Teaching methods in a correctional school. (after E. D. Khudenko) - presentation. Economic experiment of Khudenko in agriculture Khudenko method in agriculture

To the 100th anniversary of the birth of the organizer of Soviet agricultural production I.N. Khudenko

June 16, 2018 marks the 100th anniversary of the birth of the outstanding organizer of Soviet agricultural production Ivan Nikiforovich Khudenko (1918 — 1974).

I.N. Khudenko was born into a peasant family. In 1957, after demobilizing from the army, he began to work in the Ministry of Agriculture Kazakh SSR... In the early 1960s, he began his experiments to improve economic relations on state farms. First in state farm "Ili" Alma-Ata region, and then in farm "Akchi" on virgin soil.

The traditional system of payment, both in agriculture and in other industries, involved accounting for specific work carried out by this or that worker, and payment for them either according to existing tariffs, or in the form of workdays. For this purpose, for each work performed, orders were drawn up, which were closed. Such a system did not interest the employee in the final results of the work of the entire team. He did his job, received money for it, and everything else did not concern him.

I.N. Khudenko

The essence of the experiment organized by I.N. Khudenko, was that workers began to be paid not for specifically performed work, but for the final results of the work of the entire team in the form of centners of grain or other products. Small teams of 4-5 people were created, for which the land and equipment were assigned. In addition, specialized units were created, for example, a repair unit, which served grain producers.

The wage fund per centner of grain produced was determined by the average level of wages for the region. The cost savings were included in the salary.

The salaries of the teams involved in the repair of equipment were not piecework. They were paid stable and considerable money when the equipment worked. And when the equipment broke down, the money was not paid. Therefore, the repairmen were interested in repairing the equipment in such a way that there was no need for subsequent repairs.

This idea was invented in the distant past by one eastern ruler. He paid his court physician when he was healthy. And during his illness he did not pay. Therefore, the doctor was financially interested in ensuring that the patient, to the delight of his subjects, did not get sick.

Payment for labor based on the final result, and not on individual operations, was not invented by Khudenko. It has been used in Soviet agriculture since the mid-1950s. I suspect that it started in apprenticeship production teams that began to form around this time. Schoolchildren worked in these brigades during school hours for 2 hours, in non-school hours for 4-5 hours. The first such brigade was created in Stavropol Territory in the village of Grigoripolisskaya in 1954. It consisted of about 100 students. The brigade was selected by competition - idlers and violators of discipline were not taken. A plot of land, a technician and an agronomist-consultant were assigned to the brigade. The team carried out the entire cycle of work related to the cultivation of the crop and worked for the final result.

However, structures similar to student production teams have existed before. In 1948, the foreman of one of these brigades, a schoolboy Tursunali Matkazimov(1933 - 2004) at the age of 15 he became the Hero of Socialist Labor.

In 1956, the village of Grigoripolisskaya was visited Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev(1894 - 1971) and leader of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito(1892 - 1980), who were very pleased with what they saw. Soon the experience of apprentice production teams began to spread throughout the country.

Unfortunately, apprenticeship production teams have become one of the foundations of a grandiose political career Secretary of the Stavropol Regional Komsomol Committee Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev(born 1931), which ended with the collapse of our country.

At the end of the 1950s, the link working on a free-order system thundered throughout the country. Vladimir Yakovlevich Pervitsky(1928 - 2017), growing corn. True, Pervitsky did not work on an ordinary collective farm or state farm, but on an experimental farm at a research institute.

In 1960 I.N. Khudenko sent a note to the USSR Council of Ministers with proposals on improving the economic mechanism in industries where labor costs and the number of operations performed do not always lead to a useful result. He proposed paying workers in these industries for the end result of their work (minus costs). The note was met favorably and in the early 1960s by I.N. Khudenko began an experiment at the Ili state farm in the Alma-Ata region.

Already in the first year, grain production on the state farm increased more than 2 times. At the same time, due to the improvement of the organization of labor, the number of employees was significantly (almost 10 times) reduced. Particularly large reductions affected the management staff: out of 132 managers, only two remained: a manager and an accountant. This is not surprising: the majority of managers in ordinary farms are engaged in the design of orders, taking into account the work performed, monitoring, and fighting for labor discipline. As the Deputy Minister of Agriculture wrote A.E. Yelemanov, all this activity at new system became unnecessary.

As a result, the cost of a centner of grain has decreased by almost 10 times. And the salary of workers has increased to more than 300 rubles.

In order to employ the laid-off workers, Khudenko proposed to build a fruit and vegetable plant that supplied the cities of Kazakhstan with vegetables and fruits. But there were no funds for this. I had to pay each laid-off worker an allowance at the expense of the farm - 30 rubles a month. In the presence of a private farm, this money could somehow live, but rather scarcely. Therefore, conflicts began: laid-off workers demanded employment, which was impossible.

Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev closely followed the experiment in Iliysk (about which his son wrote in his memoirs).

About the state farm Iliysky was filmed documentary"Man on Earth". At the end of 1964 it was viewed Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev and spoke in the sense that this is premature. Apparently, he was embarrassed by the sharp decline in the number of workers, who had nowhere to go.

After the resignation of N.S. Khrushchev's experiment in Iliysk was closed.

In the late 1960s, I.N. Khudenko succeeded in carrying out a new experiment in the newly created experimental farm for the production of herbal flour "Akchi". The addition of such flour, which contains a lot of proteins and vitamins, to the feed for cows, raises the milk yield by one and a half times.

The experiment was carried out quite officially by decree of the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR. Its terms were agreed with the allied authorities. The experiment was supervised by the Deputy Minister of Agriculture of the Republic Abdrakhim Yelemanovich Yelemanov (1916 - 1970).

Just as in the Iliysk, small links formed the basis of the structure of the economy.

The economy has sharply increased labor productivity and the quality of products.

Since the farm was created anew, there was no problem with the dismissal of the previous workers. But few workers were recruited. As in Iliysky, there were only two managers: a director and an accountant. Interestingly, Khudenko himself did not apply for the position of director, preferring to be an accountant.

Labor productivity in the Akchi farm turned out to be 6 times higher than the national average, wages are 2-3 times higher than the average. The workers voluntarily abandoned household plots: there was simply no need for them.

An architect from Alma-Ata also came to work in Akchi, who built five-room houses for farm workers according to individual projects with all city amenities.

Economic successes were the result of social successes. Previously, the employee thought only about his operation - now he began to think about the success of the link and the economy as a whole. This created the basis for the development of self-government. Each employee had to act both in the role of a leader and in the role of an executor. Work from purely performing work became creative. And much more varied. It turned out that the narrow specialization of an employee is inappropriate from the point of view of the organization of production.

There was no sweatshop either in Ili or Akchi. We worked more when needed, and less when not. Khudenko said that if there is no work, there is nothing to pretend to be work, you need to rest. And if the farm workers for some reason did not have work, then they took a bus and went to swim, sunbathe, frolic with the children. The collective farm had an average annual seven-hour working day.

Not finding active support from the leaders of Kazakhstan, A. Ye. Yelemanov repeatedly turned to Moscow. Here is one of his talks:

« Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee comrade F.D. Kulakov:
In the state farms of Kazakhstan, the administrative and economic apparatus is extremely inflated. On average, a state farm has 110 workers in this apparatus. Within one month in the state farm, it is required to draw up only 15 thousand different invoices, accounting sheets and other settlement documents containing 1,800 indicators for accounting and remuneration.».

In 1970, the experiment was closed, and in the most ugly way, and without even giving the workers honestly earned money. I.N. Khudenko sought to overturn this decision, went to the authorities and the editorial offices of newspapers, but to no avail. In the end, he committed a minor offense, for which he was brought to justice. On November 12, 1974, Ivan Nikiforovich died in prison. The district authorities moved into the cottages built for the workers of the state farm.

For all that, it should be noted that, despite the persecution, I.N. Khudenko never slipped into the position of anti-Sovietism and anti-communism.

The order to close the experiment in Akchi was given by the Minister of Agriculture of the Kazakh SSR Mikhail Georgievich Roginets(1910 - 1980). From the publications on this matter, the position of the leadership of the republic remained unclear. It was said that the head of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan Dinmukhammed Akhmetovich Kunaev(1912 - 1993) treated Khudenko's experiment positively. At least for the time being. However, without sanction, or at least without benevolent neutrality from the party leadership of Kazakhstan, the minister would hardly have dared to close the experiment, which was known in Moscow.

What is the reason for the closure of the experiment?

Much has been written that this was due to the corporate interests of the bureaucracy, which feared that the new mechanism that freed farms from day-to-day control would lead to a serious reduction in the number of managers. However, the experience of post-perestroika reality has shown that the fears of managers were in vain. Today's officials do not control the day-to-day activities of collective and state farms, but their number has not only not decreased, but even increased. They explained the closure of the experiment and resentment that the workers of the state farm live better than officials.

Probably, these reasons really played a role. But the main thing was different.

Khudenko's experiments showed how large reserves of growth Soviet agriculture has. And that the existing economic mechanism does not allow these reserves to be realized. But the management could not fail to understand that one circumstance prevented the large-scale implementation of Khudenko's experience. The experiment led to a several-fold reduction in the number of employees. They had to be put somewhere. Workers released from one farm can be employed. But if all farms switch to this mechanism, then there will be nowhere to put the laid-off workers. And this is a serious problem, the solutions to which were not clear.

One publicist wrote that the massive implementation of Khudenko's experience would lead to the release of about 25 million people from agriculture. It was written about this with a tinge of admiration. But the publicist did not think about what to do with these 25 million. But the decision-maker must think about it.

What are possible options?

The first option is the creation of agricultural processing enterprises on collective and state farms, as well as other enterprises. This option was proposed by Khudenko in Iliysky. The money for the construction of such an enterprise in one state farm, if desired by the authorities, would most likely be found. And it is unlikely to build such an enterprise in every state farm. And you don't need so many enterprises of this kind.

The second option is development in the countryside social infrastructure... This business is undoubtedly useful. But at the same time it is hardly realistic to give work to all those who have been made redundant.

The third option is to shorten the working day. If the working day is reduced from 8 hours to 4 hours, not 25, but 20 million people will have to be employed. Which is easier, but not much. In addition, during shift work, problems arise associated with the assignment of equipment to the link. For the technique should not work for 4 hours, but more.

Fourth option- relocation to the city. It is unclear whether the urban industry will be able to provide migrants with jobs. In time, perhaps, it will be able to. But this will not happen so quickly. In addition, when moving to the city, the family will lose their own house, the construction of which was spent on a lot. It will be difficult to sell it.

The fifth option is to pay unemployment benefits. A rural dweller, receiving a small allowance and having a personal plot, can survive. But with great difficulty. This is what we see today, when most of the rural population has lost their jobs. And I am afraid that in this case some of the freed workers would have to be turned into police officers who protect highly paid workers of state farms from being beaten by unemployed fellow villagers.

The ideological aspect of the matter was also important. Khuddenko's experiment once again showed the weaknesses of Soviet agriculture. That undermined the authority of the Soviet system.

Within the framework of the Soviet economy of the 1960s and 70s, a good solution is not visible. Transfer of all farms to the system proposed by I.N. Khudenko, would inevitably give rise to very serious social problems. The party and state leadership understood this. Presumably, this is why L.I. Brezhnev called Khudenko's ideas untimely.

Probably, the Soviet leadership needed to say all this openly and honestly that by introducing the experience of Khudenko, we can dramatically increase the efficiency of agriculture. But at the cost of serious social consequences.

The Soviet leadership did not reject the idea of work without ordering for the final result. In the same 1970, such brigades appeared in construction. Brigade Nikolay Anatolyevich Zlobin(1931 - 1997) from Zelenograd takes a contract for the construction of a 14-storey building and hands over a turnkey building. For this N.A. Zlobin is awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor (in 1985 he will become twice Hero). Soon, "brigade contracting" spreads in construction.

A very interesting detail: in order to avoid egalitarianism and financially incentivize the best workers, economists proposed to introduce the concept of “labor participation rate” (KTU) and developed a method for calculating it. However, many brigades did not want to use KTU and began to share their salaries equally. And sometimes according to the principle: who needs it more. For good relations in a team are more expensive than an extra dozen. Moreover, with good relations, the work goes better and the salary of each member of the brigade is higher. Karl Marx's prediction came true brilliantly: collective work "removed" individual material incentives.

The May 1982 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, which discussed the Food Program, set the task of a large-scale transition to collective contracting in various areas of the national economy. First of all, in agriculture. After that, a green street was opened to work without orders for the final result. Of course, provided that other workers will not be fired.

Ph.D. S.V. Bagotsky

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We recently quoted a case in which the historical doom of the Soviet system was reflected like a drop of water:

A prominent financial worker of the Council of Ministers of the USSR in the rank of deputy minister, Khudenko in 1960 voluntarily undertook to conduct an economic experiment in state farms in Kazakhstan. Khudenko's proposals were very simple: he proposed a system of full cost accounting and economic independence, and most importantly, a real system of material incentives. What was paid was the results achieved, not the effort expended. The experiment was a fantastic success. The employment of people and machines on state farms was reduced by 10-12 times, the cost of grain - by 4 times. The profit per worker increased 7 times, and the salary - 4 times. With figures in hand, Khudenko proved that the widespread introduction of his system in the country's agriculture will allow to increase the volume of production by 4 times - while 6 million people will be employed in agriculture instead of the current thirty million.
Newspapers and films were enthusiastically writing about Khudenko's experiment, but no one was in a hurry to apply his system across the country. Moreover, in 1970 his state farm "Akchi" was closed by order from above. The state farm was closed at the height of the season, without paying the workers money or returning their investments. Khudenko and his workers continued their struggle by legal means, appealing to the courts. The vicissitudes of this struggle reflected the struggle within the Soviet leadership. The decisions of the courts were canceled several times and new ones were adopted. Several media outlets continued to write about the value of the experiment. Finally, in August 1973, Khudenko and his deputy were convicted of "embezzling state property"- to six and four years. Even after the verdict, the protests of major economic workers of the country continued on this case. November 12, 1974 Khudenko died in a prison hospital.

A detailed article about Khudenko was published in the January (2007) issue of Forbes magazine.
Author - I. Karatsuba, candidate historical sciences, associate professor of Moscow State University.

On November 12, 1974, an unusual prisoner was dying in one of the prison hospitals of the Kazakh SSR. “The crisis came suddenly. Ivan Nikiforovich got up on his rigid metal bunk, barely audible he said: "That's all ..." - gasped convulsively air and fell on the pillow. The doctor stated that he had cardiopulmonary insufficiency, ”recalled Vladislav Filatov, an accomplice and colleague of the prisoner (published in the newspaper“ Selskaya Zhizn ”in 1988). The name of the hero of the memoirs is Ivan Khudenko. In the 1960s, he tried to introduce capitalist methods of doing business in Soviet agriculture, achieved a 20-fold increase in labor productivity, but ended his days behind bars as a plunderer of socialist property.

The economic results of the experiment were overwhelming. Work on the new system started on March 1, 1963. During the first season, grain production on the state farm increased 2.9 times, profit per worker - seven times, and the cost of a centner of grain fell from 5-7 rubles to 63 kopecks. The productivity of an employee in mechanized units has increased almost 20 times over the year. Revenues have increased accordingly. The head of the link received 350 rubles a month, his machine operators - 330 rubles. In other state farms in the USSR, even 100 rubles was considered a good monthly income.

The central press erupted with laudatory publications, Kazakh documentary filmmakers made the film "Man on Earth" about Khudenko, and the fathers of the republic at the end of the agricultural season closed the experiment. Moscow economists who came to defend the innovator were told honestly: Khudenko “violates the social peace”. The fact is that according to Ivan Khudenko's system, the number of employees employed at Iliysk has decreased from 863 to 85 people. The author of the experiment proposed a solution to the problem: to build a fruit and vegetable plant in the Iliysky, which would supply the Kazakh capital with fresh and canned vegetables and fruits all year round. But this required additional appropriations ... In addition, Khudenko proposed to extend his experience to the entire agriculture of the country. In this case, 33 million of the 40 million peasants who were then employed in production would have to be re-employed. At the end of 1964, the new first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Leonid Brezhnev, watched the film "Man on Earth" and concluded the discussion: "This is premature."

Already in the last Khrushchev years, the relative independence of the peasants came to an end. Material incentives, progressive methods of work - all this is nonsense, you just need to work better and follow the party line. It is all the more surprising that Ivan Khudenko in 1969 achieved a new experiment. Literally out of the blue, in the Kazakh semi-desert, a small state farm "Akchi" was created, officially called "an experimental farm for the production of vitamin grass flour." The addition of such flour, which contains a lot of protein and vitamins, in the diet of cows raises milk yield by 30-40%. "Akchi" was again built of links (working groups, as they would say now) - machine operators, construction and management. All links worked on full cost accounting, and issues were resolved openly and quite democratically at the council of the economy, to which its director was subordinate. There were only two people in the management level - director Mikhail Li and economist-accountant Ivan Khudenko.

The experiment was carried out by decree of the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR, and its conditions were agreed with the union departments - the Labor Committee, the Central Statistical Administration of the USSR, the Ministry of Finance and the State Bank of the USSR How Khudenko succeeded is still a mystery. Labor productivity at Akchi was six times higher than the national average, wages were two to three times higher. The quality of the very products of the state farm, herbal flour, was also unusually high. As the partner of Khudenko Vladislav Filatov recalled: “For the premium grade, the carotene content in herbal flour was set at 180 units, while we had 280. The devices were off scale, the inspectors could not believe their eyes. And we deducted that its content depends on the time of day. And they were mowing at night, when there was a maximum of carotene ”.

Attracted by the spirit of free and creative labor, the Almaty architect Vladislav Filatov (already mentioned above), who was building comfortable houses for state farmers with his team, and the director of the neighboring farm Vladimir Khvan joined Akchi. Local and central press wrote about Akchi, and an article from Literaturnaya Gazeta was reprinted even by the Yugoslav communist organ Borba under the heading "The Mystery of an Economic Miracle in a Kazakh State Farm."

In 1970, the experiment was closed, and in the most barbaric way. This is how Filatov remembered it: “Everything looked like a robbery. In the middle of the day, a detachment of mounted militia surrounded our plant for the production of grass flour. People were literally dragged off the tractors, driven away from the units working at the plant. From the outside it might seem that there is a round-up of big criminals. " The state farm was closed at the height of the season, without paying the workers money and without returning their investments.

Khudenko and his team fought for their cause for three years, went to offices and newspaper offices. They "caught" innovators on stupidity. Tired of fighting for the idea, Khudenko tried to return at least the money he earned on the state farm. Having drawn up a lawsuit in court, the economist sealed the document with the seal of the already defunct Akchi. This became a formal reason to accuse Khudenko and his partners of attempting to steal state property. You know the end of this story.

A typical story for those years. We can recall the high-profile case of Ivan Snimshchikov, chairman of the Kirov collective farm near Moscow (the village of Chernaya, Balashikha district). In 1952, he was elected as the sixteenth chairman in five years of a collapsed farm of eighty workers, which ranked last in the region in all respects. Over the next seventeen years Snemshchikov managed to make the collective farm a leader. His collective farmers took up any business that could bring money. They untwisted old ropes that were lying on the ground in the ports of Riga, Arkhangelsk and Vladivostok, and made of them a cabole for the needs of builders and electricians, sewed mattresses, made juices and jams from fruits and vegetables ruined by vegetable stores, stamped plastic containers for perfume factories. All this was sold at "negotiated prices", which provided funds for the development of the main business (animal husbandry and crop production), construction and landscaping. People returned to the collective farm, by 1969 Snemshchikov employed 1,500 people, and the total volume of products sold was 12 million rubles.

And everything would be fine, but the people of Snimshchikov lived defiantly well - the chairman paid his double wages and drove milkmaids across the Black Sea on motor ships. As a result, Snimshchikov was accused of "nepmanism", private property sentiment and brought to justice. The collective farm seethed, the tractor drivers shouted: "Now we will start a tractor and go to Red Square with a demonstration." Ivan Snimshchikov received six years with confiscation of property (for 900 rubles, according to the court's inventory), was amnestied five years later, went blind and died in a tiny "crumbling" apartment.

The fate of the Ukrainian Viktor Belokon, a one-legged war hero, whose collective farm "Serbs" flourished on the supply of apples and pears from Odessa in Transbaikalia, was also tragic. Among those repressed for Good work-Vladimir chairman Akim Gorshkov, Kuban combine operator Vladimir Pervitsky and many others. Meanwhile, under Brezhnev, agriculture plunged into depression. Since 1963, the USSR has been purchasing food abroad. State investment in agriculture in 1966-1980 was estimated at 383 billion rubles - with almost zero return. Anyone over the age of 25 remembers that a couple of kilograms of meat in one hand could only be obtained by standing in line for three hours. You already know how this story ended.

And, by the way, a small detail of the Akchin history: after the defeat of the Khudenkovsky economy, the district committee authorities moved into the vacated houses of the evicted state farmers.

That's all.

Was not a tenant Soviet Union, not a tenant.

EXPERIMENT I. N. KHUDENKO

Multi-branch state farm "Iliyskiy" of the Alma-Ata region, Ivan Nikiforovich Khudenko.

Results:

The number of accountants and managers 132 in the 62nd and 2 in the 63rd

Grain produced per worker - 317.3 tons, in comparison - 15.6 in 1962.

As you can see, in 1963 against 1962, grain production increased 2.9 times, mechanized units increased labor productivity 20 times. In 1964, the state farm handed over to the state more than 1 million poods of grain - more than two times more than in previous years. The salary fund was saved 3 times, and the use of natural funds decreased by the same amount. At the same time, the cost of a centner of grain fell from 5-7 rubles to 63 kopecks. Accordingly, the salary increased to 300-350 rubles. Houses were built on individual project, installed a water supply system, installed electric stoves, abandoned a home courtyard, laid a winter garden, a theater ...

In the early 1960s, the restless economist was given control of the diversified state farm "Iliyskiy" in the Alma-Ata region. Here Khudenko set up an experiment on the introduction of a "no-order-link system of organization and remuneration of labor." To put it simply, Khudenko switched his state farm to full cost accounting, backed up by direct material incentives for workers. What was paid was the results achieved, not the effort expended.

Instead of a cumbersome system of three integrated departments and nine field-cultivation brigades with a huge number of workers and common, that is, "nobody's" equipment, 17 teams of 4-5 people were created with equipment assigned to them (combines, tractors, etc.) ... Each link had strictly defined functions and a fund for their implementation. Up to 500-600 people used to work on nine currents, depending on the amount of grain. After the reorganization according to the Khudenko system, three mechanized currents were created, and only 12 people served them. The number of managers in the state farm was reduced from 132 to two people - the manager (who is also the chief agronomist) and the economist-accountant of the grain department remained.

Ivan Khudenko was allowed to introduce a new wage system in one of the virgin regions of Kazakhstan. All work was distributed between small self-supporting links, to which one requirement was presented: to produce a set volume of products by a certain date, while wages were paid without restriction, according to the results achieved. The results of the work over several years were amazing: labor productivity exceeded the average level by almost 20 times, the cost of grain production decreased four times, wages increased four times, and the profit per worker - seven times. The calculations made by I. Khudenko confirmed that the introduction of such a system throughout the country would increase grain production several times, while reducing the number of people employed in agriculture from 35 to 5 million people.

SCHEME. REPAIRER'S INCOME.

Each link, earning money in a certain way, deducts a certain percentage into the REPAIRS WAGE FUND. Payment condition (RULE) - if the technician worked CORRECTLY at the link, then the transfers are made in full. And if something refused, then there is no transfer. This picture in our diagram is depicted in the form of a chamomile in the center of which is the REPAIRS PAYMENT FUND consisting of the above deductions.

That's all! And what are the CONSEQUENCES! There is no longer the need to look at who came to work and when, and what he did, and how he did it. Knowing that the payment of his labor is a FUNCTIONAL TECHNIQUE, the repairman will do everything to provide it. If earlier, when they paid for repairs, it was profitable for the repairman to change the "screwed up" engine (a lot of repairs, which means money!), But now there is no - FUNCTION is important - they pay for it. Than changing the engine, it is easier to do prophylaxis on time, to monitor lubrication, adjustment, and so labor productivity rises, preventive work is ten times less laborious.

Such RULES OF CASH FLOWS ensure CORRECT OPERATION of the fixed equipment.

The economic experiment of Khudenko.

When in the USSR the industry destroyed by the war was restored and the opportunity for peaceful development was obtained, industrial experiment was the norm in the late 50s - early 60s of the USSR. There were experiments in agriculture as well. The most resonant was the Kazakhstani experience in the implementation of the "no-order-link system of organization and remuneration", developed by the economist Ivan Khudenko, whose preparation began in 1960 at the Iliysk state farm, near Alma-Ata. The experiment itself was started on March 1, 1963.

I. Khudenko worked as the head of the department of financing of state farms in the Ministry of Agriculture of the Kazakh SSR. Calculations in this area required a certain amount of intellectual courage, because 40 million people were employed in the village! I. Khudenko comes to the following conclusion - for the implementation of economic calculation in practice in agriculture, both a new system of organization of production and distribution according to work are needed. Mathematically, this can be expressed as follows. There are obligatory labor costs. The task: how to force an irresponsible person to do everything in his power, so that his work is not just equal to the obligatory expenditures of labor, but goes beyond this equality?

The labor organization system at the Iliysky state farm was simple and ingenious: in addition to reducing the number of production workers by a factor of 10 (the state farm, in which I. Khudenko undertook to implement his system, had previously employed 853 people), it was simplified and reduced to a minimum (only the initial and final point) accounting of resources, and with it 132 people of accountants and managers. 17 teams of 5-7 people were created with equipment assigned to them (combines, tractors, etc.) and funds, which they manage and for which they are responsible. In I. Khudenko's work, overcoming sabotage, “negative participation in management”, is achieved by positive inclusion of workers in management. In the place of the overseer, there is a self-governing production team, but the money formally remains in the form of in-kind cost funds, which are managed by each link and, in fact, in the form of wages, which each manages individually. Wasted - you will be left with nothing, saved - use for development. By being involved in the management and disposal of funds, a person became responsible for the overall result and personally interested in the results of his work. In just a year, the savings in the use of material resources: diesel fuel, spare parts, etc., turned out to be three times. An interesting point, the remuneration of the repair team was made according to the principle - the less equipment is repaired, the more the salary of the repairmen. It was this decision that was made at the link council.

As already mentioned, Khudenko left only the director (who is also the chief agronomist) out of 132 accountants and managers, who obeyed the advice of the foremen and the economist-accountant (coordinator of the experiment). Up to 500-600 people used to work at nine currents during the season, three mechanized currents were created, and they were served by as many as 12 people. In the first year, the economic results were staggering. The indicators of grain production by mechanized units in 1963 compared with 1962 are presented in the following form:

The gross harvest of grain in tons - 9204, in comparison - 3150 in 1962. The number of average annual workers - 29 people, in comparison - 202 in 1962. Grain produced per worker - 317.3 tons, in comparison - 15.6 in 1962 The wage fund (thousand rubles) - 59, in comparison - this is 181 in 1962.

As you can see, in 1963 against 1962, grain production increased 2.9 times, mechanized units increased labor productivity 20 times. In 1964, the state farm handed over to the state more than 1 million poods of grain - more than two times more than in previous years. The salary fund was saved 3 times, and the use of natural funds decreased by the same amount. At the same time, the cost of a centner of grain fell from 5-7 rubles to 63 kopecks. Accordingly, the salary increased to 300-350 rubles. Houses were built according to an individual project, water pipes were installed, electric stoves were installed, a home courtyard was abandoned, and a winter garden was laid.

Five years later, having received the support of the Deputy Minister of Agriculture of Kazakhstan A. Yelemanov, I. Khudenko will again continue the experiment in another state farm "Akchi", which was officially called "an experimental farm for the production of vitamin grass flour." The addition of such flour, which contains a lot of protein and vitamins, in the diet of cows raises milk yield by 30-40%. The principle of labor organization is the same as in Iliysk. All the links were in full control of the funds, the management went through the board of links.

I. Khudenko's production units were united into a self-governing labor collective. Managed by the council of foremen (link). Annual, or even seasonal, mandatory rotation of the council, everyone learns to manage and dispose of the results of work. Managing man by man, i.e. compulsion to work by another person ceases to be a profession. The principle of self-government works. This is the first step towards the transition "from managing people to managing things and processes."

This put on the agenda a number of issues that could not be solved within the framework of the experiment. First, with such a high labor productivity, it was completely logical to raise the question of shortening the working day (and the transition to a five-hour working day was discussed in the USSR in the 1960s). Secondly, the experiment showed that a person who is fluent in various professional modes of activity - from agriculture and mechanization to managing the production process - is the norm: it means that narrow specialization is a deviation. Third, which is completely logical, such a level of production culture required a transition to a universal higher, but not any higher, namely, a universal laboratory polytechnic education, which was abandoned in the USSR in the 30s.

Each person, without exception, must be trained and included in the management process. This is exactly what I. Khudenko demonstrated by the example of the organization of labor in the form of a self-governing labor collective.

1902, a group of Taganskaya prison inmates returns from a morning performance in The Bolshoi Theater which they attended as a reward for exemplary behavior:

On November 12, 1974, an unusual prisoner was dying in one of the prison hospitals of the Kazakh SSR. “The crisis came suddenly. Ivan Nikiforovich got up on his hard metal bunk, barely audibly said: "That's all ..." - gasped convulsively air and fell on the pillow. The doctor stated that he had cardiopulmonary insufficiency, ”recalled Vladislav Filatov, an accomplice and colleague of the prisoner (published in the newspaper“ Selskaya Zhizn ”in 1988). The name of the hero of the memoirs is Ivan Khudenko. In the 1960s, he tried to introduce capitalist methods of doing business in Soviet agriculture, achieved a 20-fold increase in labor productivity, but ended his days behind bars as a plunderer of socialist property.

However, first things first. By defeating Germany, the Soviet Union was losing the battle for potatoes and wheat. The drought, crop failure and famine of 1946-1947 gave way to a protracted depression in agriculture. Attempts by party bodies to restore order "in the countryside" have led to the disappearance of even a hint of the economic independence of collective farms. Farm directors spent all their time agreeing on plans for sowing, raising fallow, inter-row cultivation, harvesting, threshing, and fall plowing. Collective farmers, meanwhile, were laying the foundation for today's rampant alcoholism in the countryside. They could not change anything in their lives, since 1932 the peasants did not even have passports that would allow them to move freely around the country.

The coming to power of Nikita Khrushchev in 1953 changed the situation for a short time. Everyone remembers corn (it was planted even in Yakutia) and the plowing of virgin lands. Less remembered is that in the first five years under Khrushchev, the collective farms were given the opportunity to work in a human way. Most importantly, the party bodies were not recommended to interfere in the current activities of the farms. The collective farm could be given a work plan, but how to carry it out was the business of the director and his peasants. Farms were forgiven all debts that had accumulated since the war times, and the agricultural tax was halved; purchase prices for products, including those produced in excess of the standards, were increased 2-5 times. From the rostrum of the party plenum, Khrushchev announced that the material interest of rural workers in the development of production is one of the "fundamental principles of socialist management." In addition, the collective farmers were given passports and subsequently began to pay state pensions. As a result, the volume of gross agricultural output in 1954-1958 increased by 35.3%.

Ivan Nikiforovich Khudenko was a characteristic character of that era - the "sixties" from agriculture. A peasant son, he was born in 1918, in 1934 he graduated from a financial and credit technical school and was sent to work as an assistant accountant at a state farm. Passed the Finnish and Great Patriotic War, serving "on the economic side." In 1957, he was demobilized with the rank of captain, settled in Alma-Ata, became the head of the department for financing state farms in the Ministry of Agriculture of the Kazakh SSR. However, he could not calmly shift the papers. Tatyana Gavrilovna, the widow of Khudenko, recalled: “It used to be, we were sitting, watching TV, suddenly someone spoke on economic issues. Ivan Nikiforovich right there for a pencil, he will write down all the numbers, recount and then send his opinion: this, they say, is true, but this is not true, a lie! He loved numbers, just to be honest ... And if dishonest, he just suffered! .. He did not tolerate disorder ... He said: goodness is lying under our feet, and we trample on it ... Give a man freedom, he said, so he will move mountains! "

In the early 1960s, the restless economist was given control over the diversified state farm Iliyskiy in the Alma-Ata region. Here Khudenko set up an experiment on the introduction of a "no-order-link system of organization and remuneration of labor." To put it simply, Khudenko switched his state farm to full cost accounting, backed up by direct material incentives for workers. What was paid was the results achieved, not the effort expended.

Instead of a cumbersome system of three integrated departments and nine field-farming brigades with a huge number of workers and common, that is, "nobody's" equipment, 17 teams of 4-5 people were created with equipment assigned to them (combines, tractors, etc.) ... Each link had strictly defined functions and a fund for their implementation. Up to 500-600 people used to work on nine currents, depending on the amount of grain. After the reorganization according to the Khudenko system, three mechanized currents were created, and only 12 people served them. The number of managers in the state farm was reduced from 132 to two people - the manager (who is also the chief agronomist) and the economist-accountant of the grain department remained.

Already in the last Khrushchev years, the relative independence of the peasants came to an end. Material incentives, progressive methods of work - all this is nonsense, you just need to work better and follow the party line. It is all the more surprising that Ivan Khudenko in 1969 achieved a new experiment. Literally out of the blue, in the Kazakh semi-desert, a small state farm "Akchi" was created, officially called "an experimental farm for the production of vitamin grass flour." The addition of such flour, which contains a lot of protein and vitamins, in the diet of cows raises milk yield by 30–40%. "Akchi" was again built of links (working groups, as they would say now) - machine operators, construction and management. All links worked on full cost accounting, and issues were resolved openly and quite democratically at the council of the economy, to which its director was subordinate. There were only two people in the management level - director Mikhail Li and economist-accountant Ivan Khudenko.

The experiment was carried out by decree of the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR, and its conditions were agreed with allied departments - the Labor Committee, the Central Statistical Administration of the USSR, the Ministry of Finance and the State Bank of the USSR. How Khudenko managed it is still a mystery. Labor productivity at Akchi was six times higher than the national average, wages were two to three times higher. The quality of the state farm's products - grass flour - was also unusually high. As the partner of Khudenko Vladislav Filatov recalled: “For the premium grade, the carotene content in herbal flour was set at 180 units, while we had 280. The devices were off scale, the inspectors could not believe their eyes. And we deducted that its content depends on the time of day. And they were mowing at night, when there was a maximum of carotene ”.

The fate of the Ukrainian Viktor Belokon, a one-legged war hero, whose collective farm "Serbs" flourished on the supply of apples and pears from Odessa in Transbaikalia, was also tragic. Among those repressed for good work are the Vladimir chairman Akim Gorshkov, the Kuban combine operator Vladimir Pervitsky and many others. Meanwhile, under Brezhnev, agriculture plunged into depression. Since 1963, the USSR has been purchasing food abroad. State investment in agriculture in 1966-1980 was estimated at 383 billion rubles - with almost zero return. Anyone over the age of 25 remembers that a couple of kilograms of meat in one hand could only be obtained by standing in line for three hours. You already know how this story ended.

And, by the way, a small detail of the Akchin story: after the defeat of the Khudenkov economy, the district committee authorities moved into the vacated houses of the evicted state farmers.

Old Man Angel from the cult Soviet TV series wanted to "make excrement." He was not the only one who liked to make them.
Those interested can familiarize themselves with the activities of Ivan Khudenko (https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khudenko_Ivan_Nikiforovich). Or here: http://www.forbes.ru/mneniya/opyty/26953-bitva-za-urozhai. The text overlaps, see Forbes for more details. Also here: http://www.b-m.narod.ru/9_75/8_1.htm And here: http://vikent.ru/author/1329/. By the way, the experiment began in 1963, that is, it would be more correct to attribute it to the Khrushchev reforms, and not to the so-called. Kosyginsky.
Briefly what happened. Khudenko supervised experiments in two state farms of the Kazakh SSR ("Iliyskiy" and "Akchi"). In both state farms, excellent production results were achieved, but in the 70s the experiment was closed, and Khudenko was imprisoned (embezzlement!). There is clearly little information for global conclusions. But let's try to figure it out. It is too suspicious that Khudenko was praised by such odious personalities as Academician Sakharov and American Sovietologist Yanov. Something is unclean here!
Let's leave on the conscience of the authors of the articles phrases like "In the 1960s, he tried to introduce capitalist methods of doing business in Soviet agriculture." Yes, yes, just himself, without any support. And cost accounting, of course, was used only under capitalism. Let's take on faith the data on the growth of labor productivity (2.9 and even 20 times). Further, Khudenko "creates" - the authors write - a new state farm "Akchi". How does it create? The state, represented by the republican bodies of the Kazakh SSR, decided to create a new state farm, where Khudenko is a hired manager. Let's believe the phrases about the unprecedented content of carotene in herbal flour: "The devices were off scale, the inspectors could not believe their eyes" (this is from Forbes). Only capitalist methods themselves increased the carotene content. What uncomplicated propaganda was in 2007! The author of Forbes (PhD in History and Associate Professor at Moscow State University) is not afraid of being called a fool. Under Stalin, I think the MSU associate professors were smarter. Under a totalitarian regime. But let's look at the facts.
The work, which was carried out by 863 people in the state farm "Iliyskiy", was performed by 85 people under Khudenko (data of "Forbes"). Wikipedia says that 12 people worked at the currents instead of 500-600. At the same time, they made even more. Have earned a fig. We have built cottages. Really without new technology? Or such a revolutionary organization of labor, like Stakhanov's? Let's look at the data on mechanized units (table from Wikipedia). The average annual salary of 202 workers of the state farm "Iliyskiy" in 1962 was 896 rubles, in 1963 for 29 workers it was already 2034 rubles. The growth of the average annual salary exceeds 2 times, while the total amount of salaries decreases 3 times. The amount of grain harvested is also almost 3 times larger. At the Akchi state farm, productivity was 6 times higher, wages were 2-3 times higher.
Wikipedia reports that the cost of production in the first state farm has dropped sharply. Under Stalin, workers would also have cut down the dough for this, but the money would have been a bonus, not a salary. They would have set a new plan for next year, taking into account the record low cost. What would happen to earnings? Exactly! Of course, the times were not Stalinist. The economy is already different. As far as I understand, wages at the state farm were really high. But is it right? After all, productivity jumped up once and then stayed at the same level. If some know-how is incredible, then it is not necessary to row the loot, but to share it with everyone and implement it everywhere. And after all, this was not Khudenko, but the state determined: the work plan, the salary fund, the price of manufactured products, the supply of agricultural machinery, and so on. Well, we redistributed what we had gained in a different way. Therefore, all these earnings (not achievements, but earnings) were often artificial. Of course, experimenters would clearly be happy to set the price of their products on their own in order to cut down the dough. But for some reason, Khudenko and his supporters did not think how much the equipment that was allocated to them cost, how much spare parts, how much fuel, how much electricity, how much building materials, etc. Maybe there were also Stakhanovites who wanted to build cottages for themselves. And there was no need to knock out the deficit, since the experiment was approved from above. Another proof that in the Khrushchev-Brezhnev period they tried to slap some kind of surrogate of capitalism with socialism. How later (under Gorbachev) miners dreamed of selling coal at world prices, while continuing to receive everything else at the old state prices.
Where did the dismissed employees go? Under capitalism, they would become unemployed, but here they simply switched to other jobs. What did the dismissed comrades "produce"? Maybe they didn’t find a job, went into the non-production sphere, or moved from Kazakhstan?
Let us think about why the experiment took place on the state farm. First, the experiment was conducted by the state. It was supposed to take place and show the "skeptics" what material incentives are. Second, what would the experiment lead to on a collective farm? The collective farm is headed by a general meeting of collective farmers. So far, all is well, the collective farmers do not care about the authorities. And here they can simply be re-elected. If you drive out careless collective farmers, then they also need to cut off the land, like individual farmers. It is impossible to expel without land. As a result, such a collective farm will lose part of the land. And the worker leaves the state farm as a worker from the factory, except for the salary - nothing. You can experiment a lot. Another confirmation of the fact that the destruction of Stalinist socialism required the replacement of collective farms by state farms.
Why was Khudenko imprisoned? Wikipedia writes vaguely about this. But we learn that Khudenko filed a lawsuit on behalf of the state farm, which was dissolved, having sealed the claim with the state farm's seal. That is? The state farm is a state organization. Is the hired manager acting on behalf of an organization that does not exist? Who is he suing? For some suppliers? Unlikely. For the relevant ministry? And not as an individual, but as a hired manager of a non-existent organization? Yes, this is a clinical case! He wants to return money to people ... "His". He-he-he ... In real capitalism you, uncle! True, it is not Khudenko and his employees who are to blame for this story, but those who allocated them budgetary funds.
Actually, the main problem is what kind of experiment it was? What was it done for? It is clear that it was not Khudenko who did him. He is just a manager, even if he offered his own (or not his?) Method. The fact that Khudenko was a good leader is quite possible. The possibility of corruption of Khudenko is not excluded (but not independently, but together with Kazakhstani leaders). But this is not the main thing. The result of a surge in productivity is not new to the homeland of the Stakhanov movement. More equipment - and there will be an increase in productivity. Lower standards (that's right!) - it will be the same. I strongly suspect that the goal of the authors of the experiment was different: to show that for a lot of money, people would be better off humping. And also - that it is easier to get rid of "bad" workers. This was the goal of the experimenters. Actually, they did not need to break socialism right away. The main thing they achieved: 1) "capitalist" (as it were!) Methods dramatically increased productivity and even the level of carotene (hehe); 2) it was possible to say with confidence that the shortcomings of the economy are not in bad management, but in the "bad" people, since almost 9/10 of the former employees of the collective farm (85 out of 863 left!) Were deliberately exposed as idlers and parasites. I wonder how they worked elsewhere? Are all drunks and managers bureaucrats?
And more ... Did the experiment prove something new? Alas and ah! The fact that people can work better for more money has been known since the days of Tsar Pea. At the same time, it is known that people can work under the threat of dismissal and under the threat of starvation. And they can also work as slaves. If the authors of the experiment recruited slaves and forced them to work under threat of death, then productivity could increase. Only two things were required: reliable security and real "bonuses" for the drummers, without deception. And it will go. But where?
And to us - the supporters of socialism - what has the experiment proved? Just the fact that in the existing system were hidden huge opportunities for further development. And socialism needs not 85 people to work effectively, but all 863.