The most dangerous invention of mankind - nuclear weapons have more than once put the planet on the brink of destruction. The world was closest to the end of the world in the fall of 1962. The attention of the international community in October was riveted to the events unfolding in the Caribbean. The confrontation between the two superpowers was the pinnacle of the arms race and the highest point of tension in the Cold War.

Today the Cuban crisis, as it is called in the United States, is assessed in different ways. Some consider the operation "Anadyr" a brilliant work of the Soviet special services and the organization of military supplies, as well as a risky, but competent political move, others stigmatize Khrushchev for short-sightedness. It is not true to say that Nikita Sergeevich foresaw absolutely all the consequences of the decision to deploy nuclear warheads on Freedom Island. The sly and experienced politician probably understood that the reaction from the United States would be decisive.

"Nikolaev" in the port of Kasilda. A shadow of the RF-101 Voodoo, the reconnaissance aircraft that captured the photo, is visible on the dock.

The actions of the Soviet military leadership in Cuba should be considered taking into account the prehistory of the development of the crisis. In 1959, the revolution finally triumphed on the island, and Fidel Castro became the head of state. Cuba did not receive much support from the USSR during this period, since it was not considered as a stable participant in the socialist camp. However, already in the 1960s, after the introduction of an economic blockade by the United States, supplies of Soviet oil began to Cuba. In addition, the Soviets are becoming the main foreign trade partner of the young communist state. Thousands of specialists in the field of agriculture and industry reached the country, and large capital investments began.

The interests of the Union on the island were dictated by far from ideological convictions. The fact is that in 1960 the United States managed to deploy its medium-range nuclear missiles in Turkey, which caused extreme indignation in Moscow. A successful strategic position allowed the Americans to control vast Soviet territories, including the capital, and the speed of launching and achieving the goal of this weapon was minimal.

Cuba was located in close proximity to the US borders, so the deployment of an offensive weapons system with a nuclear charge could to some extent compensate for the created advantage in the confrontation. The idea of ​​placing launchers with nuclear missiles on the territory of the island belonged directly to Nikita Sergeevich, and was expressed by him on May 20, 1962 to Mikoyan, Malinovsky and Gromyko. After that the idea was supported and developed.

Cuba's interest in placing Soviet military bases on its territory was obvious. Since his establishment as a political leader and head of state, Fidel Castro has become a constant target for various kinds of American provocations. They tried to eliminate him, and the United States was openly preparing a military invasion of Cuba. Evidence of which was the unsuccessful attempt to land troops in the Bay of Pigs. The increase in the Soviet contingent and the buildup of weapons on the island gave hope for the preservation of the regime and the sovereignty of the state.

Nikita Khrushchev and John F. Kennedy

With Castro's approval, Moscow launched a large-scale covert operation to transfer nuclear weapons. Missiles and components for their installation and putting them on alert were delivered to the island under the guise of trade cargo, and were unloaded only at night. In the holds of the ships, about forty thousand soldiers, dressed in civilian clothes, who were strictly forbidden to express themselves in Russian, left for Cuba. During the trip, the soldiers could not go out into the open air, since the command was seriously afraid of being exposed ahead of schedule. The leadership of the operation was entrusted to Marshal Hovhannes Khachaturianovich Baghramyan.

The first missiles were unloaded by Soviet ships in Havana on September 8, the second batch arrived on the 16th of the same month. The captains of the transport ships did not know about the nature of the cargo and its destination; before shipment, they were handed envelopes, which they could only open on the high seas. The text of the order indicated the need to follow the coast of Cuba and avoid meetings with NATO ships. The bulk of the missiles was deployed in the western part of the island, where the overwhelming majority of the military contingent and specialists were concentrated. Some of the missiles were planned to be installed in the center, and some in the East. By October 14, forty medium-range nuclear missiles were delivered to the island and began to install them.

The actions of the USSR in Cuba were watched with caution from Washington. Young American President John F. Kennedy convened the ex-executive committee of national security every day. Until September 5, the United States sent U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, but they did not bring information about the presence of nuclear weapons. To conceal, however, further the intentions of the USSR, it became more and more difficult. The length of the rocket together with the tractor was about thirty meters, so their unloading and transportation was noticed local residents, among whom there were many American agents. Nevertheless, the assumptions alone seemed to the Americans not enough, only the photographs taken on October 14 by the pilot of Lockheed U-2 Heizer left no doubt that Cuba had become one of the strategic Soviet bases equipped with nuclear missiles.

Kennedy considered the Soviet leadership incapable of such decisive action, so the pictures came as a surprise to some extent. From October 16, reconnaissance aircraft will fly over the island up to six times a day. The committee put forward two main proposals: to start hostilities, or to organize a naval blockade of Cuba. Kennedy was immediately critical of the idea of ​​an invasion, as he understood that such a thing could provoke the beginning of the Third World War. The president could not take responsibility for the consequences of such a decision, so American forces were sent to the blockade.

First American image of Soviet missiles in Cuba. October 14, 1962

The intelligence activities of the Americans in this incident proved to be the worst. The information provided by the special services to the president turned out to be far from the truth. For example, the number of the military contingent of the USSR, according to their information, in Cuba was no more than ten thousand people, while the real number has long exceeded forty thousand. The Americans also did not know that the island had not only medium-range nuclear missiles, but also short-range atomic weapons. The bombing, which the American military had so insistently proposed, could not have been carried out, since four launchers were ready by October 19. Washington was also within their reach. The landing also threatened disastrous consequences, as the Soviet military was ready to use the complex called "Luna".

The tense situation continued to heat up, as neither side was willing to make concessions. For the United States, the deployment of missiles in Cuba was a security issue, but the USSR was also targeted by the American missile system in Turkey. The Cubans demanded to open fire on the reconnaissance aircraft, but were forced to obey the decisions of the USSR.

On October 22, Kennedy made a public statement to the Americans that offensive weapons were indeed being installed in Cuba against the United States, and the government would view any act of aggression as the beginning of a war. This meant that the world was on the brink of destruction. The international community supported the American blockade, largely due to the fact that the Soviet leadership for a long time hid the true meaning of their actions. However, Khrushchev did not recognize it as legal and said that fire would be opened on any of the ships that showed aggression against the Soviet sea transport. Most of the ships of the USSR still obliged to return to their homeland, but five of them were already approaching their destination, accompanied by four diesel submarines. The submarines carried weapons on board that could destroy most of the American fleet in the region, but the United States was not informed about this.

On October 24, one of the Aleksandrovsk ships landed on the shore, but a telegram was sent to Khrushchev with an appeal for prudence. The day after the scandalous disclosure at the UN meeting, the US issued an order on combat readiness for the first time in history 2. Any careless action could trigger the outbreak of war - the world froze in anticipation. In the morning, Khrushchev sent a conciliatory letter in which he offered to dismantle the missiles in exchange for a US promise to abandon the invasion of Cuba. The situation was somewhat defused, and Kennedy decided to postpone the outbreak of hostilities.

The crisis escalated again on October 27, when the Soviet leadership put forward an additional demand for the dismantling of American missiles in Turkey. Kennedy and his entourage suggested that a military coup took place in the USSR, as a result of which Khrushchev was ousted. At this time, an American reconnaissance aircraft was shot down over Cuba. Some believe that this was a provocation on the part of the commander, who advocated a categorical refusal to withdraw weapons from the island, but most call the tragedy the unauthorized actions of Soviet commanders. On October 27, the world was closest in its entire history to the brink of self-destruction.

On the morning of October 28, the Kremlin received an appeal from the United States in which it was proposed to resolve the conflict peacefully, and Khrushchev's first proposal became the terms of the resolution. According to unconfirmed reports, the elimination of the missile complex in Turkey was also orally promised. In just 3 weeks, the USSR dismantled the nuclear installations, and on November 20 the blockade of the island was lifted. A few months later, the Americans dismantled the missiles in Turkey.

Radius of coverage of missiles deployed in Cuba: R-14 - large radius, R-12 - medium radius

The most dangerous moment human history fell on the twentieth century, but it also marked the end of the arms race. The two superpowers had to learn to find a compromise. Contemporary politicians often try to interpret the outcome of the Cuban crisis as a defeat or victory for the Union. From the point of view of the author of this article, it is impossible to draw an unambiguous conclusion in this case. Yes, Khrushchev was able to achieve the elimination of the American base in Turkey, but the risk was too great. The prudence of Kennedy, who was under intense pressure from the Pentagon to unleash a war, was not calculated in advance. Attempts to preserve a missile base in Cuba could become tragic not only for Cubans, Americans and Soviet people, but also destroy all of humanity.

In the early 1960s. Cuba has become an arena of rivalry between great powers. The American government was very alarmed at the prospect of getting a communist state on its side. The revolutionary hotbed that emerged in Cuba posed a certain threat to American influence in Latin America. At the same time, the USSR was interested in turning Cuba into its ally in the fight against the United States.

Support for the USSR

All the actions of the United States against Cuba were skillfully used by the Soviet government in its own interests. Thus, the US-organized economic blockade led to the fact that Soviet Union began to supply Cuba with oil. The USSR and the countries of the socialist camp bought Cuban sugar, supplied the island's population with everything they needed. This allowed the revolutionary regime to survive. An attempt by the United States to carry out an intervention on the island with the help of Cuban emigrants in April 1961 ended in the defeat of the landing force. It was after these events that F. Castro began to call the Cuban revolution socialist.

Placement of nuclear missiles in Cuba

The economic, political and military pressure of the United States on the rebellious island led to a further tightening of the revolutionary regime. In these conditions, the Cuban authorities decided to strengthen the country's defense capability with the help of the USSR. The Soviet government, under a secret agreement with the Cuban leadership, in the summer and autumn of 1962, deployed medium-range nuclear missiles in Cuba. The vital centers of the United States were targeted by Soviet missiles.

The transfer of missiles was carried out in the strictest secrecy, but already in September 1962, the US leadership suspected something was wrong. On September 4, President Kennedy announced that the United States would by no means tolerate Soviet nuclear missiles 150 kilometers from its borders. In response, Khrushchev assured Kennedy that there are no Soviet missiles or nuclear warheads in Cuba and will not be. He called the installations discovered by the Americans Soviet research equipment. Material from the site

October crisis

The dramatic events in October 1962 developed as follows. On October 14, photographs of the American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft showed the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba. On October 22, US President John F. Kennedy made an official statement on the blockade of the island. American missile units were put on alert. Nuclear warheads were activated on 100 missiles. On October 24, Soviet ships loaded with missiles reached the quarantine line and stopped. Never before has the danger of atomic war been so real. On October 25, Kennedy sent a telegram to Khrushchev demanding the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from the island. The Soviet leader sent two replies, in the first he demanded US guarantees of non-aggression against Cuba, and in the second - to withdraw the American Mars missiles from Turkey. Kennedy accepted the first, but the second condition was met a few months later. On October 28, Khrushchev agreed to withdraw the missiles.

The Cuban crisis was followed by a slight improvement in international relations, which led to the signing on August 5, 1963 of an agreement between the USSR, the USA, and Great Britain banning the testing of nuclear weapons in three areas - in the atmosphere, outer space and under water. This improvement, however, began already in the absence of the main protagonists of the Cuban missile crisis: on November 22, 1963, John F. Kennedy was assassinated, and on October 14, 1964, N. S. Khrushchev was dismissed from all his party and state posts.

Caribbean crisis- extremely tense confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States regarding the deployment of nuclear missiles by the Soviet Union in Cuba in October 1962. Cubans call it "October crisis"(Spanish. Crisis de Octubre), in the USA the name is widespread "Cuban Missile Crisis"(eng. Cubanmissilecrisis).

The crisis was preceded by the deployment of medium-range Jupiter missiles in Turkey in 1961 by the United States, which directly threatened cities in the western part of the Soviet Union, reaching Moscow and major industrial centers.

The crisis began on October 14, 1962, when a US Air Force U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, during one of its regular flights over Cuba, discovered Soviet R-12 medium-range missiles in the vicinity of the village of San Cristobal. By decision of US President John F. Kennedy, a special Executive Committee was created to discuss possible solutions to the problem. For some time, the meetings of the executive committee were of a secret nature, but on October 22, Kennedy made an appeal to the people, announcing the presence of Soviet "offensive weapons" in Cuba, which immediately caused panic in the United States. The "quarantine" (blockade) of Cuba was introduced.

At first, the Soviet side denied the presence of Soviet nuclear weapons on the island, then - assured the Americans of the deterrent nature of the deployment of missiles in Cuba. On October 25, photographs of the missiles were shown at a meeting of the UN Security Council. The executive committee seriously discussed the use of force to resolve the problem, and his supporters persuaded Kennedy to begin a massive bombing of Cuba as soon as possible. However, another U-2 flyby showed that several missiles were already installed and ready for launch, and that such actions would inevitably lead to war.

US President John F. Kennedy suggested that the Soviet Union dismantle the installed missiles and deploy ships still heading for Cuba in exchange for US guarantees not to attack Cuba and not overthrow the Fidel Castro regime (it is sometimes indicated that Kennedy also proposed withdrawing American missiles from Turkey, but this requirement came from the Soviet leadership). Nikita Khrushchev, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, agreed, and on October 28, the dismantling of missiles began. The last Soviet missile left Cuba a few weeks later, and the blockade of Cuba was lifted on 20 November.

The Cuban missile crisis lasted 13 days. It had an extremely important psychological and historical significance. For the first time in its history, mankind found itself on the verge of self-destruction. The resolution of the crisis was a turning point in the Cold War and the beginning of a relaxation of international tension.

Background

Cuban revolution

During the Cold War, the confrontation between the two superpowers, the USSR and the United States, was expressed not only in a direct military threat and an arms race, but also in the desire to expand their zones of influence. The Soviet Union strove to organize and support liberation socialist revolutions in different parts of the world. In pro-Western countries, support for the "people's liberation movement" was provided, sometimes even with weapons and people. In the event of the victory of the revolution, the country became a member of the socialist camp, military bases were built there, significant resources were invested there. The aid of the Soviet Union was often free of charge, which aroused additional sympathy for it from the poorest countries of Africa and Latin America.

The United States, in turn, has followed similar tactics, organizing revolutions to establish democracy and supporting pro-American regimes. Initially, the preponderance of forces was on the side of the United States - they were supported by Western Europe, Turkey, some Asian and African countries, such as South Africa.

In the immediate aftermath of the Cuban Revolution in 1959, its leader, Fidel Castro, did not have a close relationship with the Soviet Union. During his struggle against the Fulgencio Batista regime in the 1950s, Castro appealed to Moscow for military assistance several times, but was refused. Moscow was skeptical about the leader of the Cuban revolutionaries and the very prospects of a revolution in Cuba, believing that the US influence was too great there. Fidel made his first foreign visit after the victory of the revolution to the United States, but President Eisenhower refused to meet with him, citing his busy schedule. After this demonstration of arrogant attitude towards Cuba, F. Castro carried out measures against the dominance of the Americans. Thus, the telephone and electric companies, oil refineries, 36 largest sugar factories owned by US citizens were nationalized; the previous owners were offered the corresponding packages of securities. All branches of North American banks owned by US citizens were also nationalized. In response, the United States stopped supplying oil to Cuba and buying its sugar, although a long-term purchase agreement was in force. Such steps have put Cuba in a very difficult position. By that time, the Cuban government had already established diplomatic relations with the USSR, and it turned to Moscow for help. In response to a request, the USSR dispatched tankers with oil and organized purchases of Cuban sugar.

It can be considered that Cuba became the first country to choose the communist path without significant military or political interference from the USSR. In this capacity, it was deeply symbolic for Soviet leaders, especially for Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev - he considered the defense of the island critical to the international reputation of the USSR and communist ideology.

Khrushchev probably believed that the deployment of missiles in Cuba would protect the island from a second American invasion, which he considered inevitable after the failed landing attempt in the Bay of Pigs. A militarily significant deployment of a critical weapon in Cuba would also demonstrate the importance of the Soviet-Cuban alliance to Fidel Castro, who demanded material confirmation of Soviet support for the island.

US missile positions in Turkey

By 1960, the United States had a significant strategic nuclear advantage. For comparison: the Americans had about 6,000 warheads in service, while the USSR had only about 300. By 1962, the United States had more than 1,300 bombers in service, capable of delivering about 3,000 nuclear warheads to the territory of the USSR. In addition, the United States was armed with 183 Atlas and Titan ICBMs and 144 Polaris missiles on nine nuclear-powered submarines such as George Washington and Aten Allen. The Soviet Union had the opportunity to deliver about 300 warheads to the United States, mainly with the help of strategic aviation and ICBMs R-7 and R-16, which had a low degree of combat readiness and a high cost of creating launch complexes, which did not allow large-scale deployment of these systems.

In 1961, the United States began deploying 15 PGM-19 Jupiter medium-range missiles near Izmir in Turkey with a range of 2,400 km, which directly threatened the European part of the Soviet Union, reaching Moscow. President Kennedy considered these missiles to be of limited strategic importance, as ballistic missile submarines could cover the same area with the advantage of stealth and firepower. Nevertheless, in the late 1950s, medium-range missiles were technologically superior to ICBMs, which at that time could not be constantly on alert. Another advantage of medium-range missiles is the short flight time - less than 10 minutes.

Soviet strategists realized that some nuclear parity could be effectively achieved by deploying missiles in Cuba. Soviet medium-range missiles on Cuban territory, with a firing range of up to 4,000 km (R-14), could hold at gunpoint Washington and about half of the strategic nuclear bombers' airbases of the US Strategic Air Force, with a flight time of less than 20 minutes. In addition, the radars of the US early warning system were directed towards the USSR and were little adapted to detect launches from Cuba.

The head of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev, publicly expressed his indignation at the fact of the deployment of missiles in Turkey. He considered these missiles a personal insult. The deployment of missiles in Cuba - the first time Soviet missiles left Soviet territory - is considered Khrushchev's direct response to American missiles in Turkey. In his memoirs, Khrushchev writes that the first time the idea of ​​placing missiles in Cuba came to him in 1962, when he headed a delegation of the Soviet Union that visited Bulgaria at the invitation of the Bulgarian Central Committee of the Communist Party and the government. There, one of his associates, pointing towards the Black Sea, said that on the opposite shore, in Turkey, there were missiles capable of striking the main industrial centers of the USSR within 15 minutes.

Placement of missiles

Khrushchev's proposal

On May 20, 1962, Nikita Khrushchev, immediately after returning from Bulgaria, held a conversation in the Kremlin with Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Anastas Mikoyan and Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky, during which he presented his idea to them: in response to Fidel Castro's constant requests for an increase in the Soviet military presence in Cuba to place nuclear weapons on the island. On May 21, at a meeting of the Defense Council, he raised this issue for discussion. Mikoyan was most opposed to such a decision, however, in the end, the members of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, who were part of the Defense Council, supported Khrushchev. The ministries of defense and foreign affairs were instructed to organize the covert movement of troops and military equipment by sea to Cuba. Due to the special haste, the plan was adopted without approval - the implementation began immediately after receiving Castro's consent.

On May 28, a Soviet delegation consisting of USSR Ambassador Alekseev, Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces Marshal Sergei Biryuzov, Colonel-General Semyon Pavlovich Ivanov, and Sharaf Rashidov flew from Moscow to Havana. On May 29, they met with Raul and Fidel Castro and presented them with the proposal of the CPSU Central Committee. Fidel asked for a day to negotiate with his closest associates. It is known that on May 30 he had a conversation with Ernesto Che Guevara, however, nothing is known about the essence of this conversation. On the same day, Castro responded positively to the Soviet delegates. It was decided that Raul Castro will visit Moscow in July to clarify all the details.

The composition of the contingent

On June 10, at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee, the results of the trip of the Soviet delegation to Cuba were discussed. After Rashidov's report, Malinovsky presented to everyone a preliminary draft of the missile transfer operation prepared by the General Staff. The plan envisaged the deployment of two types of ballistic missiles in Cuba - the R-12 with a range of about 2,000 km and the R-14 with a range twice as long. Both types of missiles were equipped with 1 Mt nuclear warheads. Malinovsky also clarified that the armed forces will deploy 24 R-12 medium-range missiles and 16 R-14 intermediate-range missiles and leave in reserve half of the number of missiles of each type. It was supposed to remove 40 missiles from positions in Ukraine and in the European part of Russia. After the installation of these missiles in Cuba, the number of Soviet nuclear missiles capable of reaching US territory doubled.

It was supposed to send a group of Soviet troops to Liberty Island, which should be concentrated around five nuclear missile units (three R-12 and two R-14). In addition to missiles, the group also included 1 Mi-4 helicopter regiment, 4 motorized rifle regiments, two tank battalions, a MiG-21 squadron, 42 Il-28 light bombers, 2 subunits of cruise missiles with 12 Kt nuclear warheads with a range of 160 km, several batteries of anti-aircraft guns, as well as 12 S-75 installations (144 missiles). Each motorized rifle regiment numbered 2,500 men, tank battalions were equipped with the latest T-55 tanks. It is worth noting that the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba (GSVK) became the first army group in the history of the USSR to include ballistic missiles.

In addition, an impressive group of the Navy was sent to Cuba: 2 cruisers, 4 destroyers, 12 Komar missile boats, 11 submarines (7 of them with nuclear missiles). In total, it was planned to send 50,874 troops to the island. Later, on July 7, Khrushchev decided to appoint Issa Pliev as commander of the group.

After listening to Malinovsky's report, the Presidium of the Central Committee voted unanimously for the operation.

"Anadyr"

By June 1962, the General Staff had already developed a cover operation codenamed "Anadyr". The operation was planned and directed by Marshal of the USSR Ovane? S Khachaturovich Baghramyan. In the opinion of the planners, this should have misled the Americans as to the destination of the goods. All Soviet servicemen, technical personnel and others accompanying the "cargo" were also told that they were heading for Chukotka. For greater reliability, whole wagons of fur coats and sheepskin coats came to the ports. But despite such a large-scale cover, the operation had one significant flaw: it was impossible to hide the missiles from the American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft regularly flying around Cuba. Thus, the plan was developed in advance, taking into account the fact that the Americans would detect the Soviet missiles before they were all mounted. The only way out that the military managed to find was to place several anti-aircraft batteries already in Cuba in the places of unloading.

Missiles and other equipment, as well as personnel, were delivered to six different ports from Severomorsk to Sevastopol. 85 ships were allocated for the transfer of troops. Before sailing, not a single captain knew about the contents of the holds, as well as about the destination. Each captain was handed a sealed package, which was to be opened at sea in the presence of the political officer. The envelopes were instructed to go to Cuba and avoid contact with NATO ships.

In early August, the first ships arrived in Cuba. On the night of September 8, the first batch of medium-range ballistic missiles was unloaded in Havana, the second batch arrived on September 16. The GSVK headquarters is located in Havana. Divisions of ballistic missiles deployed in the west of the island - near the village of San Cristobal and in the center of Cuba - near the port of Casilda. The main forces were concentrated around missiles in the western part of the island, but several cruise missiles and a motorized rifle regiment were deployed to the east of Cuba - a hundred kilometers from Guantanamo and the US naval base in Guantanamo Bay. By October 14, 1962, all 40 missiles and most of the equipment had been delivered to Cuba.

U-2 flights

A U-2 aircraft photographed a number of anti-aircraft missile positions under construction during a late August flight, but on September 4, 1962, Kennedy declared before Congress that there were no "offensive" missiles in Cuba. In fact, Soviet specialists at that time were already building nine positions - six for the R-12 and three for the R-14 with a range of 4,000 km. Until September 1962, US Air Force aircraft flew over Cuba twice a month. Flights were discontinued from September 5 to October 14. On the one hand, because of bad weather, on the other, Kennedy banned them out of fear of an escalation of the conflict in the event that an American plane was shot down by a Soviet anti-aircraft missile.

It is worth noting that until September 5, the flights were carried out with the knowledge of the CIA. Now such flights have come under the control of the Air Force. The first flight took place on October 14, 1962. A Lockheed U-2 reconnaissance aircraft of the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, piloted by Major Richard Heizer, took off at about 3 am from Edwards Air Force Base in California. An hour after sunrise, Heizer reached Cuba. The flight to the Gulf of Mexico took him 5 hours. Heizer flew over Cuba from the west and crossed the coastline from the south at 7:31 am. The plane crossed all of Cuba almost exactly from south to north, flying over the cities of Taco Taco, San Cristobal, Bahia Honda. Heizer covered these 52 kilometers in 12 minutes.

After landing at an air base in southern Florida, Heizer handed the tape to the CIA. On October 15, CIA analysts determined that the photographs showed Soviet R-12 medium-range ballistic missiles ("SS-4" according to NATO classification). In the evening of the same day, this information was brought to the attention of the top military leadership of the United States. On the morning of October 16 at 8:45 am, the photographs were shown to the president. After that, by order of Kennedy, flights over Cuba increased 90 times: from twice a month to six times a day.

US reaction

Developing a response

After receiving photographs of Soviet missile bases in Cuba, President Kennedy convened a special group of advisers for a secret meeting at the White House. This 14-member group, later known as the Executive Committee (EXCOMM), consisted of members of the US National Security Council and several specially invited advisers. Soon, the committee offered the president three possible options for resolving the situation: destroy the missiles with pinpoint strikes, conduct a full-scale military operation in Cuba, or impose a naval blockade of the island.

The immediate bombing was rejected immediately, as was the long-delayed appeal to the UN. The only real options considered by the committee were military measures. Diplomatic, barely touched on on the first day of work, were immediately rejected - even before the main discussion began. As a result, the choice was reduced to a naval blockade and an ultimatum, or to a full-scale invasion.

Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JSC) General Maxwell Taylor and the head of the Air Force Strategic Command (SAC) General Curtis LeMay (eng. CurtisLeMay) came up with a proposal to start an invasion. In their opinion, the Soviet Union would not have dared to take serious countermeasures. In preparation for the invasion, the deployment of troops to Florida began. The military rushed the president to order the invasion, because they feared that when the USSR had installed all the missiles, it would be too late. It is worth noting, however, that the CIA intelligence data on the number of Soviet troops in Cuba were already significantly lower than the real ones by that time. The Americans also did not know about the twelve Luna tactical nuclear missile systems already on the island, which could have been activated by order of General Pliev, the commander of the Soviet forces on the island. The invasion could lead to a nuclear strike on the American landing party, with disastrous consequences.

One way or another, the idea of ​​an invasion was criticized by the president. Kennedy feared that “even if Soviet troops did not take active action in Cuba, the response would follow in Berlin,” which would escalate the conflict. Therefore, at the suggestion of Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, it was decided to consider the possibility of a naval blockade of Cuba.

On October 18, the USSR Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko visited the President of the United States together with the USSR Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin, who knew nothing about Khrushchev's plans. Gromyko categorically denied the presence of any offensive weapons in Cuba. But the next day, another U-2 flight revealed several more mounted missile positions, an Il-28 squadron off the northern coast of Cuba, and a cruise missile division aimed at Florida.

The decision to impose the blockade was made at the final vote on the evening of October 20: President Kennedy himself, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and the US Ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson, specially summoned from New York for this, voted for the blockade.

However, according to international law, the blockade is an act of war. In this regard, when discussing this option, fears arose about the reaction not only of the Soviet Union, but of the world community. Therefore, the decision to impose the blockade was brought up for discussion by the Organization of American States (OAS). Building on the Rio Pact, the OAS unanimously supported the imposition of sanctions against Cuba. The action was called not a "blockade" but a "quarantine", which meant not a complete cessation of sea traffic, but only an obstacle to the supply of weapons. It was decided to introduce quarantine on October 24 from 10 am local time.

Meanwhile, by October 19, U-2 survey data showed four completed launch positions. Therefore, in addition to the blockade, the US military command began preparations for a possible invasion at the first signal. To the south of the country, to the state of Georgia, the 1st tank division, and five combined arms divisions were put on high alert.

Strategic Air Command relocated B-47 Stratojet medium-range bombers to civilian airports and put the B-52 Stratofortress strategic bomber fleet on permanent patrol.

Quarantine

There were many problems with the naval blockade. There was a question of legality - as Fidel Castro pointed out, there was nothing illegal about installing the missiles. They were, of course, a threat to the United States, but similar missiles aimed at the USSR were deployed in Europe: sixty Thor missiles in four squadrons near Nottingham in Great Britain; thirty medium-range Jupiter rockets in two squadrons near Gioia del Colle in Italy; and fifteen Jupiter rockets in one squadron near Izmir in Turkey. Then there was the problem of the Soviet reaction to the blockade - would an armed conflict start with an escalation of retaliation?

President Kennedy addressed the American public (and the Soviet government) in a televised address on October 22. He confirmed the presence of missiles in Cuba and declared a naval blockade in the form of a quarantine zone of 500 nautical miles (926 km) around the coast of Cuba, warning that the military was "ready for any development of events", and condemning the Soviet Union for "secrecy and misleading ". Kennedy noted that any missile launch from Cuba towards any of the American allies in the Western Hemisphere would be regarded as an act of war against the United States.

The Americans were surprised by the strong support from their European allies, although British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, expressing the opinion of most of the international community, expressed bewilderment that no attempt was made to diplomatically resolve the conflict. The Organization of American States also voted unanimously in favor of the quarantine resolution. Nikita Khrushchev stated that the blockade was illegal and that any ship flying the Soviet flag would ignore it. He threatened that if the Soviet ships were attacked by the American ones, a retaliatory strike would follow immediately.

However, the blockade took effect on October 24 at 10:00. 180 US Navy ships surrounded Cuba with a clear order not to open fire on Soviet ships without a personal order from the president. By this time, 30 ships and vessels were sailing to Cuba, including the Aleksandrovsk with a cargo of nuclear warheads and 4 ships carrying missiles for two MRBM battalions. In addition, 4 diesel submarines were approaching the Freedom Island, accompanying the ships. On board "Aleksandrovsk" were 24 warheads for MRBM and 44 for cruise missiles. Khrushchev decided that the submarines and four ships with R-14 missiles - Artemyevsk, Nikolaev, Dubna and Divnogorsk - should continue on their previous course. In an effort to minimize the possibility of a collision of Soviet ships with American ones, the Soviet leadership decided to deploy the rest of the ships that did not manage to get to Cuba home.

At the same time, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU decided to bring the armed forces of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries into a state of increased combat readiness. All layoffs were canceled. Conscripts preparing for demobilization are ordered to remain at their duty stations until further orders. Khrushchev sent Castro an encouraging letter, assuring the Soviet Union's steadfastness under any circumstances. However, he did not mention that a significant part of Soviet weapons would no longer reach Cuba.

Aggravation of the crisis

On the evening of October 23, Robert Kennedy went to the Soviet embassy in Washington. At a meeting with Dobrynin, Kennedy found out that he had no idea about the military preparations of the USSR in Cuba. However, Dobrynin told him that he knew about the instructions received by the captains of the Soviet ships - not to comply with illegal demands on the high seas. Before leaving, Kennedy said: "I don't know how this will end, but we intend to stop your ships."

On October 24, Khrushchev learned that Aleksandrovsk had safely reached Cuba. At the same time, he received a short telegram from Kennedy, in which he called on Khrushchev to "show prudence" and "comply with the conditions of the blockade." The Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee gathered at a meeting to discuss an official response to the imposition of the blockade. On the same day, Khrushchev sent a letter to the US President, in which he accused him of setting "ultimatum conditions." Khrushchev called the blockade "an act of aggression pushing humanity into the abyss of a world nuclear missile war." In the letter, the First Secretary warned Kennedy that "the captains of the Soviet ships will not comply with the orders of the US Navy," and also that "if the US does not stop its pirate activities, the USSR government will take any measures to ensure the safety of the ships."

On October 25, at an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council, one of the most memorable scenes in UN history took place. US Ambassador Adlai Stevenson tried to force Soviet Ambassador Valerian Zorin (who, like most Soviet diplomats, had no idea about Operation Anadyr) to give an answer regarding the presence of missiles in Cuba, making the well-known demand: "Don't wait for someone to transfer you!" Rejected by Zorin, Stevenson showed photographs taken by US reconnaissance aircraft showing missile positions in Cuba.

At the same time, Kennedy gave the order to increase the combat readiness of the US armed forces to the level of DEFCON-2 (for the first and only time in US history).

Meanwhile, in response to Khrushchev's message, a letter from Kennedy came to the Kremlin, in which he indicated that "the Soviet side had broken its promises regarding Cuba and misled him." This time, Khrushchev decided not to go to confrontation and began to look for possible ways out of the current situation. He announced to the Presidium members that "it is impossible to store missiles in Cuba without going to war with the United States." At the meeting, it was decided to offer the Americans to dismantle the missiles in exchange for US guarantees to abandon attempts to change the state regime in Cuba. Brezhnev, Kosygin, Kozlov, Mikoyan, Ponomarev and Suslov supported Khrushchev. Gromyko and Malinovsky abstained from voting. After the meeting, Khrushchev unexpectedly turned to the members of the Presidium: “Comrades, let's go to The Bolshoi Theatre... Our people and foreigners will see us, maybe it will calm them down. "

Khrushchev's second letter

On the morning of October 26, Nikita Khrushchev began drafting a new, less belligerent message to Kennedy. In the letter, he offered the Americans the option of dismantling the installed missiles and returning them to the USSR. In exchange, he demanded guarantees that "the United States will not invade Cuba with its troops and will not support any other forces that would intend to invade Cuba." He finished the letter with the famous phrase "You and I should not now pull the ends of the rope on which you tied the knot of war."

Khrushchev drew up this letter alone, without collecting the Presidium. Later, in Washington, there was a version that the second letter was not written by Khrushchev, and that a coup d'etat may have taken place in the USSR. Others believed that Khrushchev, on the contrary, was looking for help in the fight against hardliners in the ranks of the leadership. The armed forces THE USSR. The letter arrived at the White House at 10 am. Another condition was broadcast in an open radio broadcast on the morning of October 27 calling for the withdrawal of American missiles from Turkey in addition to the letter's requirements.

Secret negotiations

On Friday, October 26, at 13-00 Washington time, a message was received from ABC News reporter John Scali that Alexander Fomin, the KGB resident in Washington, had approached him with a proposal to meet. The meeting took place at the Ocsidental restaurant. Fomin expressed concern about the growing tension and invited Scali to approach his "high-ranking friends in the State Department" with a proposal to find a diplomatic solution. Fomin conveyed an unofficial proposal from the Soviet leadership to remove missiles from Cuba in exchange for refusing to invade Cuba.

The American leadership responded to this proposal by conveying to Fidel Castro through the Brazilian embassy that in the event of the withdrawal of offensive weapons from Cuba, "an invasion would be unlikely."

The balance of power at the time of the crisis - USA

At the time of the crisis, the United States possessed the largest nuclear and conventional arsenal and numerous delivery vehicles.

It was based on the US-based SM-65 Atlas ICBM. In 1962, there were 144 such ICBMs, carrying 4-megaton W38 warheads. Also available were 62 SM-68 Titan-I ICBMs.

The ICBM arsenal was supplemented by the PGM-19 Jupiter MRBM, with a radius of 2400 km. 30 of these missiles were deployed in Northern Italy and 15 in Turkey. Also 60 PGM-17 Thor missiles have been deployed in the UK, with similar characteristics.

The basis of the offensive power of the Air Force, in addition to ICBMs, was a huge fleet of strategic bombers - more than 800 B-52 and B-36 intercontinental bombers, over 2,500 B-47 strategic bombers and about 150 supersonic B-58 bombers.

To equip them, there was an arsenal of more than 547 supersonic AGM-28 Hound Dog missiles with a radius of up to 1200 km and free-fall nuclear bombs. US Air Force positions in Northern Canada and Greenland made it possible to carry out transpolar attacks against the deep rear of the USSR with minimal Soviet opposition.

The navy had 8 SSBNs with Polaris missiles with a radius of 2000 km and 11 attack aircraft carriers, including the nuclear-powered Enterprise, capable of carrying A-3 strategic nuclear bombers. Also available were SSGNs with Regulus missiles.

The balance of forces at the time of the crisis - USSR

The Soviet nuclear arsenal was much more modest than the American one. It was based on R-7 missiles, intercontinental, but very imperfect, with a long preparation time and low reliability. There were only 4 launching devices in Plesetsk, suitable for combat launch.

Also, about 25 R-16 missiles, more combat-ready, entered service. In fact, they formed the backbone of the USSR's strategic strike forces.

In Eastern Europe, there were also about 40 R-21 missiles and 20 R-12 medium-range missiles aimed at industrial centers and ports in Great Britain and France.

The Strategic Air Force of the USSR was much weaker than the US Air Force. They were based on about 100 intercontinental bombers 3M and M4, about 1000 strategic bombers Tu-16. They were armed with cruise missiles with a radius of up to 700 km. The Soviet Navy included Project 658 SSBNs armed with 650 km surface-launched missiles, and Project 611 and Project 629 SSBNs, a total of about 25. These submarines were less advanced than their American counterparts, were quite noisy and had surface-launched missiles, which exposed them to unmasking.

Black Saturday

Meanwhile, in Havana, the political situation has escalated to the limit. Castro became aware of the new position of the Soviet Union, and he immediately went to the Soviet embassy. The Comandante decided to write a letter to Khrushchev to push him to more decisive action. Even before Castro finished the letter and sent it to the Kremlin, the head of the KGB station in Havana informed the First Secretary of the essence of the message to the Commander: "According to Fidel Castro, the intervention is almost inevitable and will take place in the next 24-72 hours." At the same time, Malinovsky received a report from the commander of Soviet troops in Cuba, General I.A.Pliev, about the increased activity of American strategic aviation in the Caribbean. Both messages were delivered to Khrushchev's office in the Kremlin at 12 noon, Saturday, October 27.

It was 5 pm in Moscow when a tropical storm was raging in Cuba. One of the air defense units received a message that an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft was seen approaching Guantanamo. The chief of staff of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division, Captain Antonets, called Pliev's headquarters for instructions, but that was not there. Major General Leonid Garbuz, deputy commander of the GSVK for combat training, ordered the captain to wait for Pliev to appear. A few minutes later Antonets again called the headquarters - no one answered the phone.

When U-2 was already over Cuba, Garbuz himself ran to the headquarters and, without waiting for Pliev, gave the order to destroy the plane. According to other sources, the order to destroy the reconnaissance aircraft could have been given by Pliev's deputy for air defense, Aviation Lieutenant General Stepan Grechko, or the commander of the 27th Air Defense Division, Colonel Georgy Voronkov. The launch was carried out at 10:22 local time. U-2 pilot Major Rudolph Anderson died, becoming the only victim of the confrontation. Around this time, another U-2 was nearly intercepted over Siberia, as General Curtis LeMay, Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, defied an order from the President of the United States to stop all overflights over Soviet territory. A few hours later, two US Navy RF-8A Crusader photo reconnaissance aircraft were fired upon by anti-aircraft guns while flying over Cuba at low altitude. One of them was damaged, but the pair returned safely to base.

Kennedy's military advisers tried to persuade the president to order the invasion of Cuba before Monday, "before it is too late." Kennedy no longer categorically rejected this development of the situation. However, he did not give up hope for a peaceful resolution. It is generally accepted that "Black Saturday", October 27, 1962 - the day when the world was closest to a global nuclear war.

Permission

On the night of October 27-28, on the instructions of the President, Robert Kennedy again met with the Soviet ambassador in the building of the Ministry of Justice. Kennedy shared with Dobrynin the president's fears that "the situation is about to get out of control and threatens to create a chain reaction." Robert Kennedy said that his brother was ready to give guarantees of non-aggression and the earliest possible lifting of the blockade from Cuba. Dobrynin asked Kennedy about missiles in Turkey. “If this is the only obstacle to achieving the above-mentioned settlement, then the President does not see any insurmountable difficulties in resolving the issue,” Kennedy replied.

The next morning, the Kremlin received a message from Kennedy, which stated: “1) You will agree to withdraw your weapons systems from Cuba under the appropriate supervision of UN representatives, as well as to take, in compliance with appropriate security measures, steps to stop the supply of the same weapons systems to Cuba. 2) We, for our part, agree - subject to the creation, with the help of the UN, of a system of adequate measures to ensure the fulfillment of these obligations - a) quickly abolish the blockade measures introduced at the moment and b) give guarantees of non-aggression against Cuba. I am sure that the rest of the states of the Western Hemisphere will be ready to do the same. " Not a word was said about the Jupiter missiles in Turkey.

At noon Khrushchev gathered the Presidium at his dacha in Novo-Ogaryov. At the meeting, there was a discussion of a letter from Washington, when a man entered the hall and asked Khrushchev's assistant Oleg Troyanovsky to the phone: Dobrynin called from Washington. He conveyed to Troyanovsky the essence of his conversation with Robert Kennedy and expressed fears that the US president is under strong pressure from Pentagon officials. Dobrynin conveyed literally the words of the brother of the President of the United States: “We must receive an answer from the Kremlin today, Sunday. There is very little time left to resolve the problem. " Troyanovsky returned to the hall and read to the audience what he had managed to write down in his notebook while listening to Dobrynin's report. Khrushchev immediately invited a stenographer and began to dictate consent. He also dictated two confidential letters to Kennedy personally. In one, he confirmed the fact that Robert Kennedy's message reached Moscow. In the second, that he regards this message as consent to the condition of the USSR on the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba - to remove the missiles from Turkey.

Fearing any "surprises" and disruption of negotiations, Khrushchev forbade Pliev to use anti-aircraft weapons against American aircraft. He also ordered the return of all Soviet aircraft patrolling the Caribbean to the airfields. For greater confidence, it was decided to broadcast the first letter by radio so that it would reach Washington as soon as possible. An hour before the broadcast of Nikita Khrushchev's message (16:00 Moscow time), Malinovsky sent Pliev an order to begin dismantling the R-12 launch pads.

It took 3 weeks to dismantle Soviet rocket launchers, load them onto ships and withdraw from Cuba. After confirming that the Soviet Union had withdrawn the missiles, President Kennedy issued the order on November 20 to end the blockade of Cuba. A few months later, American missiles were withdrawn from Turkey as "obsolete".

Effects

The peaceful resolution of the crisis did not satisfy everyone. It became a diplomatic awkwardness for Khrushchev and the Soviet Union, who appeared to be backing off in a situation they had created themselves. Khrushchev's dismissal a few years later can be partly attributed to irritation in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU over concessions to the United States made by Khrushchev and his inept leadership that led to the crisis.

The communist leadership of Cuba regarded the compromise as a betrayal on the part of the Soviet Union, since the decision that ended the crisis was taken exclusively by Khrushchev and Kennedy.

Some US military leaders were also unhappy with the outcome. This is how the commander of the US Air Force, General LeMay, called the refusal to attack Cuba "the worst defeat in our history."

At the end of the crisis, analysts of the Soviet and American intelligence services suggested establishing a direct telephone line (the so-called "red telephone") between Washington and Moscow, so that in the event of a crisis, the leaders of the superpowers could immediately contact each other, rather than use the telegraph.

Historical meaning

The crisis was a watershed moment in the nuclear race and the Cold War. The beginning of the relaxation of international tension was laid. The anti-war movement began in Western countries, which peaked in the 1960s-1970s. In the USSR, voices also began to be heard calling for a limitation of the nuclear arms race and an increase in the role of society in political decision-making.

It is impossible to say unequivocally whether the removal of missiles from Cuba was a victory or a defeat for the Soviet Union. On the one hand, the plan conceived by Khrushchev in May 1962 was not completed, and Soviet missiles could no longer ensure the security of Cuba. On the other hand, Khrushchev obtained from the US leadership guarantees of non-aggression against Cuba, which, despite Castro's fears, were and are being respected to this day. A few months later, American missiles in Turkey, which provoked Khrushchev to deploy weapons in Cuba, were also dismantled. In the end, thanks to technical progress in rocketry, there was no need to deploy nuclear weapons in Cuba and in the Western Hemisphere in general, since a few years later the Soviet Union created missiles capable of reaching any city and military facility in the United States directly from the territory of the USSR.

Epilogue

In 1992, it was confirmed that by the time the crisis erupted, Soviet units in Cuba had received nuclear warheads for tactical and strategic missiles, as well as nuclear bombs for Il-28 medium-range bombers, a total of 162 units. General Gribkov, who participated in the work of the Soviet headquarters of the operation, said that the commander of the Soviet units in Cuba, General Pliev, had the authority to use them in the event of a full-scale US invasion of Cuba.

The short duration of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the extensive documentation of decision-making by both sides make it an excellent example for analyzing government decision-making processes. In The Essence of the Solution, authors Graham Allison and Philip Zelikov (eng. PhilipD.Zelikow) use the crisis to illustrate different approaches to the analysis of government actions. The intensity and scope of the crisis also provides excellent material for drama, as illustrated by the film "Thirteen Days" by the American director R. Donaldson. The Cuban Missile Crisis was also a major theme in the 2003 Oscar-winning documentary The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara.

In October 2002, McNamara and Arthur Schlesinger, along with other guests of honor, attended a meeting with Castro in Cuba to further study the crisis and release declassified documents. At this conference, it became clear that the world was much closer to nuclear confrontation than previously thought. So, it is possible that only the common sense of the senior mate of the captain of the Soviet submarine B-59 (project 641) Vasily Arkhipov prevented a full-scale conflict.

Caribbean crisis in art

• Thirteen Days is a film by Roger Donaldson (eng. RogerDonaldson) (2000)
• "Fog of War" (eng. The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara) - a film by Eroll Maurice (eng. Errol morris) (2003).
• ((In 2004, the Japanese firm Konami released a cult video game that was set against the backdrop of the Cuban Missile Crisis *))

October 1962 went down in history as one of the most terrifying crises in the world, in Cuba it was called the October crisis, and in the United States the Cuban missile crisis.

The Cuban Missile Crisis was caused by the secret movement and deployment of Soviet missile forces in Cuba, which the United States regarded as not at all a peaceful action.

Nuclear weapons are not a subject of controversy or a measurement of power. Innocent people in all three countries were terrified throughout October 1962. And only skillful political cooperation between the USA and the USSR was able to solve this problem.

Causes of the Cuban missile crisis

Of course, any crisis has its reasons. The Cuban missile crisis was a confrontation between two large countries, the USA and the USSR. Both sides had their own preconditions and reasons for taking this or that political step. But in order to better understand, it is possible to identify the main reasons for the start of the Cuban missile crisis. It all started with the fact that the United States deployed its missiles in Turkey, the range of which covered several Russian cities, including Moscow.

After the revolution in Cuba and the victory of Fidel Castro's party in it, Moscow supported him. This was beneficial to both sides, Cuba was supported by a big power, and the USSR found its first ally in the western hemisphere. America did not like this course of events, they decided to land their squad on the island in order to suppress the Castro regime. The sortie failed, the operation failed.

So after the deployment of missiles by the Americans in Turkey, the USSR decided to deploy its missiles in Cuba, albeit secretly. The States had a great advantage in armament, the Soviets were inferior to them in this. Therefore, in order to defend against a surprise attack (we wake up to remember the non-aggression pact of Germany), the Soviet leadership came to such a step. US intelligence learned about the deployment of Russian missiles and reported to the president. America viewed the Russians' actions as a threat.

The forces and the United States were on alert. The Russians were demanded to remove the missiles from the island, Khrushchev also demanded to remove the missiles from Turkey. Of course, no one liked such an aggressive alignment on the part of both countries. The aggravation of the situation could lead to World War 3. It was a dangerous conflict. Therefore, they decided to settle the controversial issue peacefully through negotiations and cooperation. The leaders of the two countries, Kennedy and Khrushchev, showed restraint and sanity.

Results of the Cuban Missile Crisis

During the negotiations, the following decisions were made:

• USSR withdraws missiles from Cuba
• America withdraws missiles from Turkey
• America does not invade Cuba
• In 1962, an agreement was signed to end nuclear tests in space, atmosphere and under water.
• One of the results was the establishment of a direct telephone line between Washington and Moscow, so that, if necessary, the presidents of the two countries could immediately discuss this or that issue.

In February 1962, the KGB informed the leadership of the Soviet Union that the United States was planning to put an end to the Castro government: military base Guantanamo Bay with the support of naval ships in the Caribbean. The actions of the ground forces will be supported by the Air Force based in Florida and Texas ... "On March 13, 1962, Operation Northwoods was approved.

In May 1962, NS Khrushchev, in a conversation with Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko, noted the seriousness of the situation around Cuba: "It is necessary to place a certain number of our nuclear missiles there. Only this can save the country ...". All the participants in the meeting in the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee supported Khrushchev. The General Staff developed Operation Anadyr to transfer to Cuba a Soviet grouping (up to 44 thousand people) and the 51st separate missile division, which had 40 P12 and P14 launchers.

In the chronicle published by Rodina - the denouement of the dramatic events on the threshold of the Third World War.

Mid September 1962

TASS special statement: "The Soviet Union does not need to move to any country, for example, Cuba, the means it has to repel aggression ...

Our nuclear weapons are so powerful ... that there is no need to look for a place to place them somewhere outside the USSR. "

October 9

A message from the USSR military attaché in the United States: US special forces will be increased from 4,000 to 6,639 people, and Cuban mercenaries are enlisted in the "Anti-Castro Expeditionary Force."

Kennedy creates a special "crisis group" ... Some of them propose to strike at the positions of Soviet missiles in Cuba

October 14

A US reconnaissance aircraft photographed two Soviet missiles in the San Cristobal area.

16 october

Kennedy creates a special "crisis team" of senior officials. Some of them propose to strike at the positions of Soviet missiles in Cuba.

18 october

14.00-18.00

A.A. Gromyko's meeting with President D. Kennedy. The Soviet minister noted that the USSR "will not play the role of an outside observer." Kennedy proposes a deal: "The US will not undertake an armed invasion of Cuba. Soviet offensive weapons must be removed from Cuba."

The 20th of October

President Kennedy decides to declare a naval blockade of Cuba.

22 of October

Secretary of State Rusk is delivering a personal message from the American President to NS Khrushchev and the text of his next appeal to the American people: "The United States is determined to eliminate this threat to the security of our hemisphere."

President Kennedy announces on TV and radio that on October 24, from 14:00 GMT, "quarantine" on all types of offensive
weapons imported into Cuba.

Gathering of the leadership of the Soviet embassy in the United States and a meeting of Ambassador Dobrynin with the leaders of the Soviet intelligence services. Taking the necessary precautions and destroying some documents.

A message from a GRU resident in Washington: "1) The establishment of a strict quarantine against the delivery of offensive weapons to Cuba. All ships carrying such weapons will not
admitted to Cuba; 2) strengthening the monitoring of military construction in Cuba ...; 3) attack nuclear weapons from Cuba to any other country in the Western Hemisphere will be regarded as an attack by the USSR on the United States; 4) the Guantanamo base is being strengthened, a number of military units... 6) The USA demanded an immediate meeting of the Security Council. In the Caribbean Sea, under the pretext of maneuvers, there are 45 ships with 20 thousand people, including 8 thousand sea
infantrymen ".

October 23

Statement by the Soviet government: the naval blockade of Cuba - "unprecedented aggressive actions." In the USSR, the dismissal of older people from the army was delayed, vacations were canceled, and the troops were put on high alert.

October 24

Khrushchev's second personal message to President Kennedy: “We will ...
accurate in order to protect their rights. "

Morning

GRU radio intercepted data on the order of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the US Air Force Strategic Aviation Command (SAC): "prepare for a nuclear attack."
A message from a GRU resident in Washington: “During the 24 hours of October 23, 85 strategic aircraft were flying over the United States.
Of these, 22 are B-52 bomber aircraft. 57 B-47s flew from the United States to Europe. "

Meeting of an employee of the embassy G. N. Bolshakov with the American journalist Charles Bartlett, at which the Americans are trying to find an additional channel of communication with the Soviet leadership.

About 14.00

American TV channels show how the Soviet tanker crossed the imaginary line, but the American warships did not shoot and let it go further. Another Soviet ship, Aleksandrovsk, carrying 24 nuclear warheads for medium-range missiles and 44 atomic charges for land-based cruise missiles, managed to dock in the Cuban port of La Isabella instead of Mariel.

About 18.00

The second meeting between Bartlett and Bolshakov, at which the American for the first time voiced a variant of the deal - "the elimination of Soviet missiles in Cuba in exchange for the closure of the American missile base in Turkey."

the 25th of October

A message from a GRU resident in New York: "The first echelon of the invasion of Cuba has been prepared, which will go to sea in the next few hours." A note from the head of the GRU, IA Serov: "According to the intelligence of the KGB, the invasion of Cuba is allegedly scheduled for October 26th."

The first half of the day

Cuba's civil defense systems, nuclear shelters are brought to full readiness, the population in panic buys food and other essential goods.

After 21.00

Kennedy's personal message to NS Khrushchev, in which the president suggests returning "to the previous situation."

Khrushchev's message to Kennedy: We will be ... forced ... to take action as we see fit

October 26

Two meetings of the Embassy Counselor A.S. Feklisov with the political observer ABC D. Skali, at which the Americans propose a compromise deal: the USSR demonstratively removes UN-controlled missiles from Cuba, and the United States lifts the blockade of Cuba and publicly undertakes not to invade Cuba. Island. President Kennedy receives a letter from N.S. Khrushchev with a proposal from the Soviet side: it announces the refusal of military supplies in general, and the American side - a refusal to intervene in Cuba.

27th October

6.45. Moscow

Telegram from BAT (military attaché), VMAT (naval attaché) and VVAT of the air defense attache) of the USSR to the USA: American invasion of Cuba is possible in the next 5-7 days.

A message from a GRU resident in Washington: "The United States has really decided to seek ... the destruction of missile bases in Cuba, right up to the invasion ... Everything is ready for the invasion of Cuba; it's a matter of pretext, and the best pretext is the bases, their ongoing construction ... Invasion to Cuba could take place later this week. "

Top secret

"Simulate the shooting down of a US military plane ..."

In 2001, the United States declassified the details of the provocations planned by the American side.

1. Sabotage in and around the American military base at Guantanamo (arson of the plane and the sinking of the ship; it is necessary to publish in the media a list of non-existent "victims").

2. The sinking of a ship with Cuban refugees.

3. Organize terrorist attacks in Miami, other Florida cities and Washington, DC aimed at Cuban refugees. Arrest "Cuban agents" and publish false documents.

4. To carry out an air raid on the territory of the states adjacent to Cuba.

5. Simulate attacks on passenger planes and shoot down an unmanned American plane or blow up a radio-controlled ship. To simulate attacks, use the F-86 Saber fighter, repainted to resemble the "Cuban MiG" ... Publish in the newspapers a list of those killed in a downed plane or an exploded ship.

6. Simulate the shooting down of a US military aircraft by a Cuban MiG "

28 of October

16.00. Washington

29th of October

October 30

R. Kennedy confirmed the President's consent to the liquidation of the American military bases in Turkey, but without mentioning the connection with the Cuban events.

27th October

Morning. Washington

"Black Saturday"

Kennedy receives another letter from Khrushchev. The Soviet leader declares the USSR's consent to take out "those funds from Cuba that you consider offensive" and proposes "to take out similar American means from Turkey."

The first half of the day

The next meeting of the "crisis group": it was decided that the United States will not mention Turkey in the official dialogue.

Afternoon

Kennedy replies to Khrushchev: the USSR must stop all work on missile sites and, under international control, bring all offensive weapons in Cuba to a dormant state.

27th October

Evening

A. F. Dobrynin's meeting with R. Kennedy in connection with the American reconnaissance aircraft shot down over Cuba. At the end of the conversation, R. Kennedy, when asked about Turkey, said: "If this is now the only obstacle to achieving the above-mentioned settlement, the President does not see any insurmountable difficulties in resolving this issue. The main difficulty for the President is the public discussion of the issue of Turkey. Formally, the location missile bases in Turkey were formalized by an official NATO decision ... However, the President ... is ready to secretly agree on this issue as well. "

27th October

About 24.00

A message from a GRU resident in Washington: "1) The situation at 24.00 27.10 remains tense. The next 24 hours are considered decisive. 2) US Secretary of Defense McNamara ordered the Air Force Secretary to transfer 24 airborne squadrons with support units from the reserve. The squadrons are intended to transfer the first assault echelon during the landing. 3) the reinforced movement of troops on the roads of Florida is completed. 4) On Saturday, up to 50% of the personnel continued to work at the Pentagon. "

Chief of the GRU IA Serov: "I ask you to urgently find out and report by all available means: 1) the number of troops, equipment and their affiliation in Florida and Guantanamo; 2) the concentration of counter-revolutionary forces that were previously in Latin America and transferred to Florida and Guantanamo. ; 3) quantity Vehicle in the Florida area, adapted for the landing of troops. "

28 of October

A message from a GRU resident in Washington: "The United States is building up its force in the Caribbean. 1) The 19th Air Group arrived at McDill Air Force Base (Florida) on October 17 ... RF ‑ 101 and KB ‑ 66 2) The Independent aircraft carriers with 100 aircraft and the Enterprise, as well as three other smaller aircraft carriers and about 40 warships, including 20 destroyers, 15 military transport ships, 3 submarines, anti-submarine defense ships. The exercises are scheduled to continue until October 30. 3) Marine units (25 thousand people) and an infantry battalion (1200) have been transferred from California to the east coast ... ".

28 of October

16.00. Washington

Telegram from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "The issue of dismantling missile bases in Cuba under international control does not meet with objections and will be covered in detail in NS Khrushchev's message." The Soviet leader agreed not to publicly discuss the question of eliminating American missile bases in Turkey.

Khrushchev's message was conveyed to the President of the United States.

R. Kennedy confirmed the President's consent to the liquidation of the American military bases in Turkey, but without mentioning the connection with the Cuban events.

Above one of the tables of the fashionable Washington Occidental restaurant hangs a sign with several lines on the metal: "During the tense period of the Cuban missile crisis (October 1962), the mysterious Russian Mr. X conveyed a proposal to remove missiles from Cuba to the correspondent of the ABC television company. "To John Scali. This meeting served to eliminate a possible nuclear war."

Political Intelligence Resident

Next to the plate is a portrait of the correspondent. But there is neither a name nor a portrait of his interlocutor. With whom did John Scaly, the star of American television journalism, a man close to the Kennedy family, communicate at this historic table? Russian Mr. "X" - the resident of the Soviet political intelligence in Washington Alexander Fomin.

Real name - Alexander Semenovich Feklisov.

Let's go back to that day, October 26, 1962. A 40,000-strong contingent of our military has already been deployed to Cuba, the installation of 42 missiles with nuclear warheads aimed at the United States is almost completed. The world is on the brink of a third world war. Foreign Intelligence Colonel Alexander Feklisov is one of those very few people, thanks to whom the catastrophe was averted.

His daughter Natalia Aleksandrovna Feklisova-Asatur learned about the secret work of her father as an adult.

Only at forty-nine years old, - she tells me, - I first heard that my father was engaged in intelligence, worked with people like Julius Rosenberg and Klaus Fuchs ... I was stunned. At school, we were told about the brutality and bias of the American court, which sent young people to the electric chair. I could not even imagine that my father met with them and even considered Julius Rosenberg to be his friend! There was never a word or a hint about this at home. My sister and I clearly knew one thing: my father was an employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He loved the film "Seventeen Moments of Spring" very much, when it was shown, he always called my sister and me, wanted us to watch together. We thought: this is how dad likes the picture. It was only many years later that I began to understand that his life, work in New York, London and Washington is the material for several such films!

Single trainee

As Feklisov himself said in the documentary film "Caribbean Crisis through the Eyes of a Resident," he became a scout by accident. "My father is a switchman on railroad, and as a child I dreamed of becoming an assistant driver, well, maybe even a machinist. "But when Feklisov graduated from the Institute of Communications Engineers, he was offered to continue his studies at the SHON - School of Special Purpose. And a year later, in 1941, they began to prepare for a business trip to the USA.

Natalia Alexandrovna is still amazed: how could they send their father to America? Too young. He speaks the language poorly. Didn't start a family. Finally, deaf. In his youth, when the house where the Feklisov family lived caught fire, he saved people all night and in the morning collapsed to sleep on cold boards in the barn. When I woke up, I did not immediately realize that one ear could not hear.

But the management of SEAN saw something more important in him: Feklisov is able to work day and night and always achieves the set goal. The first task for a novice scout is to establish two-way radio communication with Moscow. How? This he must decide for himself, on the spot. Trainee of the Consulate General of the USSR in New York, Alexander Fomin, as his name is according to legend, is allocated a room in a low building surrounded by high-rise buildings. A guy from Rogozhskaya Zastava finds and buys several bamboo poles (these are used by athletes), fasten them with couplings, puts the resulting antenna on stretchers - and from now on, New York and Moscow are connected by an invisible strong thread.

Quite quickly, Alexander corrects the "not married" column in the questionnaire. Natalia Alexandrovna shows a photograph of a pretty young woman:

This is mom in the year they met. Ten girls who had graduated from foreign languages ​​in Moscow were sent to New York to work in Amtorg. Father said that Zina Osipova immediately charmed him with her cornflower blue eyes. Zinulya, as my father called her mother, became not only a wife, but also a good helper. Fluent in English, she could speak and steer any American wife aside so that men could discuss their problems in private.

The father knew how to win over almost any person. During his work, we later found out, he had 17 foreign agents, - continues Natalia Alexandrovna. - Some he called friends. Much later, my father arranged a "cache of expensive things" (as he called it) in his Moscow apartment on Bolshaya Gruzinskaya, apparently in case thieves broke into the house. Once I got out with my sister an old battered wallet: "A present from an American friend." But he never said which one.

Working with "friends" led the scout more than once to the center of important, truly historical events.

Great negotiator

On October 22, 1962, Fomin invites John Scali, a well-known political television commentator, to breakfast at the Occidental restaurant. The scout had been meeting with him for a year and a half.

Scali looks worried. Without preamble, he begins to accuse Khrushchev of an aggressive policy: "Isn't your general secretary crazy?" Feklisov objects: "The arms race was initiated by the United States!"

The two break up, dissatisfied with each other. The situation is becoming more and more explosive every hour. Top secret information is leaking into the residency: the American army will be ready to land in Cuba on October 29. And at the same time, no important instructions come from Moscow ...

Father, - says Natalia Alexandrovna, - was silent about the events around the Cuban missile crisis for many years. Once there was only something like a hint, but then I did not understand anything from my youth. He gave me two tickets to the Satire Theater for a play based on Burlatsky's play "The Burden of Decisions". He said: "It might be interesting. It's about American affairs, President Kennedy is played by Andrei Mironov. I can't go." My friend and I ran only because of Mironov. The play talked about the Cuban missile crisis, there was a Soviet employee named Fomin, and I, since I was born in New York, bore the same name as a child! I could, it seems, think about something ... But, to be honest, it was not interesting for us to watch the performance.

On the morning of October 26, Fomin decides to invite Scali to lunch at the same restaurant, hoping to get some fresh information from him. In his book "Danger and Survival," McGeorge Bundy (US National Security Adviser) later wrote that Scali's upcoming meeting with a Soviet intelligence officer was reported to the president. Kennedy ordered to convey to Fomin: "Time is running out. The Kremlin must urgently make a statement of its consent to withdraw its missiles from Cuba without any conditions."

The scout's memory preserved this meeting in all its details. Alexander Semenovich spoke about her in the book "Confession of a Scout" (published in 1999; the second edition, prepared by his daughter, was published in 2016):

"Rubbing his hands and looking at me with a smile, Scali said:

Khrushchev seems to regard Kennedy as a young, inexperienced statesman. He is deeply mistaken, of which he will soon be convinced. The Pentagon assures the president that it will be able to end the Fidel Castro regime and Soviet missiles in forty-eight hours.

The invasion of Cuba is tantamount to giving Khrushchev a free hand. The Soviet Union could strike back at a vulnerable spot for Washington.

Scali, apparently, did not expect such an answer. He looked me in the eyes for a long time, then asked:

Do you think, Alexander, this will be West Berlin?

As a retaliatory measure, it is quite possible ... You know, John, when a thousandth avalanche of Soviet tanks goes into battle, and attack aircraft attack from the air at low level flight ... They will sweep everything in their path ...

This was the end of our polemic with Scali ... Here I must say that no one authorized me to speak to Scali about the possible capture of West Berlin. It was the impulse of my soul ... I acted at my own peril and risk. "

Khrushchev's informant

The scout could not imagine further. His words were immediately communicated to the owner of the White House, and three hours later, Kennedy handed over to the journalist a compromise proposal to resolve the crisis.

Scali summoned Fomin to a new meeting.

"Wasting no time, he said that on behalf of the" highest authority "he was passing the following conditions for resolving the Cuban missile crisis: the USSR dismantles and removes from Cuba missile launchers under UN control; the United States lifts the blockade of the island; the United States publicly undertakes not to invade Cuba." ...

The scout asked to clarify what the term "supreme power" means. "Minting every word, the interlocutor said:" John Fitzgerald Kennedy - President of the United States of America. "

Fomin assured Scali that he would immediately report the American proposal to his ambassador. "But it's one thing to promise, and another to do." Ambassador Dobrynin studied the stunning text for exactly three hours, then invited Feklisov. He said in an apologetic voice: "I cannot send such a telegram, since the Foreign Ministry did not authorize the embassy to conduct such negotiations."

"Surprised by the ambassador's indecision," Feklisov recalled, "I signed the telegram myself and handed it over to the cipher for sending to my boss."

Khrushchev's positive answer came on Sunday, October 28, at ten o'clock in the morning. The USSR withdrew its missiles from Cuba, the US lifted the blockade from the island, and six months later removed its missiles from Turkey. The Earthlings breathed a sigh of relief.

Doctor of Philosophy Hakob Nazaretyan, head of the Euro-Asian Center for Mega-History and Systems Forecasting at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, claims: these two men - Feklisov and Skali - saved not just millions of lives, but the civilization of planet Earth. "These were the days and hours of world history, very modestly captured in Russia by ungrateful descendants."

Mysterious Mr. "X"

American scientist James Blythe, author of the book On the Brink, in 1989 in Moscow handed the scout his book with a dedication to Alexander Feklisov - the man I have always wanted to meet; the person who played a key role in the greatest event our time".

Based on the book "13 Days" by Robert Kennedy, then the Minister of Justice, a film of the same name was shot, where one of the main characters was shown under the name of Alexander Fomin. When it became clear that the possibilities of official diplomacy had been exhausted, the political adviser to the American president (played by Kevin Koestner) came up with the happy idea to involve a television journalist who is friendly with a certain Alexander Fomin in the negotiations. "His real name is Alexander Feklisov," says the adviser. "This is a super spy! Chief intelligence officer of the KGB!"

The film was released in 2000, Feklisov managed to watch it. Natalia Alexandrovna recalls:

My father liked the movie. The only irritation was the way they dressed "Alexander Fomin" - from under his jacket peeped out the collar of a sweater. He said: "Only farmers wore sweaters, and I always wore a shirt and a tie!" On the whole, he said, the film accurately reflects the events.

Private Alexander Fedotov, a dispatcher operator, was selected for a mysterious "mission" from a separate company at the headquarters of the 21st Air Defense Division in Odessa. The place of deployment is the village of Limonar in the province of Matanzas, the territory of the former American driving school. The combat mission is to control all aircraft in the Cuban sky.

Some details from the story of Alexander Grigorievich about the Cuban business trip were recorded by our correspondent in St. Petersburg Anna Romanova.

Duty

The entire map of Cuba was divided into a coordinate grid with secret codes, which were changed once a week. I accepted encrypted applications and entered them into the "Flight Plan" - this was necessary to exclude civil aircraft from the category of air targets.

Since the beginning of September, the Americans have been especially active in "ironing" the Cuban sky in F-104 fighters. "A couple of Americans at low level, wait" is a typical call from a radar post. Radars catch the target, at the headquarters they receive coordinates, the planners put the target on the tablet ...

Everyday life

Change of the sentry at night. There are machine guns under the raincoats, you are constantly waiting for a "counter" bullet from around the corner. A dozen meters from the guard post, behind a fence in a wretched hut, lives an old Cuban who sneaks along the fence at night with a candle in his hand. He scares the hell out of us - what is he doing there at night? Who is it looking for? Later we learned that this is a harmless madman.

Our people went to Cubans with concerts - they sang, acted out funny scenes from army life. During such a "tour" I saw a spectacle on the coast of the Florida Gulf not for the faint of heart! There are hundreds of American ships in the roadstead, and desperate young Cubans are waving their Colts on the shore. "Patria o muerte!" - the slogan of the revolution. It was evident how inflamed their support of such a power as the USSR.

During the harvest season, ours helped local farmers to pick tomatoes - but only green ones for export, so that they ripen on the way. Overeat to the belly ...

Interchange

The night of October 26-27 passed in monstrous tension. In the evening, all the women from our territory - civilian radio operators, telephone operators were taken to karst caves, which served as shelters. The personnel were ordered to carry weapons. Our radars have spotted targets - dozens of US aircraft are heading for the Cuban borders. An order comes from Fidel Castro: "The Cuban borders are sacred and inviolable, to destroy any violator!" Immediately, an order comes from Moscow: "Categorically not to take any action against American planes in violation of the Cuban borders!"

The planes flew to the border and began to patrol along it. The whole night and the whole next day became a test of strength and endurance - what will happen next? Who will give in? Who can't stand it? Only later did we learn that ours had shot down an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft with a missile.

At home, Alexander Fedotov was awaited by a bride - a Leningrad student. In Cuba, he collected a herbarium for her from exotic flowers and plants of Cuba. I made "requests", of course, by phone to my colleagues - they sent him rarities from different parts of the island on occasion. That girl became his wife, they have been living together in St. Petersburg for over forty years.

Junior Sergeant Felix Sukhanovsky: The Cubans tried to persuade us: "Comrade, let the rocket go!"

My father, Felix Aleksandrovich Sukhanovsky, junior sergeant of the engineering company of the 181st missile regiment of the 50th Red Banner Missile Division of the 43rd Red Banner Missile Army, first casually spoke about his Cuban epic only in the late 80s. Conversation only recently. I wrote down his story, excerpts from which I propose to Motherland.

Alexey Sukhanovsky, Arkhangelsk

The silence of word of mouth

I was drafted into the army from the first year of the Arkhangelsk Forestry Institute, already at the age of 22. I finished "training" as a junior sergeant, head of a radio station, and ended up serving in an engineering and technical company. The head of our division was Lieutenant Colonel Gerasimov, a Suvorovite, a polite, tough, curvy combatant.

The all-knowing word of mouth turned out to be either deaf or dumb: no rumors about where we were being sent circulated. It was just that one night at the end of September 1962 we were alerted and sent in covered trucks to the port of Nikolaev. From there we sailed in ignorance for seventeen days, having no idea of ​​the destination. We disembarked in pitch night, passing to the pier to the trucks through the corridor of submachine gunners. Some, completely killed by the rolling of the sea, were dragged in their arms. Where we are is unknown. The darkness is pitch-black. Constellations - do not understand what ...

At six in the morning the sun rose and we saw palm trees. It was only later that we learned that we were camped in the countryside near Los Palacios near San Cristobal, southwest of Havana.

"Comrade-comrade, press!"

Settled up in a fairly large perimeter, surrounded by barbed wire... The guards were carried by Cuban soldiers, who, as our company commander, Captain Kologreev, said, was told by Fidel himself: "If anything happens to at least one of the Russians, I will shoot them." But for all the time there were no sabotage or provocations in our places. Only every day American reconnaissance aircraft flew over the location.

The mood of the guys was different. Who hung his nose, saying, they say, this is our grave, we will not get out of here forever. Someone, not at all discouraged, silently did his job, and the whimsical Leningraders set off in search of adventure at all: they made contacts with the guards and then bragged about their acquaintance with local girls, admired Cuban rum and even got hold of a guitar. I think everything, except the guitar, was lies and bragging.

On the fourth day after the landing, the launch pads were assembled, the warheads of nuclear warheads were docked to the missiles, they were refueled, put in a combat position, guided at the target - and from October 25 they were waiting for an order to launch in full readiness.

Such our combat position near San Cristobal was captured for history by American air reconnaissance aircraft: two launching tables, long tents, a command post, cable lines, a fleet of trucks and refuelers with TM185 fuel and AK27I oxidizer, convoys of cars, roads sagging from rain among a thinned palm forest. ..

We did not feel the full tension of the situation, although we understood that the launch of only one P-12 - and a world hell would begin. Each missile with a capacity of one megaton is 50 Hiroshima. The Cubans, seeing our power, happily persuaded: "Comrade-comrade, push-push, let the rocket start! Let's show these Americans!" We were very offended that we would not hit the States with our club. There was no order. And we waited.

Company International

Back in the Soviet Union, we were told that we must be wary of the components of the rocket filling, otherwise "there will be no children." I remember that you are standing at the guard post of the fuel warehouse, and the sun bakes the tanks and yellow clouds of gas periodically fly out through the safety valves with a puff ...

Meanwhile, we heard that after the installation of our missiles in Florida, a wild panic began. The entire population of the peninsula rushed deep into America in fear. Of course, anyone will get sick here when nuclear missiles are at the ready under your nose ...

All this did not last so long, but it was remembered as through the fog. Even on the way to Cuba, I started to have a heart arrhythmia. True, what was happening to me, I did not understand - everything was shaking, pounding, my pulse was crazy ... My whole Cuban epic passed in such a state of health. My comrades were also not in the best condition. Perhaps the conditions of the sea passage affected, perhaps the tropical climate with a sharp drop in night and day temperatures influenced. Constant contacts with fantastic insects did not add to the mood - they are hefty, poisonous and disgusting there. So I didn't really frolic in Cuba, I spent more time in the tent. Memories remained vague and heavy.

Life passed in the disposition of a company, in which there was a complete Soviet international: Ossetians, an Armenian, a Chechen foreman, an Azeri, a Georgian, a Tajik, and a great many brothers-Slavs. We lived together. They had no losses. Nobody got sick. There were even no lice. Leisure was whiled away as best he could, and in fact it was replaced by political information, which was carried out by the political commander or the battalion commander: the situation is difficult, but stable and therefore soon - home! The famous Cuban cigars have not been seen, and there were only a couple of smokers in our company. We were not given money, but the soldiers' salary was already received in full in the Union.

"Give them a rustle!"

Work for our company was never found - the entire Cuban special operation stood ready.

On October 28, we received the command to fold and load onto ships. On October 29, our regiment was removed from combat duty.

We arrived at the port of Nikolaev in early December. They felt like winners, were glad that they had returned safe and sound. "Give them a rustle!"

Three days later, the radio operators said that on the Voice of America radio they conveyed congratulations to Lieutenant Colonel Gerasimov on his return and a new intercession on alert. I do not think that our command was delighted with such awareness of the enemy ...

At home I did not say anything about Cuba. I am very sorry that I soon lost my flashlight, issued before Operation Anadyr - the only thing that remained in my memory of Freedom Island.

Next year, the Permian Alexander Georgievich Gorensky will turn 80. And during the Cuban missile crisis, the 24-year-old technician-lieutenant was in Cuba as part of the 584th separate aviation engineering regiment. Dislocation - base "Granma". The main sector of shelling is in the northeastern and northern directions, the additional sector is in the direction of the island of Pinos.

Memories of Alexander Georgievich about the October days of 1962 were recorded by our correspondent in Perm, Konstantin Bakharev.

FEES. Operation Plaid Shirt

In the spring of 1962, I and my colleagues at 642 OAPIB (a separate air battalion of fighter-bombers), stationed at the Martynovka airfield of the Odessa Military District, were offered a business trip to "a country with a maritime subtropical climate." I agreed. Five were sent from our regiment: Major Anatoly Orlov, Lieutenant Vladimir Borisov, senior lieutenants Sergei Cherepushkin, Valery Zaichikov and me.

They gave out uniforms - a sand-colored technical suit, boots with thick soles with high lacing - ankle boots, a khaki panama with wide brims and a sand-colored T-shirt. They also issued civilian clothes: shirts, a hat, a light raincoat, shoes and suits. The shirts were all the same style - short-sleeved and checkered. Someone joked that we are members of Operation Plaid Shirt. This stuck, and we no longer called the business trip any other way.

During the gathering, I saw that the girls from the library were burning books in the courtyard of the headquarters. They were ordered to write off the most dilapidated copies. I selected for myself "Quiet Flows the Don", "Twelve Chairs", "Walking Through the Torments", a collection of O Henry and Nekrasov. I took the books with me. Then, in Cuba, they took them from me to read, and in the end the books were sold. Only "Quiet Don" remained. And when there was nothing to read, we disassembled his volumes into notebooks, numbered them, and so we all read - one after another.

SEA TRAVEL. Aviaexport containers

The regiment arrived in Baltiysk, where it began to load on the "Berdyansk" motor ship. We settled in the hold, and on the deck, in addition to truck cranes and other outwardly civilian equipment, we installed two huge containers with the words "Aviaexport". Four field kitchens were hidden in one. They cooked food for us and then lowered us into the hold in thermoses. The second container was a toilet. During the day, only 2-3 people could walk. If the number of visitors was increased, then someone might notice that water is flowing from the air container all the time. At night, the toilet was allowed to visit without restrictions.

They set sail on September 16, 1962. We walked for 18 days. On the way to Cuba, American military aircraft began flying near us. First, large twin-engined, then fighters appeared. Each flyby they made according to a specific program: they descended very low (up to 15-20 meters above the sea), entered from different courses - from the stern and bow across the course of the ship, then along the course - also from the bow and from the stern. They flew only during the day, but very often: up to six times a day. We photographed a lot, it was visible how the photo doors open, sometimes even the brilliance of the optics was visible. After the flight, some of the pilots waved their hands and showed that they were flying home to the west.

For a possible rebuff, if the Americans decide to inspect the ship, four platoons were created, armed with knives, pistols and grenades. Two platoons are on duty in the forward and aft wheelhouses, two are in reserve. In addition, assault rifles and machine guns are in reserve if it comes to them. The platoons were mainly composed of officers, but there were also soldiers, physically the most powerful and athletic.

DISLOCATION. "Black Widow"

Our regiment was stationed at a former American military base, now called "Granma". In addition to us, there was an anti-aircraft missile battalion, a regiment of Mi-4 transport helicopters, and in early October an artillery battalion appeared with four guns of 80 mm caliber. The regiment commander was Colonel Aleksey Ivanovich Frolov, the chief of staff was Lieutenant Colonel Damir Maksudovich Ilyasov. The structure is simple: two combat squadrons, engaged in missile guidance and launch, and one technical squadron, which was supposed to prepare the missiles for firing.

We were armed with FKR-1, front-line cruise missiles capable of carrying high-explosive and nuclear warheads. The missiles were transported in plywood-lined containers with the words "Aviaexport" in Russian and English. Our regiment had 48 such missiles. And on the PRTB - a mobile missile technical base - nuclear warheads for missiles were stored. We had to build a storage facility for them with a special temperature regime.

They were unloaded at the port of Mariel. After unloading, the chief of staff ordered me to lead the guard for the protection of five containers with missiles. They were immediately taken from the pier into the jungle so that no one could see. I was scared because I was afraid that it was full of snakes. A Cuban instructed us on the spot. I tried to understand it with the help of a pocket phrasebook, but I didn’t understand anything. The containers stood in a clearing with an area of ​​about 200x200 meters. I have posted three posts. The night passed quietly.

In the morning, one of the Cuban trailer drivers (they were carrying containers), approached our car - "gazik", and suddenly jumped up and shouted: "Negro! Negro!" I see a black tarantula-type spider on the floor of the gaz, a large one, about five or six centimeters in diameter. I was not afraid of tarantulas, there are many of them near Odessa, and they are harmless. He took a rag from the driver, grabbed this spider through it and threw it out of the car. The Negro trampled the spider furiously with his feet. And then we were told that this spider, the "black widow", can kill a person with one bite.

THE BEGINNING OF A CRISIS. Waiting for the bombing

On October 25, 1962, the chief of staff of the regiment announced that the Americans would bomb us. After that, of course, we had a slight tremor. The Americans flew over us very low, five or six times a day. In the evenings, they set from the west, from the setting sun. They are not visible, so they sneaked up. MiGs began to chase after them, to drive them aside. And when their reconnaissance plane was shot down, the Americans began to appear less often.

We lived in anticipation of the war. They were inclined to believe that the hostilities would begin after all. But we were ready for this. We were told by the commanders that according to all estimates, after the start of the war, we will live for half an hour, no more. Then they will cover us. But during this time, our regiment could release 3-4 missiles with nuclear warheads. So from Florida, and it was there we were aimed, there would also be little left. Our regiment would have dealt with it in 20 minutes. And the second regiment with the FKR would have smashed all the American troops on Guantanamo.

NIGHT GUEST. Submarine salvo

At night we were awakened by a volley of the artillery division, commanded by senior lieutenant Sergei Yakovlev, we called him Yashka the artilleryman. A very determined and meticulous officer. Before that, we, at his request, made a raft and dragged it across the sea. The artillerymen aimed at it, spent the whole day and then destroyed the raft with one shot. And that night the starley looked through binoculars, looked (he told us this later), saw a silhouette. Gently woke up the personnel. He personally aimed all four of his guns and fired in one gulp! There, he says, sparks, fire. Well, it's not for nothing that he adjusted the sights on our raft. Hit without a miss.

In the afternoon, divers arrived from Havana. And we also put on masks, fins and began to dive. And there, two hundred meters from the shore, there are pieces of metal at the bottom. The submarine came up at night. And our starley artilleryman slapped her. She apparently sank nearby. The divers then lifted the corpses onto their boat. I counted seven dead, they were stacked at the stern.

MORE NIGHT GUESTS. Assault on the post

We had about fifteen positions in the regiment to be guarded. And almost every night the sentries fired. Apparently, someone really wanted to determine what our regiment had in service. Attacks began. Cubans were standing nearby, they had a sentry shot at night. They also attacked the post where I was the chief of the guard.

At about 11 pm I went to take a nap. And suddenly a long burst from a machine gun! Bullets can be heard hitting the leaves of the trees. I shouted: "Help, in the gun!" They rushed into the trenches and returned fire. They beat me with a machine gun and a light machine gun. There was the sound of an engine running like a truck, and soon it died down. My assistant, Sergeant Alexey Fedorchuk, wanted to pursue them. I have banned. It's hard to see at night, maybe there is an ambush.

In the morning we examined the place from where they fired at us. It turned out from a dirt road, about a hundred meters away. The fire was fired through a small forest. We can say at random, but in our direction. Found a bunch of about 12.7 caliber shells. They gave it to the special officers who arrived in the morning.

LIFE. Sharks for lunch

The rear units of the regiment were still in the USSR. We ate dry rations, so we learned to fish. We went underwater hunting with friends. There was also a net, put it at the mouth of the Santa Laura River. Once we got four tons of mackerel at a time. And then the network was gone. They found her, all torn apart, near the shore. Two sharks got entangled in it. We also ate these sharks, and threw out the net.

At that time in the USSR I received 107 rubles a month. In Cuba, we were given a salary of 195 percent of our home wages. That is, in fact, twice as much. In addition, the Cuban authorities paid us extra three hundred pesos a month as military advisers. But this money was given only for two months. Whoever wanted and received - in rubles or pesos, to choose from. The peso went into the hands, and the rubles went to the savings book. Vneshtorgbank's checks could also be taken. Many, and I, too, gave part of their money allowance to their families before they were sent on a report. In Cuba, I received sixty percent of my salary, the rest went to my wife and daughter. And I, like others, did Money transfers family.

The soldiers and sergeants fared worse. They received ten rubles. Although they also doubled their payments. But the soldiers found a way out. Our regiment brought ten tons of caustic soda with them. For what it is unknown. And in Cuba at that time there was a terrible shortage of soap and detergents. And our soldiers began to sell this caustic soda. The case took on such a scale that from early in the morning there were already queues of Cubans at our checkpoint. Changed soda for money and food.

CONTACTS. From love to hate

When we arrived in Cuba, the Cubans were ready to carry us in their arms. In places where entrance fees were required, we were allowed through without payment. In bars, the first drink for Russians was free. The Cubans did not hesitate to say that now "they will show" the Americans. And when it became clear that we would not fight, their mood changed dramatically. At our base "Granma" leaflets appeared in Russian with calls not to obey the orders of the commanders, but to declare war on the United States and land on the American mainland. In Havana, women pelted me with Anatoly Repin with rotten tomatoes. Tolya wanted to "figure it out", I held him back. We cleaned up afterwards, but all the same we had to throw out our clothes.

DEPARTURE. Bye weapons

When Khrushchev and Kennedy did come to an agreement and the export of ballistic missiles from Cuba began, a transport was allocated from our regiment. For several days I was a senior "KrAZ", which transported cargo from former combat positions to the port. After visiting these positions, I had a difficult impression. I was struck by the scope and quality of the work performed: these were halls of not very deep (almost on the surface) bedding with powerful arched vaults and gates with a meter thick. But all this was so barbarously destroyed, plundered, broken, that all that was left was to lament.

Mikhail Valerievich Gavrilov, co-author of the recently published book "White Spots of the Caribbean Crisis" (together with VA Bubnov), told the Motherland little-known details of the key episode of the Caribbean Crisis. An American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft was shot down in the skies over the Cuban city of Banes on October 27, 1962 by a crew of the Soviet S-75 anti-aircraft missile system. The targeting officer was Lieutenant Alexei Artemovich Ryapenko. This is how he describes it in the book:

"... Major Gerchenov ordered me:" Destroy the target in three, in burst! "I switched all three firing channels to the BR mode and pressed the" Start "button of the first channel. The first missile was already flying for 9-10 seconds, when the commander ordered: “Second, start!” I pressed the “Start” button of the second channel. When the first missile exploded, a cloud appeared on the screens. I reported: “First, detonation. Purpose, meeting. The target is hit! "After the second missile detonated, the target began to lose altitude sharply, and I reported:" Second, detonation. Target destroyed! "

Major I.M. Gerchenov reported to the command post of the regiment about the destruction of target N33. He told me that I worked calmly and confidently. Then we left the cockpit. All officers and operators gathered at the site. They picked me up in their arms and started tossing me up - it was easy, since I weighed only 56 kilograms. Looking back, I can say: we fulfilled our duty, unconditionally and to the end. Then I could not have known that the American plane we shot down would be the only one, that this event would become a turning point in the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis. It's just that in those years our entire generation was brought up so that we were ready to die for the Motherland. "

The U-2 aircraft was designed and manufactured according to the latest technology. In particular, it was equipped with a device for detecting Soviet radars. Mikhail Gavrilov asks the question: why did the experienced pilot Rudolf Anderson, knowing that he was "under the gun", did not begin to maneuver, but continued to move on the intended course? The authors of the book "White Spots of the Caribbean Crisis" believe that the American command deliberately sent Anderson to certain death, having previously disabled the security system of his plane. The attack on U-2 was supposed to be the signal for the start of a massive airstrike against Cuba:

President John F. Kennedy only after the latest American aircraft was destroyed, realized that the United States in Cuba is not confronted by scattered groups. Soviet soldiers and officers, and a combat-ready group of troops. And if the United States attacks Cuba, there will be an irreversible reaction around the world.

The authors of the book are convinced that the commander of the 27th Air Defense Division Georgy Voronkov, the battalion commander Ivan Gerchenov and the guidance officer Alexei Ryapenko played one of the key roles in resolving the Cuban missile crisis. For additional details, Rodina correspondents turned to Alexei Artemovich Ryapenko, who lives in Sochi:

- The book says that you worked towards the goal "calmly and confidently." Will you decipher?

Confidence comes when you know your job perfectly. And I graduated from the Tambov Aviation School in 1960. But after graduation, I was sent to the anti-aircraft missile forces, so I had to master a new specialty. In the shooting, everything worked out in the best way, the calmness that you are asking about came. Although I was the youngest officer in the division. On October 27, everything was even easier than during the exercises.

- What were you thinking when you clicked on the "Start" button?

There is nothing to think about, all actions are scheduled in seconds. The process of detecting and firing is pretty simple. We immediately grabbed the plane on the radar screen, the reconnaissance station was leading it. And as soon as he approached the detection zone, she handed it over to us. At the command of the commander, I pressed "Start". Normal situation even though it was raining. The plane was moving at a low speed - about 800 kilometers per hour. So there were no problems.

- Was there a festive dinner on the occasion of the successful shooting?

What are you speaking about! We didn't have the feeling that it would all end there. On the contrary, we feared retribution. So there was no time for treats.

No. Yes, I would have refused. Or he simply told them: "Guys, what you did was your initiative. And we did our job, our duty - we helped the Cubans defend their revolutionary achievements. Here who is who ...".