitude of 500-1000 m, the pilot performed about 10 such maneuvers in three passes. In total, during the tests, dynamic braking was carried out several hundred times, which made it possible to fully work out this maneuver and make it an aerobatics figure. However, even before Pugachev completed his first "cobra", the test pilot of the LII IP Volkom on the Su-27 No. 09-06 (factory code - T-1030) carried out a large amount of tests to assess the behavior of the aircraft on near-critical angles of attack and in spin mode. It has been shown that the aircraft can fly and reliably control at very high angles of attack, even exceeding 90º, and that the Su-27 does not pose any significant problem to get out of various types of tailspin. It was within the framework of these studies that the famous "cobra" was born.

In the skies of France, Soviet aircraft were a huge success. Here is what Reuters reported on June 15, 1989: “The Soviet Union apparently won the fight for the superiority of its fighters over the US fighters in the skies of Le Bourget. The Russians succeeded in doing this with the help of their kite-like aircraft, whose promising design and ease of control amazed specialists. The plane attracted everyone's attention. Aviation experts say that Soviet designers have created an amazing machine. The US Air Force was represented by sleek F-16 and F-18 aircraft, but they were pushed into the background by the Soviet Su-27, which demonstrated amazing aerodynamic qualities and the ability to almost sit on its own tail. " The correspondent of the Parisian newspaper "Liberation" reported on June 9, 1989: “The new Soviet aircraft Su-27 made a great impression on the audience. Previously, he never left the territory of the Soviet Union, and his arrival at the exhibition, and then the demonstration in flight, amazed specialists. This aircraft appears to be one of the most impressive fighter-interceptors in the world. The designers have created an aircraft that is in no way inferior to the best models available in the West. And for those who were not yet convinced of this, it was enough to see the open mouths of the pilots watching the flight, which was performed by Viktor Pugachev. "

An interesting article was published in the English weekly "The Economist" on June 30, 1989 after the end of the exhibition in Le Bourget. Here are some quotes from it: “The Russian aerospace industry, which the West spoke of as outdated in the West, has produced a generation of aircraft that are among the best in the world. The star of the Le Bourget air show was the Su-27 fighter. improved aerodynamics of the aircraft.In comparison with Western-made aircraft, it remains stable at much higher angles of attack (110º for the Su-27, 35 for the F-16, 45º for the Rafal). - "cobra", when it lifts its nose to such an extent that, in fact, flies its tail forward. In the event of a fight in the air, the F-15 will have a hard time. Abrupt braking and nose lifting in a few seconds provides the Su-27 aircraft undeniable tactical superiority over modern western aircraft F-15, F-16, F-18, Mirage-2000 and Rafale, which cannot perform such a maneuver. t assume that the Su-27 has a very high maneuverability and controllability, not only at the extreme modes, demonstrated by Viktor Pugachev. In practical terms, the Su-27 has already gone beyond the limits of such limiting flight modes, in which it is planned to use the western experimental aircraft Kh-29 and the promising Kh-31; but the Su-27 is a combat aircraft in service! As a result, it may turn out that the next-generation maneuverable fighter, of which all Western designers and the Air Force dream, already exists, but “on the other side of the barricades” ... "

The survivability of the Su-27 was proven in Paris by an emergency that happened on the first day of the show. June 8, 1989, with a two-seater Su-27UB piloted by K.I. Frolov. The weather over Paris was then unimportant, it was raining, and a thunderstorm front was passing by. As a result, lightning struck the Su-27UB, which was performing a loop from takeoff. This is how EI Frolov recalled this incident: “I immediately got a lot of refusals. It can be said that all the "electrics" were cut off, and only "control" remained. I had to stop the execution of the program and urgently go in for the landing. " Having lost contact, with non-working instruments, Frolov masterfully landed the Su-27UB on the Le Bourget runway. And after inspecting the plane and the necessary equipment repairs, he soon took off again on aerobatics into the Parisian sky.

In August 1989, the Su-27 aerobatics complex was first shown to Muscovites and guests of the capital at an aviation festival in Tushino, dedicated to the Day of the Air Force of the USSR. It was then that the tradition of holding large-scale air parades with the participation of military equipment in our country was revived (such events have not been held in the Soviet Union for more than 20 years - the last large-scale aviation holiday took place in July 1967 at Domodedovo). On Sunday, August 20, 1989, and the skies over the Tushino airfield of the capital, Muscovites were finally able to see what was previously reported only by a short TV report from Le Bourget. The highlight of the show, no doubt, was the Su-27 fighters. LII pilots A.V. Krutov and E.M. Kozlov demonstrated the unique capabilities of the new fighter, in particular - flight at minimum speed, when a pair of Su-27s confidently passed in the same formation with the Mi-24 helicopter (crew commander - V. Lebenkov) ... Not without the sensational "cobra" - it was brilliantly performed by the test pilot of the "Sukhoi Design Bureau" VG Pugachev, who repeated his Paris program in the sky over Tushino.

Simultaneously, from August 19 to August 27, 1089, an exhibition of aviation equipment was launched at the Central Aerodrome of Moscow (Khodynka), the exhibits of which were two Su-27 fighters - single with side No. 22 (T1O-22) and double with No. 389. previously shown at Le Bourget. For the first time, everyone had the opportunity to get to know the new combat aircraft closely. Soon after the closure of the exhibition on Khodynka, the National Aviation Museum was organized, the exhibit of which for some time was one of the first serial Su-27s with side number 31 (T-1031). Later, another aircraft of this type, the experimental T-1020, was transferred to the museum.

On August 15, 1989, the Kubinka garrison near Moscow opened its gates for the first time, where military pilots performed demonstration flights on fighters. On August 19, 1989, an air parade was also held in Zhukovsky, where testers from the Flight Research Institute and several design bureaus demonstrated in flight the capabilities of a number of aircraft, including, of course, the Su-27. The parade in Zhukovsky became a kind of rehearsal for the capital's premiere of new combat aircraft. It is worth noting that this was not the first air holiday organized by the LII leadership, just that earlier such events were of a “local” nature and were not advertised in the press. It was at one of these parades, held over the Moscow River near the walls of the LIP in August 1988 (that is, even before the demonstration of new Soviet fighters in Farnborough and Le Bourget) that the Su-27 fighter was first shown. True, only residents of the "aviation capital of Russia" could see it then, and a small number of meticulous aviation enthusiasts who accidentally learned about the upcoming event and specially arrived in Zhukovsky.

At that holiday, it was planned to demonstrate a group flight of a pair of Su-27s accompanying a heavy Il-76 transport aircraft. The fighters were to be piloted by LII testers A.V. Shchukin and S.N. Presvyatsky. But the work of a test pilot is rightfully considered one of the most difficult and dangerous. Literally on the eve of the parade in Zhukovsky, AV Shchukin, one of the leading pilots of the LII, a member of the group of test cosmonauts preparing for the flight on the reusable spacecraft "Buran", did not return from a test flight on a light sports aircraft Su-26M.

The celebration in Zhukovsky did take place. In memory of the deceased comrade, the flight of the Il-76 and Su-27 was not canceled either. Only one fighter was in the ranks, and the place of the Shchukin Su-27 behind the left wing of the "silt" remained empty ... After the solemn and mournful flight of a pair of Il-7b (crew commander V. Aleksandrov) and Su-27, S.N .Tresvyatsky demonstrated aerobatics on this fighter No. 14, dedicating the flight to the memory of A.V. Shchukin. VG Putachev, test pilot of the Sukhoi Design Bureau, also showed his skills in the record-breaking version of the Su-27 - P-42.

The tremendous success of the 1989 parades in Zhukovsky and Tushino prompted the country's leadership to organize a regular aerospace exhibition. The first of them, called "Mosaeroshow-92", took place on the territory of the Flight Research Institute in Zhukovsky and in August 1992. LII test pilots A.N. Kvochur, S.N. Tresvyatsky and A. .G. Beschastnov, who performed on the Su-27P and Su-27PU aircraft, and the pilots of the Sukhoi Design Bureau IV Votintsev and EG Revunov, who demonstrated aerobatics on the Su-27UB and Su-27IB aircraft. In the static exposition "Mosaeroshow-92", the Su-27K ship fighter and the LMK-2405 flying laboratory on the Su-27 base were shown for the first time. Starting next year, the exhibition acquired international status and became known as the International Aerospace Salon (MAKS). Aircraft of the Su-27 family are traditional participants in MAKS air salops, which have been held every two years since 1993.

With the Paris premiere of the Su-27 and Su-27UB in June 1989, the triumphal march of Su fighters began in foreign aviation salons and air shows. In 1990, two Su-27 aircraft were demonstrated for the first time in Southeast Asia, at an exhibition in Singapore. On the way back, the dryers landed in New Delhi and were presented to the command of the Indian armed forces. In the summer of the same year, Su-27 aircraft first visited the North American continent. Test pilots LII S.N. Tresvyatsky and R.A. -A. Stankevicius on two Su-27s were invited to participate in the annual aviation festival in Zverett (near Seattle). Soon after returning from the United States, Stankevicius went to Italy, where an air show was to take place at the J. Carrer airfield near Salgareda.

Unfortunately, the demonstration flight on the Su-27 with tail number 14 in Italy on September 9, 1990 was the last in the biography of the remarkable test pilot, deputy head of the complex of the detachment of test cosmonauts of the reusable space system "Buran" Rimantas Antapas-Antano Stankevicius. When performing a vertical aerobatics figure, input into the loop was performed at a height slightly less than the calculated one. Coming out of the loop, Stankevicius almost straightened the plane, but he could not cope with the resulting drop in height. Almost flat, the plane touched the ground. An explosion took place, which claimed the life of the pilot and who was at the scene of the fall of the member of the security service of the organizing committee of the air show, Silvio Moretto.

The Su-27 crash in Italy did not affect the further participation of aircraft of this type in various kinds of air shows and air shows, especially since the commission to investigate the causes of the accident did not make any claims to the material part.

Over the past 15 years, Su-27 fighters have visited many countries in Europe, Asia, North and Latin America, Africa and Australia. On account of them airshows and airshows in the USA, Canada, France. Great Britain. Germany. Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Norway, Austria, Luxembourg, 11olyps, Czech Republic, Slovakia, China. India Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Australia, United Arab Emirates, Chile, etc.

1. Photos

2. Video

3. History of creation

3.1 Start of development

In the late 60s, the development of fourth generation fighters began in several states. The pioneers in this were the United States of America, which in 1974 produced the F-15B and 15A "Eagle" fighters.

The Soviet Union responded by opening a competition for the development of a promising front-line fighter, in which three design bureaus took part. At first, the Sukhoi Experimental Design Bureau did not participate in the project, as it was loaded with other developments. But in 1969, the Sukhoi Design Bureau carried out initial studies on promising front-line fighters, and two years later, work began on the T-10 product. Since not everyone liked the idea of ​​an integral layout of a delta wing airframe, about 15 models, differing in layout, were tested at the Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute in a wind tunnel. After that, there was a return to the first project, but at the same time the study of an aircraft with a conventional scheme, a two-keel high-wing aircraft with air intakes on the sides, began. This option was considered due to the layout of the F-15 airframe, USA.

After all, the fighter being created was basically required to ensure supremacy in the sky, and in this this glider will compete with it, which will also become its probable enemy.

In the tactics of combat in the sky, close maneuverable combat was also envisaged, which was the main element of the combat use of the aircraft.

In 1972, the Yak-45 and Yak-47 projects dropped out of the competition. The MiG design bureau proposed to produce a section of the program of a promising front-line fighter and at the same time work on a light and heavy aircraft with the greatest unification of equipment, which will make the production process less expensive and faster. Also, light and heavy fighters will be given their own range of tasks.

3.2 Adoption

The T-10S fighter began to be mass-produced in 1981 at the 126th plant (Komsomolsk-on-Amur). Unofficially, the Su-27 began to enter service in 1982, and officially - eight years later, after correcting the shortcomings discovered during testing. By this time, the fighters had already been in use for over five years. In the air defense aviation, the Su-27 was designated Su-27P, an interceptor, and in the air force, the Su-27S, serial. The interceptor could not shoot at targets on the ground due to the fact that it had simpler equipment.

4. Armament and equipment

The H001 pulse-Doppler airborne radar has a quantum optical location station equipped with a 36Sh laser rangefinder, capable of tracking targets in simple weather conditions with high accuracy. Also, the radar has a Cassegrain antenna with a diameter of 1076 mm, which can find targets on the ground and in the air with active interference. The optical location station has the ability to track the target, being not far from it, while not violating the camouflage of the fighter and not emitting radio emission. Data from optical-location and airborne radar stations go to the display frame on the windshield and the line-of-sight indicator.

4.1 Air-to-air mode

For air targets, at their minimum speeds of 210 km / h, with a probability of 0.5, the minimum difference between the carrier and the target is 150 km / h.

• Target detection range: fighter class (effective scattering area - 3 m2 at an average altitude, over 1000 m), ZPS - 25 - 35 km, PPS - 80 - 100 km, 150 km when operating in early warning mode
• Finding up to ten targets
• Defeat one target
• Guidance of up to two missiles on one target

4.2 Air-to-ground mode (only for Su-30, Su-27SM)

• Surface mapping is possible: target detection above water and on the ground in mapping mode with synthesizing an antenna aperture with high and medium resolution, real-beam mapping mode, moving targets in their selection mode. Measurement and tracking of coordinates on the ground.
• Detection in the selection mode of moving targets of a tank with an effective scattering area of ​​10 m2 and more, moving at 15-90 km / h
• Detection range, km: aircraft carrier - 350, effective scattering area (EPR) - 50,000 m2; rocket boat - 50-70, RCS - 500 m²; destroyer - 250, RCS - 10,000 m2; boats - 30, RCS - 50 m²; railway bridge - 100, EPR - 2000 m².
• MTBF 200 hours.

5. Modifications

• Su-27S (Su-27) (Flanker-B) - the main serial modification, a single-seat fighter-interceptor of the Air Force.
• Su-27SK (1991) - export version of the single-seat Su-27 (Su-27S).
• Su-27SM (2002) - modernization. It mainly affected the fighter's weapons control system.
• Su-27SM3 - based on the backlog of export Su-27K, 12 aircraft were produced. The main changes are as follows: the airframe has been strengthened, AL-31F-M1 engines with a thrust of 13,500 kgf appeared, and there are additional suspension points.
• Su-27SKM (2002) - a variant of the Su-27SM for sale to foreign countries. In terms of characteristics, it is similar to the Su-30MK2, Su-30MKK.
• Su-27P is a single-seat fighter-interceptor designed for air defense forces. Shoots down only air targets.
• Su-27UB (T-10U) (Flanker-C) is a two-seater combat training fighter. It is necessary for flight training on the Su-27, in its bow there is a radar station N001 radar. Manufactured since 1986.
• Su-30 (Su-27PU) - double target designation and guidance aircraft. Based on the Su-27UB. Four Su-27 interceptors can be targeted at the same time.
• Su-27UBK is a variant of the Su-27UB for sale to foreign countries.
• (T-12, Su-27K) (Flanker-D) - carrier-based single-seat fighter with folding wing consoles. Manufactured since 1992.
• Su-33UB (T-12UB, Su-27KUB) - carrier-based combat training fighter. Features a side-by-side seating arrangement.
• Su-34 (Su-32FN, Su-27IB) (Fullback) is a two-seater fighter-bomber in which the seats are in a shoulder-to-shoulder position. It is necessary for firing at surface or ground targets with a high degree of security at any time of the day. Weatherproof. The functionality is the same as that of the F-15E fighter, made in the United States. The first flight was performed in the spring of 1990.
• Su-35S (Su-35BM) (Flanker-E +) is a multi-role fighter. Unlike the Su-27M, it has engines with a thrust vector control system, and there is no horizontal front empennage.

5.1 Ukrainian modifications

• Su-27UB1M - modernization of the Su-27UB.
• Su-27UP1M - modernization of the Su-27UP.
• Su-27S1M - modernization of the Su-27S.
• Su-27P1M - modernization of the Su-27P.

6. Experimental aircraft

• T-10 is a prototype.
• T-10S is an improved prototype.
• Su-27 is a pre-production version equipped with AL-31 engines.
• Su-27IB is a prototype of two-seat fighter-bombers Su-34 and Su-32FN, in which the seats are next to each other. It is necessary for firing at surface or ground targets with a high degree of security at any time of the day. Weatherproof. The first flight was performed in the spring of 1990.
• P-42 (T-10-15) - converted from Su-27. In the second half of the 80s, 41 world records of flight altitude and rate of climb were made on them, registered by the International Aeronautical Federation. The weight has been significantly reduced (the largest take-off weight is 14.1 tons), in addition, forced engines have appeared.
• Su-27M (T-10M) (Flanker-E) - multi-role fighter. The power of the PGO and the radar has been increased. It was exported under the designation Su-35. The Su-35 has slightly changed the composition of the equipment and design, depending on the specific customer.
• Su-35UB (T-10UBM) is a combat training aircraft based on the Su-27M, Su-30 and Su-37. Produced in one copy.
• Su-37 (T-10M-11) (Flanker-F) is a multipurpose fighter with engines equipped with a thrust vector control system or, for short, UHT w / n 711. Based on the Su-27M with PGO. One aircraft produced.

7. Combat use

• Abkhazian war. On the side of Russia.
• First Chechen War. On the side of Russia.
• Defeat in the fall of 1998 of an automatic balloon over the White Sea.
• Ethiopo - Eritrean War. On the Ethiopian side.
• Control of the sky during the conflict in South Ossetia.
• Conflict in the east of Ukraine. On the side of the Donetsk People's Republic.

8. Locations of the Su-27 on the territory of the Russian Federation (including the former)

Aerodromes: "10th section" (Kalinka); Devil, in Karelia; Dzemgi, in the Khabarovsk Territory; Dorokhovo, in the Tver region; Golden Valley (Unashi), in the Primorsky Territory; Kilpyavr, in the Murmansk region; Krymsk, in the Krasnodar Territory; Kubinka, in the Moscow region; Kushchevskaya-2; Lipetsk; Lodeinoe Pole, in the Leningrad region; Savasleika, in the Nizhny Novgorod region; Hotilovo, in the Tver region; Central Corner, in the Primorsky Territory and Chkalovsk.

9. Comparative tactical and technical characteristics

9.1 Specifications

• Crew, people: project (T10-1), Su-27P (S), Su-27SK, Su-27SM - 1; Su-27UB - 2
• Length, m: project (T10-1) - 18.5; Su-27P (S), Su-27SK, Su-27SM, Su-27UB - 21.935
• Wingspan, m: draft (T10-1) - 12.7; Su-27P (S), Su-27SK, Su-27SM, Su-27UB - 14.698
• Height, m: project (T10-1) - 5.2; Su-27P (S), Su-27SK, Su-27SM - 5.932; Su-27UB - 6.537
• Wing area, m²: project (T10-1) - 48; Su-27P (S), Su-27SK, Su-27SM, Su-27UB - 62.04
• Wing aspect ratio: project (T10-1) - 3.38; Su-27P (S), Su-27SK, Su-27SM, Su-27UB - 3.5
• Wing constriction ratio: project (T10-1) - 6.57; Su-27P (S), Su-27SK, Su-27SM, Su-27UB - 3.4
• Sweep angle: draft (T10-1) - 45 °; Su-27P (S), Su-27SK, Su-27SM, Su-27UB - 42 °
• Chassis base, m: project (T10-1) - no data; Su-27P (S), Su-27SK, Su-27SM, Su-27UB - 5.8
• Chassis track, m: project (T10-1) - 1.8; Su-27P (S), Su-27SK, Su-27SM, Su-27UB - 4.34
• Empty weight, t: project (T10-1), Su-27SM - no data; Su-27P (S) - 16.3; Su-27SK - 16.87; Su-27UB - 17.5
• Normal takeoff weight, t: project (T10-1) - 18; Su-27P (S) - 22.5; Su-27SK - 23.4; Su-27SM - 23.7; Su-27UB - 24
• Maximum takeoff weight, t: project (T10-1) - 21; Su-27P (S) - 30; Su-27SK, Su-27SM - 33; Su-27UB - 30.5
• Fuel mass, kg: project (T10-1) - no data; Su-27P (S), Su-27SK - 9 400/5 240; Su-27SM, Su-27UB - 9 400/6 120
• Fuel volume, l: project (T10-1) - no data; Su-27P (S), Su-27SK - 11 975/6 680; Su-27SM, Su-27UB - 11 975/7 800
• Power plant: two TRDDF AL-31F
• Non-afterburning thrust, kgf (* 10 N): project (T10-1) - no data; Su-27P (S), Su-27SK, Su-27SM, Su-27UB - two for 7 600
• Afterburner, kgf (* 10 N): project (T10-1) - two per 10 300; Su-27P (S), Su-27SK, Su-27SM, Su-27UB - two for 12,500

9.2 Flight performance

• Maximum speed at an altitude of 11,000 m, km / h: project (T10-1), Su-27P (S), Su-27SK, Su-27SM - 2,500 (M = 2.35); Su-27UB - 2 125 (M = 2.0)
• Maximum speed at the ground, km / h: project (T10-1) - 1 400; Su-27P (S), Su-27SK, Su-27SM, Su-27UB - 1 380
• Landing speed, km / h: project (T10-1) - no data; Su-27P (S), Su-27SK, Su-27SM - 225 - 240; Su-27UB - 235 - 250
• Stall speed, km / h: project (T10-1), Su-27SK, Su-27SM, Su-27UB - no data; Su-27P (S) - 200
• Range, km (near the ground / at an altitude): project (T10-1), Su-27SK, Su-27SM, Su-27UB - no data; Su-27P (S) - 440/1 680
• Practical range, km (near the ground / at an altitude): project (T10-1) - 800/2 400; Su-27P (S) - 1 400/3 900; Su-27SK - 1 370/3 680; Su-27SM - no data / 3 790; Su-27UB - 1,300/3,000
• Practical ceiling, m: project (T10-1) - 22,500; Su-27P (S), Su-27SK - 18,500; Su-27SM - 18,000; Su-27UB - 17 250
• Rate of climb, m / s: project (T10-1) - 345; Su-27P (S) - 285 - 300; Su-27SK, Su-27SM, Su-27UB - no data
• Takeoff run, m: project (T10-1) - 300; Su-27P (S) - 650 - 700; Su-27SK - 700 - 800; Su-27SM - 650; Su-27UB - 750 - 800
• Run length, m: project (T10-1) - 600; Su-27P (S) - 620 - 700; Su-27SK, Su-27SM - 620; Su-27UB - 650 - 700
• Wing loading, kg / m²: project (T10-1) - 375; Su-27P (S), Su-27SK, Su-27SM, Su-27UB - no data
• Thrust-to-weight ratio: project (T10-1) - 1.12; Su-27P (S) - 1.2; Su-27SK, Su-27SM, Su-27UB - no data
• Minimum bend radius, m: project (T10-1), Su-27SK, Su-27SM, Su-27UB - no data; Su-27P (S) - 450
• Maximum operational overload: + 9 g

9.3 Armament

• Small and cannon: project (T10-1) - 30 mm gun AO-17A; Su-27P (S), Su-27SK, Su-27SM, Su-27UB - 30 mm GSh-30-1 cannon
• Ammunition load, sn .: project (T10-1) - 250; Su-27P (S), Su-27SK, Su-27SM, Su-27UB - 150
• Weapon suspension units: project (T10-1) - 8; Su-27P (S), Su-27SK - 10; Su-27SM - 12; Su-27UB - 10
• Combat load, kg: project (T10-1) - no data; Su-27P (S) - 6,000; Su-27SK, Su-27SM - 8,000; Su-27UB - 4,000
• Air-to-air missiles: project (T10-1) - two K-25 and six K-60; Su-27P (S), Su-27SK - six R-27 and four R-73; Su-27SM - eight R-27 or four or six R-73 and eight R-77; Su-27UB - six R-27 and four R-73
• Air-to-surface missiles: Su-27SM - six Kh-29s or six Kh-31s or two Kh-59s
• Unguided aircraft missiles: project (T10-1) - no data; Su-27P (S), Su-27SK, Su-27SM, Su-27UB - eighty S-8 or twenty S-13 or four S-25
• Air bombs: project (T10-1) - no data; Su-27P (S), Su-27SK - eight per 500 kg or thirty-one per 250 kg or thirty-eight per 100 kg; Su-27SM - eight per 500 kg or thirty-one per 250 kg or thirty-eight per 100 kg or six KAB-500 or three KAB-1500; Su-27UB - 10 per 500 kg or thirty-one per 250 kg or fifty 100 kg

9.4 Avionics

• Radar station: project (T10-1) - Sapphire-23MR; Su-27P (S), Su-27SK, Su-27SM, Su-27UB - RLPK-27
• Antenna diameter, mm: project (T10-1), Su-27SM - no data; Su-27P (S), Su-27SK, Su-27UB - 975
• Air target detection range, km: project (T10-1) - 40 - 70/20 - 40; Su-27P (S), Su-27SK - 80 - 100/30 - 40; Su-27SM - no data; Su-27UB - 80 - 100/30 - 40
• Number of simultaneously tracked targets: project (T10-1), Su-27SM - no data; Su-27P (S), Su-27SK, Su-27UB - 10
• Number of simultaneously attacked targets: project (T10-1), Su-27SM - no data; Su-27P (S); Su-27UB - 1; Su-27SK - 2
• ECO: project (T10-1) - available; Su-27P (S), Su-27SK, Su-27SM, Su-27UB - OEPS-27
• Air target detection range, km: project (T10-1) - no data; Su-27P (S), Su-27SK, Su-27SM, Su-27UB - 15/50
• View area in height: project (T10-1) - no data; Su-27P (S), Su-27SK, Su-27SM, Su-27UB - −15 ° / + 60 °
• View area in azimuth: project (T10-1) - no data; Su-27P (S), Su-27SK, Su-27SM, Su-27UB - ± 60 °
• Helmet target designation system: project (T10-1) - yes; Su-27P (S), Su-27SK, Su-27SM, Su-27UB - "Shchel-3UM"

10. Records

In the fall of 1986, test pilot Viktor Pugachev climbed 3000 m in 25.4 seconds at the wheel of a P-42 modification prepared for this, which set the world record for reaching this height.

At the same time, the fighter climbed in 37.1 s at 6000 m, in 47 s at 9000 m and for 58.1 at 12000 m.

In the spring of the next year, test pilot Nikolai Sadovnikov climbed 15,000 m in 76 seconds.

The military doctrine of the USSR, adopted under Brezhnev, again relied on the classics of military science, returning the ground forces to the main role in achieving victory. Their main quality was considered to be the ability to attack, interacting with other types of troops, and above all with aviation. The firstborn of the Brezhnev era, the Su-24 was to become an aerial ram that would pave the way for tank wedges to the shores of the English Channel. For cover, he needed a fighter with an appropriate range. The requirements for such a machine - a promising front-line fighter (PFI) - were first formed at the 30th Central Research Institute of Aerospace Technology of the Ministry of Defense.

By that time, the United States was already developing the F-15, a powerful long-range fighter with powerful weapons. The MAP was tasked with creating an aircraft capable of surpassing its overseas competitor by 10%. The task was brought to all the fighter design bureaus, but they were in no hurry to allocate funding. Meanwhile, the technical risk of the project was very high. As a result, P.O. Sukhoi was in no hurry to authorize large-scale work on PFIs, but his subordinates began a pre-draft study of the topic without his visa. The initiator was the head of the projects department O.S. Samoilovich. At the first stage, only designer V.I. Antonov was involved in PFI. In the fall of 1969, Antonov made the first sketches of its general view, using the integral conjugation of the wing with the fuselage, recruited from deformed wing profiles. The layout of the fighter, which received the proprietary code T-10, turned out to be unusually beautiful. However, in TsAGI, which was promoting the concept based on the MiG-25, the project did not meet with support. Therefore, such an option was developed, called the T10-2. In 1971, after agreeing on all the requirements, the ministry officially announced a competition for the creation of a new fighter, which in mid-1972 won the T10-1 project.

The preliminary design of the PFI was entrusted to the team of L.I.Bondarenko, but other divisions gradually joined the subject. The chief designer of the aircraft was N.S. Chernyakov, and at the management level, the topic was supervised by the first deputy of Sukhoi E.A. Ivanov. After hard work in the spring of 1977 (by that time MP Simonov had become the chief designer of the Su-27), the T-10 entered flight tests. This work had its own successes and failures, but the main conclusion of the tests of the T-10 with AL-31F engines turned out to be so depressing that it sounded like a sentence to the entire Su-27 program: it was not possible to achieve the specified superiority of 10% over the F-15. However, these results were not unexpected - due to the decrease in comparison with the calculated characteristics of engines, equipment and aircraft systems. At this time, a group of experts from the OKB and SibNIA under the leadership of M.P. Simonov developed an alternative layout for the Su-27, which was distinguished by a smooth coupling of the wing with an extremely compressed fuselage, a reduced curvature of the wing profile and an extended vertical tail. This was a return to the original layout, modified under pressure from TsAGI. Thanks to the persistence and energy of Simonov, the ministry agreed to a radical version of the aircraft change. The new version received the T-10S index.

By 1985, the main components of the Su-27's weapons, equipment and power plant had already been put into service, but the aircraft's GSI as a whole was not completed. However, the lag behind the United States was becoming serious, and the data obtained clearly testified: a truly outstanding aircraft had been created, which has no equal in the world. Therefore, from the end of 1984, mass production of the Su-27 began and its entry into the troops. At the same time, work on fine-tuning the car continued. Only after debugging the entire set of equipment was the USSR Council of Ministers Decree of August 23, 1990 officially adopted by the Air Force and Air Defense Aviation of the Soviet Union.

The Su-27 is a single-seat monoplane, made according to an integrated aerodynamic scheme, in which the wing with a root inflow and the fuselage form a single bearing body, recruited from wing profiles. The design uses aluminum and titanium alloys, steels and composite materials. The power plant consists of two twin-shaft turbojet engines with afterburners AL-31F, air intakes and systems for starting, control, cooling and lubrication, fuel, fastening, etc. Depending on the conditions of use, the AL-31F can operate in combat, combat training or special modes. The operating mode is adjusted on the ground.

The aircraft control system includes longitudinal, lateral and directional control systems, as well as wing tip control. In the longitudinal channel, the electro-remote control system SDU-10S is used. SDU provides the required characteristics of stability and controllability in all aircraft control channels. The flight and navigation complex PNK is designed for air navigation at all stages of flight, day and night, in PMU and SMU. The complex includes the following subsystems: navigation complex, information complex of high-altitude and speed parameters and control, indication and monitoring devices. The automatic control system SAU-10 is designed for automatic and directorial control of the fighter. The on-board communication equipment with ground-based ACS contains the Lazur, Turquoise and Raduga channels, which ensure the transmission of command sets characteristic of NASU data. A total of 21 sets of different commands can be transmitted. The information received from NASU is sent for processing to the automatic control system of the aircraft, to the weapons control system and is displayed on the sighting and flight indicator of the unified display system.

The Su-27 armament control system includes the SUO-27M, RLPK N001, OEPS-27 and the Narciss-M unified display system. It is designed to solve combat missions for the destruction of air targets during group, autonomous and semi-autonomous combat operations, as well as the use of aircraft weapons against ground targets. To protect against being hit by missiles with semi-active seeker, the Su-27 is equipped with the Yatagan onboard REB system of mutual-group protection as part of the Sorption-S detachable stations installed on each aircraft, and the Smalta-SK on the support aircraft. Artillery armament consists of a built-in cannon installation 9A4071K with a GSh-301 cannon and two SPPU-30 suspended under the wing with similar weapons. The guided missile armament includes medium-range air-to-air missiles R-27 or R-27E with RLGSN (up to 6) or TGSN (up to 2) and close-range R-73 with TGSN (up to 6). Unguided weapons include NAR S-25 (up to 6), S-13 (up to 6 B-13L), S-8 (up to 6 B-8M1), aerial bombs and RBK caliber up to 500 kg, ZAB and KMGU.

In terms of duration and cost, the program for creating the Su-27 turned out to be unprecedented - 14 years have passed since the start of work until the arrival of the first machines in the troops. During this difficult and difficult period, three General Designers were replaced, the aircraft completely changed its appearance, several aircraft were killed during testing. But the result was outstanding: with the high flight characteristics traditional for the Soviet design school, the Su-27 for the first time surpassed a similar American aircraft in terms of armament power and flight range. At the same time, he remained simple to operate and accessible to combat pilots. The most important role in achieving high combat effectiveness of the fighter was played by its onboard systems, primarily radar. For the first time in world practice, the sighting equipment of the Su-27, like the MiG-29, includes two complementary channels - radar and optoelectronic. And the widespread use of digital computers to control the aircraft and its weapon systems can be considered no less a "horse" of the Su-27 than vortex aerodynamics. In terms of combat capabilities, the Su-27 can conduct both an all-weather missile air battle at long distances, and a maneuverable duel at "dagger" distances, and in addition has a range and duration of flight unprecedented for a Soviet fighter.

Today the Su-27 (and its modifications) is the most advanced fighter in the CIS armed forces, and in Russia it is also the most widespread. The aircraft has earned a high reputation among the flight personnel and the nickname "an airplane for a pilot", and in many it has awakened the highest feelings that only aviators are capable of. In terms of its combat capabilities, it has far outstripped its foreign opponents, and no one is able to fly the way the Su-27 can fly anymore.

The Su-35 is a 4 ++ generation fighter, which is currently the most modern aircraft in the Russian Air Force. It is a deep modernization of the Su-27 fighter, produced in the days of the USSR. Today we will get acquainted with the history and performance characteristics of the Su-35 aircraft, the leading fighter of Russian aviation.

Generation

Generation "4 ++" to which the hero of our conversation belongs is a conditional concept designed to emphasize the fact that the technical characteristics of the SU-35 are very close to the parameters of the 5th generation aircraft. The car meets most of the requirements for models of this generation, but still slightly inferior to them.

Aircraft creation

Before getting acquainted with the description and technical characteristics of the Su-35, it is worth taking a short historical excursion. Work on the production of an initial batch of the Su-35 aircraft began in 2006. Large-scale flight tests were scheduled for the next year, but they took place only in 2008. By the summer of 2007 at the KnAAPO im. Gagarin, the assembly of the pilot model was completed, after which he went to the MAKS-2007 air show.

The fighter made its first flight on February 19, 2008 at the LII im. Gromova. On that day, the Su-35 was piloted by Sergei Bogdan. The next day, when visiting the city of Zhukovsky, the President of the Russian Federation got acquainted with the new fighter.

The aircraft performed its first demonstration flight in Zhukovsky in mid-summer 2008. On October 2, 2008, the second copy took off from the KnAAPO airfield. By March 2009, the new aircraft had completed a hundred flights.

First contracts

Within the framework of the MAKS-2009 exhibition, the largest contract in the Russian Federation over the past few decades was signed for the purchase of new fighters. According to the agreement, in the period from 2012 to 2015, the manufacturer was supposed to supply 48 Su-35 aircraft. It was assumed that a similar contract will be concluded for 2015-2020. In 2010, Sukhoi successfully completed a cycle of preliminary tests of the fighter. Convinced of the excellent technical characteristics of the Su-35, it was put into production. On May 3, 2011, the first production model took to the skies. Then the index "C" was added to the name of the aircraft.

By the end of 2012, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation received six copies of the fighter. By the beginning of 2016, 48 aircraft had already been built. At the end of 2015, a second contract was signed with the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, according to which the manufacturer must supply the Air Force with 50 more pieces of equipment by the beginning of 2020. The technical characteristics of the Su-35 airframe were also appreciated abroad - in parallel with the Russian order, machines are manufactured for export: 12 for Indonesia and 24 for China.

Purpose of the fighter

The multipurpose Su-35S fighter is designed for:

1. Delivering a preemptive strike against air enemy targets, including those that are subtle.
2. Attacks sea or ground targets without entering the air defense zone.
3. Participation in group actions to attack ground or air targets.
4. Flight at low altitudes, avoiding obstacles.
5. Tracking air targets.
6. Performing tasks in conditions of intentional interference.
7. Detection of typical ground and air targets from a distance of up to 200 km, as well as large air targets with image intensifier tubes - from a distance of up to 400 km.

Grade

According to the National Interest (USA), the Su-35 is the first in the list of the most dangerous weapons in the Russian Federation. The experts of the publication recognized the fighter as dangerous for all aircraft in service with NATO, with the exception of the F-22 fighter. According to them, the danger of the Russian fighter is associated primarily with the large load of long-range air-to-air missiles, the ability to launch missiles at supersonic speed, powerful radar weapons and excellent maneuverability.

Design

The fighter is designed according to the normal aerodynamic configuration with an integral layout. The trapezoidal wing, located in the middle, is equipped with influxes and, mating with the fuselage, forms a one-piece load-bearing body. Two dual-circuit turbojet power plants with afterburners are located in separate engine nacelles, which are installed under the aircraft body at such a distance from each other that a pair of guided missiles can be placed between them. In addition, the "clearance" between the engine nacelles is necessary to avoid their aerodynamic influence on each other. The adjustable air intakes are located under the center section. The landing gear fairings go into the rear beams, which act as platforms for the consoles of the vertical and horizontal empennage, as well as under-beam ridges.

The performance characteristics of the Su-35S distinguish it favorably from other fighters of the Russian Air Force. On the Su-35, aerodynamic innovations were implemented, which were developed for the deck modification of the Su-27K. In the manufacture of the machine body, aluminum-lithium alloys and composite materials have been widely used. Compared to its predecessor, the hero of our conversation received reinforced landing gear and external suspension units, which are located under the wing. The fighter's cockpit is equipped with a K-36 model ejection seat, which has an increased backrest tilt amplitude.

To accommodate a refueling system, a reinforced front support and an updated avionics, the designers have developed an updated configuration of the fuselage head with side hatches and a larger radio-transparent radar fairing. In order to maintain the stability and controllability of the aircraft with a new "head", it was necessary to increase the area of ​​the vertical tail and rudders. The diameter and length of the tail fairing have also increased. This is necessary for the installation of additional equipment. The braking parachute was transferred to the upper surface of the rear fuselage and placed in front of the fuel tank.

Power point

The Su-35 fighter, the technical characteristics of which we are considering today, is equipped with a pair of twin-circuit turbojet power plants of the AL-41F1S model. The engines have an afterburner and a fully controlled thrust vector. To increase the number of views, the pivot axes of the deflected nozzles were made inclined. These engines, in fact, represent a simplified version of the AL-41F1 engine, developed for fifth generation fighters.

The version used in the Su-35 is distinguished by reduced afterburner and non-afterburner thrust, as well as by the presence of an electromechanical control system. In the afterburner mode, the thrust of each engine is 14,500 kgf, without the afterburner, the engine develops only 8800 kgf. The power of the engines is sufficient for the fighter to gain supersonic speed without the use of afterburner.

The overhaul life of engines is 1000 hours, and the total is 4000 hours. The auxiliary power plant of the aircraft uses a VGTD TA14-130-35 gas turbine engine with a power of 105 kW. It provides air conditioning for the aircraft compartments and cockpit, as well as power supply for onboard consumers.

Onboard electronics

Considering the technical characteristics of the Su-35, one cannot fail to mention the avionics. The Su-35 was equipped with a radar station (radar) with an antenna array NO35 "Irbis".

The radar has the following characteristics:

1. The antenna array diameter is 0.9 m.
2. The viewing angle is 240 °.
3. The frequency range is 8-12 GHz.
4. The maximum power is 20 kW.
5. Normal power is 5 kW.
6. Target detection range: 350-400 km on a collision course, 150 km on a catch-up course.
7. Simultaneously detected: 30 air targets or 4 ground targets.
8. Simultaneous shelling: missiles with an active homing head - up to 8 targets, missiles with a semi-active head - up to 2.

In addition to the Irbis radar station, an OPS (optical location station) is used. The aircraft can also be equipped with equipment for group electronic protection. The edges of the airframe and cockpit canopy are electrically sprayed to reduce the effective scattering area. The cockpit is equipped with a holographic indicator and two LCD displays for multi-screen operation.

Technical characteristics of the Su-35

The main parameters of the Russian car:

1. The length of the aircraft is 21.9 m.
2. The height of the aircraft is 5.9 m.
3. Wingspan - 15.3 m.
4. Wing area - 62 m 2.
5. Sweep angle - 42 °.
6. The landing gear type is tricycle, with a strut that retracts against the flight.
7. The empty weight of the aircraft is 19 tons.
8. Normal takeoff weight - 25.3 tons.
9. Maximum takeoff weight - 34.5 tons.
10. Fuel weight - 11.5 tons.
11. The number of motors is 2.
12. Motor type - TRDDF with UVT.
13. Maximum engine thrust - 8800 kgf.
14. The thrust of the engine with the afterburner is 14,500 kgf.
15. Engine weight - 1.52 tons.
16. Maximum speed: 1400 km / h - near the ground, 2500 km / h - at an altitude of over 11 km.
17. Flight range: 1580 km - near the ground, 3600 km - at high altitude.
18. Service ceiling - 20 km.
19. The rate of climb is 280 m / s.
20. Take-off run - 450 m.
21. Mileage - 650 m.

Armament

The armament of the Su-35 fighter consists of:

1. 30-mm aircraft cannon GSh-30-1 (150 rounds).
2. 16 medium-range air-to-air missiles (6 models R-27ER or R-27T, and 10 models RVV-AE).
3. 6 short-range air-to-air missiles of the R-73 model.
4. 6 X-31 air-to-ground anti-ship missiles or two X-59M models.
5. 12 high-precision air-to-surface ammunition (six Kh-29T models and the same KAB-200 model).
6. 6 unguided air-to-ground ammunition, model C-25.
7. 6 blocks of launchers (PU) B-8, designed for 7-20 missiles of the S-8 model.

At the moment, the armament of the Su-35 fighter has no analogues in terms of the breadth of the range for work on enemy ground, sea and air targets. On an external sling, the aircraft can carry up to 14 missiles. They are installed under the fuselage, on engine nacelles and on the wing suspension points.

F-35 vs Su-35

The technical characteristics of fighters in service have always been proof of the military power of a state. Comparison of the consequences of a collision of combat aircraft representing armies of different countries of the world is speculative, but it cannot be avoided, because it is competition that spurs designers to create more modern machines. If we compare the Su-35 with other representatives of the “4+” or “4 ++” generation, be it the American F family (16th and 18th models) or the French Rafale, then in terms of the main number of “passport” data, the superiority of the Russian aircraft undeniable.

A worthy adversary for the Su-35 is the F-35, a fifth-generation American aircraft designed as a cheaper version of the hard-edged F-22. Experts have noted more than once that in terms of flight range, armament, speed, maneuverability and, finally, price, the Russian fighter is superior to the American one. But there is one important nuance here.

The fact is that the comparison of the Su-35 with the competitors listed above is absolutely incorrect, since the Russian machine belongs to "heavy fighters" according to the domestic classification and "air superiority fighters" according to the western classification. As for the F-16 and F-18 and Rafale machines, they fall under the Russian class of "light" or "medium" fighters, and in the NATO classification they are called "multifunctional fighters" or "bombers". Consequently, these machines need to be compared with the Russian MiG-29 aircraft. Well, the F-35 fighter should not participate at all in comparison with the Su-35, since it belongs not only to a different class, but also to a different generation.

Thus, it would be most correct to compare the tactical and technical characteristics of the Su-35 with the parameters of the American F-22. Although this is not entirely correct because of the difference in generations (after all, "4 ++" is not 5). However, in this field, the Russian car would have lost the championship, which is quite logical. Who can really compete with the F-22 is the Su-57 (T-50), the first fifth generation fighter of the Russian Federation, which is still at the testing stage.

Conclusion

Today we have reviewed the history and characteristics of the Su-35 fighter - the leading fighter of modern Russian aviation. Finally, it is worth noting that the car turned out to be really decent. It can compete with many foreign analogues and fully justifies its adherence to the so-called “4 ++” generation.