General Shpigun Gennady Nikolaevich: biography, activities and interesting facts. Who kidnapped General Shpigun Awards and memory

Svetlana Ivanovna Kuzmina, author of the book "Two Years in Hell", spent two years in Chechen captivity, here is more about Svetlana Ivanovna's captivity: http://cheshens.blogspot.ru/2017/11/12-1946.html and was a general with him, next to the Arun Gorge in early 2000. I personally saw General Shpigun Gennady Nikolaevich. She asked about Shpigun for the first time around July 1999. One of the reticent militants said that his owner had money and that is why the general did not starve, and even cigarettes were not the cheapest for him. LaterSvetlana Ivanovna found out that this owner is Baudi Bakuev, and he has money, including from the donation of the presidential representative (Vlasov).The second time she ran into Shpigun in the Argun gorge in February-March 2000. There were 12 people, whom they considered to be commodity ones. Several field commanders Bakuev Baudi, Arbi Barayev, Ruslan Bekeshev and others. The general looked like an exhausted old man, he was spanked, kicked, They made him work unbearably. But Bakuev somehow protected him a little, when the general tried to escape when Bakuev was killed, but you can't run away from the mountains in summer, and in winter, and even an elderly exhausted man, of course, did not succeed. He was caught and beaten (as they said not hard), the general turned to the wall, in the morning he was dead.Bakueva-Svetlana Ivanovna saw several times. He came on horseback to Bekeshev (who kept them) and even before the descent of the prisoners from the mountains, Bakuev offered Bekeshev-To redeem Svetlana Ivanovna from him, since she still will not be able to withstand the descent, but Bekeshev refused.And what is especially not clear why the general was not ransomed alive, but the dead ransomed. Yes, along the way they were afraid of the public. The general was at first appreciated, not beaten, and then when over time, not seeing in him a source of money, they began to scoff. But in any case, the death of a combat general lies on the conscience of the then leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. They refused to redeem the living Shpigun.
This is the truth about the death of the generalShpigun Gennady Nikolaevich.








Now about General Shpigun:
Born and raised in the Babayurtovsky district of the Dagestan river.
He worked at the Dagdizel plant as a milling machine operator. Since 1969 he took up social and political work: in the period from 1969 to 1980 he held party positions as secretary of the Caspian city committee of the Komsomol, deputy head of the department of the Dagestan regional committee of the Komsomol, secretary of the Komsomol committee of the Dagdizel plant. In 1980, Gennady Nikolaevich received the position of a department instructor, deputy head of the department of organizational and party work of the Dagestan Regional Committee of the CPSU.
In 1984 he entered the service of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, held the position of deputy head of correctional labor institutions, then became deputy head of the political department, head of the personnel department, deputy minister, head of the service for work with personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Dagestan.
He took part in the First Chechen War, was the head of all pre-trial detention centers on the territory of Chechnya. Dzhokhar Dudaev in 1996 included Gennady Nikolaevich in the "list of those responsible for the Chechen tragedy."
From 1996 to 1998, Shpigun was the chief expert-consultant of the department for managing forces and resources in emergency conditions of the Emergency Situations Directorate of the General Staff of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, then he was promoted to chief inspector. In the same year, he was transferred to the post of chief of the inspection of the Main Organizational and Inspection Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation.
In February 1999, Shpigun replaced Adam Aushev, brother of Ruslan Aushev, as the representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in Ichkeria. This caused a protest in Chechnya, Aslan Maskhadov notified the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs about the undesirability of Shpigun's presence in the Republic of Ichkeria.

On March 5, 1999, General Shpigun was kidnapped at the airport in Grozny, right from a plane on a flight to Moscow. he was going to fly home to his wife to celebrate March 8, International Women's Day.
The kidnapping was planned in advance and well organized. Three men in masks and with weapons came out of the luggage compartment at the Severny airport on the acceleration lane, three more men who were in the cabin approached them. The pilot was forced to stop the plane and dragged the general out and taken away. empty plane into the hangar, armed people in two UAZ cars drove up and made sure that the plane was empty and only then they released the pilot.
Sergei Stepashin, (Minister of Internal Affairs) gave the officer's word that they would release the general by any means possible.

On December 29, 1999, the media circulated a statement by the elders of Achkhoy-Martan, in which it was reported that General Shpigun was alive and was estimated at $ 5 million. It was reported that for some time he was detained in Achkhoy-Martan, later he was transported to Georgia. This version was supported by the testimony of a resident of Dagestan released from captivity. He claimed that he was detained in the Georgian village of Shatili in the same basement with the abducted general. Former Minister of Defense of Georgia Tengiz Kitovani subsequently confirmed information that Gennady Shpigun was kept in the Pankisi Gorge. On January 28, 2000, a number of Russian media circulated a statement by the head of the North Caucasus Department for Combating Organized Crime that Gennady Shpigun was alive and his whereabouts were known.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation reported that the abduction of the general was carried out on the orders of Shamil Basayev by separatists from the gang of Abdul-Malik Mezhidov. According to other sources, the organizers of the abduction included Chechen separatists Baudi Bakuev, Arbi Barayev and the Akhmadov brothers. It was assumed that assistance in the abduction of Shpigun was provided by the "brigadier general", the head of the border and customs services of Ichkeria, Magomed Khatuyev, who was in charge of a military town in Grozny, where dozens of hostages were held. In addition, it is assumed that the "brigadier general", Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of Ichkeria, Nasrudi Bazhiev, was involved in organizing the abduction. Boris Berezovsky was also charged with involvement in the kidnapping. It was suspected that Gennady Shpigun knew about Berezovsky's financial contacts with Chechen gangs, which could have become the reason for the kidnapping.

Why the ransom was not paid for the hostage. Earlier, General Shpigun himself was against sponsoring armed gangs. So the government adhered to his opinion. Then in Chechnya, abduction is the main source of income for the militants.

In March of the same year, he was abducted from the plane in which he was going to fly to his wife for the celebration of International Women's Day.

In March of the same year, he was kidnapped right from the plane in which he was going to fly to his wife for the celebration of International Women's Day. The kidnapping was well planned and well organized. On the acceleration lane of the Severny airport (Grozny), three men in masks and with weapons came out of the luggage compartment of the aircraft, they were joined by three more who were in the cabin. They forced the pilot to stop the plane, dragged the general out and took him away. Then, when the pilot sent the already empty airliner into the hangar, two UAZ vehicles with armed people drove up, who made sure that the plane was empty, and only then they released the pilot.

To the Prosecutor General for reference In "Novaya Gazeta" No. 7 dated January 31 of this year, the material "It was not only Berezovsky who paid the bandits money" was published, where, using specific examples, we told who paid for whom and how much - and for ...

Attorney General for reference

H Let us remind the readers: from 1997 to 1999 in Chechnya, near the airport "Severny", in the Russian mission, replacing each other every two or three months, police generals from Moscow were constantly working. Many militia generals passed through this representation, including the current head of the Moscow Main Internal Affairs Directorate, Vladimir Pronin. And General Shpigun replaced in February 1999 Adam Aushev, the brother of the President of Ingushetia.
And everything was more or less smooth. General Vladimir Pronin in April 1997 even drove the same car with Shamil Basayev.
True, the representative of the President of Russia in Ichkeria, Valentin Vlasov, was unlucky. From May to November 1998, he was held hostage. But with the assistance of Vladimir Rushailo, then the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of Russia, he was bought out from the brothers Akhmadov and Barayev.
Gennady Shpigun was abducted directly from the Tu-134 aircraft, which took off on a regular passenger flight from Grozny to Moscow on March 5, 1999. The security of the Severny airport was carried out only by the power structures of Ichkeria. The building of the Russian mission in Chechnya, located about 200 meters from the airport, was also guarded.
The circumstances of the abduction, which I have studied, allow us to conclude that the organizer of the abduction was the now-deceased bandit Bakuev, associated with Arbi Barayev. It was Bakuev who came up with proposals to "sell" Shpigun to the Russian special services through intermediaries. All the other well-known bandits - the same Arbi Barayev, the Akhmadov brothers - always referred (again through intermediaries) to Bakuev as Shpigun's "owner" and assured that the ransom was impossible without his knowledge. But there are also grounds to assert that employees of the special services of Ichkeria helped Bakuev.
Therefore, in the case of the abduction of Gennady Shpigun, Magomed Khatuyev (previously convicted), a brigadier general, the permanent head of the border and customs services of Ichkeria, should be interrogated. It was his people who exercised control at the airport, and without their participation not a single stranger could slip through to the plane.
Magomed Khatuyev officially held dozens of hostages, military and civilians in his 15th military town in Grozny, who were either sold to the families of local residents, like the major of the medical service Aristov, or "exchanged" for criminals who committed crimes not related to military actions in Chechnya. Sometimes, as a gesture of goodwill, it was handed over to Russian politicians, officials, and human rights activists. Among those who received hostages from the 15th town in Grozny were officers of the working group of the Commission on Prisoners of War under the President of Russia, and the then Secretary of the Security Council of the Republic of Dagestan Magomed Tolboyev, and the author of these lines.
Also, Nasrudi Bazhiev, Brigadier General, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, should be interrogated. He received the post of deputy minister by inheritance after the murder of Nurdi Bazhiev's older brother. Nurdi was killed by his accomplice Ali Itayev in August 1997 for not sharing the millions of dollars received for the abduction of the NTV group led by Elena Masyuk and ORT correspondents Ilyas Bogatyrev and Vladislav Chernyaev.
The people of Nasrudi Bazhiev also ensured the security of the Severny airport. And Nasrudi, although on a smaller scale than his brother, also had his share for the kidnapped hostages (in particular, for the engineer of "Mostdorstroy" Vasily Poklonsky).
Of interest to the investigation is Ibragim Khultygov, the head of the State Security Department of the Republic of Ichkeria. He also inherited the post after the death of his older brother Leche Khultygov, who was killed in a shootout in the spring of 1998 by the chief of staff of Salman Raduyev, Vakha Jafarov.
As the subordinates of Ibragim Khultygov say, the salaries of the NSB officers were paid after the release of the hostages from the sums received from the ransom.
The NSB officers, subordinate to Ibragim Khultygov, also supervised the Severny airport.
Both Nasrudi Bazhiev and Ibragim Khultygov are alive and communicated during the anti-terrorist operation in 1999-2000, and possibly in subsequent years with the department of Mr. Patrushev, that is, with the FSB. At the request of the employees of this department, at the end of 1999, they appeared on Central TV condemning the Chechen gangs.
Salavdi Abdrazakov, aka Khalilov, - the organizer and mediator in the abductions and release of people - also deserves attention. He specialized in the abduction and release for ransom of foreign and Russian journalists (Italian Mauro Galigani, Frenchman Brice Fletho, correspondents of the Vzglyad TV company Ilyas Bogatyrev and Vladislav Chernyaev, ORT special correspondents Roman Perevezentsev and Vyacheslav Tibelius and many others). Salavdi also possessed information about the abduction and detention of Gennady Shpigun.
Salavdi Abdrazakov (Khalilov) was arrested as a result of an operation organized by the author of these lines with the assistance of the Main and North Caucasian Directorates for Combating Organized Crime. Recently sentenced to four years in prison. Is in custody.
I could list a number of other people who should be interrogated in the case of the abduction of Gennady Shpigun. But this information should be of interest not so much to readers as to specialists from the prosecutor's office.

A now about how they tried to free Gennady Shpigun.
Given the situation in Chechnya, and given the level of professionalism of the Russian special services, Gennady Shpigun could have been released either for money or as a result of a completely non-standard non-force operation. The department, then headed by Vladimir Rushailo, did not take this step.
Moreover, I have reason to believe that the former leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs limited, if not nullified, the actions of the ethnic department of the GUBOP on the release of Gennady Shpigun and did not cooperate on this issue with the Commission under the President of Russia on prisoners of war, internees and missing persons. ... For example, many employees of the ethnic department headed by Colonel Suntsov told me that the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs actually forbade them to deal with the release of Shpigun. The best of the professionals of the presidential commission - Colonel Vyacheslav Pilipenko - also told me that it seems that the fate of Shpigun is not of interest to the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, headed by Vladimir Rushailo. The information of the best specialist in the release of prisoners and hostages, his proposals for the release of Shpigun were ignored by Minister Rushailo and his assistant, Lieutenant General Orlov.
They refused to redeem the living Shpigun. On the other hand, they paid for the general's corpse by treating the secretary of the Security Council of Maskhadov Ichkeria, Doku Umarov (one of the organizers of the abductions) in Nalchik and transporting him to Georgia. There are witnesses to this. In particular, an employee of the GUBOP, Lieutenant Colonel Kazimir Botashev, Colonel of the Internal Service Said-Selim Batsiev and others who worked with them.
The former head of the ethnic department of the GUBOP, Colonel Mikhail Suntsov, and the officers and generals I named, could also be questioned by the General Prosecutor's Office on this issue.

There is practically no doubt that the body found is the body of Shpigun. This was indicated, in particular, by the data of the genetic examination, which showed a 90% match, and the fact that the general was identified by his brother. This was also evidenced by the testimony of a captured militant, who said that Shpigun died of a heart attack during one of the transitions - from Shatoi to Itum-Kali.

At the same time, on paper, Shpigun remained alive for a long time: the Ministry of Internal Affairs simply concealed the results of the examination. In addition, the then deputy head of the department, Valery Rushailo, reported on the progress of the case information that did not correspond to reality, saying, for example, that specialists from the Rostov Central Laboratory were studying the body. However, the journalists found out that this information does not correspond to reality - there was only one center in the region capable of conducting DNA research, but the body did not arrive there.

However, it is likely that both the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Prosecutor General's Office were simply reinsured. According to Kommersant, in early 2000, the president was just about to form a new government, and the then Minister of Internal Affairs Vladimir Rushailo was awaiting his appointment. The resonance around the Shpigun case reduced the chances of the official who was in charge of the department, whose representatives more than once promised to save the general. As for the head of the Prosecutor General's Office, Vladimir Ustinov, he, in turn, had to get rid of the prefix acting, so he was afraid of reputational costs.

However, these oddities are just the tip of the iceberg. Until now, it is impossible to unequivocally name those responsible for the abduction of Shpigun and say what was the motive - money or revenge.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs, in particular, argued that Shamil Basayev personally stood behind the crime, who, since the First Chechen War, could have had a grudge against the general. Allegedly, it was on his order that Shpigun was taken prisoner by separatists from the gang of Abdul-Malik Mezhidov. According to another version, among the organizers of the kidnapping were Chechen separatists Baudi Bakuev, Arbi Baraev and the Akhmadov brothers.

According to another assumption, the head of the border and customs services of Ichkeria, Magomed Khatuyev, and the deputy minister of internal affairs of Ichkeria, Nasrudi Bazhiev, could have been involved in the abduction. Their participation could be due to the fact that the leadership of the republic initially opposed the appointment of Shpigun to the post of representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation. Allegedly, the president of Ichkeria, Aslan Maskhadov, even personally notified the leadership of the department about the undesirability of the general's presence in the region.

The oligarch Boris Berezovsky was also accused of involvement in the crime. It was suspected that Shpigun knew about his financial contacts with Chechen gangs, and this could become the reason for the kidnapping. However, later Stepashin, in an interview with journalist Alexander Khinshtein, admitted that Berezovsky's role in this case was completely different: the oligarch, it turns out, paid the bandits seven million dollars, but not for the kidnapping, but for the fact that they did not give up the general. According to the former head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, this fact was later confirmed by Maskhadov.

Berezovsky's intervention really explains a lot: the sluggishness of the security forces, and the death in the full sense of the word of a precious hostage, and even some confusion after the discovery of his body. However, this is just a version. And apparently, it will hardly be possible to confirm or deny it now: many participants in those events are already dead and they will never be able to answer the questions of the investigator.

After the end of the first Chechen campaign, kidnapping became almost the main "business" of the Ichkerians (both inveterate militants and high-ranking officials). They made a fortune on the hostages. The money to the bandits for the release of the slaves, as a rule, was transferred by the officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSB of Russia. The plenipotentiary representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Chechen Republic, Major General of Police Gennady Shpigun, worked in this position since January 26, 1999. He was abducted on March 5, 1999 at 15.50 at the Grozny airport. The general, who was in Chechnya on a business trip, intended to fly to Moscow by plane of the Grozny airline. When the Tu-134 was taxiing onto the runway, two UAZs of dark green color blocked the way to the liner. The plane stopped, and from its thrown open door suddenly appeared two unknown persons in masks, who literally threw the general out of the plane, and then jumped out themselves. All three were dragged into cars, and they immediately rushed away from the airport in an unknown direction.

The security of the Severny airport was carried out only by the power structures of Ichkeria. The building of the Russian mission in Chechnya, located about 200 meters from the airport, was also guarded.

Let me remind you that from 1997 to 1999 in Chechnya, in the vicinity of the Severny airport, in the Russian mission, replacing each other every two or three months, police generals from Moscow were constantly working. Many police chiefs went through this representation. General Shpigun replaced in February 1999 Adam Aushev, the brother of the then President of Ingushetia. And everything was more or less smooth. General Vladimir Pronin (later - the head of the Moscow Main Internal Affairs Directorate) in April 1997 even drove the same car with Shamil Basayev. True, the representative of the President of Russia in Ichkeria, Valentin Vlasov, was unlucky. From May to November 1998, he was held hostage. But with the assistance of Vladimir Rushailo, then the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of Russia, he was ransomed from the brothers Akhmadov and Barayev.

At the time of Shpigun's abduction, the situation in Chechnya was rather contradictory. Anything could be expected. 2.5 years have passed since the Khasavyurt agreements, but no steps were taken by Russia to eliminate the consequences of the war, to bring the positions of Moscow and Grozny closer together. Moreover, in the republic, where life support facilities were completely destroyed, where more than 100 thousand citizens were killed, more than 200 thousand were crippled, and also in the absence of any sources of livelihood, except for criminal ones, nothing else could be expected. Moreover, the political establishment of Russia, having entered the post-Yeltsin period, did not have a specific subject for negotiations. Each political party or movement tried to present its personal benefits as national, national interests. And in this regard, the only subject charged with the responsibility to resolve issues of the economic and legal nature of the Chechen Republic were the power structures headed by the Minister of Internal Affairs Stepashin. In world practice, there was no such precedent that in the post-war period the political solution of issues related to the settlement of interethnic and federal relations was entrusted to the power departments. Moreover, there was little time left until 2001, the time limit set for determining the status of the Chechen Republic and a complete settlement of Russian-Chechen relations, but no concrete steps were taken on either side to change this situation.

Major General Shpigun was an active participant in the hostilities in Chechnya. Many did not want to see him in the republic. A few weeks before the abduction, the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs was informed by President Maskhadov about the undesirability of Shpigun's continued stay as a representative of the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation. There was no answer. The main thing is that Moscow and Grozny worked out of step. In Grozny, all forces were involved in order to find and release General Shpigun. In Moscow, they were concerned about holding a meeting of the Security Council and obtaining an appropriate mandate for the use of force actions against the Chechen Republic. The unaddressed ultimatum of the Minister of Internal Affairs Sergei Stepashin (the launching of missile and bomb attacks on the alleged bases of militants) was perceived in Chechnya as an ultimatum to the entire Chechen people, which, naturally, had nothing to do with what happened. Moreover, his own statements that repressive actions would be carried out against the Chechen diasporas (he specifically named the cities of Petersburg, Moscow and Volgograd) meant that this was a deliberate action against the entire Chechen people, Grozny newspapers wrote. The possible start of new bombing raids was regarded by the Ichkerian authorities as an attempt at revenge for the failure in the military campaign of 1994-1996.

According to various sources, in the interwar period, up to 700 hostages were constantly on the territory of Chechnya: women, children, soldiers, officers and generals. Officially, they were abducted by people not controlled by Maskhadov. Maskhadov himself suggested that Moscow create a joint operational and investigative group to investigate the whereabouts of these hostages and their release. Grozny did not deny that the militarization of Chechen society had reached such a point that it could already be compared with Afghanistan or Palestine.

"The Ichkeria leadership opposes the ransom of hostages," said Yusup Soslanbekov, the representative of the President of Chechnya in the Russian Federation on foreign policy in the Russian Federation, in March 1999, "as this will give rise to further hostage-taking." When it is known that if you hide a person, you can get 1-2-3 million dollars, then a faint-hearted person who wants to make easy money can encroach on a crime. “But we witnessed that in three cases, according to our information, more than $ 10 million was paid. This is the Masyuk group - $ 2 million; 3.5 million dollars - the representative of the President Vlasov and 5 million - Vincent Kostel. The Chechen authorities did not know about this, since it was done incognito. Even the Russian special services, including Sergei Stepashin and Rushailo, did not say and did not inform the Chechen leadership to whom they were transferring this money, from whom they were ransoming the hostages. But I know for certain that in many cases, when hostages were released, including officers and soldiers, Berezovsky took part in this event. And, as a rule, not a single fact went without ransom. "

Of course, the Chechen representative did not say a lot ...

The organizer of Shpigun's abduction was the well-known bandit Bakuev (now deceased), associated with Arbi Barayev. It was Bakuev who came up with proposals to "sell" the general to the Russian special services through intermediaries. All the other well-known bandits - the same Arbi Barayev, the Akhmadov brothers - always referred (again through intermediaries) to Bakuev as Shpigun's "owner" and assured that the ransom was impossible without his knowledge. There are reasons to assert that the Ichkeria special services officers helped Bakuev.

First of all, this is Magomed Khatuyev (previously convicted) - a brigadier general, the permanent head of the border and customs services of Ichkeria. It was his people who exercised control at the airport, and without their participation not a single stranger could slip through to the plane.

Magomed Khatuyev officially held dozens of hostages, military and civilians in his 15th military town in Grozny, who were either sold to the families of local residents, as a major of the medical service Aristov, or exchanged for criminals who had committed crimes not related to hostilities in Chechnya. Sometimes, as a gesture of goodwill, it was handed over to Russian politicians, officials, and human rights activists. Among those who received hostages from the 15th town in Grozny were officers of the working group of the Commission under the President of Russia on prisoners of war, and then Secretary of the Security Council of the Republic of Dagestan Magomed Tolboyev, correspondent of Novaya Gazeta Vyacheslav Izmailov and others.

These people did not deny their participation in the abduction of Nasrudi Bazhiev, a brigadier general, deputy minister of the interior of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. He received the post of deputy minister by inheritance after the murder of Nurdi Bazhiev's older brother. Nurdi was killed by his accomplice Ali Itayev in August 1997 for not sharing the millions of dollars received for the abduction of the NTV group led by Elena Masyuk and ORT correspondents Ilyas Bogatyrev and Vladislav Chernyaev.

The people of Nasrudi Bazhiev also ensured the security of the Severny airport. And Nasrudi, although on a smaller scale than his brother, also had his share for the kidnapped hostages (in particular, for the engineer of "Mostdorstroy" Vasily Poklonsky).

Of interest is Ibragim Khultygov - then the head of the State Security Department of the Republic of Ichkeria. He also inherited the post after the death of his older brother Leche Khultygov, who was killed in a shootout in the spring of 1998 by the chief of staff of Salman Raduyev, Vakha Jafarov. As the subordinates of Ibragim Khultygov told, the salaries of the employees of the department were paid after the release of the hostages from the sums received from the ransom. The NSB officers, subordinate to Ibragim Khultygov, also supervised the Severny airport.

Both Nasrudi Bazhiev and Ibragim Khultygov communicated during the anti-terrorist operation in 1999-2000 (and possibly in subsequent years) with the FSB. At the request of the employees of this department, at the end of 1999, they appeared on Central TV condemning the activities of the Chechen gangs.

Salavdi Abdrazakov, aka Khalilov, - the organizer and mediator in the abductions and release of people - also deserves attention. He specialized in the abduction and release for ransom of foreign and Russian journalists (Italian Mauro Galigani, Frenchman Brice Fletho, correspondents of the Vzglyad TV company Ilyas Bogatyrev and Vladislav Chernyaev, ORT special correspondents Roman Perevezentsev and Vyacheslav Tibelius and many others). Salavdi also possessed information about the abduction and detention of Gennady Shpigun. He was arrested as a result of an operation with the assistance of the Main and North Caucasian Directorates for Combating Organized Crime. Sentenced to four years in prison. But for completely different crimes.

According to V. Izmailov, given the current situation in Chechnya and the level of professionalism of the Russian special services, Gennady Shpigun could have been released either for money or as a result of a completely non-standard non-force operation. The department, then headed by Vladimir Rushailo, did not take this step.

Moreover, the former leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs limited, if not nullified, the actions of the ethnic department of the GUBOP on the release of Gennady Shpigun and did not cooperate on this issue with the Commission under the President of Russia on prisoners of war, internees and missing persons. Thus, many employees of the ethnic department, headed by Colonel Suntsov, admitted that the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs actually forbade them to deal with the release of Shpigun. The best of the professionals of the presidential commission, Colonel Vyacheslav Pilipenko, also did not hide the fact that it seems that the fate of the Major General was not interested in the Interior Ministry leadership: Minister Rushailo and his assistant, Lieutenant General Orlov, ignored the proposals of the specialist on the release of Shpigun.

It must be admitted that some of the hostages who could not be released without money were executed by bandits. Thugs such as Barayev, Akhmadov, Itaev, Kharkharoev demanded only money for the hostages.

From the end of 1996 to September 1999, both the FSB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs in many cases signaled their own impotence and doomed the abducted people to death. It was then that there was a need for people like Boris Berezovsky. His activity in freeing hostages for ransom is the result of ineffective work of the special services. Here are some facts about the release of prisoners and hostages with the participation of Boris Berezovsky:

December 1996 - Penza riot police headed by Major Zotov were bought out;

February 1997 - ransom for a very large sum of ORT correspondents Roman Perevezentsev and Vyacheslav Tibelius (a month and a half in captivity);

Spring 1997 - Berezovsky's participation in the release of four journalists from Radio Russia and ITAR-TASS;

August 1997 - correspondents of the TV program "Vzglyad" Ilyas Bogatyrev and Vladislav Chernyaev were released for about $ 1.5 million;

In March 1998, including with the financial assistance of Berezovsky, the leaders of the FSB of Ingushetia, Gribov and Lebedinsky, were released;

In the fall of 1998, Boris Berezovsky bought out the British Camilla Carr and Joe James.

In 1997, Berezovsky gave Basayev $ 2 million, allegedly for the restoration of a cement plant in Chiri-Yurt. Basayev gave $ 1 million to Maskhadov. Where this money went is anyone's guess, but not for the restoration of the cement plant.

And almost always the money for the hostages was transferred through the officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSB. The only exceptions were when Berezovsky or his closest assistants involved a certain Balaudi Tequilov, his friend Adam, nicknamed Pirate, and other Chechen intermediaries.

At least one million US dollars for the FSB officers Gribov and Lebedinsky kidnapped in 1997 were transferred to the bandits by the FSB officers. In addition, FSB officers mediated the transfer of money to the bandits for civilians. These were hundreds of thousands of dollars collected by the relatives of the abducted.

Even more actively than the FSB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs was engaged in the ransom of the hostages. Rushailo's department was especially "distinguished" in the release for ransom of Valentin Vlasov, the representative of the Russian president in Chechnya. Moreover, the amount given to the thugs Barayev and Akhmadov for Vlasov was many times higher than the money paid for any of the journalists. Hundreds of thousands of dollars were given by intermediaries from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the bandits and for the son of the former chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Dagestan. This happened already during the second Chechen campaign.

Among the many similar facts, there were also curious ones.

Autumn 1998. The subdivision of the Ministry of Internal Affairs dealing with the release of the hostages did not even have an exact list of servicemen abducted by the bandits from the territory of Russia. This happened due to competition with the Commission under the President of Russia on prisoners of war, internees and missing persons. So, there were no exact lists, and they had already received thirty thousand dollars from a certain businessman to ransom ten soldiers.

Salman Raduev himself then acted as an intermediary. He gathered eight kidnapped soldiers all over Chechnya. But to be "honest" in this deal, he urgently gave an assignment to the "lone wolf" Khizir, who kidnapped two more "missing" soldiers from the 136th motorized rifle brigade in Buinaksk. In general, Raduev reported in full for the money received from the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Who had priority in the ransom of the hostages?

Those who claim that Berezovsky owns the know-how of ransoming hostages and thereby contributing to this business are not telling the truth.

Back in the spring of 1996, by the decision of the top officials of the Chechen Republic (under D.G. Zavgaev), the Minister of Education of the Chechen Republic Gelman was redeemed for an amount equivalent to 200 thousand US dollars.

The servicemen of the federal troops and the employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs also took bribes for the release of the detained citizens of Chechnya. A similar thing happened in many pre-trial detention centers, at filtration points of the Chechen Republic and checkpoints. The fact of a bribe in the conditions of Chechnya is practically unprovable. Various people have gone through this, including State Duma deputy Aslambek Aslakhanov, Ruslan Khasbulatov, his brother and many others.

On the morning of March 10, 1999, Minister of Internal Affairs S. Stepashin (he gave the officer's word that he would release his representative in Chechnya Shpigun by any means) met with representatives of the Minister of Defense. The conversation took place in conditions of increased secrecy. It was about the military to provide several Tochka-U missile systems, which are designed to strike local targets with high accuracy.

Tactical missile system 9K79-1 "Tochka-U" (chief designer - Sergei Invincible) was developed and modernized from 1981 to 1989 - in connection with the need to increase the effectiveness of ground forces in a conventional war. The complex is the latest example of high-precision weapons. The greatest firing range is 120 km. To aim “Tochka-U” at the target, digital terrain maps are used, obtained from the results of space or aerial photography of the enemy's territory. Until recently, the main source of photographs was the archive of the GRU Space Intelligence Center. The maximum deviation of the missile from the target is 170 meters.

On the evening of the same day, Stepashin informed Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov about how the minister was going to release his subordinate. His proposals were extremely harsh: if the general is not immediately released, then missile and bomb strikes will be launched at the bases of the militants, and the special forces of the ministry and other power structures will deal with terrorists on the territory of Chechnya. In this regard, a number of leading officers of the Interior Ministry's organized crime units, who specialize in ethnic criminal groups, have already flown to the border with Chechnya. They will directly direct the operations to free the general, and will be supported by the special forces of the North Caucasian RUBOP.

“We are talking about carrying out“ rather tough operations ”against the kidnappers and the structures that support them,” said Alexander Mikhailov, head of the information department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs at the time. At the same time, according to Mikhailov, large-scale operations that will soon be carried out are not "punitive, but general preventive." They are aimed at identifying and suppressing the activities of criminals both on the territory of Chechnya and in Russia itself. Mikhailov also said that in the regions bordering on Chechnya, all the forces of the ministry were put on alert, operational units were working almost around the clock. At the same time, as Mikhailov noted, the situation on the border with Chechnya is calm.

Immediately the Chechen and Russian special services reported that Shpigun was alive and was being held in relatively decent conditions. Representatives of Chechnya under the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs assured that they would release the general in the coming days without the intervention of federal forces. "Precision strikes will only heat up the situation," they said, "and can harm the prisoner."

Deputy Prime Minister of Chechnya Turpal Atgeriyev (he headed a specially created state commission that united more than 20 operational groups representing various security and law enforcement agencies) said that due to the abduction of Shpigun in the republic, a number of high-ranking officials would be removed from work. He stressed that the President of Chechnya Aslan Maskhadov demanded that the commission, in the shortest possible time, identify the circle of persons involved in this crime, as well as identify the airport employees who assisted the terrorists to get on board the plane and onto the runway without hindrance.

Naturally, no names were given from the Chechen side.

On March 17, 1999, the kidnappers demanded a ransom of $ 15 million for General Shpigun. Later, the price was reduced first to $ 7 and then to $ 3 million. Conflicting information was received about where the general was. It was reported that he is being held in Urus-Martan, Shali and even in Georgia.

At the same time, representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for almost a year constantly noted that the abducted plenipotentiary representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in Chechnya was alive, and the movements of the terrorists holding the Russian general were "constantly monitored." “We know that General Shpigun is alive, we are working on his release, and we hope that it will end positively,” a high-ranking Russian Interior Ministry official told reporters in March 2000.

He also confirmed once again that the conduct of the counter-terrorist operation and, above all, the successful actions of the Russian troops against the bandit formations "somewhat complicated" the fulfillment of the task of releasing the general. According to him, "the bandits are forced to move and carry G. Shpigun with them more often than it was before." Also, the Ministry of Internal Affairs stressed that in the case of General Shpigun "there is no question of his ransom or exchange, it is a question of a special operation to release him." The possibility of exchanging G. Shpigun for any of the Chechen field commanders or captured Chechens was ruled out. "The bandits are unlikely to agree to such an exchange, since for them every hostage is a bargaining chip primarily in their personal interests." The interlocutor emphasized that the Interior Ministry "is confident that we will still be able to positively resolve the issue of releasing General Shpigun from Chechnya."

On March 31, 2000, in the area of ​​the Chechen village of Itum-Kale, the body of an unknown person was found in one of the graves. The expert examination confirmed the intelligence data - Gennady Shpigun is the victim. There is still no reliable information about whether heart failure was the cause of Shpigun's death (the kidnappers' version) or whether the general was killed in revenge for the start of a large-scale offensive by the Russian army in Dagestan and Chechnya in the summer of 1999.

But in any case, the death of a combat general lies on the conscience of the then leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. They refused to redeem the living Shpigun. On the other hand, they paid for the general's corpse by treating the secretary of the Security Council of Maskhadov Ichkeria, Doku Umarov (one of the organizers of the abductions) in Nalchik, with his subsequent transfer to Georgia.

Exactly one year ago, Major General of the Police Gennady Shpigun was taken hostage by Chechen bandits. Then, a year ago, the former Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergei Stepashin gave the officer's word that the general would be released. A year has passed, the war ends in Chechnya, and Shpigun is still languishing in captivity. The Trud correspondent met with the general's wife Svetlana Shpigun.

Svetlana Yakovlevna, do you have any news about your husband's fate?
- No. I am assured that he is alive, and this is still the main thing for me. And so there is no more information ...
- Yes ... Ex-Minister Stepashin recently said that in June-July last year there was a real opportunity to release the general, even a specific date for his release was determined, but for some reason the case fell through. Do you know anything about this?
- I know all this, but as far as this is true, it is not for me to judge. From time to time I communicate with the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Kozlov. Now Gennady's brother is in Moscow, he went through all the instances, but did not find out anything definite. There is only one answer: "every effort is being made to free Shpigun."
- But the operation to rescue your husband is under the personal control of Interior Minister Vladimir Rushailo. Have you met him?
- No. I was only given a greeting card from him on the day of the women's holiday on March 8, but an annoying embarrassment happened to it. The congratulation begins correctly: "Shpigun Svetlana Yakovlevna". And below, after the congratulatory text, it is written: "I sincerely wish you, dear Larisa Vasilievna, health", etc. Probably, the assistants confused something.
- I understand that getting used to the idea that a loved one is not around is impossible, although a whole year has passed ...
- I often dream about Gennady. As if he is still in Dagestan, where we used to live, I always beg him to return home, to Moscow, but for some reason he stubbornly refuses ... And he always dreams of being cheerful, energetic, the way he always was.
Some friends advise me to turn to psychics, they say, they will tell you where Gennady is and what happened to him. But I was brought up in a different spirit and totally against it. I do not believe in all sorts of prophecies, fortune-telling and predictions.
- Do you experience any difficulties from the material point of view? Are you being helped?
- Yes, both the Ministry of Internal Affairs and my husband's comrades. But, you know, I work a lot myself. I am a police captain, I work in the Moscow police department. Business is up to my throat, but I cannot forget even in my official worries about my grief. Although we work, like the rest of the Moscow police, in an enhanced mode.
- Did the bandits personally try to find you?
- Never, not once. Neither me nor our relatives. Apparently, they are well aware that we do not have and never had the millions of dollars that they demanded for their husband.
- Who else lives with you?
- Now I live alone, the children have their own families. Of course, being alone is sad. I think about my husband all the time. I come home from work late, until late at night I go through the photographs where we, together with Gennady, watch family videotapes ... And I cry. I remember a lot. I often call my sister Natasha in Petersburg, she is also very worried ...
For me, the emotional support of friends means a lot, but they can only sympathize, and they cannot return their husband to the family. All hope is on the authorities ... And special thanks to the journalists. Your attention pleases and gives hope that our family tragedy is not forgotten.
In spite of everything, I continue to believe that everything will be all right, Gennady will return safe and sound. I live by this faith.

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